07-07-2006, 06:48 AM
hmmm..
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http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1...120001.htm
<b>Nuke the doubts </b>
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri
July 6, 2006
The critics who have howled their disapproval of the Indo-US nuclear deal have been small but loud. They formed packs in both India and the US, they have included both right and left, war hawks and peaceniks. That they have emerged from the extremes is as good evidence as any that the deal is a win-win for India and the world.
Hereâs a checklist of the main arguments against the deal â and why theyâre hogwash.
Myth 1: The deal caps Indiaâs fissile material production. Elements in the BJP argue that the deal puts curbs on how much bomb-making fissile material India can make. The US non-proliferation lobby argues the deal places no curbs on fissile material production. They both canât be right.
The truth is closer to the latter stance. The deal gives India the option of piling up fissile material: India can build as many military reactors as it wants and continue developing its breeder reactor. The latter, when completed, would leave the country knee-deep in plutonium.
The non-proliferation crowd is wrong to say India will go fissile crazy. There may be a way, but thereâs no will. India didnât make a plutonium mountain before the deal â though it could have â because New Delhi has no interest in a mega-arsenal. Reasons: An emptied exchequer and an arms race with China.
Bottomline: The deal doesnât restrict Indiaâs fissile material production, Indiaâs own strategic calculations do.
Myth 2: The deal stops India from more nuclear tests. Not even the fine print says India canât test. What it says is that if India does test, the US will break off all civil nuclear cooperation. This has been part of US law since 1978 and applies to all countries, including Israel and the UK.
The only reason India may test again is to maintain the stability of its nuclear stockpile. But this can be done through subcritical tests â which attract no penalties. But just in case Pakistan and China suddenly start preparing to mushroom-cloud the region and India feels it must follow suit, the deal allows the US President to go to the US Congress and explain Indiaâs reasons and try for an exemption.
Assume the worst: India tests and the US says itâs The End. The only real consequence for India would be a disrupted nuclear fuel supply. Which is why India is negotiating an International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement that commits third parties to supply fuel if the US goes into a sulk.
Bottomline: The deal extracts a cost if India tests. But it has a reimbursement clause.
Myth 3: The deal forced India to sell out Iran. Assume the Indo-US nuclear deal never happened. Would India be happy with Iran getting nuclear weapons? Not a chance. Tehran did business with Pakistanâs atomic smuggler A. Q. Khan. New Delhi has long fretted that Iranâs going nuclear would lead to a Saudi Arabia-Pakistan nuclear alliance. Put it another way: a nuclear Iran rebounds in Pakistanâs favour.
Much is made of Indiaâs âspecial relationshipâ with Iran. This is mythical. Yes, the two worked together, notably in Afghanistan. But they have clashed on almost everything else. Iran opposes Indiaâs own nuclear ambitions, lobbies against Indiaâs attempts to get a UN Security Council seat, and supports human rights resolutions and other irritants that have negative implications for Kashmir. Iran is a fair-weather friend. On the nuclear issue, the bilateral sky is permanently cloudy.
Indians have rightly grimaced at heavy-handed attempts by US congressmen and officials to link the Indo-US nuclear deal to Indiaâs opposition to Iranâs nuclear programme. The truth is that Indiaâs policy on Iran wasnât different, it was just never articulated out of political correctness.
Bottomline: India is and has been against a nuclear-armed Iran. But New Delhi foolishly never made this clear to its public or to Tehran.
Myth 4: Safeguards in perpetuity are a sellout. The idea that any safeguarded nuclear facility will remain civilian forever has an ominously biblical ring. But itâs not new. India first accepted the principle of perpetuity in 1978 when the Department of Atomic Energy let Russia place the Rana Pratap Sagar reactors in Rajasthan under safeguards in 1978. India then agreed to the same for the Koodankulum reactors.
In other words, India has been accepting perpetuity clauses in return for nothing in the past. Now itâs doing the same, but getting international acceptance of its right to have both civilian and military nuclear programmes in return. No country will provide India with nuclear fuel or technology without perpetual safeguards. This is not a US bogey, itâs a global norm.
