12-30-2003, 03:13 AM
<b>Outside View: No free passes for Pakistan</b>
By Kaushik Kapisthalam
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
ATLANTA, Dec. 29 (UPI) -- The last few days have brought about many a stunning turnaround in the world of nuclear non-proliferation. First, it was the news of Iran agreeing to submit its nuclear facilities to United Nations inspection. Then it was Libya's turn to announce that it has forsaken its weapons of mass destruction programs in order to re-enter the international community. But the most shocking news was the revelation that Pakistan's nuclear scientists were intimately involved in both the Libyan and Iranian nuclear programs.
Pakistan's nuclear proliferation, though serious, was old news for most non-proliferation experts. Indeed, Pakistan's involvement in Iran and Libya were known to have happened in the 1980s and early 1990s. This has not been the extent of Pakistani proliferation. Documents unearthed by the United Nations after the first Gulf war with Iraq revealed that middlemen representing Pakistan's nuclear program offered to help Saddam Hussein's regime with its nuclear program well into the run up to Operation Desert Storm.
Not all of Pakistan's proliferation happened in the distant past. In the summer of 2002, U.S. intelligence tracked a Pakistani Air Force Lockheed C-130 cargo plane -- supplied by the United States, ironically -- carrying a shipment of uranium enriching centrifuges to North Korea. The plane returned to Pakistan with components of the Nodong nuclear capable ballistic missile, which Pakistan repainted and called "Ghauri."
This uncovered clinching evidence of a "nukes-for-missiles" barter between Pakistan and North Korea. It also directly contributed to a nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula.
In late 2003, Pakistan was reported to have concluded a "nukes-for-oil" deal with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who had financed the Pakistani nuclear program to the tune of $1 billion in addition to around 150,000 barrels of oil a day to Pakistan in off-budget foreign aid, were moving in for their cut of the nuclear pie.
Pakistan's nuclear program has also been reportedly associated with al-Qaida-linked Islamist groups. In late 2001, U.S. officials discovered that Osama bin Laden had contacted Pakistani nuclear experts for assistance in making a small nuclear or "dirty" bomb. U.S. officials sought two veteran Pakistani nuclear scientists -- Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid, for interrogation. During interrogation, the two admitted meeting bin Laden. However, after "debriefing" the two, Pakistan quietly released them without charge.
U.S. intelligence agencies had also wanted to interrogate two other Pakistani nuclear experts, Suleiman Asad and Muhammed Ali Mukhtar, over their links with al-Qaida. However, before U.S. investigators could reach them, Pakistan sent the two to Myanmar on a "research project." Pakistani officials later admitted that President Pervez Musharraf telephoned one of Myanmar's military rulers to ask him to provide temporary asylum for the two nuclear specialists. The two scientists were later revealed to be aiding Myanmar's nascent nuclear program. Asad and Mukhtar are still in Myanmar, well away from U.S. reach.
Pakistan's nuclear scientists have also exhibited open Islamist views. In 1999, for example, when Pakistani nuclear scientists were decorated on "Pakistan Day" for their role in the nuclear tests the year before, most of them proudly sported flowing beards, making clear their Islamist leanings. The "father" of Pakistan's nuclear program, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, has long espoused support for all Islamic nations to go nuclear. Khan, and Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, the nuclear scientist who met with bin Laden, used to attend the conclaves of a banned al-Qaida-linked terrorist group called Lashkar-e-Taiba, as late as the summer of 2001. Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists have been arrested as far away as the United States as well as Australia for terrorist acts. Top al-Qaida figure Abu Zubeidah, was found hiding in a Lashkar-e-Taiba safe house in Pakistan.
American response to all these revelations about Pakistan have been muted. A few months back, the United States imposed meaningless sanctions on a Pakistani nuclear entity. Other than that, American officials have touted the "400 percent guarantee" made by Pakistan's president Gen. Musharraf that his nation will not proliferate again.
The theory propounded is that Musharraf is the best bet for the U.S. in Pakistan. Pushing him now, American officials say, may cause a fundamentalist backlash in Pakistan. They see the recent assassination attempts on Musharraf as proof that the status quo is the best option.
But this policy is terribly shortsighted. Firstly, other nations watching this could learn, for instance, that the United States is only too willing to ignore nuclear proliferation as long as its other interests are satisfied. Also, America overlooking of Pakistan's proliferation has been going on for a long time and Musharraf hasn't always been as weak as he is today. Besides, Musharraf has only himself to blame for his predicament. He tried playing a high-wire balancing act between the jihadis and the United States and it backfired badly.
Secondly, there are ways to send a clear public message to Pakistan without seriously jeopardizing Musharraf. America could, for instance, impose sanctions on Pakistan under the many non-proliferation laws, such as the Glenn-Symington Act. President Bush can then waive the sanctions on a yearly basis, making it publicly clear to Pakistan that any more nuclear shenanigans could result in aid being cut off. At the very least, this would prevent the Pakistanis from sticking to their current policy of bald-faced denial.
With 2004 being an election year and with Iraq and the elections being the main focus, the current Pakistan policy may easily degenerate into a "throw some money at them and hope they behave" policy. That is why it is critical that the Congress push the Bush administration to make clear the full extent of Pakistan's nuclear profligacy and the reasons behind the current U.S. policy of private admonishments and public silence.
Pakistan's nuclear commodity trading has gone on for far too long for Americans to be worried about embarrassing an ally that few trust anyway. Without this, the American war on terror and weapons of mass destruction may be seriously jeopardized.
-0-
(Kaushik Kapisthalam is an IT professional and commentator on U.S. policy towards South Asia and its effects on the war on terror. He lives in Atlanta, Ga.)
