Pakistan News And Discussion-10

[Guest]

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>The beginning of the end? </b>
FT
Moeed Yusuf
<i>No matter how one looks at it, Musharraf seems headed towards losing out  </i>
President Musharraf has sent the entire country reeling by filing a reference against the Chief Justice of Pakistan. Beyond the interpretation of the president’s move, stricto senso, which suggests that he has the right to force the issue if he is aware of misconduct on the part of the CJ, the majority view is that the move was guided by political motives. Some analysts are predicting that the current event will amount to Musharraf’s final unraveling. Indeed, there are signs that he may be repenting the move.

<i>Could the ongoing situation be his undoing?</i>
Not really. Given the lack of coherence among the opposition, it is unlikely that the current anti-Musharraf sentiment would retain its momentum long enough to unseat him. While Musharraf is now standing on a slippery slope, the final push is unlikely to come from the opposition; it would require a reversal of US policy towards Musharraf. Domestic pressure will play a part, but only if Musharraf is also compromised on the external front.

<i>Will Washington give up completely on Musharraf; if so, why will that force his ouster? </i>
Prior to the US mid-term elections in 2006, the majority of analysts in Pakistan were contending that a Democratic victory would force Bush to scale down the War hysteria, thus leading to reduced pressure on Islamabad. In response to such misplaced opinions, I had pointed to several reasons why a Democratic Congress would spell further trouble for Pakistan (‘Democrats and Pakistan’, TFT, December 8-14 2006). A key element of my argument was that the Democrats would pressure the Bush White House to give up its ‘one-man’ policy and call for a return to genuine democracy. That has indeed been the case.

Dick Cheney’s surprise visit two weeks ago followed by Richard Boucher’s presence in Islamabad makes clear that the US wants more. The Republicans are now playing the Democratic card, in essence suggesting to Musharraf that they will be unable to ward off demands from Democrats that call on the White House to push Musharraf harder. In other words, they are hinting that Musharraf must deliver faster and more tangibly.

This position indicates that the tide is fast turning against Musharraf. In reality, the Bush administration is using the Democratic plea as a cover up. Granted, it remains worried about domestic opposition. However, the real change is coming from within. Consider that the changed face of Bush’s security team is not as amenable to Pakistan’s position as their predecessors. The bottom line is that Washington is now unlikely to cease pressuring Musharraf to deliver more aggressively.

From Musharraf’s point of view, the tide could not have turned at a worse time. Just as domestic opposition within the country is burgeoning, courtesy persistent policy errors (not limited to the move against the CJ), his external support is also beginning to wane. What is more, regardless of what he desires, it is impossible for Musharraf to deliver with any greater success than he has attained thus far.

Consider that the US has drastically overestimated Musharraf’s ability to continue with his pro-US line in the war on terror. In the face of challenges at home, it is impossible for Musharraf to grant any further concessions. In addition, he simply cannot afford to continue taking the blame for Karzai’s persistent failure to rein in militants within his own territory.

Earlier, Washington was satisfied with clandestine guarantees, allowing them a virtual carte blanche as far as targeting militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan was concerned. However, that not having delivered to Washington’s satisfaction, the US has now shifted to requesting a swift ‘elimination’ of the Taliban without any ifs and buts. Musharraf will not concede the troop casualties an overly aggressive campaign would extract; he is not in a position to clear the mess flowing from Karzai’s failure, and he would not be able to survive the domestic backlash of the heavy collateral damage the US-proposed approach would result in.

The ultimate outcome is obvious. Musharraf will soon realise (if he already has not) that even the slightest hint that he may be prepared to toe the US line in the next phase on the war on terror could provide the very anti-Musharraf momentum the domestic opposition is looking for. Having failed to convince Washington to adopt a softer position, he will be forced to present himself as defying further US pressure, even if that means putting himself out of favour with the Americans. Already, Musharraf is being made to realise the fundamental flaw in pinning his personal survival solely on external support.

Political history across the globe suggests that when in a difficult situation, a leader’s ability to survive rests on support among the domestic population. As soon as Musharraf let go of a balanced domestic-foreign equation with his outright neglect of a need to remain diplomatic about his controversial Balochistan and Waziristan policies, he had compromised his position. Soon, he will have no option but to return to seeking domestic support. In the process he will have to brace for the impact of a reversed outlook from Washington.

<i>What would such a change in Washington’s position imply for Musharraf? </i>
Two fundamental issues are likely to force him to make an exit.
First, the economic ‘miracle’, which Musharraf terms his greatest achievement, is likely to collapse. Independent economists have for some time been questioning the sustainability of the current export-led growth model. There seems to be a consensus that GDP growth is being sustained through external support, without which domestic anomalies would force the artificially created ‘bubble’ to burst. Indeed, despite government claims to the contrary, the investment climate is gradually unravelling. Trade deficits are at a record high, and losses are being made up through privatisation proceeds and ‘terror money’. Exports have also plummeted in the recent past for reasons that lead back to structural problems in the economy.

Clearly, these problems cannot be rectified overnight. Moreover, despite the widely acknowledged fact that the Rupee remains overvalued, political considerations are not allowing for the much-needed downward revision. The government on its part has persisted with its obsession to look good, completely ignoring key fundamental changes that are long overdue.

While there are relevant members within the present cabinet who are keen to raise concerns about the inevitable outcome, the top brass already has its hands full with the political turmoil. Thus, despite realising the economic situation, the government is extremely reluctant to acknowledge anomalies in the economic make-up. Be that as it may, given that Musharraf’s political fortunes are dwindling faster than expected, it is already too late for the authorities to rectify the situation in time for the country to cope with the impact of a substantially downsized US support. In all probability, Musharraf’s miracle will end up becoming one of his worst nightmares in times to come.

Second, with the change of heart in the Congress, Bush’s ‘one-man’ policy will have come full circle and will necessarily have to be revised. While this will be counterproductive for the US goals in the war on terror, given that no Pakistani leader could assist the US more sincerely and boldly than Musharraf has done thus far, such a realisation may only set in once Musharraf is gone.

For the moment it seems highly unlikely that the Democratic House would alter their ‘pressure-Musharraf’ stance. Lawmakers in Washington are likely to continue pushing Bush to prompt Musharraf to allow for a truly representative democratic set-up. Moderate political opponents (read PPP) are already lobbying in Washington for a favourable outcome. In all likelihood, the pressure on Musharraf will become overbearing in the coming months. If he remains steadfast, Washington may employ coercive tactics. These could entail legislative bills to restrain aid to Pakistan. It won’t be surprising if the AQ Khan affair is brought back to the forefront, with a possible talk of sanctions.

That Musharraf will eventually lose out in the predicted scenario is a given. Whether he will choose to follow the path of his predecessors and fight till he is pushed out, in the process also putting the country in a compromised diplomatic position vis-à-vis the West, or will allow better sense to prevail and make a voluntary exit will determine his legacy for the most part.
<i>
Moeed Yusuf is a Consultant on Economic Policy at the Sustainable
Development Policy Institute in Islamabad</i><!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->