01-13-2004, 11:33 AM
Pakistan's nuclear deals
By M.R. Srinivasan
(The writer is a former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.)
There would appear to be a real risk of sensitive nuclear material or even weapon components falling into jihadi or terrorist hands due to the complicity of functionaries at various levels.
NEWSPAPERS IN India and abroad are full of stories about Pakistan helping various countries acquire sensitive nuclear technologies, which can help them, over time, acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons. These reports are dismissed as untrue by Pakistani spokesmen who say they have been, and continue to be, committed to nuclear non-proliferation. The American media is full of stories about Pakistan assisting North Korea, Iran and Libya in enriching uranium, an essential step to produce bomb grade nuclear material. Senior U.S. leaders claim that Pakistan's President, Pervez Musharraf has assured the U.S. that no nuclear co-operation between Pakistan and these countries is taking place at present. But the reality is that such cooperation has been going on from the 1980s.
The architect of Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme, Abdul Qadir Khan, had worked for a number of years in Holland at the uranium enrichment plant owned by Urenco, a Dutch-German-U.K. consortium. This was the first commercial scale uranium enrichment plant using the gas-centrifuge process. Earlier plants of that kind used the gaseous diffusion process, pioneered by the U.S. and built thereafter in the USSR, Britain, France and China. These plants produce highly enriched uranium (having a high concentration of uranium-235), which is a bomb grade material. The alternative bomb grade material is plutonium produced from natural uranium in a nuclear reactor. The gaseous diffusion process has the limitation that it has to have a larger size or high throughput and uses large quantities of electrical energy. The gas centrifuge process is suited for smaller scale plants and needs smaller amounts of energy. When Dr. Qadir Khan worked in Holland, he systematically stole the blueprints and specifications of the process and took them with him when he decided to work for the Pakistan programme. Although a Dutch court convicted him of indulging in this unlawful activity, no punishment was imposed on him.
During much of the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistani agents were procuring from European and North American sources various sensitive material and equipment in violation of export control regulations in the countries of origin. These included maraging steel for making centrifuge cylinders, high frequency power supplies to drive the centrifuge rotors at high speed, and plants for making uranium hexaflouride gas. Some persons and companies indulging in this trade were caught by several governmental agencies in Europe and North America and were charged with offences. After lengthy trials and juicy publicity, no punitive action was taken.
Dr. Qadir Khan played a key role in identifying the commercial and industrial entities who could deliver various equipment required for the nuclear weapon programme as he was familiar with these institutions from his association with the Dutch activity. Whatever the economic difficulty Pakistan faced, the nuclear weapon activity was never starved of resources.
While Pakistan made good progress on enrichment of uranium because of Dr. Qadir Kahn's Dutch connections, it still needed vital inputs on the design of a nuclear weapon and certain critical hardware. This is where the long established friendship with China proved handy. In agreeing to give Pakistan design information on one of its early nuclear weapons and some hardware, China gained access to gas centrifuge technology for enriching uranium, which Pakistan had by them established. Some years later when Pakistan needed missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, China once again came to its aid. After the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) came into force in the 1990s at the urging of the U.S., China found it difficult to satisfy Pakistani aspirations on missile acquisition. By that time, North Korea emerged as a source for obtaining missiles and associated technology. It also coincided with a period when North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and began to work on a nuclear weapon programme. Thus Pakistan and North Korea got engaged in a missiles-for-nuclear-weapons-technology transfer. It has been widely reported that Dr. Qadir Khan made over a dozen trips to North Korea in the 1990s.
Now we come to the more recent cases. Iran admitted a few months ago that it had undertaken work on enrichment of uranium though it insisted that this was purely for peaceful purposes. Even in the early 1990s, western media reports alleged that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon programme. I had occasion to visit nearly all the Iranian nuclear facilities in 1991. At that time, Iran had just one electromagnetic separator of Chinese origin, ostensibly for research and development work. As Iraq found earlier, the electromagnetic separation process of enrichment, which the U.S. had abandoned in the 1940s, was indeed unviable. So the Iranians followed the prospects of a gas centrifuge process. There are reports that Iran had centrifuges similar to those Pakistan had used in the early phase of its programme. Radioactivity levels measured at the Iranian facilities show evidence of highly enriched uranium. Iran explained this as contamination from an earlier location. The needle of suspicion points only to Pakistan. There are reports of Dr. Qadir Khan making frequent visits to Iran and even owning a villa on the Caspian Sea. Iran has now agreed to a more stringent regime of inspections including surprise inspections, from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The most recent episode is the announcement from Libya that it was suspending all work on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and opening its facilities to the more stringent inspections of the IAEA. A few years after Pokhran-I test of 1974, Col. Maumar Qaddafi of Libya made a serious offer to India to get nuclear weapon technology in exchange for substantial sums of money, oil and other business. India fended off this proposition in a polite manner. However it appears that in recent years, Libya has sought help from the only source that was available to it, namely Pakistan, to get nuclear weapon technology. There are reports once again of uranium enrichment work in Libya using the centrifuge process, very similar to that in Pakistan.
