12-23-2005, 03:12 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->It is not, however, as if the British and earlier the French, the Dutch and the Portuguese, had an easy time in India. From the beginning, there was constant armed as well as unarmed resistance to their conquering mission, dominance, and rule. The first 110 years, from 1748âwhen the extended British conquest began in the region around Madrasâto 1858, were like a long drawn hundred years war between the people of India and Britain (the latter supported by the military men from several Germanic countries). The climate of India was not hospitable to European men. In order to overcome that, the British began to establish military stations, garrisons and towns in the Himalayas and other high mountains of India.
Unarmed resistance was resorted to not only by the Indian peasan-try, but also by city and town people in most parts of India6 till they were wholly exhausted (especially in southern and eastern India), by about 1840. Then came the great battle of 1857â1858 between India and Britain, by the end of which India had conclusively lost.
But even their conclusive victory had to be paid for by the British. From 1780 to 1857, the British had believed that if they had one Euro-pean soldier to 4 or at the most 6 Indian soldiers, all officered by Europeans, they would be militarily safe in India. 1857â1858 changed this view altogether. From 1858 till about 1910, Britain decided to have one British soldier to every two Indian soldiers in the British Indian armies. While the actual number of Indians in the army was drastically reduced in 1858, it still meant that a British force of around 100,000 soldiers had to be constantly kept in India for the next 50 years and more. It may be of interest to mention here that in 1946, the British again felt that they could only maintain their control of India with an overwhelming display of military power as neither any major sector of the Indian people nor the Indian military personnel could be depended upon. But at this time they found that after their losses in the 1939â45 war, they no longer commanded the number of personnel which was required. A different solution was, however, soon found as the Indian National Congressâa somewhat exhausted and ageing leadershipâagreed to a compromise on the question of Indian independence, and the manner of the transfer of power to Indian hands.7
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Unarmed resistance was resorted to not only by the Indian peasan-try, but also by city and town people in most parts of India6 till they were wholly exhausted (especially in southern and eastern India), by about 1840. Then came the great battle of 1857â1858 between India and Britain, by the end of which India had conclusively lost.
But even their conclusive victory had to be paid for by the British. From 1780 to 1857, the British had believed that if they had one Euro-pean soldier to 4 or at the most 6 Indian soldiers, all officered by Europeans, they would be militarily safe in India. 1857â1858 changed this view altogether. From 1858 till about 1910, Britain decided to have one British soldier to every two Indian soldiers in the British Indian armies. While the actual number of Indians in the army was drastically reduced in 1858, it still meant that a British force of around 100,000 soldiers had to be constantly kept in India for the next 50 years and more. It may be of interest to mention here that in 1946, the British again felt that they could only maintain their control of India with an overwhelming display of military power as neither any major sector of the Indian people nor the Indian military personnel could be depended upon. But at this time they found that after their losses in the 1939â45 war, they no longer commanded the number of personnel which was required. A different solution was, however, soon found as the Indian National Congressâa somewhat exhausted and ageing leadershipâagreed to a compromise on the question of Indian independence, and the manner of the transfer of power to Indian hands.7
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