04-10-2004, 08:43 PM
Resolution 9[f.9] No. 7:
" This meeting of the All India Muslim League deprecates and protests against the formation of
Ministries in certain Provinces by the Congress parties in flagrant violation of the letter and the
spirit of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Instrument of Instructions and condemns the
Governors for their failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them for the safeguards of the
interest of the Musalmans and other important minorities"
Resolution* No. 8:
" Resolved that the object of the All India Muslim League shall be the establishment in India of
Full Independence in the form of federation of free democratic states in which the rights and
interests of the Musalmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the
constitution."
Equal number of resolutions were passed at the next annual session of the League held at Patna in
December 1938. Resolution* No. 10 is noteworthy. It reads as follows :â
"The All India Muslim League reiterates its view that the scheme of Federation embodied in the
Government of India Act, 1935, is not acceptable, but in view of the further developments that have
taken place or may take place from time to time it hereby authorises the President of the All India
Muslim League to adopt such course as may be necessary with a view to explore the possibility of a
suitable alternative which will safeguard the interests of the Musalmans and other minorities in
India." By these resolutions Mr. Jinnah showed that he was for a common front between the
Muslims and other non-Muslim minorities. Unfortunately the catholicity and statesmanship that
underlies these resolutions did not last long. In 1939 Mr. Jinnah took a somersault and outlined the
dangerous and disastrous policy of isolation of the Musalmans by passing that notorious resolution
in favour of Pakistan. What is the reason for this isolation ? Nothing but the change of view that the
Musalmans were a nation and not a community ! ! One need not quarrel over the question whether
the Muslims are a nation or a community. But one finds it extremely difficult to understand how the
mere fact that the Muslims are a nation makes political isolation a safe and sound policy ?
Unfortunately Muslims do not realize what disservice Mr. Jinnah has done to them by this policy.
But let Muslims consider what Mr. Jinnah has achieved by making the Muslim League the only
organization for the Musalmans. It may be that it has helped him to avoid the possibility of having
to play the second fiddle. For inside the Muslim camp he can always be sure of the first place for
himself. But how does the League hope to save by this plan of isolation the Muslims from Hindu
Raj ? Will Pakistan obviate the establishment of Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Musalmans
are in a minority ? Obviously it cannot. This is what would happen in the Muslim minority
Provinces if Pakistan came. Take an all-India view. Can Pakistan prevent the establishment of
Hindu Raj at the centre over Muslim minorities that will remain Hindustan? It is plain that it
cannot. What good is Pakistan then ? Only to prevent Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Muslims
are in a majority and in which there could never be Hindu Raj ! ! To put it differently Pakistan is
unnecessary to Muslims where they are in a majority because there, there is no fear of Hindu Raj. It
is worse than useless to Muslims where they are in a minority, because Pakistan or no Pakistan they
will have to face a Hindu Raj. Can politics be more futile than the politics of the Muslim League ?
The Muslim League started to help minority Muslims and has ended by espousing the cause of
majority Muslims. What a perversion in the original aim of the Muslim League ! What a fall from
the sublime to the ridiculous ! Partition as a remedy against Hindu Raj is worse than useless.
VI
These are some of the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan which have occurred to me.
There might be others which have not struck me. But the list as it is, is quite a formidable one. How
do the Muslims propose to meet them ? That is a question for the Muslims and not for me. My duty
as a student of the subject extends to setting forth these weaknesses. That I have done. I have
nothing more to answer for.
There are, however, two other questions of such importance that this discussion cannot be closed
with any sense of completeness without reference to them. The purpose of these questions is to
clear the ground between myself and my critics. Of these questions, one I am entitled to ask the
critics, the other the critics are entitled to ask me.
