01-27-2004, 11:41 PM
<b>PAKISTAN & DANGERS OF NUCLEAR JIHAD </b>
B.Raman
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22. When Pakistan faced difficulties in the late 1980s in developing its indigenous missiles (based on the Hatf series), it was to China it turned. Beijing helped it by supplying it with technology and fully tested short and medium range missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons up to Delhi and Mumbai in India, but was reluctant to supply long-range missiles capable of striking Chennai and Kolkatta
...
28. In response to periodic Western media reports about Pakistanâs clandestine co-operation with these countries, Musharraf has been taking shifting stands just as he has been doing so in the case of the Pakistani links with Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorist groups.
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31. After Libya and Iran made a clean breast of the inputs received by them from Pakistan, he has again shifted his stand. He is now trying to give the impression as if this was the unauthorized doing of rogue elements in Pakistanâs scientific community who, according to him, betrayed Pakistanâs nuclear secrets out of greed for money.
32. He has been enacting an elaborate nuclear charade of detaining and âdebriefingâ A.Q.Khan and eight other nuclear scientists close to him and four ISI officers who had served in the Kahuta uranium enrichment factory and by projecting the proliferation which has taken place, which he no longer denies, as the act of these rogue elements
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35. Putinâs concerns have been justified by the recent discoveries of the role of over a dozen members of Pakistanâs WMD community, civilian scientists as well as their military supervisors, in the proliferation of nuclear technology and material to Libya and Iran. Even if one were to accept Musharrafâs unconvincing arguments that this was a rogue operation by greedy scientists without the knowledge of the military, these concerns would only be aggravated and not lessened because if greedy scientists were prepared to help other States in return for money, they would be equally capable of selling material and expertise to jihadi terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, which can pay as well as these Islamic States.
36. If an Islamic fundamentalist orientation was an additional factor in their sale/transfer of these technologies to Iran and Libya, the international community would have reasons to be even more concerned. Till now, strategic analysts have been focusing only on the dangers of a possible Talibanisation or Al Qaedisation of the Pakistan Army. It is time now to pay more attention to the dangers of a Talibanisation or Al Qaedisation of Pakistanâs scientific community.
....
<b>37. The recent developments and the shifting stands of Musharraf only add to the misgivings in the minds of many about him. If he has been telling a lie by putting all the blame on individual scientists, it shows how he continues to be as unreliable as before befitting his reputation as âtricky Mushâ. If he is telling the truth, it shows how ineffective is his control over the jihadi elements in the Pakistani Army and scientific establishment</b>
B.Raman
..
22. When Pakistan faced difficulties in the late 1980s in developing its indigenous missiles (based on the Hatf series), it was to China it turned. Beijing helped it by supplying it with technology and fully tested short and medium range missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons up to Delhi and Mumbai in India, but was reluctant to supply long-range missiles capable of striking Chennai and Kolkatta
...
28. In response to periodic Western media reports about Pakistanâs clandestine co-operation with these countries, Musharraf has been taking shifting stands just as he has been doing so in the case of the Pakistani links with Al Qaeda and other jihadi terrorist groups.
..
31. After Libya and Iran made a clean breast of the inputs received by them from Pakistan, he has again shifted his stand. He is now trying to give the impression as if this was the unauthorized doing of rogue elements in Pakistanâs scientific community who, according to him, betrayed Pakistanâs nuclear secrets out of greed for money.
32. He has been enacting an elaborate nuclear charade of detaining and âdebriefingâ A.Q.Khan and eight other nuclear scientists close to him and four ISI officers who had served in the Kahuta uranium enrichment factory and by projecting the proliferation which has taken place, which he no longer denies, as the act of these rogue elements
...
35. Putinâs concerns have been justified by the recent discoveries of the role of over a dozen members of Pakistanâs WMD community, civilian scientists as well as their military supervisors, in the proliferation of nuclear technology and material to Libya and Iran. Even if one were to accept Musharrafâs unconvincing arguments that this was a rogue operation by greedy scientists without the knowledge of the military, these concerns would only be aggravated and not lessened because if greedy scientists were prepared to help other States in return for money, they would be equally capable of selling material and expertise to jihadi terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, which can pay as well as these Islamic States.
36. If an Islamic fundamentalist orientation was an additional factor in their sale/transfer of these technologies to Iran and Libya, the international community would have reasons to be even more concerned. Till now, strategic analysts have been focusing only on the dangers of a possible Talibanisation or Al Qaedisation of the Pakistan Army. It is time now to pay more attention to the dangers of a Talibanisation or Al Qaedisation of Pakistanâs scientific community.
....
<b>37. The recent developments and the shifting stands of Musharraf only add to the misgivings in the minds of many about him. If he has been telling a lie by putting all the blame on individual scientists, it shows how he continues to be as unreliable as before befitting his reputation as âtricky Mushâ. If he is telling the truth, it shows how ineffective is his control over the jihadi elements in the Pakistani Army and scientific establishment</b>