<!--QuoteBegin-Husky+Jan 28 2007, 09:00 AM-->QUOTE(Husky @ Jan 28 2007, 09:00 AM)<!--QuoteEBegin-->...Gil glances over facts like how the Romans also helped cause the extinction of the Picts (who had to leave the region, and were then persecuted by the Celts and presumably destroyed by the Vikings). The Romans also killed innumerable numbers of Germanic tribes in their wars (hundreds of thousands or more), and the same case in their dealings with the Gauls and Thracians.
The armies of the Roman Empire dealt ruthless blows at many peoples, and the Roman genocide of the Jews was not aimed at Jewry in a way more particularly and peculiarly than that which they perpetrated against other peoples whom they could not assimilate into the empire. [right][snapback]63665[/snapback][/right]
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husky,
gil=white uses the terminology that he is familiar with..
i don't think he is saying that christianity is egalitarian. jews do not have the universality of christians and "maintain" a natural tribal social organization; that is they are not fully messianic and their concerns are limited to the boundaries of palestine. the jewish response to roman pressures was the slave religion of Christianity - a slave religion by all accounts is definitely a revolutionary movement, not necessarily egalitarian, and certainly in form similiar to all succeeding revolutionary movements, communism, etc. why blame picts for not being able to develop a religico-polito movement that was able to bring romans to their knees. should we have expected the jews to take comfort in the fact that the romans were just occupiers and not homogeneizing monotheists. this problem of our perception will continue if we insists on viewing the messianic error as just a monotheist-polytheist problem (as the semitics do). the monotheist-polytheist dichotomy is just the first symptom of the semitic (actually greek) error that burst onto the stage of history. the real, original error lies elsewhere (in greece and rome, where the christist scriptures were frst written in koine greek):
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->... The actions one is âashamedâ of are done in such moments of âdeliriumâ. Good actions are reflec-tions of, come from, the âreal meâ. The point of reference is essentially the inner self (the good inner self, in Rousseauâs case), in terms of which one can say: âThis is really meâ or âThis is really not meâ. Such sentiments are foreign to us, or so I claim.
Three peripheral remarks are in order.
1. We do describe, even in our models, people as âgoodâ or âevilâ. But these descriptions abbreviate actions and relations: âdutiful sonâ abbreviates actions performed by one of the relata in its relation-ship with the other.
2. The âdoctrine of Karmaâ is a component of a theory of âself-identity. Because the âselfâ is the set of actions performed by the organism (if we leave out its representations) and because all organisms (including animals, insects etc.) do act, it is not possible to restrict âselvesâ to human beings alone. Such a doctrine must perforce be applicable to all organisms capable of performing actions, as is indeed the case.
3. Because of the essential relationship between the âselfâ and actions, the moral life of an organism includes all kinds of actions performed by it during its life-time. This has an additional conse-quence that a human organismâs relationship to the Natural world becomes an essential aspect in the construction of a âselfâ. By the same token, manâs relationship to Nature becomes a moral re-lationship as well.
<b>The contrast with Western ethical thought is again instructive in this regard. Ever since Homer, it has been a rather characteristic trait of Western thinking that moral phenomena pertained only to the domain of human intercourse. The relation of Man to Nature fell outside the scope of moral life: </b>where it does enter into discussion at all, it does so derivatively in terms of, say, the consequences of such actions on future generations. Inanimate Nature, non- and quasi-sentient animals, on their part, could not enter into any moral relationship with human beings because they lacked the faculty or the capacity to âreasonâ (or whatever) by exercising which moral choices and decisions could be made. Morality came into play only when both the relata in the relationship were moral agents and Nature disqualified herself from being one. In the best of cases, Nature was indifferent to manâs striving to realize a moral world. At worst, she was hostile to such an endeavour.
This restricted scope of the domain of moral life has had the consequence that âtechnologyâ could not be considered as a moral action in itself. Technological action has come to be governed by criteria other than those that regulate moral action. To be sure, in the last decade or so, there has emerged a burgeoning domain of environmental ethics, which has seen it fit to challenge the predominant view. ...<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
it is of course wrong to see buddhism in a similar light as christianity, that is as a egalitarian response to brahmin machinations, but we should not import our specific concerns onto the jew-roman situation..
gil's greater point is that the western herrenvolk are intent on projecting the persians as the ancient USSR, and themselves as the lone cowboy on the shining hill. this is demonstrably wrong.....
