02-01-2006, 04:43 PM
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Institutional excesses, elite deadlock
Harish Khare
A democratic constitutional arrangement is predicated on mutual respect among various institutions. We appear to be entering a phase where the assumption is the elected representatives cannot be trusted with the public interest.
AT THE height of the Quattrocchi controversy last month, the Central Vigilance Commissioner told an Indian Express reporter that he had written to the Central Bureau of Investigation for "a complete factual position on the [Bofors] case." He wanted to "have a better understanding of our own rules and see if changes need to be made." Presumably Mr. Shankar deemed it necessary to go public with his own bit because every television channel and every newspaper was indignant over the defreezing of the Quattrocchi accounts. In the process Mr. Shankar displayed the creeping penchant of all our institutions to play Savonarola, the medieval preacher who zealously took it upon himself to cleanse public life.
The incumbent CVC is a wise man and having served in the Indian bureaucracy for three decades can be presumed to know the limit of his institutional authority. When he was told that the existing Supreme Court guidelines did not permit the Commission any say in the matter of an on-going investigation, he quietly let it be. This admirable restraint is not easily imitated by others. Everyone seems to be eager to practise a bit of institutional encroachment.
If this trend is not reversed, new experiments in institutional autonomy are sure to produce chaos and worse. This desire on the part of almost every authority-person to redefine and expand his or her institutional limits is bound to become the enemy of good governance.
A democratic constitutional arrangement is predicated on the principle of mutual respect among various institutions. The Indian polity has been at its creative best when it has been able to produce a dynamic balance between autonomous institutions while retaining a collective capacity for listening to and addressing the democratic voices and aspirations from below. Whenever the elites displayed respect for the masses and tried to channel popular energy into a positive and constructive force, the political system moved forward. Whenever one section of the elites â be they from the political or judicial or corporate arena â overplayed its hand, the result has been paralysis and conflict.
Of late we appear to be on the verge of entering a dangerous phase. There seems to be a new arrogance: the government does not deserve to be respected, and it is deemed a legitimate exercise to question not only policies but also motives. The assumption is that the elected representatives of the people cannot be trusted with the public interest, and that it is up to the unelected gods â in the judiciary, the media, civil society, the private sector â to step in and to "save the nation."
Part of the problem, of course, is within the political domain. Disparate political parties come together to cobble together coalitions at the Centre and in the States without the leaders being sufficiently anchored in the responsibilities of power and restraints of authority.
Since political parties and leaders choose to bargain and negotiate in the full glare of round-the-clock television cameras, the system gets choked with one "crisis" after another. Bargaining among unappetising political players produces images of haggling and unethical deals, generating disrespect for the politician. Entitlements claimed â and claimed brazenly â by allies and supporting parties in a coalition government end up eroding public confidence in and respect for governing institutions.
Unfortunately, the principal opposition party in the country is most guilty of unrestrained behaviour. The Bharatiya Janata Party has perfected the art of accusing its political rivals of the worst offences while using the same presumably undesirable tactics when it suits its internal needs. For instance, the BJP has come close to instigating the President to act independently of the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
At the drop of a hat, senior National Democratic Alliance leaders troop to Rashtrapati Bhavan to demand dismissal of this Cabinet Minister or that Governor, as if the Constitution stipulates any kind of voice for the President in such matters. In the context of the Supreme Court judgment on Bihar, there have been mischievous suggestions that the President should resign because he was "misguided" by the Prime Minister in signing the Proclamation.
When Atal Bihari Vajpayee was Prime Minister, the BJP was watchful â and correctly â of the institutional respect of his office; now its leaders merrily deploy a less than respectful tone for the current Prime Minister. Out of office, the BJP invites supervision by other institutions of the working of the executive. When the political leadership is unable to know and respect the limits of power and powerlessness, it becomes an ideal setting for encroachment by other institutions.
The Indian judicial system operates under a comforting but unexamined assumption that the judges are absolute servants of the Constitution without any personal biases â ideological or intellectual. This too has been taken in our collective stride but now there seems to be a new itch to regulate the disputes among the political players as well as to penalise political players who do not pass some mythical (mostly middle class) test of public probity. It should be a cause for concern when a verdict gets influenced less by constitutional arguments and legal reasoning and more by a disapproval of the ways of the political class.
