08-09-2007, 02:19 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>'N-deal will hit our strategic programme' </b>
Pioneer.com
It's not a question of agreeing or disagreeing with the 123 Agreement, says former National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra in a candid interview to Karan Thapar, the India-US civil nuclear cooperation deal is ab initio faulty. Any future nuclear test, forced by security concerns, will come with a hefty price tag, he warns, unless India can carry the NSG countries with it
Former National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra, who played a key role in convincing the US that taking a tough position on India after Pokhran II served no purpose, least of all American interests, and crafted the beginnings of a strategic relationship between New Delhi and Washington, feels the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement will adversely impact on our strategic programme.
In a candid interview to Karan Thapar, host of CNBC's India Tonight on Tuesday, he voiced his reservations about the nuclear deal and explained why there's reason to feel concerned. The following are excerpts from the interview:
Karan Thapar: Let me ask for your overall opinion about the 123 Agreement. The Atomic Energy Commission chairman has called it a satisfactory agreement. Mr NR Srinivasan has termed it the best compromise with which we can live. Do you agree with them?
Brajesh Mishra: It's not a question of agreeing or disagreeing. When this deal was announced in July 2005, I had said this would have an adverse impact on our strategic programme. The separation idea that came in March 2006 reinforced that concern. And the promise to go for an early conclusion of FMCT further reinforces what I had said. Because of that the text of the 123 Agreement doesn't really matter as far I am concerned. The deal ab initio as it was outlined in the July 2005 declaration was itself faulty.
KT: What you are saying is that regardless of the language of the 123 Agreement the entire deal ab initio is deleterious to India's interest. It impinges on India's military strategic programme. And, therefore, it's not in India's interest.
BM: That's right.
KT: You stand by that?
BM: Yes.
KT: And nothing in the agreement has given you assurance that your earlier fears are now laid to rest.
BM: No. Because the 123 Agree-ment also includes the separation plan
KT: You don't think it is satisfactory... it is an unfortunate, unwelcome outcome for India.
BM: Well, whatever language we may use, it is something which causes us great concern.
KT: It causes you great concern. In other words, it means a vote against it.
BM: Yes. I won't go for this agreement.
KT: Let's come to the specifics. Let's take the testing issue. Now the critics of the 123 Agreement claim that India's freedom to carry out further nuclear tests has been taken away. The Government, on the other hand, says that the very word nuclear testing isn't there. Nicholas Burns says that India retains the sovereign right to test. What's your view about the implications for testing?
BM: Of course, India retains the sovereign right to test. But the conditions that have been imposed through the 123 Agreement or the US laws, they continue to have the right of return. Which means down the years, say 5, 10, 15 years, if we face a national security situation which leads us to test then we have reason to be worried about the economic cost of that test which will be far greater than in the past. So, any Government at that point of time will be faced with a dilemma. Do we go for allaying our national security concerns or sacrifice all this. So, we are in that situation.
KT: What you are saying is that because the cost of testing has gone up exponentially because of this agreement, the Government's capacity to take a simple, easy decision will be a lot less. The concern, therefore, will be greater.
BM: Yes, the Government at that point of time can take a decision to test, but the costs will be greater. And it will have to convince the public about the reasons. Since the costs are greater, it becomes a difficult decision to take.
KT: Since it's a difficult decision to take, the ease has gone down and the constraints have gone up.
BM: Obviously, but the right to test remains.
KT: Connected with this is the whole issue of Indian strategic reserves in the event of India testing or for that matter if 123 is terminated. By my count, there are three separate references in the 123 Agreement to this issue. Do they add up to effective immunisation, or are they simply repeated assurances to favourably consider the issue as and when the matter arises?
BM: Well, so far as American fuel given to us is considered, I think it's going to be very difficult to refuse the right of return. But in the end, if the NSG countries support the idea of strategic fuel reserve then there is nothing to worry about. What is to be seen is that does the 123 Agreement impact the thinking of other NSG countries, or it applies only to the US?
KT: At this moment we don't know whether it would impact the thinking of the NSG. If it does and the NSG insists on right of return, then India's fuel reserves will be in jeopardy should India test, regardless of where they come from.
BM: But there is a point... The agreement with the NSG will have to be arrived at before this agreement is signed.
KT: If the NSG doesn't insist on the right of return, then India, if it conducts tests, could lose supplies from the US but not the NSG. In that event, one could say that strategic reserves are effectively immunised.
BM: Effectively immunised or not, they are under less of a risk.
