Pakistan News And Discussion-11

Naresh · 05-28-2007, 04:08 PM

[center]Rentier elite[/center]

[center]The authoritarian and rentier nature of Pakistan's ruling elite has been both the cause and effect of the political conditions in which the state finds itself

Dr Ayesha Siddiqa[/center]

The other day someone asked me why there was such a difference in the political conditions of India and Pakistan. India with its established democratic norms is on the opposite end of the political spectrum to Pakistan. Again, while India had managed to get its first constitution within four years of its independence, it took Pakistan about nine years to achieve the same objective and even that was scraped within two years of its making. Is it because the Indian leadership is more sagacious than Pakistan's or is it that the people there are better than what we have in this country?

The difference becomes glaring particularly when we realise that the basic chemistry of the people is similar. The common man of the two countries is almost similar or at least they started out from the same starting line. So, what went wrong with Pakistan that it never managed to establish democratic norms or strengthen civilian institutions?

The answer lies in the nature of the ruling elite which in Pakistan's case was always authoritarian and rentier in nature. The nature of the elite was both the cause and effect of the political conditions in which the state found itself.

The fact is that authoritarianism has always flown in the veins of the country's leadership. Although it is considered sacrilege to question the country's leadership, especially those who established the state, the fact is that none of the decisions taken in the early years reflected any sensitivity for democratic norms. The decisions to annex Kalat or to dismiss the provincial government in the frontier province or engaging the military in a conflict with India are highly questionable. According to the famous Pakistani historian, Ayesha Jalal, such decisions were necessitated by the need to consolidate a fragile country. However, the fact of the matter is that these were precisely the decisions which embarked the polity on its peculiar course from which it could never extricate itself.

The leadership, which followed, was no different. The first popularly elected government that followed after thirteen years of military rule was not inclined to follow democratic principles. In fact, as soon as the 1973 Constitution was made Bhutto started introducing amendments to the constitution. Moreover, he erred by involving the military in political issues thus giving the armed forces the confidence to take over the reigns of the government again.

Such authoritarianism of the ruling elite got a fillip during the early years due to the formulation of a patron-client relationship. The hostility with India required strengthening of defenses and forging alignments which could then be used to keep a belligerent bigger neighbour at bay. Perhaps, it could be argued that Mohammad Ali Jinnah did not envision hostile relations with India. He had, as sources suggest, retained his house in Bombay where he planned to return and settle down after partition. In his imagination, life would return to normal after the two countries were made. Such a plan did not reflect an appreciation of realpolitik or realities of partition. Jinnah was certainly not prepared for the carnage or for getting a Pakistan truncated due to the absence of Kashmir.

The war of 1947, which was meant to complete Pakistan, had far reaching implications for the country. It not only created a festering wound for both countries, but it also created conditions which pushed Pakistan into a system of global patronage.

This system refers to the patron-client relationship developed with the West. The earlier leadership including Jinnah was keen to woo the US as a balancer of power. A patron-client relationship was finally established during the end of the 1950s when Pakistan joined two US-sponsored military alliances, SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan's military had agreed to fight the Communist threat on Washington's behalf in return for money, weapons and political patronage. Issues such as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy were flagged to get American attention and to justify an alignment with the West. People were told that there was a real threat of Communism to Pakistan.

Twenty three years later, a similar argument was made by Zia-ul-Haq while re-establishing a strategic alignment with Washington. In a mercenary fashion, the military and the ruling elite agreed to serve American interests as long as Washington could guarantee relatively free flow of financial and material resources.

The same equation was struck by General Musharraf after 2001. There are many who argue that Pervez Musharraf should have evaluated the situation and behaved in a more constrained manner than what he eventually did. There are others who argue that a political government might have behaved a bit differently. However, both these arguments miss out on a fundamental reality that nothing would have changed the situation. Being rentier in nature, the elite has always jumped at opportunities to offer its services in return for American patronage. Of course, with international crises, which have implications for American security, the rent of Pakistan's rulers and its military always goes up. The military, in particular, is a direct beneficiary of the patron-client relationship because it is the only institution which can contribute the maximum to fulfilling American security objectives. Whether it is fighting Communism or Jihadis, or providing bases to American forces against the Soviet Union, Iran and others, Pakistan's military has always been the best option. Therefore, it is not surprising that the US has been more forthcoming in rendering support to the military and military regimes in Pakistan.

The above argument raises a vital question regarding issues on which the rulers have not delivered such as rolling back the nuclear programme or handing over AQ Khan to the US. These tricky issues do not necessarily denote divergence of views, but the domestic compulsions of the rentier elite. The arrangement between the patron and the client requires for the latter to have sufficient domestic control besides having the ability to deliver according to American strategic objectives. A restless mass of people can become problematic in delivering to the external patron. The issue with domestic control, however, is that it can be ensured through a combination of coercive tactics and acquiring some political legitimacy. The latter is achieved through creating an impression that the elite can deliver certain goods and services which are fundamental to the survival of the people and the state. This means propagating military security as essential for the survival of the state or to propagate that the state and its ideology is under great threat.

Pakistan's nuclear programme, its India policy or the Islamic agenda are essential ploys for gaining legitimacy at home. In the absence of commitment to socioeconomic development, such policies or popular agendas are critical in getting public support. The elite make people believe that they are getting their money's worth. Hence, these are the very issues on which a blatant comprise cannot be done.

The external patrons understand the compulsions of their clients and do not push them beyond a certain point. The upshot of my argument is that the patron-client system is designed to ensure greater accountability to the external patrons instead of the domestic audience. Devoid of any sense of responsibility to the people, the ruling elite is under no pressure to introduce political accountability or ensure socioeconomic development. Consequently, domestic politics in Pakistan has become nothing but an immoral game of realpolitik which lacks the capacity of bringing substantive changes within.

Cheers

Login




Remember me Lost Password?