Any reminder of institutional boundaries is sought to be seen as a "confrontation." It is the job of the courts to scrutinise and strike down, if necessary, laws passed by Parliament, just as it is the duty of the executive to find ways and means of meeting the courts' objections while still exploring the possibility of carrying out its political and legislative priorities within the constitutionally prescribed procedures. An attempt to get around a judicial pronouncement need not be seen as an essay in confrontation.
Stalemating of authority
The cumulative impact of various kinds of institutional excesses is the stalemating of authority at the Centre, which in turn invites further testing and encroachment from all kinds of players at home and abroad. When an executive authority is made to be seen as subject to all kind of pressures and counter-pressures, it becomes open season for one and all to poke their nose in others' business.
Take, for instance, the extraordinary gumption of the American Ambassador in New Delhi. While an envoy can legitimately claim a right to explain his government's policies, he has no business commenting on the correctness or otherwise of our domestic disputes. Yet David Mulford can be said to be the victim of the same set of calculations that motivated the Chief Vigilance Commissioner to overshoot his brief. What is reassuring is that political leaders across the spectrum have closed ranks against the American envoy's transgressions.
Our collective fortunes seem to be hostage to two kinds of infirmities: a fragmented polity, as no political party is capable of commanding the confidence of the majority and, second, a new itch for institutional over-reaching.
The first infirmity not only necessarily produces a less efficacious governing arrangement but also aggravates elite conflicts, played out by the middle classes. The second infirmity becomes an antidote for any kind of working synergy at the national level, as each and every player wallows in a "me-too" self-importance, unrelated to public interest or national purpose.
The basic axiom in democratic thinking all over the world has been that a strong executive must be restrained by various devices like the doctrine of separation of powers or theory of judicial review. In the ideal Indian context, the need for countervailing institutional force suggests itself when a political party commands a runaway majority in the Lok Sabha, when the Opposition is weak and fragile, or power gets centralised in the Union Government.
Now we seem to be saddled with the worst of both worlds. Because of a breakdown in the norms of self-restraint among those who fancy themselves as guardians of the constitutional order and public interest, we have produced a script for paralysis.
Institutional excesses, elite deadlock
Harish Khare
A democratic constitutional arrangement is predicated on mutual respect among various institutions. We appear to be entering a phase where the assumption is the elected representatives cannot be trusted with the public interest.
AT THE height of the Quattrocchi controversy last month, the Central Vigilance Commissioner told an Indian Express reporter that he had written to the Central Bureau of Investigation for "a complete factual position on the [Bofors] case." He wanted to "have a better understanding of our own rules and see if changes need to be made." Presumably Mr. Shankar deemed it necessary to go public with his own bit because every television channel and every newspaper was indignant over the defreezing of the Quattrocchi accounts. In the process Mr. Shankar displayed the creeping penchant of all our institutions to play Savonarola, the medieval preacher who zealously took it upon himself to cleanse public life.
The incumbent CVC is a wise man and having served in the Indian bureaucracy for three decades can be presumed to know the limit of his institutional authority. When he was told that the existing Supreme Court guidelines did not permit the Commission any say in the matter of an on-going investigation, he quietly let it be. This admirable restraint is not easily imitated by others. Everyone seems to be eager to practise a bit of institutional encroachment.
If this trend is not reversed, new experiments in institutional autonomy are sure to produce chaos and worse. This desire on the part of almost every authority-person to redefine and expand his or her institutional limits is bound to become the enemy of good governance.
A democratic constitutional arrangement is predicated on the principle of mutual respect among various institutions. The Indian polity has been at its creative best when it has been able to produce a dynamic balance between autonomous institutions while retaining a collective capacity for listening to and addressing the democratic voices and aspirations from below. Whenever the elites displayed respect for the masses and tried to channel popular energy into a positive and constructive force, the political system moved forward. Whenever one section of the elites â be they from the political or judicial or corporate arena â overplayed its hand, the result has been paralysis and conflict.
Of late we appear to be on the verge of entering a dangerous phase. There seems to be a new arrogance: the government does not deserve to be respected, and it is deemed a legitimate exercise to question not only policies but also motives. The assumption is that the elected representatives of the people cannot be trusted with the public interest, and that it is up to the unelected gods â in the judiciary, the media, civil society, the private sector â to step in and to "save the nation."
