06-13-2006, 10:52 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->India, U.S.: Washington Grooms New Delhi
June 07, 2006 20 26 GMT
Summary
India's June 6 announcement that it will test-fire its Agni-III
missile sometime in August came just a day after U.S. Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace said such a firing would not
affect the pending U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal. Pace also
indicated that the United States would like India to assume a much
greater role in patrolling the Strait of Malacca. Pace's four-day
visit to New Delhi and his comments have a geopolitical undercurrent:
The United States is developing India into a junior partner in the
Indian Ocean region.
Analysis
U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace wrapped up
his four-day visit to India on June 7. Pace indicated June 5 that
Washington would accept India's test-firing of the Agni-III missile;
the next day, New Delhi announced that the test-firing would take
place in August. Pace also said the United States looks forward to
India assuming greater responsibility in patrolling the Strait of
Malacca.
Pace's trip to India marks the first time the highest-ranking U.S.
military commander visited since Washington and New Delhi signed a
10-year defense cooperation agreement in 2005. That agreement set in
motion negotiations of a U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal that
involved the United States giving significant help in India's
development of a nuclear power infrastructure in exchange for India's
putting some restrictions on its military nuclear program. The nuclear
deal has been stalled in the U.S. Congress; U.S. President George W.
Bush has found it increasingly difficult to push his international
agenda forward because of his precipitous decline in popularity in
opinion polls. India knows that Bush has faced much opposition to the
nuclear deal, and so put off testing its Agni-III missile for fear of
further endangering the agreement. This is why India did not respond
in kind, as it typically does, when Pakistan tested a missile -- the
ShaheenII/HatfVI ballistic missile -- May 7.
Pace's June 5 announcement that Washington would not see the missile
test as a nuclear-proliferation concern changed New Delhi's reasoning.
India, realizing that the United States likely would not approve the
civilian nuclear deal until at least autumn, was happy to get the
go-ahead from at least the U.S. executive branch.
India's attention to -- and desire for -- U.S. approval suggests that
India is playing its role in the development of a strategic
partnership between Washington and New Delhi. The relationship is a
potentially deep one: the United States will provide India with
nuclear technology, development capital, and military hardware and
training; in return, India will help safeguard U.S. interests in the
Indian Ocean region. The partnership could also powerfully demonstrate
to Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf that the United States
would not act to block a resurgent India from attacking Pakistan (not
that such a scenario is likely) and also help take New Delhi out of
Iran's orbit.
A formal alliance it is not; India does not want to be seen as being
anti-Moscow or anti-Beijing, even as it develops stronger ties with
the United States. Geopolitically, China and India have been off of
each other's radar screens (despite a piddling border skirmish in
1962), as they are geographically sealed from each other by the
natural wall of the Himalayas and jungle.
India wants to continue to buy arms from Russia, such as parts for the
MiG-29Ks that will be flying off the deck of the INS Vikramaditya
aircraft carrier, which is to be handed over after a Russian refit in
2008. New Delhi wants the United States to continue to train the
pilots of those MiGs for carrier operations. The United States has
also agreed in principle to sell India an Austin-class Landing
Platform Dock, the USS Trenton, significantly enhancing New Delhi's
maritime power-projection capabilities.
In return, Washington would like India to do exactly what it wants to
anyway: shoulder responsibility and become a powerhouse in the Indian
Ocean, second only to the U.S. Navy. The United States hopes that an
India more involved in the Malacca Strait and with an improved navy
will make China nervous. As Malacca is a chokepoint for Chinese trade
and energy supplies, the naval frontier is essentially the only
potential conflict point between New Delhi and Beijing, which
otherwise are for all intents and purposes a continent away from one
another.
Pace's visit merely formalized what has already been occurring: a
coming together of Indian and American interests in a confederation of
convenience. Washington would like New Delhi to break out of its shell
and exert enough influence in the region to at least annoy China and a
recalcitrant Pakistan. India would like to get whatever it can from
its latest patron, the United States, in order to help alleviate its
massive infrastructure problems, which are preventing India from
becoming a major world power.
