12-24-2005, 02:01 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->COMMENTARY
<b>The U.S. and India: A Relationship Restored </b>
By WILLIAM S. COHEN
December 22, 2005
One of the most important successes of U.S. President George W. Bush's foreign policy is the progress being made in building a strategic partnership between America and India, thereby helping to create a strong democratic anchor in Asia. The foundations of this alliance are being set in shared democratic ideals, political and economic interests, and a global vision based on a common interest in ensuring strategic stability. But while the relationship between the two countries has gained significant momentum in recent years, serious issues remain that require immediate focus and resolution, lest these aspirations dissolve into mutual disappointment and recrimination.
During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington in July, he and President Bush committed to follow a strategic road map that will lead the two democracies to a prosperous and secure future. Prime Minister Singh agreed to separate India's civilian nuclear-power operations from those related to India's nuclear-weapons program, place all civil nuclear operations under international inspections and safeguards and sign the International Atomic Energy Agency's 1997 Additional Protocol that provides for tighter international inspections. He also agreed to support a treaty to stop production of fissile material, and take other actions consistent with those taken by members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. President Bush, in turn, agreed to seek changes in U.S. law and America's international commitments that would permit the U.S. to transfer technology and provide other civil nuclear assistance to help India meet its growing civilian energy requirements.
Skeptics of this accord abound both in India and the U.S. In India, there are many who question whether the U.S. will modify existing law to permit the transfer of needed technologies; remain a reliable supplier of technology and support services; and demand that India bow to U.S. foreign policies that would compromise its traditional "nonaligned" status.
Members of the U.S. Congress are angry that they were not consulted by the Bush administration prior to striking the agreement with India. In addition, they are wary that the U.S. has signaled that it is no longer committed to a strong nuclear nonproliferation policy and that it has given India a stamp of approval in exchange for vague promises for future actions that will go unfulfilled.
A Gordian knot has formed that needs to be cut. Prime Minister Singh is not prepared to act without prior congressional action. But what he could do immediately is provide a detailed blueprint on how India plans to separate its civilian and military nuclear activities and adopt full safeguards and inspections once congressional approval is secured. This should be enough to satisfy the legitimate concerns expressed by members of Congress.
Any failure by India faithfully to comply with the pledges that it makes might result in a permanent breach in the strategic relationship between the two countries. India would be taking a comparable leap of faith in assuming that Congress would not interrupt or terminate the flow of technology if India should act in a manner that is inconsistent with, or stultifies, American foreign-policy objectives.Â
Of immediate interest to both countries is the determination to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Iran's declared intent to proceed with its nuclear programs without regard to IAEA concerns crystallizes the choice that India may soon be called upon to make. India continues to maintain close political and economic ties with Iran, a significant source of its present and future energy needs.
Although India recently voted against Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons in the IAEA, India cannot treat this recent decision as a "one-time only" symbolic act. In remaining firm in its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, India would not compromise its political independence. Rather, it would solidify its commitment to the view shared by the governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, among others, that Iran's undeclared but unmistakable pursuit of nuclear weapons will contribute to instability, and possibly conflict, in the region.
India and the United States are embarking on a historic journey. The opportunity for progress and prosperity is at hand. Mistrust and misunderstanding should not be allowed to cloud this vision or derail this mission.
Mr. Cohen, a former U.S. defense secretary, recently led a U.S.-India Business Council delegation visit of senior American business leaders to India. He is currently CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic advisory firm based in Washington, DC.Â
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113519979441428698.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<b>The U.S. and India: A Relationship Restored </b>
By WILLIAM S. COHEN
December 22, 2005
One of the most important successes of U.S. President George W. Bush's foreign policy is the progress being made in building a strategic partnership between America and India, thereby helping to create a strong democratic anchor in Asia. The foundations of this alliance are being set in shared democratic ideals, political and economic interests, and a global vision based on a common interest in ensuring strategic stability. But while the relationship between the two countries has gained significant momentum in recent years, serious issues remain that require immediate focus and resolution, lest these aspirations dissolve into mutual disappointment and recrimination.
During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Washington in July, he and President Bush committed to follow a strategic road map that will lead the two democracies to a prosperous and secure future. Prime Minister Singh agreed to separate India's civilian nuclear-power operations from those related to India's nuclear-weapons program, place all civil nuclear operations under international inspections and safeguards and sign the International Atomic Energy Agency's 1997 Additional Protocol that provides for tighter international inspections. He also agreed to support a treaty to stop production of fissile material, and take other actions consistent with those taken by members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. President Bush, in turn, agreed to seek changes in U.S. law and America's international commitments that would permit the U.S. to transfer technology and provide other civil nuclear assistance to help India meet its growing civilian energy requirements.
Skeptics of this accord abound both in India and the U.S. In India, there are many who question whether the U.S. will modify existing law to permit the transfer of needed technologies; remain a reliable supplier of technology and support services; and demand that India bow to U.S. foreign policies that would compromise its traditional "nonaligned" status.
Members of the U.S. Congress are angry that they were not consulted by the Bush administration prior to striking the agreement with India. In addition, they are wary that the U.S. has signaled that it is no longer committed to a strong nuclear nonproliferation policy and that it has given India a stamp of approval in exchange for vague promises for future actions that will go unfulfilled.
A Gordian knot has formed that needs to be cut. Prime Minister Singh is not prepared to act without prior congressional action. But what he could do immediately is provide a detailed blueprint on how India plans to separate its civilian and military nuclear activities and adopt full safeguards and inspections once congressional approval is secured. This should be enough to satisfy the legitimate concerns expressed by members of Congress.
Any failure by India faithfully to comply with the pledges that it makes might result in a permanent breach in the strategic relationship between the two countries. India would be taking a comparable leap of faith in assuming that Congress would not interrupt or terminate the flow of technology if India should act in a manner that is inconsistent with, or stultifies, American foreign-policy objectives.Â
Of immediate interest to both countries is the determination to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. Iran's declared intent to proceed with its nuclear programs without regard to IAEA concerns crystallizes the choice that India may soon be called upon to make. India continues to maintain close political and economic ties with Iran, a significant source of its present and future energy needs.
Although India recently voted against Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons in the IAEA, India cannot treat this recent decision as a "one-time only" symbolic act. In remaining firm in its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, India would not compromise its political independence. Rather, it would solidify its commitment to the view shared by the governments of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, among others, that Iran's undeclared but unmistakable pursuit of nuclear weapons will contribute to instability, and possibly conflict, in the region.
India and the United States are embarking on a historic journey. The opportunity for progress and prosperity is at hand. Mistrust and misunderstanding should not be allowed to cloud this vision or derail this mission.
Mr. Cohen, a former U.S. defense secretary, recently led a U.S.-India Business Council delegation visit of senior American business leaders to India. He is currently CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic advisory firm based in Washington, DC.Â
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB113519979441428698.html<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->