Beginning with the first question, what I feel like asking the critics is, what good do they expect
from a statement of these weaknesses ? Do they expect the Musalmans to give up Pakistan if they
are defeated in a controversy over the virtues of Pakistan ? That of course depends upon what
method is adopted to resolve this controversy. The Hindus and the Musalmans may follow the
procedure which Christian missionaries had set up in early times in order to secure converts from
amongst the Hindus. According to this procedure a day was appointed for a disputation, which was
open to public, between a Christian missionary and a Brahmin, the former representing the
Christian religion and the latter holding himself out as the protagonist of the Hindu religion with
the condition that whoever failed to meet the case against his religion was bound to accept the
religion of the other. If such a method of resolving the dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims
over the issue of Pakistan was agreed upon there may be some use in setting out this string of
weaknesses. But let it not be forgotten that there is another method of disposing of a controversy
which maybe called Johnsonian after the manner which Dr. Johnson employed in dealing with
arguments of Bishop Berkeley. It is recorded by Boswell that when he told Dr. Johnson that the
doctrine of Bishop Berkeley that matter was non-existent and that everything in the universe was
merely ideal, was only an ingenious sophistry but that it was impossible to refute it. Dr. Johnson
with great alacrity answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he
rebounded from it saying, " I refute it thus." It may be that the Musalmans will agree, as most
rational people do, to have their case for Pakistan decided by the tests of reason and argument. But
I should not be surprised if the Muslims decided to adopt the method of Dr. Johnson and say "
Damn your arguments ! We want Pakistan." In that event the critic must realize that any reliance
placed upon the limitations for destroying the case for Pakistan will be of no avail. It is therefore no
use being jubilant over the logic of these objections to Pakistan.
Let me now turn to the other question which I said the critic is entitled to put to me. What is my
position regarding the issue of Pakistan in the light of the objections, which I have set out ? I have
no doubts as to my position. I hold firmly that, subject to certain conditions, detailed in the chapters
that follow, if the Musalmans are bent on having Pakistan then it must be conceded to them. I know
my critics will at once accuse me of inconsistency and will demand reasons for so extraordinary a
conclusionâ extraordinary because of the view expressed by me in the earlier part of this chapter
that the Muslim case for Pakistan has nothing in it which can be said to carry the compelling force
which the decree of an inexorable fate may be said to have. I withdraw nothing from what I have
said as to the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan. Yet I hold that if the Muslims must have
Pakistan there is no escape from conceding it to them. As to the reasons which have led me to that
conclusion I shall not hesitate to say that the strength or weakness of the logic of Pakistan is not
one of them. In my judgement there are two governing factors which must determine the issue.
First is the defence of India and second is the sentiment of the Muslims. I will state why I regard
them as decisive and how in my opinion they tell in favour of Pakistan.
To begin with the first. One cannot ignore that what is important is not the winning of
independence but the having of the sure means of maintaining it. The ultimate guarantee of the
independence of a country is a safe armyâan army on which you can rely to fight for the country
at all time and in any eventuality. The army in India must necessarily be a mixed army composed
of Hindus and Muslims. If India is invaded by a foreign power, can the Muslims in the army be
trusted to defend India ? Suppose invaders are their co-religionists. Will the Muslims side with the
invaders or will they stand against them and save India ? This is a very crucial question. Obviously,
the answer to this question must depend upon to what extent the Muslims in the army have caught
the infection of the two-nation theory, which is the foundation of Pakistan. If they are infected, then
the army in India cannot be safe. Instead of being the guardian of the independence of India, it will
continue to be a menace and a potential danger to its independence. I confess I feel aghast when I
hear some Britishers argue that it is for the defence of India that they must reject Pakistan. Some
Hindus also sing the same tune. I feel certain that either they are unaware as to what the
determining factor in the independence of India is or that they are talking of the defence of India
not as an independent country responsible for its own defence but as a British possession to be
defended by them against an intruder. This is a hopelessly wrong angle of vision. The question is
not whether the British will be able to defend India better if there was no partition of India. The
question is whether Indians will be able to defend a free India. To that, I repeat, the only answer is
that Indians will be able to defend a free India on one and one condition aloneânamely, if the
army in India remains non-political, unaffected by the poison of Pakistan. I want to warn Indians
against the most stupid habit that has grown up in this country of discussing the question of Swaraj
without reference to the question of the army. Nothing can be more fatal than the failure to realize
that a political army is the greatest danger to the liberty of India. It is worse than having no army.
