04-19-2006, 04:26 AM
<b>A Different Jihad Dalit Muslims' Challenge to Ashraf Hegemony</b><!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Casteismâ, he goes on, â has deeply also crept into Muslims. They do not act like a âmillatâ. We were united before, but especially after 1990 caste divisions have grown stronger among Muslims. Prior to 1990 we used to fight elections collectively. All Muslims used to vote for one Muslim candidate. But ever since the rise of casteism, we have often lost (except in the last election when a candidate belonging to the qureshi community got elected to the state assembly) and BJP has won instead. They (low-castes) are indeed âjahilâ, ignorantâ.
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<b>Denial and Anxiety </b>
The upper castes comprise no more than 8 per cent of the total population. The majority of Muslims in Sheher are qureshis, ansaris, saifis, rangrez, bishtis or alvis. Before 1990, candidates were often from the so-called Ashraf classes and Muslims in general supported them. But after 1990, that is, since what Yogender Yadav has described as the âsecond democratic upsurgeâ [1996:101] inaugurated by Mandal and the ascendance of the other backward classes3Â (OBCs), low-caste Muslims started putting up their own candidates and asked the Ashraf to vote for them. In the narrative of the upper castes, it was then that casteism began within Muslims and the imagined millat got severely wounded
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<b>Embattled Future</b>
In post-partition India, Muslim politics has predominantly been reactive. It has raised emotive rather than substantive issues. Monopolised by the traditionally privileged classes of ashraf, Muslim leadership has so far rarely looked beyond the four issues of Urdu, Aligarh Muslim University, Muslim Personal Law and Babri masjid [Ahmad 1997]. There is thus a growing feeling that such an edition of politics has failed to deliver much dividend. As a matter of fact, many observers feel that it has instead strengthened the hands of Hindutva and created boredom and alienation in Muslim society, particularly the youth. A fringe minority has thus begun to be taken over by the captivating slogan of jihad against the forces of what it calls ânon-Islamâ.
By bringing into sharp focus the plight of backward and dalit Muslims, Anwarâs book does not merely address an economic question but has the great potential to also redefine the very grammar of Muslim politics in favour of a progressive agenda. This redefinition, if successful, augurs well for Indiaâs destiny. It is framed in a distinctively secular language and envisions a socially just, plural society. This may inaugurate a departure of some sorts from the old-style reactive politics. The need for such a departure hardly needs to be stressed in the face of two major challenges confronting Indian polity â near triumph of Hindutva on the one hand and reactive Muslim politics on the other. There is a visible propensity of a section of Muslim youth towards a revivalist jihad ignited by robust ideology of Wahabism. In obvious contrast to this, Anwarâs book calls for a radically different jihad â jihad for the social empowerment of the downtrodden Muslims and the restoration of honour to them. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
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<b>Denial and Anxiety </b>
The upper castes comprise no more than 8 per cent of the total population. The majority of Muslims in Sheher are qureshis, ansaris, saifis, rangrez, bishtis or alvis. Before 1990, candidates were often from the so-called Ashraf classes and Muslims in general supported them. But after 1990, that is, since what Yogender Yadav has described as the âsecond democratic upsurgeâ [1996:101] inaugurated by Mandal and the ascendance of the other backward classes3Â (OBCs), low-caste Muslims started putting up their own candidates and asked the Ashraf to vote for them. In the narrative of the upper castes, it was then that casteism began within Muslims and the imagined millat got severely wounded
...................
................
<b>Embattled Future</b>
In post-partition India, Muslim politics has predominantly been reactive. It has raised emotive rather than substantive issues. Monopolised by the traditionally privileged classes of ashraf, Muslim leadership has so far rarely looked beyond the four issues of Urdu, Aligarh Muslim University, Muslim Personal Law and Babri masjid [Ahmad 1997]. There is thus a growing feeling that such an edition of politics has failed to deliver much dividend. As a matter of fact, many observers feel that it has instead strengthened the hands of Hindutva and created boredom and alienation in Muslim society, particularly the youth. A fringe minority has thus begun to be taken over by the captivating slogan of jihad against the forces of what it calls ânon-Islamâ.
By bringing into sharp focus the plight of backward and dalit Muslims, Anwarâs book does not merely address an economic question but has the great potential to also redefine the very grammar of Muslim politics in favour of a progressive agenda. This redefinition, if successful, augurs well for Indiaâs destiny. It is framed in a distinctively secular language and envisions a socially just, plural society. This may inaugurate a departure of some sorts from the old-style reactive politics. The need for such a departure hardly needs to be stressed in the face of two major challenges confronting Indian polity â near triumph of Hindutva on the one hand and reactive Muslim politics on the other. There is a visible propensity of a section of Muslim youth towards a revivalist jihad ignited by robust ideology of Wahabism. In obvious contrast to this, Anwarâs book calls for a radically different jihad â jihad for the social empowerment of the downtrodden Muslims and the restoration of honour to them. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->