KT: Under less of a risk! Let's take one step backwards and look at how the 123 Agreement permits India to build strategic reserves - lifetime supplies of fuel that last for 40 years of a reactor's lifecycle. There are three separate references to lifetime supply in the 123 Agreement. Section 5.6 contains details of it. In your eyes, do they assure India right to effectively build lifetime supplies?
BM: If these provisions in the 123 Agreement are carried out honestly, then it should give us comfort. But I repeat we are yet to discuss the matter with the NSG countries.
KT: You are saying two things: If the US lives up to what it has committed on paper - and we have no reason to believe that the Americans would cheat - and if there is good faith from the Americans, we will build effective reserves.
BM: Well, if they are going to build reactors in India, it's in their interest to continue operations.
KT: So, you say it's in the US interest not to cheat us.
BM: Yes.
KT: Are there any reasons on which the NSG might differ on building of lifetime reserves?
BM: It depends upon the fact how the agreement is seen by other countries. I am told we have a problem with China. I don't know what other countries think. There could be problem.
KT: Assuming that the US lives up to the assurances it has given to the Government in the 123 Agreement to help us in the NSG and presumably China's concern will also be allayed in due course of time...
BM: It depends upon China.
KT: Let's put it this way. At the end, we get assurances from the NSG to build reserves - an assurance identical to the Americans - then you feel we have got lifetime reserves.
BM: There is no point in going for foreign reactors when we won't have the fuel to continue their operations.
KT: But if we know in advance by October that with the NSG clearance we can have the fuel then we can do so.
BM: I presume if we enter into a contract, it will be taken care of.
KT: To sum up, the cost has gone up, so it has become a difficult decision to test. Freedom is there, but it has become a tough decision. You also agreed that at least US fuel apart, all other fuel supplies will be immunised if the NSG follows what's here in the agreement...
BM: I am not fully aware of the 1954 Act of the US Congress. Whether it is just the right of supply that will be affected or there will be sanctions or something else. So, if it is merely right of return or there is additional cost we don't know. And it's worrying. Anything unknown.
KT: As you read the 123 Agreement, has India got prior consent for reprocessing as the Government has often repeated. Or, is it over-interpreting the language?
BM: It's very clear that India has approval for right to reprocess in principle, but it is subject to further consultation, which may take a year or so. But what happens at the end of it, it's not said.
KT: If after 18 months two parties don't agree on procedures, can India reprocess?
BM: India is stymied as far as the US fuel is concerned.
KT: If the NSG follows same pattern as the US for reprocessing we are stymied all around.
BM:On reprocessing, like the other two issues of immunisation and building reserves, it all depends on what the NSG does. Assuming that the NSG takes a different route than the US, we are through.
BM: Yes
KT: On all the three issues, 123 is an interim agreement; the NSG gives it real teeth. Let's come to the desire of India to purchase technology of enrichment and heavy water. Article 5.1 of the 123 Agreement requires further amendment for the 123 for such transfers. Do you agree with the Government that they haven't been denied transfers?
BM: They (the US) haven't given it, nor have they denied it. They have left the possibility open for the future. It's just a mere possibility because the US hasn't given that technology to anyone so we can't take it as a firm promise. And this agreement has to go through the US Congress.
KT: It raises the hope but without any realistic rational expectation of fulfilling that hope.
BM: If the NSG agrees to sell those technologies to India, then we can say that we have achieved full civilian nuclear cooperation with the NSG through the US route, if not the US alone... That's a possibility, but I don't know if other countries have similar technologies as the US, which they say they haven't given to anyone, including the nuclear weapons states.
KT: You want to say that you want the US technology, as they are the best.
BM: Maybe I am not a scientist; or, may be we are asking for these technologies to say that it's full civil nuclear cooperation.
KT: Do you share the fears that this 123 document impinges on India's foreign policy and more importantly on India's freedom to take its decisions when the US decides to take a different line?
BM: Not this document. But people are saying this because the deal does (impinge on India), not this document... If the deal goes through, the two countries will be very close. Then we will have problems of aligning our views with their views. In other words, the agenda of the two countries has to come close to each other. Now, in that case, take the example of Iraq. What you are going to do? And the US is the more powerful and more important party in this. They are going to come to you every other day, seeking support for one thing or another. The answer to your question is: Is the Government of India capable of saying 'no' to America that we can't do it. Say, in the case of Iran, can it say that we don't agree with you and we will continue with our cooperation with Iran?
KT: You mean, will the future Government be capable of saying 'no', if they know 'no' is the right answer...
BM: It depends upon what kind of Government we have.
KT: But the pressure to say yes would have grown.
