08-05-2007, 11:19 PM
<b>Uranium sales to India appear inevitable:Opinion in Australia paper</b>
News that federal cabinet will consider allowing uranium sales to India is generating more heat than light. Critics of the idea insist Australia is shedding principles to reward an outlaw, thus encouraging others to seek nuclear weapons. In response, supporters claim that nuclear co-operation with India will reduce the spread of these most destructive of arms.
If the public ends up confused, it is because both arguments are overdone. Both obscure that the central issue is not some ideal called non-proliferation, but a way to reconcile the messy reality of nuclear policy with India's changing place in the global system. Non-proliferation - the effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons - is vital for international security. But its effects in shaping how states behave cannot be divorced from the unequal and changing distribution of power among them.
The Government's prospective policy shift shows that Australia accepts India's relatively small nuclear weapons program - even though New Delhi has not signed the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But non-proliferation diplomacy has always been marked by double standards. The treaty allows only the five countries that tested before 1967 to bear nuclear arms, with vague promises to disarm one day.
The status quo, with one of the new century's giants treated as a rebel and denied civilian nuclear trade, is unsustainable. Trying to help India sign the treaty by reopening the text, with 187 signatories wanting a say, would risk more damage than any informal deal - and could take forever. So slipping India into the club through the back door, 34 years after it first tested the bomb, is the best bad outcome. This logic informs the historic US-India deal, ostensibly finalised last month, ending decades of bans on civilian nuclear trade and paving the way for Australia's move.
Australian uranium exported to India would be used solely to help meet huge electricity needs. Our insistence on inspection-and-audit safeguards ensures this, as it does with China, France and others. As for the argument this would free India's limited uranium reserves for bombs instead of energy, were that to be a basis for policy, we would absurdly ban coal exports too - since coal-fired power stations also free up uranium for arms-making.
And neither the US-India deal nor Australian uranium sales will determine whether third countries opt for nuclear arms. Each state that might want such weapons has its own reasons based on fear, power and prestige.
There should be no pretending atomic commerce with India will make the world safer from proliferation. The US deal puts most of India's reactors under safeguards. But these would probably have been for civil use anyway. By ending trade bans, the US recognises India does not share nuclear weapons materials or knowledge with others, but in that sense India always has been responsible.
The flaws in the Government's looming policy change are in timing, priming and bargaining. The US-India agreement is not quite over the line. Technical details were finalised just days before Canberra's July 26 announcement-by-leak.
American negotiators made last-minute concessions on reprocessing and on whether the deal would end if India tested again. That fix might yet prove too tenuous to convince the middle ground in the US Congress or some countries in the international group that sets guidelines on nuclear trade.
So, in considering exports, we still have scope to ask a political price from Delhi's djinns of diplomacy. Any uranium transfer agreement should include our right to cease supply if India tests another nuclear bomb. We should also seek a special public declaration, not least to satisfy our cautious mining industry.
This would affirm that India sustains its moratorium on nuclear testing. It would state that India will support the long-overdue negotiation of a verifiable global treaty to ban producing fissile material for weapons. It would proclaim India's determination to help thwart efforts by any other state to acquire nuclear weapons, and it would commit India's navy to interdicting illegal nuclear trade in harmony with the Proliferation Security Initiative. It could also reiterate that India has a strictly defensive nuclear posture based on no first use, along with a moral commitment to global nuclear disarmament.
Ending New Delhi's nuclear isolation recognises the massive importance of India in a changing world. For Australia, it is about forging the missing link in our strategic Asian diplomacy, building a bond of indispensability to match our ties with China and Japan. That should be our destination.
Rory Medcalf directs the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy.
<b>Apsara reactor to move out of BARC post Indo-US nuclear deal</b>
Asiaâs first nuclear reactor âApsaraâ will not be Mumbaiâs pride henceforth. The reactor situated at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Turbhe, is set to be shift out of Mumbai. Apsaraâs foundation stone was laid 51 years ago on August 4, 1956.