Part of the problem, of course, is within the political domain. Disparate political parties come together to cobble together coalitions at the Centre and in the States without the leaders being sufficiently anchored in the responsibilities of power and restraints of authority.
Since political parties and leaders choose to bargain and negotiate in the full glare of round-the-clock television cameras, the system gets choked with one "crisis" after another. Bargaining among unappetising political players produces images of haggling and unethical deals, generating disrespect for the politician. Entitlements claimed â and claimed brazenly â by allies and supporting parties in a coalition government end up eroding public confidence in and respect for governing institutions.
Unfortunately, the principal opposition party in the country is most guilty of unrestrained behaviour. The Bharatiya Janata Party has perfected the art of accusing its political rivals of the worst offences while using the same presumably undesirable tactics when it suits its internal needs. For instance, the BJP has come close to instigating the President to act independently of the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
At the drop of a hat, senior National Democratic Alliance leaders troop to Rashtrapati Bhavan to demand dismissal of this Cabinet Minister or that Governor, as if the Constitution stipulates any kind of voice for the President in such matters. In the context of the Supreme Court judgment on Bihar, there have been mischievous suggestions that the President should resign because he was "misguided" by the Prime Minister in signing the Proclamation.
When Atal Bihari Vajpayee was Prime Minister, the BJP was watchful â and correctly â of the institutional respect of his office; now its leaders merrily deploy a less than respectful tone for the current Prime Minister. Out of office, the BJP invites supervision by other institutions of the working of the executive. When the political leadership is unable to know and respect the limits of power and powerlessness, it becomes an ideal setting for encroachment by other institutions.
The Indian judicial system operates under a comforting but unexamined assumption that the judges are absolute servants of the Constitution without any personal biases â ideological or intellectual. This too has been taken in our collective stride but now there seems to be a new itch to regulate the disputes among the political players as well as to penalise political players who do not pass some mythical (mostly middle class) test of public probity. It should be a cause for concern when a verdict gets influenced less by constitutional arguments and legal reasoning and more by a disapproval of the ways of the political class.
Any reminder of institutional boundaries is sought to be seen as a "confrontation." It is the job of the courts to scrutinise and strike down, if necessary, laws passed by Parliament, just as it is the duty of the executive to find ways and means of meeting the courts' objections while still exploring the possibility of carrying out its political and legislative priorities within the constitutionally prescribed procedures. An attempt to get around a judicial pronouncement need not be seen as an essay in confrontation.
Stalemating of authority
The cumulative impact of various kinds of institutional excesses is the stalemating of authority at the Centre, which in turn invites further testing and encroachment from all kinds of players at home and abroad. When an executive authority is made to be seen as subject to all kind of pressures and counter-pressures, it becomes open season for one and all to poke their nose in others' business.
Take, for instance, the extraordinary gumption of the American Ambassador in New Delhi. While an envoy can legitimately claim a right to explain his government's policies, he has no business commenting on the correctness or otherwise of our domestic disputes. Yet David Mulford can be said to be the victim of the same set of calculations that motivated the Chief Vigilance Commissioner to overshoot his brief. What is reassuring is that political leaders across the spectrum have closed ranks against the American envoy's transgressions.
Our collective fortunes seem to be hostage to two kinds of infirmities: a fragmented polity, as no political party is capable of commanding the confidence of the majority and, second, a new itch for institutional over-reaching.
The first infirmity not only necessarily produces a less efficacious governing arrangement but also aggravates elite conflicts, played out by the middle classes. The second infirmity becomes an antidote for any kind of working synergy at the national level, as each and every player wallows in a "me-too" self-importance, unrelated to public interest or national purpose.
The basic axiom in democratic thinking all over the world has been that a strong executive must be restrained by various devices like the doctrine of separation of powers or theory of judicial review. In the ideal Indian context, the need for countervailing institutional force suggests itself when a political party commands a runaway majority in the Lok Sabha, when the Opposition is weak and fragile, or power gets centralised in the Union Government.
Now we seem to be saddled with the worst of both worlds. Because of a breakdown in the norms of self-restraint among those who fancy themselves as guardians of the constitutional order and public interest, we have produced a script for paralysis.