The only reasonable demand is that India not concede perpetuity without a guarantee of perpetual nuclear fuel supplies. Otherwise, in some theoretical global fluff-up, India could end up with a lot of idle nuclear power plants. This perpetuity-for-perpetuity trade-off is exactly what is being embedded in Indiaâs IAEA safeguards agreement.
Bottomline: Perpetuity is fine, but it must be double-barrelled.
Myth 5: India is not getting genuine nuclear power status. India canât get nuclear power status as defined by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty unless it can get: a) a time machine and detonate a nuclear bomb before 1967, or b) the support of all 151 NPT signatories. Itâs a toss-up as to which is more impossible.
What the nuclear deal gives India is the right to have both civilian and military nukes and access to global nuclear knowhow â the key benefits of nuclear club membership. All else is just rhetoric. It helps to realise that there is no standard âbill of rights of a nuclear powerâ, even among the five NPT powers. Crudely speaking, the earlier you enter the nuclear club, the more rights you get. Thus the US has the most, China the least. China, for example, places many of its atomic installations under perpetual safeguards despite being a recognised nuclear power.
Bottomline: India gets the wine in the bottle, minus the label.
Myth 6: India doesnât need nuclear power. India needs power from any source that it can find. Critics of nuclear power focus on the high start-up costs of reactors and projections that reactors will at best provide 8 per cent of Indiaâs future energy needs. Yes, reactors are billion-dollar-babies. But thatâs why the private sector is being brought in. Reliance, Tata and others are all lining up and they feel they have the funds. The fact the critics sidestep is that after a reactor is up and running, the per unit cost of its electricity is among the lowest and least volatile in the industry.
Also, no one says nuclear power is the be all, end all of Indiaâs power needs. A nationâs energy security is also about being able to tap a variety of power sources. In the long-term, it wouldnât help to be dependent solely on nuclear power. But not having a lot more nuclear power â cheap electricity that is independent of sheikhs and price cycles â is worse.
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http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1...120001.htm
<b>Nuke the doubts </b>
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri
July 6, 2006
The critics who have howled their disapproval of the Indo-US nuclear deal have been small but loud. They formed packs in both India and the US, they have included both right and left, war hawks and peaceniks. That they have emerged from the extremes is as good evidence as any that the deal is a win-win for India and the world.
Hereâs a checklist of the main arguments against the deal â and why theyâre hogwash.
Myth 1: The deal caps Indiaâs fissile material production. Elements in the BJP argue that the deal puts curbs on how much bomb-making fissile material India can make. The US non-proliferation lobby argues the deal places no curbs on fissile material production. They both canât be right.
The truth is closer to the latter stance. The deal gives India the option of piling up fissile material: India can build as many military reactors as it wants and continue developing its breeder reactor. The latter, when completed, would leave the country knee-deep in plutonium.
The non-proliferation crowd is wrong to say India will go fissile crazy. There may be a way, but thereâs no will. India didnât make a plutonium mountain before the deal â though it could have â because New Delhi has no interest in a mega-arsenal. Reasons: An emptied exchequer and an arms race with China.
Bottomline: The deal doesnât restrict Indiaâs fissile material production, Indiaâs own strategic calculations do.
Myth 2: The deal stops India from more nuclear tests. Not even the fine print says India canât test. What it says is that if India does test, the US will break off all civil nuclear cooperation. This has been part of US law since 1978 and applies to all countries, including Israel and the UK.
The only reason India may test again is to maintain the stability of its nuclear stockpile. But this can be done through subcritical tests â which attract no penalties. But just in case Pakistan and China suddenly start preparing to mushroom-cloud the region and India feels it must follow suit, the deal allows the US President to go to the US Congress and explain Indiaâs reasons and try for an exemption.
Assume the worst: India tests and the US says itâs The End. The only real consequence for India would be a disrupted nuclear fuel supply. Which is why India is negotiating an International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement that commits third parties to supply fuel if the US goes into a sulk.