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/r...e.php?id=267303
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
June 07, 2006 20 26 GMT
Summary
India's June 6 announcement that it will test-fire its Agni-III
missile sometime in August came just a day after U.S. Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace said such a firing would not
affect the pending U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal. Pace also
indicated that the United States would like India to assume a much
greater role in patrolling the Strait of Malacca. Pace's four-day
visit to New Delhi and his comments have a geopolitical undercurrent:
The United States is developing India into a junior partner in the
Indian Ocean region.
Analysis
U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Peter Pace wrapped up
his four-day visit to India on June 7. Pace indicated June 5 that
Washington would accept India's test-firing of the Agni-III missile;
the next day, New Delhi announced that the test-firing would take
place in August. Pace also said the United States looks forward to
India assuming greater responsibility in patrolling the Strait of
Malacca.
Pace's trip to India marks the first time the highest-ranking U.S.
military commander visited since Washington and New Delhi signed a
10-year defense cooperation agreement in 2005. That agreement set in
motion negotiations of a U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal that
involved the United States giving significant help in India's
development of a nuclear power infrastructure in exchange for India's
putting some restrictions on its military nuclear program. The nuclear
deal has been stalled in the U.S. Congress; U.S. President George W.
Bush has found it increasingly difficult to push his international
agenda forward because of his precipitous decline in popularity in
opinion polls. India knows that Bush has faced much opposition to the
nuclear deal, and so put off testing its Agni-III missile for fear of
further endangering the agreement. This is why India did not respond
in kind, as it typically does, when Pakistan tested a missile -- the
ShaheenII/HatfVI ballistic missile -- May 7.
Pace's June 5 announcement that Washington would not see the missile
test as a nuclear-proliferation concern changed New Delhi's reasoning.
India, realizing that the United States likely would not approve the
civilian nuclear deal until at least autumn, was happy to get the
go-ahead from at least the U.S. executive branch.
India's attention to -- and desire for -- U.S. approval suggests that
India is playing its role in the development of a strategic
partnership between Washington and New Delhi. The relationship is a
potentially deep one: the United States will provide India with
nuclear technology, development capital, and military hardware and
training; in return, India will help safeguard U.S. interests in the
Indian Ocean region. The partnership could also powerfully demonstrate
to Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf that the United States
would not act to block a resurgent India from attacking Pakistan (not
that such a scenario is likely) and also help take New Delhi out of
Iran's orbit.
A formal alliance it is not; India does not want to be seen as being
anti-Moscow or anti-Beijing, even as it develops stronger ties with
the United States. Geopolitically, China and India have been off of
each other's radar screens (despite a piddling border skirmish in
1962), as they are geographically sealed from each other by the
natural wall of the Himalayas and jungle.
India wants to continue to buy arms from Russia, such as parts for the
MiG-29Ks that will be flying off the deck of the INS Vikramaditya
aircraft carrier, which is to be handed over after a Russian refit in
2008. New Delhi wants the United States to continue to train the
pilots of those MiGs for carrier operations. The United States has
also agreed in principle to sell India an Austin-class Landing
Platform Dock, the USS Trenton, significantly enhancing New Delhi's
maritime power-projection capabilities.
In return, Washington would like India to do exactly what it wants to
anyway: shoulder responsibility and become a powerhouse in the Indian
Ocean, second only to the U.S. Navy. The United States hopes that an
India more involved in the Malacca Strait and with an improved navy
will make China nervous. As Malacca is a chokepoint for Chinese trade
and energy supplies, the naval frontier is essentially the only
potential conflict point between New Delhi and Beijing, which
otherwise are for all intents and purposes a continent away from one
another.
Pace's visit merely formalized what has already been occurring: a
coming together of Indian and American interests in a confederation of
convenience. Washington would like New Delhi to break out of its shell
and exert enough influence in the region to at least annoy China and a
recalcitrant Pakistan. India would like to get whatever it can from
its latest patron, the United States, in order to help alleviate its
massive infrastructure problems, which are preventing India from
becoming a major world power.
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/r...e.php?id=267303
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->