The country that has probably picked up most of the bills for the Pakistani nuclear weapons is Saudi Arabia. All the rulers of Pakistan in recent decades have cultivated cordial relations with the Saudi royal family. Important Saudi leaders have had access to Pakistani nuclear weapons facilities. Considering that Saudi Arabia does not have the pool of technical manpower or facilities of Iraq or Iran, any transfer from Pakistan may have to be more than mere technology or knowhow. It may involve ready to assemble nuclear weapons, from kits that may be sent across should a need arise.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who launched the Pakistani nuclear weapon programme, referred to it as an `Islamic Bomb'. He talked about the goal in civilisational terms and not simply in the context of Pakistani security. He used the religion card effectively to get financial support from the conservative petro-rich Islamic states. At present when mounting evidence of Pakistani complicity in spreading nuclear weapon technology widely has come into the open, there are reports that key aides of Dr. Qadir Khan are being questioned.
It is entirely possible that the jihadi mentality pervades several levels of the Pakistani scientific leadership. Two aspects of Dr. Qadir Khan have received public attention; the first is his visceral hatred of India and the second his vainglorious attitude. It is quite possible he himself has engendered a jihadi world view among his colleagues. But it will be sacrilege to point an accusing finger at him in Pakistan and we may be certain that no guilt will be heaped on him. But
what is of concern to the outside world in general and India in particular is that the claim that Gen. Musharraf makes that he is in full control of the nuclear weapon programme and can promise that only responsible actions will be taken by Pakistan at all times, may only be rhetoric devoid of substance. There would appear to be a real risk of sensitive nuclear material or even weapon components falling into jihadi or terrorist hands due to complicity of functionaries at various levels.
Now that a thaw is Indo-Pakistan relations has set in, there is expectation of a return to normality in the relations between the two countries leading to meaningful discussions to resolve the outstanding differences. The 1999 Lahore Memorandum of Understanding signed between India and Pakistan envisages among others nuclear confidence building measures. An impediment to agreement on these CBMs would be Pakistan's track record in assisting nuclear proliferation over the past two decades or more and the general feeling that the controls on dispersal of sensitive nuclear information are porous at best. Furthermore, there is the impression that some scientists, even at senior levels, are acting as conduits in supplying sensitive WMD information to potential terrorists. Pakistan will have to be candid with Indian interlocutors and convince them that whatever may have happened in the past, Pakistan will cease to encourage nuclear proliferation and act as a responsible nuclear weapon state.
http://www.hindu.com/2004/01/13/stories/...301000.htm
By M.R. Srinivasan
(The writer is a former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.)
There would appear to be a real risk of sensitive nuclear material or even weapon components falling into jihadi or terrorist hands due to the complicity of functionaries at various levels.
NEWSPAPERS IN India and abroad are full of stories about Pakistan helping various countries acquire sensitive nuclear technologies, which can help them, over time, acquire the capability to make nuclear weapons. These reports are dismissed as untrue by Pakistani spokesmen who say they have been, and continue to be, committed to nuclear non-proliferation. The American media is full of stories about Pakistan assisting North Korea, Iran and Libya in enriching uranium, an essential step to produce bomb grade nuclear material. Senior U.S. leaders claim that Pakistan's President, Pervez Musharraf has assured the U.S. that no nuclear co-operation between Pakistan and these countries is taking place at present. But the reality is that such cooperation has been going on from the 1980s.
The architect of Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme, Abdul Qadir Khan, had worked for a number of years in Holland at the uranium enrichment plant owned by Urenco, a Dutch-German-U.K. consortium. This was the first commercial scale uranium enrichment plant using the gas-centrifuge process. Earlier plants of that kind used the gaseous diffusion process, pioneered by the U.S. and built thereafter in the USSR, Britain, France and China. These plants produce highly enriched uranium (having a high concentration of uranium-235), which is a bomb grade material. The alternative bomb grade material is plutonium produced from natural uranium in a nuclear reactor. The gaseous diffusion process has the limitation that it has to have a larger size or high throughput and uses large quantities of electrical energy. The gas centrifuge process is suited for smaller scale plants and needs smaller amounts of energy. When Dr. Qadir Khan worked in Holland, he systematically stole the blueprints and specifications of the process and took them with him when he decided to work for the Pakistan programme. Although a Dutch court convicted him of indulging in this unlawful activity, no punishment was imposed on him.
During much of the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistani agents were procuring from European and North American sources various sensitive material and equipment in violation of export control regulations in the countries of origin. These included maraging steel for making centrifuge cylinders, high frequency power supplies to drive the centrifuge rotors at high speed, and plants for making uranium hexaflouride gas. Some persons and companies indulging in this trade were caught by several governmental agencies in Europe and North America and were charged with offences. After lengthy trials and juicy publicity, no punitive action was taken.
Dr. Qadir Khan played a key role in identifying the commercial and industrial entities who could deliver various equipment required for the nuclear weapon programme as he was familiar with these institutions from his association with the Dutch activity. Whatever the economic difficulty Pakistan faced, the nuclear weapon activity was never starved of resources.
