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I think the efforts are being made to break lila (or narrative) aspect of Hindu art forms. Look at above painting. Little rascal Hanuman is pulling beard of rishi maharaj. Little rascal is putting out vedic fire. I am sure little Hanuman must have been previous avatar of Mohammad Ghori and Francis Xavier, says our modernist friend.
Lila is evident in this painting. There is no trace of Lila in Hussain and likes, rather there is just an attempt to portray humans as bundles of various essences.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->If we learn to be moral beings through mimesis, it means that moral and ethical actions must be susceptible to being mimed. Contrast this stance with that of the West: a moral individual (an ideal priest or, say, Jesus Christ) is inimitable in principle. That is, a moral individual is actually a message, which does not say âbe like meâ, but one which proclaims âhopeâ for the humankind, brings âglad tidingsâ so to speak. And the âhopeâ is that the presence of such an inimitable, excep-tional individual will âsaveâ humankind. If one is ârighteousâ, it is not only because that is the way to oneâs âsalvationâ, but more importantly, because the salvation of humankind depends upon the ârighteousâ being present amongst them. One is âmoralâ so that other âsinnersâ may be delivered from their âsinsâ. Such figures cannot influence daily life positively, but do so negatively viz., as examples of what we ordinary mortals, cannot be. They are, literally, the embodiments of âoughtâ and, as such, outside the âisâ (Not every human being can be an ideal priest or even, as the exam-ples tell us, ought to be one.)
In Asia, such an âoughtâ is no moral example at all. A moral action must be capable of emulation in daily life and only as such can someone be an âexampleâ. Moral actions are actions that a son, a father, a friend, a teacher, a wife, etc., can perform as a son, a father, a friend, a teacher, a wife, etc. Either moral actions are realizable in this world, and in circumstances we find ourselves in our daily lives or they are not moral actions at all. Therefore, those real or fictitious individuals whose ac-tions we mime and who are, consequently, construed as âexemplaryâ individuals cannot find them-selves âoutsideâ our world, but in situations analogous to our own. (Such a view is consistent with our models of âselfâ, for obvious reasons.)
5. This suggests that the role of moral authorities in these two cultures is different. In the West, the moral authorities are rigid principles without mercy or forgiveness. All talk of autonomy notwith-standing, moral âdecisionsâ are totally heteronymous. One has to reflect not only about the princi-ple one has to apply, but also judge whether one has correctly applied it. As a consequence, moral domain becomes one of judgement. The objects of judgement are and can only be conceptual ones, viz., theories. To say that some action is moral is to say whether or not the description of that action satisfies some or other moral principle. We have noticed this already. Moral life gets impoverished by being reduced to a principle (e.g. utilitarianism) or by being at the mercy of an-otherâs âjudgementâ (e.g., that of a priest).
In Asia, by contrast, the immediate physically recognizable authority figures (parents, teachers, elders) are also figures of moral authority. Mimesis in moral action requires figures recognized as moral authorities. Consequently, in a culture dominated by mimetic learning, not only do such au-thorities play an important role in regulating moral conduct, but are also so recognized. That is why, I suggest, parents, teachers, elders, ancestors have such a privileged position in our culture. They are not only familial or socially recognized authorities, but are individually recognized moral authorities also.
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I think the efforts are being made to break lila (or narrative) aspect of Hindu art forms. Look at above painting. Little rascal Hanuman is pulling beard of rishi maharaj. Little rascal is putting out vedic fire. I am sure little Hanuman must have been previous avatar of Mohammad Ghori and Francis Xavier, says our modernist friend.
Lila is evident in this painting. There is no trace of Lila in Hussain and likes, rather there is just an attempt to portray humans as bundles of various essences.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->If we learn to be moral beings through mimesis, it means that moral and ethical actions must be susceptible to being mimed. Contrast this stance with that of the West: a moral individual (an ideal priest or, say, Jesus Christ) is inimitable in principle. That is, a moral individual is actually a message, which does not say âbe like meâ, but one which proclaims âhopeâ for the humankind, brings âglad tidingsâ so to speak. And the âhopeâ is that the presence of such an inimitable, excep-tional individual will âsaveâ humankind. If one is ârighteousâ, it is not only because that is the way to oneâs âsalvationâ, but more importantly, because the salvation of humankind depends upon the ârighteousâ being present amongst them. One is âmoralâ so that other âsinnersâ may be delivered from their âsinsâ. Such figures cannot influence daily life positively, but do so negatively viz., as examples of what we ordinary mortals, cannot be. They are, literally, the embodiments of âoughtâ and, as such, outside the âisâ (Not every human being can be an ideal priest or even, as the exam-ples tell us, ought to be one.)
In Asia, such an âoughtâ is no moral example at all. A moral action must be capable of emulation in daily life and only as such can someone be an âexampleâ. Moral actions are actions that a son, a father, a friend, a teacher, a wife, etc., can perform as a son, a father, a friend, a teacher, a wife, etc. Either moral actions are realizable in this world, and in circumstances we find ourselves in our daily lives or they are not moral actions at all. Therefore, those real or fictitious individuals whose ac-tions we mime and who are, consequently, construed as âexemplaryâ individuals cannot find them-selves âoutsideâ our world, but in situations analogous to our own. (Such a view is consistent with our models of âselfâ, for obvious reasons.)
5. This suggests that the role of moral authorities in these two cultures is different. In the West, the moral authorities are rigid principles without mercy or forgiveness. All talk of autonomy notwith-standing, moral âdecisionsâ are totally heteronymous. One has to reflect not only about the princi-ple one has to apply, but also judge whether one has correctly applied it. As a consequence, moral domain becomes one of judgement. The objects of judgement are and can only be conceptual ones, viz., theories. To say that some action is moral is to say whether or not the description of that action satisfies some or other moral principle. We have noticed this already. Moral life gets impoverished by being reduced to a principle (e.g. utilitarianism) or by being at the mercy of an-otherâs âjudgementâ (e.g., that of a priest).
In Asia, by contrast, the immediate physically recognizable authority figures (parents, teachers, elders) are also figures of moral authority. Mimesis in moral action requires figures recognized as moral authorities. Consequently, in a culture dominated by mimetic learning, not only do such au-thorities play an important role in regulating moral conduct, but are also so recognized. That is why, I suggest, parents, teachers, elders, ancestors have such a privileged position in our culture. They are not only familial or socially recognized authorities, but are individually recognized moral authorities also.
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