05-14-2007, 06:39 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Project disaster - 3</b>
<i>SSCP could degrade India's ambitions in the Indian Ocean, writes
Preeti Sharma.</i>
12 May 2007: Even assuming the worst that SSCP will make no money,
does it redeem itself at all? One argument is that SSCP will reinforce
India's sovereign maritime territorial rights in the GoMPBPS area,
although neither the Centre nor the Tamil Nadu government have ever
officially taken this line. Before the government clarified, questions
were raised in Sri Lanka's parliament about the project, but its then
foreign minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, said that the SSCP alignment
was in Indian waters but that anyhow India was keen to remove
misapprehensions.
But a bigger threat has been cited from the United States, although
significantly, the Indian government has been silent on it. In August
1976 and June 1979, the Indian and Sri Lankan governments declared the
waters of the Gulf of Mannar as "historic" and those of the Palk Bay
as "internal". Rejecting this, the US Navy conducted "operational
assertions" as late as 2001. On 23 June 2005, the US Department of
Defence reiterated that these claims were untenable through reissue of
a manual for operational assertions. Less than a month later, despite
pointed warnings by the international tsunami expert, Professor Tad
Murthy, the Centre and the Tamil Nadu government expeditiously
commenced on the Sethusamudram Project. While again, there is no
official word, it is implied that the project would warn the US Navy
off the GoMPBPS area.
The US does not accept India and Sri Lanka's "historic claim" to the
Gulf of Mannar waters. In the absence of a navigable channel, the US
Navy cannot do much more than show its flag, and with its growing
operational burdens in the Middle East, the Taiwan Strait, and with
rising tensions with Russia, it is unlikely that it will do further
assertions here. In any case, the Indian Navy has the capability to
bottle up any such intention, and on current account, the US claims
only a friendly intent with India. North, in the Palk Bay and Palk
Strait, Indian and Sri Lankan straight baseline territorial claims
exceed the twelve nautical mile limit set by the UN Convention on Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS). The United States has not ratified UNCLOS but
insists on its right to free passage in the GoMPBPS area under UNCLOS.
But SSCP is not the answer to keep the US away.
For one, SSCP is in Indian territorial waters. If the US insists, it
can still force its Navy into the strip of water lying between the
UNCLOS-mandated Indian and Sri Lankan claims. But with India laying
historical claims over and above those granted by UNCLOS, the US would
have to confront the Indian Navy, which it would not want. But in any
case, this bears no connection to the SSCP. So how SSCP helps in
reinforcing our territorial claims in the GoMPBPS area is an open
question.
Commodore Rajeev Sawhney of the New Delhi-based National Maritime
Foundation sees no connection between SSCP and any perceived threat
from the United States. "In any case, SSCP lies in our territorial
waters," says Commodore Sawhney. "It would not help the government to
counter US operational assertions in the area." Adds Rear Admiral
(Retired) O.P.Sharma, an expert on maritime law, "Sri Lanka is
comfortable with the boundary agreement with India, so I see no reason
for an US objection. The US has not ratified UNCLOS anyhow. India
should not bother." The key thing is that the Indian Navy has not been
broached on this issue specific to SSCP. So, if the Indian government
has a sense that somehow SSCP will assist it against the US claim, it
is putting good money after a bad project.
SSCP's second alleged advantage is that it would enable the Indian
Eastern and Western fleet to quickly join in action in a contingency.
The underlying apprehension, although never expressed by the Indian
Navy, is that a rival power could establish in the rough area of the
Gulf of Mannar and divide and take on the two fleet. The logic of this
is hard to deny, and it follows on the British capture of Gibraltar in
The War of the Spanish Succession in the early eighteenth century
which denied the French the advantage of having fleet in the Atlantic
and in the Mediterranean Sea. The Indian Navy spokesman told this
writer that there wasn't much strategic basis to this, although there
was no deny that a channel would cut sailing distance and time.
Captain Balakrishnan more forthrightly rejects any strategic setback
to the Navy not having the Sethusamudram Project. "Since at least the
Seventies," says Captain Balakrishnan, "India has worked on a
two-fleet principle. Once a year or during VIP visits, the fleet join.
Otherwise, they work perfectly independently, and no power can prevent
them from coming together. Anyhow, Sethusamudram is not the answer.
Naval ships never move alone, and they need wide seas to operate. In
the channel, ships have to move in single file. The escort profile can
never be maintained. V.Prabhakaran (of the Tamil Tigers) will salivate
at the sight of the unescorted Indian Navy. There are the Sea Tigers
to contend with in the area. And remember that not only has the LTTE
air power, it has also shown skills in night flying. For the Navy, the
channel only represents a source of trouble." Since the channel
draught is no more than ten metres, it rules out the aircraft carrier
Viraat in full load, and the under-refurbishment Admiral Gorshkov
cannot pass Sethusamudram at all. For Indian naval power projection in
the Indian Ocean, a naval base in Rameshwaram would be an asset. But
the SSCP could be a liability.
On the other hand, the Sethusamudram Project's positive disadvantages
are several. It could, for a start, draw India into the LTTE-Sri Lanka
civil war. India has said no to joint patrolling with the Sri Lankan
Navy in the area as this would bias it against the LTTE, whereas India
wants to stay neutral. Even without any channel traffic, Indian
fishermen are being fired upon both by the Sri Lankan Navy and the
LTTE, each claiming that the fishermen are spying or working for the
other party. Imagine when the channel opens, and in addition to
securing such international shipping as passes through it, the
fishermen also have to be protected by the Navy. Also, in the triangle
pointing to the Gulf of Mannar and in the scalene triangle north of
Palk Bay, currently no international ships go. But with the channel
and ships coming, smuggling to the LTTE gains impetus. The Indian Navy
would not care for the additional responsibility of boarding ships to
search for LTTE weapons. And in case LTTE air power is deployed
against ships using the channel, it would destroy India's image and
circumscribe its ambitions in the Indian Ocean.
To be continued
Preeti Sharma is Newsinsight. net's Correspondent.
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