BM: The pressure will grow obviously. When you come close, it becomes difficult to say 'no'.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Pioneer.com
It's not a question of agreeing or disagreeing with the 123 Agreement, says former National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra in a candid interview to Karan Thapar, the India-US civil nuclear cooperation deal is ab initio faulty. Any future nuclear test, forced by security concerns, will come with a hefty price tag, he warns, unless India can carry the NSG countries with it
Former National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra, who played a key role in convincing the US that taking a tough position on India after Pokhran II served no purpose, least of all American interests, and crafted the beginnings of a strategic relationship between New Delhi and Washington, feels the India-US civil nuclear cooperation agreement will adversely impact on our strategic programme.
In a candid interview to Karan Thapar, host of CNBC's India Tonight on Tuesday, he voiced his reservations about the nuclear deal and explained why there's reason to feel concerned. The following are excerpts from the interview:
Karan Thapar: Let me ask for your overall opinion about the 123 Agreement. The Atomic Energy Commission chairman has called it a satisfactory agreement. Mr NR Srinivasan has termed it the best compromise with which we can live. Do you agree with them?
Brajesh Mishra: It's not a question of agreeing or disagreeing. When this deal was announced in July 2005, I had said this would have an adverse impact on our strategic programme. The separation idea that came in March 2006 reinforced that concern. And the promise to go for an early conclusion of FMCT further reinforces what I had said. Because of that the text of the 123 Agreement doesn't really matter as far I am concerned. The deal ab initio as it was outlined in the July 2005 declaration was itself faulty.
KT: What you are saying is that regardless of the language of the 123 Agreement the entire deal ab initio is deleterious to India's interest. It impinges on India's military strategic programme. And, therefore, it's not in India's interest.
BM: That's right.
KT: You stand by that?
BM: Yes.
KT: And nothing in the agreement has given you assurance that your earlier fears are now laid to rest.
BM: No. Because the 123 Agree-ment also includes the separation plan
KT: You don't think it is satisfactory... it is an unfortunate, unwelcome outcome for India.
BM: Well, whatever language we may use, it is something which causes us great concern.
KT: It causes you great concern. In other words, it means a vote against it.
BM: Yes. I won't go for this agreement.
KT: Let's come to the specifics. Let's take the testing issue. Now the critics of the 123 Agreement claim that India's freedom to carry out further nuclear tests has been taken away. The Government, on the other hand, says that the very word nuclear testing isn't there. Nicholas Burns says that India retains the sovereign right to test. What's your view about the implications for testing?
BM: Of course, India retains the sovereign right to test. But the conditions that have been imposed through the 123 Agreement or the US laws, they continue to have the right of return. Which means down the years, say 5, 10, 15 years, if we face a national security situation which leads us to test then we have reason to be worried about the economic cost of that test which will be far greater than in the past. So, any Government at that point of time will be faced with a dilemma. Do we go for allaying our national security concerns or sacrifice all this. So, we are in that situation.
KT: What you are saying is that because the cost of testing has gone up exponentially because of this agreement, the Government's capacity to take a simple, easy decision will be a lot less. The concern, therefore, will be greater.
BM: Yes, the Government at that point of time can take a decision to test, but the costs will be greater. And it will have to convince the public about the reasons. Since the costs are greater, it becomes a difficult decision to take.
KT: Since it's a difficult decision to take, the ease has gone down and the constraints have gone up.
BM: Obviously, but the right to test remains.
KT: Connected with this is the whole issue of Indian strategic reserves in the event of India testing or for that matter if 123 is terminated. By my count, there are three separate references in the 123 Agreement to this issue. Do they add up to effective immunisation, or are they simply repeated assurances to favourably consider the issue as and when the matter arises?
BM: Well, so far as American fuel given to us is considered, I think it's going to be very difficult to refuse the right of return. But in the end, if the NSG countries support the idea of strategic fuel reserve then there is nothing to worry about. What is to be seen is that does the 123 Agreement impact the thinking of other NSG countries, or it applies only to the US?
KT: At this moment we don't know whether it would impact the thinking of the NSG. If it does and the NSG insists on right of return, then India's fuel reserves will be in jeopardy should India test, regardless of where they come from.
BM: But there is a point... The agreement with the NSG will have to be arrived at before this agreement is signed.
KT: If the NSG doesn't insist on the right of return, then India, if it conducts tests, could lose supplies from the US but not the NSG. In that event, one could say that strategic reserves are effectively immunised.
BM: Effectively immunised or not, they are under less of a risk.
