02-26-2004, 02:23 AM
It is my view that that the BJP has not been completely successful in countering these arguments against Indian nationhood. some thoughts on this by Koenraad Elst in his book on the BJP
http://www.bharatvani.org/books/bjp/section13.html
13. Hindutva and other peoples' nationalism
The BJP's subordination of any and every ideological or religious conflict to questions of "national unity and integrity", this most mindless form of territorial nationalism, is also a worrying retreat from the historical Hindu conception of Indian nationhood and its implications for the evaluation of foreign problems of national unity. Along with Mahatma Gandhi and other Freedom Fighters, the BJS used to be convinced that India was a self-conscious civilizational unit since several thousands of years, strengtheÂned in its realization of unity by the Sanskrit language, the Brahmin caste, the pilgrimage cycles which brought pilgrims from every part of India all around the country ("country" rather than the "Subcontinent" or "South Asia", terms which intrinÂsically question this unity), and other socio-cultural factors of national integration. The notions that India was an artificial creation of the British and a "nation in the making", were floated by the British themselÂves and by Jawaharlal Nehru, respectively, and both are obvious cases of unfounded self-flattery. Gandhi's and the BJS's viewpoint that India is an ancient nation conscious of its own unity is historically more accurate.
In foreign policy, one can expect two opposite attitudes to follow from these two conceptions of India, the Gandhian one which derives India's political unity from a pre-existent cultural unity, and the Nehruvian one which denies this cultural unity and sees political unity as a baseless coincidence, an artificial creation of external historical forces. In its own self-interest, an arÂtificiaÂlly created state devoid of underlying legitimacy tends to support any and every other state, regardlÂess of whether that state is the political embodiment of a popular will or a cultural coherence. The reason is that any successful separatism at the expense of a fellow artificial state is a threat to the state's own legitimacy. That is, for instance, why the founding member states of the OrÂganizatÂion of African Unity decided from the outset that the ethnically absurd colonial borders were not to be altered. It is also why countries like Great Britain and France, whose own legitimacy within their present borders is questioned by their Irish, Corsican and other minorities, were reluctant to give diplomatic recognition to Lithuania when it broke away from the Soviet Union.
By contrast, those who believe that states are merely politiÂcal instrumÂents in the service of existing ethnic or cultural units, accept that state structures and borders are not sacrosaÂnct in themselves, and that they may consequently be altered. That is why Aleksandr SolzhenitÂsyn proposed to allow the non-Slavic republics to leave the Soviet Union, and why as a sterling Russian patriot he pleaded in favour of Chechen independence from the Russian Federation: it is no use trying to keep Turks and Slavs, or Chechens and Russians, under one roof against their will. If Russia is meant to be the political expression of the collective will of the Russian people, it is only harmful to include other nations by force, as the Chechens and Turkic peoples once were.
To be sure, even partisans of this concept of "meaniÂngfÂul" (as opposed to arbitrary) states will concede that there may be limitations to this project of adjusÂting state structures and state borders to existing ethnic and cultural realitiÂes, especially where coherent comÂmunities have been ripped apart and relocated, as has happened in Russia. Also, cultural and ethnic identities are not static givens (e.g. the "Muslim" character of India's principal minority), so we should not oversimplify the question to an idyllic picture of a permanent division of the world in states allotted to God-given national enÂtities. But at least the general prinÂciple can be acÂcepted: states should as much as possible be the emÂbodiment of coherent cultural units. That, at any rate, is the Hindu-nationalist understanding of the Indian state: as the political embodiment of Hindu civilization.
Now, what is the position of the BJS/BJP regarding the right of a state to self-preservation as against the aspirations of ethnic-cultural communities or nations? The BJS originally had no problem supporting separatism in certain specific cases, esp. the liberation of East Turkestan (Sinkiang/ÂXinjiang), Inner Mongolia and Tibet from Chinese rule. At the time, the BJS still adhered to the Gandhian position: India should be one independent state because it is one culturally, and so should Tibet for the same reason. Meanwhile, however, this plank in its platform has been quietly withdrawn. ..