The development has been underlined with the finalisation of Indiaâs nuclear deal with America on Friday. According to the deal, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have the powers to inspect those of Indiaâs nuclear reactors that are built from foreign assistance and are operational for civil purposes.
S K Malhotra, Executive Director (Media Relations) of BARC, confirmed the development. âApsaraâs core was built with an assistance from the United Kingdom. So only the core will be shifted from Mumbai. However, its new location has not been finalised yet,â he reveals.
Justifying the decision to shift Apsara, Malhotra says, âApsara is situated in the BARC complex, which hosts other strategic nuclear reactors too which are completely indigenous and would not be open for inspection from any international body.
We donât want any foreign body to come to the BARC at the pretext of inspecting âApsaraâ. That is why the reactor will have to leave Mumbai.â
According to the pact, Apsara will be under IAEAâs inspection wherever it will be situated.
What Apsara meant.
Indiaâs nuclear power programme began with Apsara on August 4, 1956. It enabled Indian scientists and engineers to gain insights into the complexities of design and construction of a nuclear reactor and to learn the intricacies of controlling the nuclear fission chain reaction.
Apsara served as the stepping-stone for advanced work in several nuclear facilities that were subsequently set up at Turbhe. It is also used for research purposes by universities and educational institutions countrywide.
Swimming pool reactor.
Apsara is a swimming pool type reactor loaded with enriched uranium as fuel. The fuel core is suspended from a movable trolley in a pool filled with water. The pool water serves as coolant, moderator and reflector, besides providing the shielding.
Father of the Indian atomic programme, Dr Homi Jehangir Bhabha, conceptualised Apsaraâs design. It was built entirely by Indian engineers in a record time of about 15 months. It was named Apsara (celestial damsel or water nymph) by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru because of its swimming pool type reactor.
<b>Long-term scenario taken care of in 123 agreement:Indian Experts</b>
MUMBAI: Indian experts took utmost care to include several "insulation mechanisms" in the draft agreement to implement the nuclear deal with the US in order to protect security and nuclear commerce interests, official sources have said.
Though the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation and the draft 123 agreement, which was made public on Friday, is between two "unequal partners", the experts took all possible long-term scenarios into consideration in the interest of the country, said the sources familiar with the negotiations.
Reacting to concerns expressed by some quarters about the pact curtailing India's right to conduct a nuclear test, a source said: "Every article of the draft 123 agreement is carefully worded with many in-built insulation mechanisms to protect India's interest."
Though the deal is for civil nuclear cooperation, India has taken all possible security situations into consideration and article 14 of the agreement clearly states that both India and the US have agreed to carefully consider the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of such cooperation, the sources said.
The two sides also agreed to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to such a termination or cessation resulted from India's serious concern about a changed security environment or were a response to "actions by other states which would impact national security", they said.
Legally, the conditions remain the same whether India conducts a nuclear test now or after signing the deal. But if the testing is done after the signing of the agreement, "there would be an additional economic penalty", the sources said.
Article 14 also points out that if one side seeks the termination of the pact while citing a violation of the agreement as the reason, the US and India will have to consider whether the action was inadvertent or otherwise and whether "the violation could be considered as material", they said.
It is also made explicitly clear in the same article that no violation can be considered as "material" unless it corresponds to the definition of "material violation or breach" in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the sources said.
Moreover, if a party seeks termination while citing a violation of the proposed IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA's Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance, the sources said.
"The Americans also understand this," a source said.
The sources also said there is no mention of any foreign policy prescription in the draft 123 agreement.
With regard to IAEA safeguards, the sources pointed that if the application of these was no longer possible, both the supplier and recipient countries should hold consultations and agree on appropriate verification measures.
