06-12-2006, 08:03 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Nuclear deal: Is it a dead end or the endgame? </b>- By Dilip Lahiri
All the sound and fury of the arguments for and against the Indo-US nuclear deal, and particularly the separation of Indian nuclear facilities needed for our weapons programme from those purely to be used for civilian purposes, have been made moot by the US proposal for the early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT ), preferably during 2006. It scarcely makes sense for senior officials of both sides to meet every other week in various parts of the world for tortuous negotiations on the separation list, or for us to negotiate a safeguard agreement with the IAEA for our civilian facilities if an FMCT will soon place all our nuclear facilities on the civilian list by a prohibition on the further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. We have been in this situation before, 10 years ago. At that time, India was committed to sign on to the FMCT, whose conclusion appeared imminent, and the only rearguard action open to India was to try to gain some more time to produce sufficient fissile material to provide a margin of safety for our then nascent nuclear weapons programme. We were then saved by the bell, with the Chinese insisting on a linkage of the FMCT with the demilitarisation of outer space, which was unacceptable to the US.
Our 1998 nuclear weapon tests have changed our situation. Our declared objective now is to build up a credible minimum deterrent. But 10 years down the road from our close shave with the FMCT in its earlier avatar, we seem to feel that we are still far from accumulating enough fissile material for our proposed credible minimum deterrent. And yet we committed, under the Indo-US agreement, to work with the US towards the early conclusion of an FMCT. Can the US be faulted for concluding that, barring the requirements of a viable negotiating position, we felt our plutonium stocks were sufficient for our credible minimum deterrent, and for being bemused at the heavy weather we have been since making in the separation negotiations? Can we rely on the Chinese to bail us out again, while we continue to chant our earlier mantra of the requirement of a non discriminatory multilateral verification mechanism for the FMCT and the need to link it with the venerable Rajiv Gandhi action plan for nuclear disarmament? The US is unlikely to view such a stance as being in line with our bilateral commitment to work with them for the early conclusion of an FMCT. Having parted company with the nuclear have-nots, we should not count on their support if we try to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds. Countries like South Africa and Brazil would be quick to pull the rug out from under us, and expose the disingenuousness of our arguments.
What is the US up to with this move? The US has made a substantial investment in the Indo-US nuclear deal, having gone out on a limb against the prevailing NPT orthodoxy to make an exception for India. The US diplomatic style is also not known for infructuous time wasting and it seems difficult to believe that US leaders and senior officials would have spent so many days traipsing to Delhi and elsewhere and countless hours in strenuous negotiations with India on a separation agreement and in lobbying the US Congress, if the principal objective of the nuclear deal with India was to immobilise Indiaâs fissile material production capacity with an FMCT. It is possible that the aim is to put pressure on Iran and other potential proliferants, and to show up China as the main obstruction to an essential step for nuclear weapons limitation and eventual disarmament.
It would accordingly be politic to have a frank talk with the US when both sides can lay their cards on the table. The US might still be under the misapprehension that, for all our kicking and screaming, our agreement to work for the early conclusion of an FMCT means that we are prepared to live with our current stockpile. If so, we should disabuse them, and make it quite clear that while we could go along with early negotiations on an FMCT, we could only sign on after accumulating a sufficient stockpile for a credible minimum deterrent. For this to be possible, the provisions for the coming into force of the FMCT must provide us sufficient leeway. It would be expedient at the same time, to avoid later misunderstandings, to delineate the clear limits that this consideration would place on our commitment under the Indo-US deal to work towards an early FMCT during negotiations in the Geneva Commission on Disarmament. The US should also be asked to explain credibly what advantage, if any, it sees in continuing at this time with our bilateral negotiations on a separation list of our nuclear facilities.
On the other hand, if we find the US really serious about getting an FMCT in place within a year or two, and they are not prepared to accommodate our concerns about the size of our stockpile, we would have come to a parting of ways and should be prepared to kiss the Indo-US deal goodbye. While the deal itself is very beneficial for us, both politically, and in removing annoying restrictions, the heavens will not fall if it gets aborted. We would be left no worse than we were before, and we have learned to live with these restrictions since 1974. Politically, the principle has already been won, with the US executive, at its highest level, signing a bilateral agreement on normalising nuclear relations with India with the explicit recognition that we shall continue to maintain a non-civilian programme. France, the UK, Russia and others are also on board.