While Pakistan made good progress on enrichment of uranium because of Dr. Qadir Kahn's Dutch connections, it still needed vital inputs on the design of a nuclear weapon and certain critical hardware. This is where the long established friendship with China proved handy. In agreeing to give Pakistan design information on one of its early nuclear weapons and some hardware, China gained access to gas centrifuge technology for enriching uranium, which Pakistan had by them established. Some years later when Pakistan needed missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, China once again came to its aid. After the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) came into force in the 1990s at the urging of the U.S., China found it difficult to satisfy Pakistani aspirations on missile acquisition. By that time, North Korea emerged as a source for obtaining missiles and associated technology. It also coincided with a period when North Korea withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and began to work on a nuclear weapon programme. Thus Pakistan and North Korea got engaged in a missiles-for-nuclear-weapons-technology transfer. It has been widely reported that Dr. Qadir Khan made over a dozen trips to North Korea in the 1990s.
Now we come to the more recent cases. Iran admitted a few months ago that it had undertaken work on enrichment of uranium though it insisted that this was purely for peaceful purposes. Even in the early 1990s, western media reports alleged that Iran was developing a nuclear weapon programme. I had occasion to visit nearly all the Iranian nuclear facilities in 1991. At that time, Iran had just one electromagnetic separator of Chinese origin, ostensibly for research and development work. As Iraq found earlier, the electromagnetic separation process of enrichment, which the U.S. had abandoned in the 1940s, was indeed unviable. So the Iranians followed the prospects of a gas centrifuge process. There are reports that Iran had centrifuges similar to those Pakistan had used in the early phase of its programme. Radioactivity levels measured at the Iranian facilities show evidence of highly enriched uranium. Iran explained this as contamination from an earlier location. The needle of suspicion points only to Pakistan. There are reports of Dr. Qadir Khan making frequent visits to Iran and even owning a villa on the Caspian Sea. Iran has now agreed to a more stringent regime of inspections including surprise inspections, from the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The most recent episode is the announcement from Libya that it was suspending all work on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and opening its facilities to the more stringent inspections of the IAEA. A few years after Pokhran-I test of 1974, Col. Maumar Qaddafi of Libya made a serious offer to India to get nuclear weapon technology in exchange for substantial sums of money, oil and other business. India fended off this proposition in a polite manner. However it appears that in recent years, Libya has sought help from the only source that was available to it, namely Pakistan, to get nuclear weapon technology. There are reports once again of uranium enrichment work in Libya using the centrifuge process, very similar to that in Pakistan.
The country that has probably picked up most of the bills for the Pakistani nuclear weapons is Saudi Arabia. All the rulers of Pakistan in recent decades have cultivated cordial relations with the Saudi royal family. Important Saudi leaders have had access to Pakistani nuclear weapons facilities. Considering that Saudi Arabia does not have the pool of technical manpower or facilities of Iraq or Iran, any transfer from Pakistan may have to be more than mere technology or knowhow. It may involve ready to assemble nuclear weapons, from kits that may be sent across should a need arise.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who launched the Pakistani nuclear weapon programme, referred to it as an `Islamic Bomb'. He talked about the goal in civilisational terms and not simply in the context of Pakistani security. He used the religion card effectively to get financial support from the conservative petro-rich Islamic states. At present when mounting evidence of Pakistani complicity in spreading nuclear weapon technology widely has come into the open, there are reports that key aides of Dr. Qadir Khan are being questioned.
It is entirely possible that the jihadi mentality pervades several levels of the Pakistani scientific leadership. Two aspects of Dr. Qadir Khan have received public attention; the first is his visceral hatred of India and the second his vainglorious attitude. It is quite possible he himself has engendered a jihadi world view among his colleagues. But it will be sacrilege to point an accusing finger at him in Pakistan and we may be certain that no guilt will be heaped on him. But
what is of concern to the outside world in general and India in particular is that the claim that Gen. Musharraf makes that he is in full control of the nuclear weapon programme and can promise that only responsible actions will be taken by Pakistan at all times, may only be rhetoric devoid of substance. There would appear to be a real risk of sensitive nuclear material or even weapon components falling into jihadi or terrorist hands due to complicity of functionaries at various levels.
Now that a thaw is Indo-Pakistan relations has set in, there is expectation of a return to normality in the relations between the two countries leading to meaningful discussions to resolve the outstanding differences. The 1999 Lahore Memorandum of Understanding signed between India and Pakistan envisages among others nuclear confidence building measures. An impediment to agreement on these CBMs would be Pakistan's track record in assisting nuclear proliferation over the past two decades or more and the general feeling that the controls on dispersal of sensitive nuclear information are porous at best. Furthermore, there is the impression that some scientists, even at senior levels, are acting as conduits in supplying sensitive WMD information to potential terrorists. Pakistan will have to be candid with Indian interlocutors and convince them that whatever may have happened in the past, Pakistan will cease to encourage nuclear proliferation and act as a responsible nuclear weapon state.
http://www.hindu.com/2004/01/13/stories/...301000.htm