<b>Disclaimer</b>:Above reports were first posted on BR, posting them here since it can reach a wider audience. Please DONT blame me for cloning BR threads. <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->
News that federal cabinet will consider allowing uranium sales to India is generating more heat than light. Critics of the idea insist Australia is shedding principles to reward an outlaw, thus encouraging others to seek nuclear weapons. In response, supporters claim that nuclear co-operation with India will reduce the spread of these most destructive of arms.
If the public ends up confused, it is because both arguments are overdone. Both obscure that the central issue is not some ideal called non-proliferation, but a way to reconcile the messy reality of nuclear policy with India's changing place in the global system. Non-proliferation - the effort to stem the spread of nuclear weapons - is vital for international security. But its effects in shaping how states behave cannot be divorced from the unequal and changing distribution of power among them.
The Government's prospective policy shift shows that Australia accepts India's relatively small nuclear weapons program - even though New Delhi has not signed the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But non-proliferation diplomacy has always been marked by double standards. The treaty allows only the five countries that tested before 1967 to bear nuclear arms, with vague promises to disarm one day.
The status quo, with one of the new century's giants treated as a rebel and denied civilian nuclear trade, is unsustainable. Trying to help India sign the treaty by reopening the text, with 187 signatories wanting a say, would risk more damage than any informal deal - and could take forever. So slipping India into the club through the back door, 34 years after it first tested the bomb, is the best bad outcome. This logic informs the historic US-India deal, ostensibly finalised last month, ending decades of bans on civilian nuclear trade and paving the way for Australia's move.
Australian uranium exported to India would be used solely to help meet huge electricity needs. Our insistence on inspection-and-audit safeguards ensures this, as it does with China, France and others. As for the argument this would free India's limited uranium reserves for bombs instead of energy, were that to be a basis for policy, we would absurdly ban coal exports too - since coal-fired power stations also free up uranium for arms-making.
And neither the US-India deal nor Australian uranium sales will determine whether third countries opt for nuclear arms. Each state that might want such weapons has its own reasons based on fear, power and prestige.
There should be no pretending atomic commerce with India will make the world safer from proliferation. The US deal puts most of India's reactors under safeguards. But these would probably have been for civil use anyway. By ending trade bans, the US recognises India does not share nuclear weapons materials or knowledge with others, but in that sense India always has been responsible.
The flaws in the Government's looming policy change are in timing, priming and bargaining. The US-India agreement is not quite over the line. Technical details were finalised just days before Canberra's July 26 announcement-by-leak.
American negotiators made last-minute concessions on reprocessing and on whether the deal would end if India tested again. That fix might yet prove too tenuous to convince the middle ground in the US Congress or some countries in the international group that sets guidelines on nuclear trade.
So, in considering exports, we still have scope to ask a political price from Delhi's djinns of diplomacy. Any uranium transfer agreement should include our right to cease supply if India tests another nuclear bomb. We should also seek a special public declaration, not least to satisfy our cautious mining industry.
This would affirm that India sustains its moratorium on nuclear testing. It would state that India will support the long-overdue negotiation of a verifiable global treaty to ban producing fissile material for weapons. It would proclaim India's determination to help thwart efforts by any other state to acquire nuclear weapons, and it would commit India's navy to interdicting illegal nuclear trade in harmony with the Proliferation Security Initiative. It could also reiterate that India has a strictly defensive nuclear posture based on no first use, along with a moral commitment to global nuclear disarmament.
Ending New Delhi's nuclear isolation recognises the massive importance of India in a changing world. For Australia, it is about forging the missing link in our strategic Asian diplomacy, building a bond of indispensability to match our ties with China and Japan. That should be our destination.
Rory Medcalf directs the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy.
<b>Apsara reactor to move out of BARC post Indo-US nuclear deal</b>
Asiaâs first nuclear reactor âApsaraâ will not be Mumbaiâs pride henceforth. The reactor situated at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Turbhe, is set to be shift out of Mumbai. Apsaraâs foundation stone was laid 51 years ago on August 4, 1956.