KT: Under less of a risk! Let's take one step backwards and look at how the 123 Agreement permits India to build strategic reserves - lifetime supplies of fuel that last for 40 years of a reactor's lifecycle. There are three separate references to lifetime supply in the 123 Agreement. Section 5.6 contains details of it. In your eyes, do they assure India right to effectively build lifetime supplies?
BM: If these provisions in the 123 Agreement are carried out honestly, then it should give us comfort. But I repeat we are yet to discuss the matter with the NSG countries.
KT: You are saying two things: If the US lives up to what it has committed on paper - and we have no reason to believe that the Americans would cheat - and if there is good faith from the Americans, we will build effective reserves.
BM: Well, if they are going to build reactors in India, it's in their interest to continue operations.
KT: So, you say it's in the US interest not to cheat us.
BM: Yes.
KT: Are there any reasons on which the NSG might differ on building of lifetime reserves?
BM: It depends upon the fact how the agreement is seen by other countries. I am told we have a problem with China. I don't know what other countries think. There could be problem.
KT: Assuming that the US lives up to the assurances it has given to the Government in the 123 Agreement to help us in the NSG and presumably China's concern will also be allayed in due course of time...
BM: It depends upon China.
KT: Let's put it this way. At the end, we get assurances from the NSG to build reserves - an assurance identical to the Americans - then you feel we have got lifetime reserves.
BM: There is no point in going for foreign reactors when we won't have the fuel to continue their operations.
KT: But if we know in advance by October that with the NSG clearance we can have the fuel then we can do so.
BM: I presume if we enter into a contract, it will be taken care of.
KT: To sum up, the cost has gone up, so it has become a difficult decision to test. Freedom is there, but it has become a tough decision. You also agreed that at least US fuel apart, all other fuel supplies will be immunised if the NSG follows what's here in the agreement...
BM: I am not fully aware of the 1954 Act of the US Congress. Whether it is just the right of supply that will be affected or there will be sanctions or something else. So, if it is merely right of return or there is additional cost we don't know. And it's worrying. Anything unknown.
KT: As you read the 123 Agreement, has India got prior consent for reprocessing as the Government has often repeated. Or, is it over-interpreting the language?
BM: It's very clear that India has approval for right to reprocess in principle, but it is subject to further consultation, which may take a year or so. But what happens at the end of it, it's not said.
KT: If after 18 months two parties don't agree on procedures, can India reprocess?
BM: India is stymied as far as the US fuel is concerned.
KT: If the NSG follows same pattern as the US for reprocessing we are stymied all around.
BM:On reprocessing, like the other two issues of immunisation and building reserves, it all depends on what the NSG does. Assuming that the NSG takes a different route than the US, we are through.
BM: Yes
KT: On all the three issues, 123 is an interim agreement; the NSG gives it real teeth. Let's come to the desire of India to purchase technology of enrichment and heavy water. Article 5.1 of the 123 Agreement requires further amendment for the 123 for such transfers. Do you agree with the Government that they haven't been denied transfers?
BM: They (the US) haven't given it, nor have they denied it. They have left the possibility open for the future. It's just a mere possibility because the US hasn't given that technology to anyone so we can't take it as a firm promise. And this agreement has to go through the US Congress.
KT: It raises the hope but without any realistic rational expectation of fulfilling that hope.
BM: If the NSG agrees to sell those technologies to India, then we can say that we have achieved full civilian nuclear cooperation with the NSG through the US route, if not the US alone... That's a possibility, but I don't know if other countries have similar technologies as the US, which they say they haven't given to anyone, including the nuclear weapons states.
KT: You want to say that you want the US technology, as they are the best.
BM: Maybe I am not a scientist; or, may be we are asking for these technologies to say that it's full civil nuclear cooperation.
KT: Do you share the fears that this 123 document impinges on India's foreign policy and more importantly on India's freedom to take its decisions when the US decides to take a different line?
BM: Not this document. But people are saying this because the deal does (impinge on India), not this document... If the deal goes through, the two countries will be very close. Then we will have problems of aligning our views with their views. In other words, the agenda of the two countries has to come close to each other. Now, in that case, take the example of Iraq. What you are going to do? And the US is the more powerful and more important party in this. They are going to come to you every other day, seeking support for one thing or another. The answer to your question is: Is the Government of India capable of saying 'no' to America that we can't do it. Say, in the case of Iran, can it say that we don't agree with you and we will continue with our cooperation with Iran?
KT: You mean, will the future Government be capable of saying 'no', if they know 'no' is the right answer...
BM: It depends upon what kind of Government we have.
KT: But the pressure to say yes would have grown.
BM: The pressure will grow obviously. When you come close, it becomes difficult to say 'no'.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->