" This meeting of the All India Muslim League deprecates and protests against the formation of
Ministries in certain Provinces by the Congress parties in flagrant violation of the letter and the
spirit of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Instrument of Instructions and condemns the
Governors for their failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them for the safeguards of the
interest of the Musalmans and other important minorities"
Resolution* No. 8:
" Resolved that the object of the All India Muslim League shall be the establishment in India of
Full Independence in the form of federation of free democratic states in which the rights and
interests of the Musalmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the
constitution."
Equal number of resolutions were passed at the next annual session of the League held at Patna in
December 1938. Resolution* No. 10 is noteworthy. It reads as follows :â
"The All India Muslim League reiterates its view that the scheme of Federation embodied in the
Government of India Act, 1935, is not acceptable, but in view of the further developments that have
taken place or may take place from time to time it hereby authorises the President of the All India
Muslim League to adopt such course as may be necessary with a view to explore the possibility of a
suitable alternative which will safeguard the interests of the Musalmans and other minorities in
India." By these resolutions Mr. Jinnah showed that he was for a common front between the
Muslims and other non-Muslim minorities. Unfortunately the catholicity and statesmanship that
underlies these resolutions did not last long. In 1939 Mr. Jinnah took a somersault and outlined the
dangerous and disastrous policy of isolation of the Musalmans by passing that notorious resolution
in favour of Pakistan. What is the reason for this isolation ? Nothing but the change of view that the
Musalmans were a nation and not a community ! ! One need not quarrel over the question whether
the Muslims are a nation or a community. But one finds it extremely difficult to understand how the
mere fact that the Muslims are a nation makes political isolation a safe and sound policy ?
Unfortunately Muslims do not realize what disservice Mr. Jinnah has done to them by this policy.
But let Muslims consider what Mr. Jinnah has achieved by making the Muslim League the only
organization for the Musalmans. It may be that it has helped him to avoid the possibility of having
to play the second fiddle. For inside the Muslim camp he can always be sure of the first place for
himself. But how does the League hope to save by this plan of isolation the Muslims from Hindu
Raj ? Will Pakistan obviate the establishment of Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Musalmans
are in a minority ? Obviously it cannot. This is what would happen in the Muslim minority
Provinces if Pakistan came. Take an all-India view. Can Pakistan prevent the establishment of
Hindu Raj at the centre over Muslim minorities that will remain Hindustan? It is plain that it
cannot. What good is Pakistan then ? Only to prevent Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Muslims
are in a majority and in which there could never be Hindu Raj ! ! To put it differently Pakistan is
unnecessary to Muslims where they are in a majority because there, there is no fear of Hindu Raj. It
is worse than useless to Muslims where they are in a minority, because Pakistan or no Pakistan they
will have to face a Hindu Raj. Can politics be more futile than the politics of the Muslim League ?
The Muslim League started to help minority Muslims and has ended by espousing the cause of
majority Muslims. What a perversion in the original aim of the Muslim League ! What a fall from
the sublime to the ridiculous ! Partition as a remedy against Hindu Raj is worse than useless.
VI
These are some of the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan which have occurred to me.
There might be others which have not struck me. But the list as it is, is quite a formidable one. How
do the Muslims propose to meet them ? That is a question for the Muslims and not for me. My duty
as a student of the subject extends to setting forth these weaknesses. That I have done. I have
nothing more to answer for.
There are, however, two other questions of such importance that this discussion cannot be closed
with any sense of completeness without reference to them. The purpose of these questions is to
clear the ground between myself and my critics. Of these questions, one I am entitled to ask the
critics, the other the critics are entitled to ask me.