The development has been underlined with the finalisation of Indiaâs nuclear deal with America on Friday. According to the deal, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will have the powers to inspect those of Indiaâs nuclear reactors that are built from foreign assistance and are operational for civil purposes.
S K Malhotra, Executive Director (Media Relations) of BARC, confirmed the development. âApsaraâs core was built with an assistance from the United Kingdom. So only the core will be shifted from Mumbai. However, its new location has not been finalised yet,â he reveals.
Justifying the decision to shift Apsara, Malhotra says, âApsara is situated in the BARC complex, which hosts other strategic nuclear reactors too which are completely indigenous and would not be open for inspection from any international body.
We donât want any foreign body to come to the BARC at the pretext of inspecting âApsaraâ. That is why the reactor will have to leave Mumbai.â
According to the pact, Apsara will be under IAEAâs inspection wherever it will be situated.
What Apsara meant.
Indiaâs nuclear power programme began with Apsara on August 4, 1956. It enabled Indian scientists and engineers to gain insights into the complexities of design and construction of a nuclear reactor and to learn the intricacies of controlling the nuclear fission chain reaction.
Apsara served as the stepping-stone for advanced work in several nuclear facilities that were subsequently set up at Turbhe. It is also used for research purposes by universities and educational institutions countrywide.
Swimming pool reactor.
Apsara is a swimming pool type reactor loaded with enriched uranium as fuel. The fuel core is suspended from a movable trolley in a pool filled with water. The pool water serves as coolant, moderator and reflector, besides providing the shielding.
Father of the Indian atomic programme, Dr Homi Jehangir Bhabha, conceptualised Apsaraâs design. It was built entirely by Indian engineers in a record time of about 15 months. It was named Apsara (celestial damsel or water nymph) by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru because of its swimming pool type reactor.
<b>Long-term scenario taken care of in 123 agreement:Indian Experts</b>
MUMBAI: Indian experts took utmost care to include several "insulation mechanisms" in the draft agreement to implement the nuclear deal with the US in order to protect security and nuclear commerce interests, official sources have said.
Though the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation and the draft 123 agreement, which was made public on Friday, is between two "unequal partners", the experts took all possible long-term scenarios into consideration in the interest of the country, said the sources familiar with the negotiations.
Reacting to concerns expressed by some quarters about the pact curtailing India's right to conduct a nuclear test, a source said: "Every article of the draft 123 agreement is carefully worded with many in-built insulation mechanisms to protect India's interest."
Though the deal is for civil nuclear cooperation, India has taken all possible security situations into consideration and article 14 of the agreement clearly states that both India and the US have agreed to carefully consider the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of such cooperation, the sources said.
The two sides also agreed to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to such a termination or cessation resulted from India's serious concern about a changed security environment or were a response to "actions by other states which would impact national security", they said.
Legally, the conditions remain the same whether India conducts a nuclear test now or after signing the deal. But if the testing is done after the signing of the agreement, "there would be an additional economic penalty", the sources said.
Article 14 also points out that if one side seeks the termination of the pact while citing a violation of the agreement as the reason, the US and India will have to consider whether the action was inadvertent or otherwise and whether "the violation could be considered as material", they said.
It is also made explicitly clear in the same article that no violation can be considered as "material" unless it corresponds to the definition of "material violation or breach" in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the sources said.
Moreover, if a party seeks termination while citing a violation of the proposed IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA's Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance, the sources said.
"The Americans also understand this," a source said.
The sources also said there is no mention of any foreign policy prescription in the draft 123 agreement.
With regard to IAEA safeguards, the sources pointed that if the application of these was no longer possible, both the supplier and recipient countries should hold consultations and agree on appropriate verification measures.
<b>Disclaimer</b>:Above reports were first posted on BR, posting them here since it can reach a wider audience. Please DONT blame me for cloning BR threads. <!--emo&:beer--><img src='style_emoticons/<#EMO_DIR#>/cheers.gif' border='0' style='vertical-align:middle' alt='cheers.gif' /><!--endemo-->