09-13-2006, 11:09 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Op-Ed in Deccan Chronicle, 13 Sept., 2006
<b>Sleemanâs list </b>
By V. Balachandran
Yet another terrorist attack on September 8 in Malegaon, Maharashtra and yet the same charade from the authorities as I had said on July 18 (A federal eye on terror): Lofty declarations that we will not tolerate terrorism. âExpertsâ will then vie with each other to give sound-bites on the identity of the organisations and the reasons for such attacks, followed by media leaks that the Central agencies had forewarned the state, although the warning might have been just âmacro-informationâ without specifics. Who are we fooling?
<b>Just one measure recommended by the NDA Group of Ministers to set up a federal police to tackle federal crime like terrorism or Naxalite menace could have, in the long run, improved our capability on counter-terrorism</b>. However, the meeting of the<b> state satraps convened by the Prime Minister on September 5 brushed aside this suggestion, according to confidential sources. Even the BJP chief ministers did not favour this, fearing erosion of their power</b>.
The reasons why the state police is unable to tackle terrorism can be repeated, ad nauseam: Terrorism is borderless, professional and secretive, conducted by highly motivated cadres through high-tech operations. Police cadres are governed by tenure rules which prevent professionalism to tackle secretive terror units. <b>State police units on the other hand are fragmented, largely inefficient, corrupt, slow in reaction, badly trained, highly politicised with Pavlovian conditioning. Posting in intelligence wings is a punishment.</b>
The operational efficiency of the police systems vastly differs from state to state. Even if the Central agencies alert a particular police, there is no guarantee that follow-up action will be efficient. Coordination between police units is hardly satisfactory. Interrogation reports are not shared promptly. Nothing illustrates this better than the case of Al-Badr terrorist Tohfooq Akmal Hashmi, brought to Mumbai on September 2 to see whether he knows anything about 7/11 although the Intelligence Bureau and J&K police had, according to media, serious misgivings.
On the other hand a centralised operation against subversive elements had always produced better results. When IRA terror hit England, the London Metropolitan Policeâs Special Branch, which had tackled the menace earlier, was designated as the nodal authority to detect and prosecute IRA terrorism all over the country till MI5 was asked to take over the lead responsibility in 1992. In the United States, all such crimes against the nation, including money laundering, are investigated by federal agencies. A study of our own history will reveal that only such nodal authority could tackle such serious nation wide crimes.
A long forgotten chapter in Indian history is the suppression of the âThugheesâ by a remarkable individual named William Henry Sleeman. Unlike many of his peers in the British Service, Sleeman was a polyglot having mastered Arabic, Pushtoo, Hindustani, Gurkhali and Persian. He was also interested in agronomy, ethnography, political economy, palaeontology, printing and was also responsible for introducing Mauritian sugarcane in India through his Mauritian wife of French origins.
The subject of Thughee engaged his attention as a magistrate. Till then there were only rumours on this secret sect which, according to later historians, had started operations even from Akbarâs period. Like modern terrorist groups they transcended religion and caste, used secret codes and a language called âRamsee,â believed in omens and led double lives. They were so secretive that even their own families did not know of their activities.
The British started taking notice of this from 1810-1812 when their own sepoys and an officer named John Maunsell disappeared. The looting of an Indian bank convoy in Malegaon in 1828 jolted them into action. The estimates on the number of killings over the centuries varied from 2,00,000 according to Guinness Book of Records to 50,000 by some British historians. Although Governor-General Bentinck gave all logistical support in 1829 by designating Sleeman as the ânodalâ officer in British India to fight the Thughee menace, there were formidable difficulties.
Even the roads and land mass of India were not surveyed till 1832. He had to counter the fragmented and corrupt princely state police which did not extend any cooperation. His âmodern technologyâ consisted only of pen, paper and indexes. However, he methodically collected every scrap of paper on 200 gangs all over India, creating an impressive database of 4,000 names with family trees as well as Muslim and Hindu aliases. British historian Mike Dash has said, âSome of the techniques that he developed in the early 1830s presaged methods that would not come into common use in police departments at home in Europe for another 50-60 years.â
Reports on each Thughee murder all over British India were sent to Sleeman for collation. Each Thug was assigned a unique number. This department spread all over India from Delhi border to Hyderabad, comprised only a staff of seven assistants besides 300 ânajibsâ (Native soldiers). Later it was known as Political Intelligence Department which became âIntelligence Bureauâ after Independence. By 1830, he managed to arrest 350 Thugs based on this databank.
The modus operandi of this anti-crime force was the same as any modern anti-terror unit like centralised collection of information, collation, analysis, dissemination to the other police systems besides conducting important centralised operations. Interrogation of captured Thugs was used to collect advance intelligence on their next operations. Secret funds were used to break die-hard Thugs to convert them as approvers.
Bentinck approved Sleemanâs hot pursuit of Thugs anywhere in India and overruled objections from princes and British residents. In 1831, Sleeman blasted the fort in Jhansi to catch a Thug leader when the ruler objected to his entry. All Thugs so arrested by Sleeman were brought for trial only in two special courts located in Sagar and Jabalpur; 4,500 Thugs were brought to trial between 1826 and 1848 of whom 3,504 were given extreme sentences like hanging and life term. Only 250 were acquitted. The Thug menace disappeared by 1840. This alone will indicate what a federal anti-terror police can achieve. Are our State leaders listening?