By Kaushik Kapisthalam
UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL
ATLANTA, Dec. 29 (UPI) -- The last few days have brought about many a stunning turnaround in the world of nuclear non-proliferation. First, it was the news of Iran agreeing to submit its nuclear facilities to United Nations inspection. Then it was Libya's turn to announce that it has forsaken its weapons of mass destruction programs in order to re-enter the international community. But the most shocking news was the revelation that Pakistan's nuclear scientists were intimately involved in both the Libyan and Iranian nuclear programs.
Pakistan's nuclear proliferation, though serious, was old news for most non-proliferation experts. Indeed, Pakistan's involvement in Iran and Libya were known to have happened in the 1980s and early 1990s. This has not been the extent of Pakistani proliferation. Documents unearthed by the United Nations after the first Gulf war with Iraq revealed that middlemen representing Pakistan's nuclear program offered to help Saddam Hussein's regime with its nuclear program well into the run up to Operation Desert Storm.
Not all of Pakistan's proliferation happened in the distant past. In the summer of 2002, U.S. intelligence tracked a Pakistani Air Force Lockheed C-130 cargo plane -- supplied by the United States, ironically -- carrying a shipment of uranium enriching centrifuges to North Korea. The plane returned to Pakistan with components of the Nodong nuclear capable ballistic missile, which Pakistan repainted and called "Ghauri."
This uncovered clinching evidence of a "nukes-for-missiles" barter between Pakistan and North Korea. It also directly contributed to a nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula.
In late 2003, Pakistan was reported to have concluded a "nukes-for-oil" deal with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who had financed the Pakistani nuclear program to the tune of $1 billion in addition to around 150,000 barrels of oil a day to Pakistan in off-budget foreign aid, were moving in for their cut of the nuclear pie.
Pakistan's nuclear program has also been reportedly associated with al-Qaida-linked Islamist groups. In late 2001, U.S. officials discovered that Osama bin Laden had contacted Pakistani nuclear experts for assistance in making a small nuclear or "dirty" bomb. U.S. officials sought two veteran Pakistani nuclear scientists -- Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid, for interrogation. During interrogation, the two admitted meeting bin Laden. However, after "debriefing" the two, Pakistan quietly released them without charge.
U.S. intelligence agencies had also wanted to interrogate two other Pakistani nuclear experts, Suleiman Asad and Muhammed Ali Mukhtar, over their links with al-Qaida. However, before U.S. investigators could reach them, Pakistan sent the two to Myanmar on a "research project." Pakistani officials later admitted that President Pervez Musharraf telephoned one of Myanmar's military rulers to ask him to provide temporary asylum for the two nuclear specialists. The two scientists were later revealed to be aiding Myanmar's nascent nuclear program. Asad and Mukhtar are still in Myanmar, well away from U.S. reach.
Pakistan's nuclear scientists have also exhibited open Islamist views. In 1999, for example, when Pakistani nuclear scientists were decorated on "Pakistan Day" for their role in the nuclear tests the year before, most of them proudly sported flowing beards, making clear their Islamist leanings. The "father" of Pakistan's nuclear program, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, has long espoused support for all Islamic nations to go nuclear. Khan, and Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, the nuclear scientist who met with bin Laden, used to attend the conclaves of a banned al-Qaida-linked terrorist group called Lashkar-e-Taiba, as late as the summer of 2001. Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists have been arrested as far away as the United States as well as Australia for terrorist acts. Top al-Qaida figure Abu Zubeidah, was found hiding in a Lashkar-e-Taiba safe house in Pakistan.
American response to all these revelations about Pakistan have been muted. A few months back, the United States imposed meaningless sanctions on a Pakistani nuclear entity. Other than that, American officials have touted the "400 percent guarantee" made by Pakistan's president Gen. Musharraf that his nation will not proliferate again.
The theory propounded is that Musharraf is the best bet for the U.S. in Pakistan. Pushing him now, American officials say, may cause a fundamentalist backlash in Pakistan. They see the recent assassination attempts on Musharraf as proof that the status quo is the best option.
But this policy is terribly shortsighted. Firstly, other nations watching this could learn, for instance, that the United States is only too willing to ignore nuclear proliferation as long as its other interests are satisfied. Also, America overlooking of Pakistan's proliferation has been going on for a long time and Musharraf hasn't always been as weak as he is today. Besides, Musharraf has only himself to blame for his predicament. He tried playing a high-wire balancing act between the jihadis and the United States and it backfired badly.
Secondly, there are ways to send a clear public message to Pakistan without seriously jeopardizing Musharraf. America could, for instance, impose sanctions on Pakistan under the many non-proliferation laws, such as the Glenn-Symington Act. President Bush can then waive the sanctions on a yearly basis, making it publicly clear to Pakistan that any more nuclear shenanigans could result in aid being cut off. At the very least, this would prevent the Pakistanis from sticking to their current policy of bald-faced denial.
With 2004 being an election year and with Iraq and the elections being the main focus, the current Pakistan policy may easily degenerate into a "throw some money at them and hope they behave" policy. That is why it is critical that the Congress push the Bush administration to make clear the full extent of Pakistan's nuclear profligacy and the reasons behind the current U.S. policy of private admonishments and public silence.
Pakistan's nuclear commodity trading has gone on for far too long for Americans to be worried about embarrassing an ally that few trust anyway. Without this, the American war on terror and weapons of mass destruction may be seriously jeopardized.
-0-
(Kaushik Kapisthalam is an IT professional and commentator on U.S. policy towards South Asia and its effects on the war on terror. He lives in Atlanta, Ga.)