The armies of the Roman Empire dealt ruthless blows at many peoples, and the Roman genocide of the Jews was not aimed at Jewry in a way more particularly and peculiarly than that which they perpetrated against other peoples whom they could not assimilate into the empire. [right][snapback]63665[/snapback][/right]
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
husky,
gil=white uses the terminology that he is familiar with..
i don't think he is saying that christianity is egalitarian. jews do not have the universality of christians and "maintain" a natural tribal social organization; that is they are not fully messianic and their concerns are limited to the boundaries of palestine. the jewish response to roman pressures was the slave religion of Christianity - a slave religion by all accounts is definitely a revolutionary movement, not necessarily egalitarian, and certainly in form similiar to all succeeding revolutionary movements, communism, etc. why blame picts for not being able to develop a religico-polito movement that was able to bring romans to their knees. should we have expected the jews to take comfort in the fact that the romans were just occupiers and not homogeneizing monotheists. this problem of our perception will continue if we insists on viewing the messianic error as just a monotheist-polytheist problem (as the semitics do). the monotheist-polytheist dichotomy is just the first symptom of the semitic (actually greek) error that burst onto the stage of history. the real, original error lies elsewhere (in greece and rome, where the christist scriptures were frst written in koine greek):
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->... The actions one is âashamedâ of are done in such moments of âdeliriumâ. Good actions are reflec-tions of, come from, the âreal meâ. The point of reference is essentially the inner self (the good inner self, in Rousseauâs case), in terms of which one can say: âThis is really meâ or âThis is really not meâ. Such sentiments are foreign to us, or so I claim.
Three peripheral remarks are in order.
1. We do describe, even in our models, people as âgoodâ or âevilâ. But these descriptions abbreviate actions and relations: âdutiful sonâ abbreviates actions performed by one of the relata in its relation-ship with the other.
2. The âdoctrine of Karmaâ is a component of a theory of âself-identity. Because the âselfâ is the set of actions performed by the organism (if we leave out its representations) and because all organisms (including animals, insects etc.) do act, it is not possible to restrict âselvesâ to human beings alone. Such a doctrine must perforce be applicable to all organisms capable of performing actions, as is indeed the case.
3. Because of the essential relationship between the âselfâ and actions, the moral life of an organism includes all kinds of actions performed by it during its life-time. This has an additional conse-quence that a human organismâs relationship to the Natural world becomes an essential aspect in the construction of a âselfâ. By the same token, manâs relationship to Nature becomes a moral re-lationship as well.
<b>The contrast with Western ethical thought is again instructive in this regard. Ever since Homer, it has been a rather characteristic trait of Western thinking that moral phenomena pertained only to the domain of human intercourse. The relation of Man to Nature fell outside the scope of moral life: </b>where it does enter into discussion at all, it does so derivatively in terms of, say, the consequences of such actions on future generations. Inanimate Nature, non- and quasi-sentient animals, on their part, could not enter into any moral relationship with human beings because they lacked the faculty or the capacity to âreasonâ (or whatever) by exercising which moral choices and decisions could be made. Morality came into play only when both the relata in the relationship were moral agents and Nature disqualified herself from being one. In the best of cases, Nature was indifferent to manâs striving to realize a moral world. At worst, she was hostile to such an endeavour.
This restricted scope of the domain of moral life has had the consequence that âtechnologyâ could not be considered as a moral action in itself. Technological action has come to be governed by criteria other than those that regulate moral action. To be sure, in the last decade or so, there has emerged a burgeoning domain of environmental ethics, which has seen it fit to challenge the predominant view. ...<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
it is of course wrong to see buddhism in a similar light as christianity, that is as a egalitarian response to brahmin machinations, but we should not import our specific concerns onto the jew-roman situation..
gil's greater point is that the western herrenvolk are intent on projecting the persians as the ancient USSR, and themselves as the lone cowboy on the shining hill. this is demonstrably wrong.....