<i>V. Balachandran is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat </i><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<b>Sleemanâs list </b>
By V. Balachandran
Yet another terrorist attack on September 8 in Malegaon, Maharashtra and yet the same charade from the authorities as I had said on July 18 (A federal eye on terror): Lofty declarations that we will not tolerate terrorism. âExpertsâ will then vie with each other to give sound-bites on the identity of the organisations and the reasons for such attacks, followed by media leaks that the Central agencies had forewarned the state, although the warning might have been just âmacro-informationâ without specifics. Who are we fooling?
<b>Just one measure recommended by the NDA Group of Ministers to set up a federal police to tackle federal crime like terrorism or Naxalite menace could have, in the long run, improved our capability on counter-terrorism</b>. However, the meeting of the<b> state satraps convened by the Prime Minister on September 5 brushed aside this suggestion, according to confidential sources. Even the BJP chief ministers did not favour this, fearing erosion of their power</b>.
The reasons why the state police is unable to tackle terrorism can be repeated, ad nauseam: Terrorism is borderless, professional and secretive, conducted by highly motivated cadres through high-tech operations. Police cadres are governed by tenure rules which prevent professionalism to tackle secretive terror units. <b>State police units on the other hand are fragmented, largely inefficient, corrupt, slow in reaction, badly trained, highly politicised with Pavlovian conditioning. Posting in intelligence wings is a punishment.</b>
The operational efficiency of the police systems vastly differs from state to state. Even if the Central agencies alert a particular police, there is no guarantee that follow-up action will be efficient. Coordination between police units is hardly satisfactory. Interrogation reports are not shared promptly. Nothing illustrates this better than the case of Al-Badr terrorist Tohfooq Akmal Hashmi, brought to Mumbai on September 2 to see whether he knows anything about 7/11 although the Intelligence Bureau and J&K police had, according to media, serious misgivings.
On the other hand a centralised operation against subversive elements had always produced better results. When IRA terror hit England, the London Metropolitan Policeâs Special Branch, which had tackled the menace earlier, was designated as the nodal authority to detect and prosecute IRA terrorism all over the country till MI5 was asked to take over the lead responsibility in 1992. In the United States, all such crimes against the nation, including money laundering, are investigated by federal agencies. A study of our own history will reveal that only such nodal authority could tackle such serious nation wide crimes.
A long forgotten chapter in Indian history is the suppression of the âThugheesâ by a remarkable individual named William Henry Sleeman. Unlike many of his peers in the British Service, Sleeman was a polyglot having mastered Arabic, Pushtoo, Hindustani, Gurkhali and Persian. He was also interested in agronomy, ethnography, political economy, palaeontology, printing and was also responsible for introducing Mauritian sugarcane in India through his Mauritian wife of French origins.
The subject of Thughee engaged his attention as a magistrate. Till then there were only rumours on this secret sect which, according to later historians, had started operations even from Akbarâs period. Like modern terrorist groups they transcended religion and caste, used secret codes and a language called âRamsee,â believed in omens and led double lives. They were so secretive that even their own families did not know of their activities.
The British started taking notice of this from 1810-1812 when their own sepoys and an officer named John Maunsell disappeared. The looting of an Indian bank convoy in Malegaon in 1828 jolted them into action. The estimates on the number of killings over the centuries varied from 2,00,000 according to Guinness Book of Records to 50,000 by some British historians. Although Governor-General Bentinck gave all logistical support in 1829 by designating Sleeman as the ânodalâ officer in British India to fight the Thughee menace, there were formidable difficulties.
Even the roads and land mass of India were not surveyed till 1832. He had to counter the fragmented and corrupt princely state police which did not extend any cooperation. His âmodern technologyâ consisted only of pen, paper and indexes. However, he methodically collected every scrap of paper on 200 gangs all over India, creating an impressive database of 4,000 names with family trees as well as Muslim and Hindu aliases. British historian Mike Dash has said, âSome of the techniques that he developed in the early 1830s presaged methods that would not come into common use in police departments at home in Europe for another 50-60 years.â
Reports on each Thughee murder all over British India were sent to Sleeman for collation. Each Thug was assigned a unique number. This department spread all over India from Delhi border to Hyderabad, comprised only a staff of seven assistants besides 300 ânajibsâ (Native soldiers). Later it was known as Political Intelligence Department which became âIntelligence Bureauâ after Independence. By 1830, he managed to arrest 350 Thugs based on this databank.
The modus operandi of this anti-crime force was the same as any modern anti-terror unit like centralised collection of information, collation, analysis, dissemination to the other police systems besides conducting important centralised operations. Interrogation of captured Thugs was used to collect advance intelligence on their next operations. Secret funds were used to break die-hard Thugs to convert them as approvers.
Bentinck approved Sleemanâs hot pursuit of Thugs anywhere in India and overruled objections from princes and British residents. In 1831, Sleeman blasted the fort in Jhansi to catch a Thug leader when the ruler objected to his entry. All Thugs so arrested by Sleeman were brought for trial only in two special courts located in Sagar and Jabalpur; 4,500 Thugs were brought to trial between 1826 and 1848 of whom 3,504 were given extreme sentences like hanging and life term. Only 250 were acquitted. The Thug menace disappeared by 1840. This alone will indicate what a federal anti-terror police can achieve. Are our State leaders listening?
<i>V. Balachandran is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat </i><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->