We could legitimately declare victory and walk away. During the FMCT negotiations, we could confine our efforts to the provisions for its entry into force, seeking to ensure that its provisions would only come into effect for us on our signature. If we cannot achieve this, and a vote is forced, we should be prepared to vote against and stay out. Of course we shall be isolated and encounter much huffing and puffing. But we have faced worse in 1998. And, if we are serious about building a credible minimum deterrent, and we really do not have enough plutonium for this yet, there is no alternative.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
All the sound and fury of the arguments for and against the Indo-US nuclear deal, and particularly the separation of Indian nuclear facilities needed for our weapons programme from those purely to be used for civilian purposes, have been made moot by the US proposal for the early conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT ), preferably during 2006. It scarcely makes sense for senior officials of both sides to meet every other week in various parts of the world for tortuous negotiations on the separation list, or for us to negotiate a safeguard agreement with the IAEA for our civilian facilities if an FMCT will soon place all our nuclear facilities on the civilian list by a prohibition on the further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes. We have been in this situation before, 10 years ago. At that time, India was committed to sign on to the FMCT, whose conclusion appeared imminent, and the only rearguard action open to India was to try to gain some more time to produce sufficient fissile material to provide a margin of safety for our then nascent nuclear weapons programme. We were then saved by the bell, with the Chinese insisting on a linkage of the FMCT with the demilitarisation of outer space, which was unacceptable to the US.
Our 1998 nuclear weapon tests have changed our situation. Our declared objective now is to build up a credible minimum deterrent. But 10 years down the road from our close shave with the FMCT in its earlier avatar, we seem to feel that we are still far from accumulating enough fissile material for our proposed credible minimum deterrent. And yet we committed, under the Indo-US agreement, to work with the US towards the early conclusion of an FMCT. Can the US be faulted for concluding that, barring the requirements of a viable negotiating position, we felt our plutonium stocks were sufficient for our credible minimum deterrent, and for being bemused at the heavy weather we have been since making in the separation negotiations? Can we rely on the Chinese to bail us out again, while we continue to chant our earlier mantra of the requirement of a non discriminatory multilateral verification mechanism for the FMCT and the need to link it with the venerable Rajiv Gandhi action plan for nuclear disarmament? The US is unlikely to view such a stance as being in line with our bilateral commitment to work with them for the early conclusion of an FMCT. Having parted company with the nuclear have-nots, we should not count on their support if we try to run with the hares and hunt with the hounds. Countries like South Africa and Brazil would be quick to pull the rug out from under us, and expose the disingenuousness of our arguments.
What is the US up to with this move? The US has made a substantial investment in the Indo-US nuclear deal, having gone out on a limb against the prevailing NPT orthodoxy to make an exception for India. The US diplomatic style is also not known for infructuous time wasting and it seems difficult to believe that US leaders and senior officials would have spent so many days traipsing to Delhi and elsewhere and countless hours in strenuous negotiations with India on a separation agreement and in lobbying the US Congress, if the principal objective of the nuclear deal with India was to immobilise Indiaâs fissile material production capacity with an FMCT. It is possible that the aim is to put pressure on Iran and other potential proliferants, and to show up China as the main obstruction to an essential step for nuclear weapons limitation and eventual disarmament.
It would accordingly be politic to have a frank talk with the US when both sides can lay their cards on the table. The US might still be under the misapprehension that, for all our kicking and screaming, our agreement to work for the early conclusion of an FMCT means that we are prepared to live with our current stockpile. If so, we should disabuse them, and make it quite clear that while we could go along with early negotiations on an FMCT, we could only sign on after accumulating a sufficient stockpile for a credible minimum deterrent. For this to be possible, the provisions for the coming into force of the FMCT must provide us sufficient leeway. It would be expedient at the same time, to avoid later misunderstandings, to delineate the clear limits that this consideration would place on our commitment under the Indo-US deal to work towards an early FMCT during negotiations in the Geneva Commission on Disarmament. The US should also be asked to explain credibly what advantage, if any, it sees in continuing at this time with our bilateral negotiations on a separation list of our nuclear facilities.
On the other hand, if we find the US really serious about getting an FMCT in place within a year or two, and they are not prepared to accommodate our concerns about the size of our stockpile, we would have come to a parting of ways and should be prepared to kiss the Indo-US deal goodbye. While the deal itself is very beneficial for us, both politically, and in removing annoying restrictions, the heavens will not fall if it gets aborted. We would be left no worse than we were before, and we have learned to live with these restrictions since 1974. Politically, the principle has already been won, with the US executive, at its highest level, signing a bilateral agreement on normalising nuclear relations with India with the explicit recognition that we shall continue to maintain a non-civilian programme. France, the UK, Russia and others are also on board.
We could legitimately declare victory and walk away. During the FMCT negotiations, we could confine our efforts to the provisions for its entry into force, seeking to ensure that its provisions would only come into effect for us on our signature. If we cannot achieve this, and a vote is forced, we should be prepared to vote against and stay out. Of course we shall be isolated and encounter much huffing and puffing. But we have faced worse in 1998. And, if we are serious about building a credible minimum deterrent, and we really do not have enough plutonium for this yet, there is no alternative.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->