04-24-2006, 08:11 AM
http://saag.org/%5Cpapers18%5Cpaper1772.html
NEPAL INTIFADA-- BATTLE FOR KATHMANDU:
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR
APER NO.45
By B.Raman
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->8. These tactical changes came in the wake of the failure of the repeated attempts of the Maoists to extend their control from the rural areas to the urban and finally to Kathmandu, the capital. Mao had said, capture the rural areas and then surround the urban areas and launch the final assault. They had no difficulty in capturing the rural areas because the ill-trained and ill-motivated rural police hardly put up any resistance to them. In the urban areas, and particularly in Kathmandu, they have had to confront the well-trained and well-motivated Gurkha soldiers of the Army.
9. The Army is not strong enough to liberate the rural areas from the control of the Maoists, but it has shown itself to be strong enough to preven the Maoists from extending their control to Kathmandu.<b> The Maoists have a demonstrated capability for sporadic acts of urban terrorism, but do not as yet have the capability to capture power through a frontal confrontation with the Army.</b><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper277.html
THE MAOISTS OF NEPAL: Three perspectives
B. Raman
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Prachanda </b>says: "We decided that we should initiate People's War from different parts of the country. We should centralize in mainly three areas-East, Middle, West-and the capital. <b> Cities should also be another point, not for armed clashes, but for propaganda and such things. </b>"<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
NEPAL INTIFADA-- BATTLE FOR KATHMANDU:
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR

By B.Raman
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->8. These tactical changes came in the wake of the failure of the repeated attempts of the Maoists to extend their control from the rural areas to the urban and finally to Kathmandu, the capital. Mao had said, capture the rural areas and then surround the urban areas and launch the final assault. They had no difficulty in capturing the rural areas because the ill-trained and ill-motivated rural police hardly put up any resistance to them. In the urban areas, and particularly in Kathmandu, they have had to confront the well-trained and well-motivated Gurkha soldiers of the Army.
9. The Army is not strong enough to liberate the rural areas from the control of the Maoists, but it has shown itself to be strong enough to preven the Maoists from extending their control to Kathmandu.<b> The Maoists have a demonstrated capability for sporadic acts of urban terrorism, but do not as yet have the capability to capture power through a frontal confrontation with the Army.</b><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
http://www.saag.org/papers3/paper277.html
THE MAOISTS OF NEPAL: Three perspectives
B. Raman
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Prachanda </b>says: "We decided that we should initiate People's War from different parts of the country. We should centralize in mainly three areas-East, Middle, West-and the capital. <b> Cities should also be another point, not for armed clashes, but for propaganda and such things. </b>"<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->