Why Was There No Tranfer Of Population?

[G.Subramaniam]

CHAPTER VI
PAKISTAN AND COMMUNAL PEACE
Does Pakistan solve the Communal Question is a natural question which every Hindu is sure to ask. A correct
answer to this question calls for a close analysis of what is involved in it. One must have a clear idea as to what is
exactly meant, when the Hindus and Muslims speak of the Communal Question. Without it, it will not be possible
to say whether Pakistan does or does not solve the Communal Question.
It is not generally known that the Communal Question like the " Forward Policy " for the Frontier has a " greater "
and a " lesser intent, " and that in its lesser intent it means one thing, and in its greater intent it means quite a
different thing.
I
To begin with the Communal Question in its " lesser intent ". In its lesser intent, the Communal Question relates to
the representation of the Hindus and the Muslims in the Legislatures. Used in this sense, the question involves the
settlement of two distinct problems :—
(1) The number of seats to be allotted to the Hindus and the Muslims in the different legislatures, and
(2) The nature of the electorates through which these seats are to be filled in.
The Muslims at the Round Table Conference claimed :—
(1) That their representatives in all the Provincial as well as in the Central Legislatures should be elected by
separate electorates ;
(2) That they should be allowed to retain the weightage in representation given to Muslim minorities in those
Provinces in which they were a minority in the population, and that in addition, they should be given in those
Provinces where they were a majority such as the Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and Bengal, a
guaranteed statutory majority of seats.
The Hindus from the beginning objected to both these Muslim demands. They insisted on joint electorates for
Hindus and Muslims in all elections to all the Legislatures, Central and Provincial, and on population ratio of
representation, for both minorities, Hindus and Muslims, wherever they may be, and raised the strongest objections
to a majority of seats being guaranteed to any community by statute.
The Communal Award of His Majesty's Government settled this dispute by the simple, rough and ready method of
giving the Muslims all that they wanted, without caring for the Hindu opposition. "The Award allowed the Muslims
to retain weight-age and separate electorates, and in addition, gave them the statutory majority of seats in those
provinces where they were a majority in the population.
What is it in the Award that can be said to constitute a problem ? Is there any force in the objections of the Hindus
to the Communal Award of His Majesty's Government ? This question must be considered carefully to find out
whether there is substance in the objections of the Hindus to the Award.
Firstly, as to their objection to the weightage to Muslim minorities in the matter of representation. Whatever may be
the correct measure of allotting representation to minorities, the Hindus cannot very well object to the weightage
given to Muslim minorities, because similar weightage has been given to the Hindus in those Provinces in which
they are a minority and where there is sufficient margin for weightage to be allowed. The treatment of the Hindu
minorities in Sind and the North-West Frontier Province is a case in point.
Secondly, as to their objection to a statutory majority. That again does not appear to be well founded. A system of
guaranteed representation may be wrong and vicious and quite unjustifiable on theoretical and philosophical
grounds. But considered in the light of circumstances, such as those obtaining in India, the system of statutory
majority appears to be inevitable. Once it is granted that the representation to be given to a minority must not
reduce the majority to minority, that very provision creates, as a mere counterpart, a system of statutory majority to
the majority community. For, fixing the seats of the minority involves the fixation of the seats of the majority.
There is, therefore, no escape from the system of statutory majority, once it is conceded that the minority is not
entitled to representation which would convert a majority into a minority. There is, therefore, no great force in the
objections of the Hindus to a statutory majority of the Muslims in the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province,
Sind and Bengal. For, even in the Provinces where the Hindus are in a majority and the Muslims are in minority,
the Hindus have got a statutory majority over the Muslims. At any rate, there is a parity of position and to that
extent there can be said to be no ground for complaint.
This does not mean that because the objections set forth by the Hindus have no substance, there are no real grounds
for opposing the Communal Award. There does exist a substantial ground of objection to the Communal Award,
although, it does not appear to have been made the basis of attack by the Hindus.
This objection may be formulated in order to bring out its point in the following manner. The Muslim minorities in
the Hindu Provinces insisted on separate electorates. The Communal Award gives them the right to determine that
issue. This is really what it comes to when one remembers the usual position taken, viz., that the Muslim minorities
could not be deprived of their separate electorates without their consent, and the majority community of the Hindus
has been made to abide by their determination. The Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces insisted that there should
be joint electorates. Instead of conceding their claim, the Communal Award forced upon them the system of
separate electorates to which they objected. If in the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minorities are allowed the right
of self-determination in the matter of electorates, the question arises : Why are not the Hindu minorities in the
Muslim Provinces given the right of self-determination in the matter of their electorates ? What is the answer to this
question ? And, if there is no answer, there is undoubtedly a deep seated inequity in the Communal Award of His
Majesty's Government, which calls for redress.