Beginning with the first question, what I feel like asking the critics is, what good do they expect
from a statement of these weaknesses ? Do they expect the Musalmans to give up Pakistan if they
are defeated in a controversy over the virtues of Pakistan ? That of course depends upon what
method is adopted to resolve this controversy. The Hindus and the Musalmans may follow the
procedure which Christian missionaries had set up in early times in order to secure converts from
amongst the Hindus. According to this procedure a day was appointed for a disputation, which was
open to public, between a Christian missionary and a Brahmin, the former representing the
Christian religion and the latter holding himself out as the protagonist of the Hindu religion with
the condition that whoever failed to meet the case against his religion was bound to accept the
religion of the other. If such a method of resolving the dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims
over the issue of Pakistan was agreed upon there may be some use in setting out this string of
weaknesses. But let it not be forgotten that there is another method of disposing of a controversy
which maybe called Johnsonian after the manner which Dr. Johnson employed in dealing with
arguments of Bishop Berkeley. It is recorded by Boswell that when he told Dr. Johnson that the
doctrine of Bishop Berkeley that matter was non-existent and that everything in the universe was
merely ideal, was only an ingenious sophistry but that it was impossible to refute it. Dr. Johnson
with great alacrity answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he
rebounded from it saying, " I refute it thus." It may be that the Musalmans will agree, as most
rational people do, to have their case for Pakistan decided by the tests of reason and argument. But
I should not be surprised if the Muslims decided to adopt the method of Dr. Johnson and say "
Damn your arguments ! We want Pakistan." In that event the critic must realize that any reliance
placed upon the limitations for destroying the case for Pakistan will be of no avail. It is therefore no
use being jubilant over the logic of these objections to Pakistan.
Let me now turn to the other question which I said the critic is entitled to put to me. What is my
position regarding the issue of Pakistan in the light of the objections, which I have set out ? I have
no doubts as to my position. I hold firmly that, subject to certain conditions, detailed in the chapters
that follow, if the Musalmans are bent on having Pakistan then it must be conceded to them. I know
my critics will at once accuse me of inconsistency and will demand reasons for so extraordinary a
conclusionâ extraordinary because of the view expressed by me in the earlier part of this chapter
that the Muslim case for Pakistan has nothing in it which can be said to carry the compelling force
which the decree of an inexorable fate may be said to have. I withdraw nothing from what I have
said as to the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan. Yet I hold that if the Muslims must have
Pakistan there is no escape from conceding it to them. As to the reasons which have led me to that
conclusion I shall not hesitate to say that the strength or weakness of the logic of Pakistan is not
one of them. In my judgement there are two governing factors which must determine the issue.
First is the defence of India and second is the sentiment of the Muslims. I will state why I regard
them as decisive and how in my opinion they tell in favour of Pakistan.
To begin with the first. One cannot ignore that what is important is not the winning of
independence but the having of the sure means of maintaining it. The ultimate guarantee of the
independence of a country is a safe armyâan army on which you can rely to fight for the country
at all time and in any eventuality. The army in India must necessarily be a mixed army composed
of Hindus and Muslims. If India is invaded by a foreign power, can the Muslims in the army be
trusted to defend India ? Suppose invaders are their co-religionists. Will the Muslims side with the
invaders or will they stand against them and save India ? This is a very crucial question. Obviously,
the answer to this question must depend upon to what extent the Muslims in the army have caught
the infection of the two-nation theory, which is the foundation of Pakistan. If they are infected, then
the army in India cannot be safe. Instead of being the guardian of the independence of India, it will
continue to be a menace and a potential danger to its independence. I confess I feel aghast when I
hear some Britishers argue that it is for the defence of India that they must reject Pakistan. Some
Hindus also sing the same tune. I feel certain that either they are unaware as to what the
determining factor in the independence of India is or that they are talking of the defence of India
not as an independent country responsible for its own defence but as a British possession to be
defended by them against an intruder. This is a hopelessly wrong angle of vision. The question is
not whether the British will be able to defend India better if there was no partition of India. The
question is whether Indians will be able to defend a free India. To that, I repeat, the only answer is
that Indians will be able to defend a free India on one and one condition aloneânamely, if the
army in India remains non-political, unaffected by the poison of Pakistan. I want to warn Indians
against the most stupid habit that has grown up in this country of discussing the question of Swaraj
without reference to the question of the army. Nothing can be more fatal than the failure to realize
that a political army is the greatest danger to the liberty of India. It is worse than having no army.