<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>Therefore, Indian nationalists are harming their own case by equating Kashmiri separatism with independentism in Tibet, which did not accede to China of its own free will and following due procedure, and which was not historically a part of China. To equate Kashmir with Tibet or Chechnya is to deny the profound historical and cultural Indianness of Kashmir, and to undermine India's case against Kashmiri separatism. Here again, we see the harmful effect of the BJP's intelÂlectual sloppiness. </span>
http://www.bharatvani.org/books/bjp/section13.html
13. Hindutva and other peoples' nationalism
The BJP's subordination of any and every ideological or religious conflict to questions of "national unity and integrity", this most mindless form of territorial nationalism, is also a worrying retreat from the historical Hindu conception of Indian nationhood and its implications for the evaluation of foreign problems of national unity. Along with Mahatma Gandhi and other Freedom Fighters, the BJS used to be convinced that India was a self-conscious civilizational unit since several thousands of years, strengtheÂned in its realization of unity by the Sanskrit language, the Brahmin caste, the pilgrimage cycles which brought pilgrims from every part of India all around the country ("country" rather than the "Subcontinent" or "South Asia", terms which intrinÂsically question this unity), and other socio-cultural factors of national integration. The notions that India was an artificial creation of the British and a "nation in the making", were floated by the British themselÂves and by Jawaharlal Nehru, respectively, and both are obvious cases of unfounded self-flattery. Gandhi's and the BJS's viewpoint that India is an ancient nation conscious of its own unity is historically more accurate.
In foreign policy, one can expect two opposite attitudes to follow from these two conceptions of India, the Gandhian one which derives India's political unity from a pre-existent cultural unity, and the Nehruvian one which denies this cultural unity and sees political unity as a baseless coincidence, an artificial creation of external historical forces. In its own self-interest, an arÂtificiaÂlly created state devoid of underlying legitimacy tends to support any and every other state, regardlÂess of whether that state is the political embodiment of a popular will or a cultural coherence. The reason is that any successful separatism at the expense of a fellow artificial state is a threat to the state's own legitimacy. That is, for instance, why the founding member states of the OrÂganizatÂion of African Unity decided from the outset that the ethnically absurd colonial borders were not to be altered. It is also why countries like Great Britain and France, whose own legitimacy within their present borders is questioned by their Irish, Corsican and other minorities, were reluctant to give diplomatic recognition to Lithuania when it broke away from the Soviet Union.
By contrast, those who believe that states are merely politiÂcal instrumÂents in the service of existing ethnic or cultural units, accept that state structures and borders are not sacrosaÂnct in themselves, and that they may consequently be altered. That is why Aleksandr SolzhenitÂsyn proposed to allow the non-Slavic republics to leave the Soviet Union, and why as a sterling Russian patriot he pleaded in favour of Chechen independence from the Russian Federation: it is no use trying to keep Turks and Slavs, or Chechens and Russians, under one roof against their will. If Russia is meant to be the political expression of the collective will of the Russian people, it is only harmful to include other nations by force, as the Chechens and Turkic peoples once were.
To be sure, even partisans of this concept of "meaniÂngfÂul" (as opposed to arbitrary) states will concede that there may be limitations to this project of adjusÂting state structures and state borders to existing ethnic and cultural realitiÂes, especially where coherent comÂmunities have been ripped apart and relocated, as has happened in Russia. Also, cultural and ethnic identities are not static givens (e.g. the "Muslim" character of India's principal minority), so we should not oversimplify the question to an idyllic picture of a permanent division of the world in states allotted to God-given national enÂtities. But at least the general prinÂciple can be acÂcepted: states should as much as possible be the emÂbodiment of coherent cultural units. That, at any rate, is the Hindu-nationalist understanding of the Indian state: as the political embodiment of Hindu civilization.
Now, what is the position of the BJS/BJP regarding the right of a state to self-preservation as against the aspirations of ethnic-cultural communities or nations? The BJS originally had no problem supporting separatism in certain specific cases, esp. the liberation of East Turkestan (Sinkiang/ÂXinjiang), Inner Mongolia and Tibet from Chinese rule. At the time, the BJS still adhered to the Gandhian position: India should be one independent state because it is one culturally, and so should Tibet for the same reason. Meanwhile, however, this plank in its platform has been quietly withdrawn. ..
<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>Therefore, Indian nationalists are harming their own case by equating Kashmiri separatism with independentism in Tibet, which did not accede to China of its own free will and following due procedure, and which was not historically a part of China. To equate Kashmir with Tibet or Chechnya is to deny the profound historical and cultural Indianness of Kashmir, and to undermine India's case against Kashmiri separatism. Here again, we see the harmful effect of the BJP's intelÂlectual sloppiness. </span>