Bottomline: The deal extracts a cost if India tests. But it has a reimbursement clause.
Myth 3: The deal forced India to sell out Iran. Assume the Indo-US nuclear deal never happened. Would India be happy with Iran getting nuclear weapons? Not a chance. Tehran did business with Pakistanâs atomic smuggler A. Q. Khan. New Delhi has long fretted that Iranâs going nuclear would lead to a Saudi Arabia-Pakistan nuclear alliance. Put it another way: a nuclear Iran rebounds in Pakistanâs favour.
Much is made of Indiaâs âspecial relationshipâ with Iran. This is mythical. Yes, the two worked together, notably in Afghanistan. But they have clashed on almost everything else. Iran opposes Indiaâs own nuclear ambitions, lobbies against Indiaâs attempts to get a UN Security Council seat, and supports human rights resolutions and other irritants that have negative implications for Kashmir. Iran is a fair-weather friend. On the nuclear issue, the bilateral sky is permanently cloudy.
Indians have rightly grimaced at heavy-handed attempts by US congressmen and officials to link the Indo-US nuclear deal to Indiaâs opposition to Iranâs nuclear programme. The truth is that Indiaâs policy on Iran wasnât different, it was just never articulated out of political correctness.
Bottomline: India is and has been against a nuclear-armed Iran. But New Delhi foolishly never made this clear to its public or to Tehran.
Myth 4: Safeguards in perpetuity are a sellout. The idea that any safeguarded nuclear facility will remain civilian forever has an ominously biblical ring. But itâs not new. India first accepted the principle of perpetuity in 1978 when the Department of Atomic Energy let Russia place the Rana Pratap Sagar reactors in Rajasthan under safeguards in 1978. India then agreed to the same for the Koodankulum reactors.
In other words, India has been accepting perpetuity clauses in return for nothing in the past. Now itâs doing the same, but getting international acceptance of its right to have both civilian and military nuclear programmes in return. No country will provide India with nuclear fuel or technology without perpetual safeguards. This is not a US bogey, itâs a global norm.
The only reasonable demand is that India not concede perpetuity without a guarantee of perpetual nuclear fuel supplies. Otherwise, in some theoretical global fluff-up, India could end up with a lot of idle nuclear power plants. This perpetuity-for-perpetuity trade-off is exactly what is being embedded in Indiaâs IAEA safeguards agreement.
Bottomline: Perpetuity is fine, but it must be double-barrelled.
Myth 5: India is not getting genuine nuclear power status. India canât get nuclear power status as defined by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty unless it can get: a) a time machine and detonate a nuclear bomb before 1967, or b) the support of all 151 NPT signatories. Itâs a toss-up as to which is more impossible.
What the nuclear deal gives India is the right to have both civilian and military nukes and access to global nuclear knowhow â the key benefits of nuclear club membership. All else is just rhetoric. It helps to realise that there is no standard âbill of rights of a nuclear powerâ, even among the five NPT powers. Crudely speaking, the earlier you enter the nuclear club, the more rights you get. Thus the US has the most, China the least. China, for example, places many of its atomic installations under perpetual safeguards despite being a recognised nuclear power.
Bottomline: India gets the wine in the bottle, minus the label.
Myth 6: India doesnât need nuclear power. India needs power from any source that it can find. Critics of nuclear power focus on the high start-up costs of reactors and projections that reactors will at best provide 8 per cent of Indiaâs future energy needs. Yes, reactors are billion-dollar-babies. But thatâs why the private sector is being brought in. Reliance, Tata and others are all lining up and they feel they have the funds. The fact the critics sidestep is that after a reactor is up and running, the per unit cost of its electricity is among the lowest and least volatile in the industry.
Also, no one says nuclear power is the be all, end all of Indiaâs power needs. A nationâs energy security is also about being able to tap a variety of power sources. In the long-term, it wouldnât help to be dependent solely on nuclear power. But not having a lot more nuclear power â cheap electricity that is independent of sheikhs and price cycles â is worse.
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