It is no answer that the Hindus also have a statutory majority based on separate electorates 38[f.38] in those
Provinces where the Musalmans are in a minority. A little scrutiny will show that there is no parity of position in
these two cases. The separate electorates for the Hindu majorities in the Hindu Provinces are not a matter of their
choice. It is a consequence resulting from the determination of the Muslim minorities who claimed to have separate
electorates for themselves. A minority in one set of circumstances may think that separate electorates would be a
better method of self-protection and may have no fear of creating against itself and by its own action a statutory
majority based on separate electorates for the opposing community. Another minority or, for the matter of that, the
same minority in a different set of circumstances would not like to create by its own action and against itself a
statutory majority based upon separate electorates and may, therefore, prefer joint electorates to separate electorates
as a better method of self-protection. Obviously the guiding principle, which would influence a minority, would be :
Is the majority likely to use its majority in a communal manner and purely for communal purposes ? If it felt certain
that the majority community is likely to use its communal majority for communal ends, it may well choose joint
electorates, because it would be the only method by which it would hope to take away the communal cement of the
statutory majority by influencing the elections of the representatives of the majority community in the Legislatures.
On the other hand, a majority community may not have the necessary communal cement, which alone would enable
it to use its communal majority for communal ends, in which case a minority, having no fear from the resulting
statutory majority and separate electorates for the majority community, may well choose separate electorates for
itself. To put it concretely, the Muslim minorities in choosing separate electorates are not afraid of the separate
electorates and the statutory majority of the Hindus, because they feel sure that by reason of their deep-seated
differences of caste and race the Hindus will never be able to use their majorities against the Muslims. On the other
hand, the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces have no doubt that, by reason of their social solidarity, the
Muslims will use their statutory majority to set into operation a "Resolute Muslim Government", after the plan
proposed by Lord Salisbury for Ireland as a substitute for Home Rule; with this difference, that Salisbury's Resolute
Government was to last for twenty years only, while the Muslim Resolute Government was to last as long as the
Communal Award stood. "The situations, therefore, are not alike. The statutory majority of the Hindus based on
separate electorates is the result of the choice made by the Muslim minority. The statutory majority of the Muslims
based on separate electorates is something which is not the result of the choice of the Hindu minority. In one case,
the Government of the Muslim minority by a Hindu communal majority is the result of the consent of the Muslim
minority, In the other case, the Government of the Hindu minority by the Muslim majority is not the result of the
consent of the Hindu minority, but is imposed upon it by the might of the British Government.
To sum up this discussion of the Communal Award, it may be said that, as a solution of the Communal Question in
its " lesser intent ", there is no inequity in the Award on the ground that it gives weightage to the Muslim minorities
in the Hindu Provinces. For, it gives weightage also to Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces. Similarly, it may be
said that there is no inequity in the Award, on the ground that it gives a statutory majority to the Muslims in Muslim
Provinces in which they are a majority. If there is any, the statutory limitation put upon the Muslim number of
seats, also gives to the Hindus in Hindu Provinces a statutory majority. But the same cannot be said of the Award in
the matter of the electorates. The Communal Award is iniquitous inasmuch as it accords unequal treatment to the
Hindu and Muslim minorities in the matter of electorates. It grants the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces
the right of self-determination in the matter of electorates, but it does not grant the same right to the Hindu
minorities in the Muslim Provinces. In the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minority is allowed to choose the kind of
electorates it wants and the Hindu majority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. But in the Muslim
Provinces, it is the Muslim majority which is allowed to choose the kind of electorates it prefers and the Hindu
minority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. Thus , the Muslims in the Muslim Provinces having been
given both statutory majority and separate electorates, the Communal Award must be said to impose upon the
Hindu minorities Muslim rule, which they can neither alter nor influence.
This is what constitutes the fundamental wrong in the Communal Award. That this is a grave wrong must be
admitted. For, it offends against certain political principles, which have now become axiomatic. First is, not to trust
any one with unlimited political power. As has been well said,
" If in any state there is a body of men who possess unlimited political power, those over whom they rule can never
be free. For, the one assured result of historical investigation is the lesson that uncontrolled power is invariably
poisonous to those who possess it. They are always tempted to impose their canon of good upon others, and in the
end, they assume that the good of the community depends upon the continuance of their power. Liberty always
demands a limitation of political authority......"
The second principle is that, as a King has no Divine Right to rule, so also a majority has no Divine Right to rule.
Majority Rule is tolerated only because it is for a limited period and subject to the right to have it changed, and
secondly because it is a rule of a political majority, i.e., majority which has submitted itself to the suffrage of a
minority and not a communal majority. If such is the limited scope of authority permissible to a political majority
over a political minority, how can a minority of one community be placed under the perpetual subjection of a
majority of another community ? To allow a majority of one community to rule a minority of another community
without requiring the majority to submit itself to the suffrage of the minority, especially when the minority demands
it, is to enact a perversion of democratic principles and to show a callous disregard for the safety and security of the
Hindu minorities.