08-22-2007, 10:37 PM
An interesting article
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->
Negotiating with NSG- Prospects and Challenges
By Ambassador (Rtd) T.P.Sreenivasan
Negotiating with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to seek an exception from its guidelines for India is like negotiating with Winston Churchill for the liquidation of the British Empire. The NSG was established specifically to deny India nuclear fuel and technology after its peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. Once India becomes a partner rather than a target, there may be no more need for such a group to be in existence. The United States, which now proposes to shepherd India in its negotiations with the NSG, was, ironically the country that proposed the formation of the Group to ensure that suppliers around the globe uniformly applied a comprehensive set of guidelines so that nuclear cooperation did not contribute to proliferation. It had its eyes especially on France, at that time a key non-NPT supplier.
The growth of the NSG from its original 7 members to 15 in 1978, when its guidelines and Trigger List were published, to 45 till today was the result of the emergence of new votaries of non-proliferation and the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 1992, the revelations about Iraqâs illicit nuclear weapons programme spurred the NSG to adopt controls on nuclear-related dual-use goods that could make a contribution to explosive technology in the hands of non- nuclear weapon states. Between the original guidelines that required application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards and physical protection against unauthorized use of transferred material and the additional requirements of a strict regime for use of dual-use technology, there is a veritable fortress of rules and lists to prevent proliferation. In 2004, the members even adopted a âcatch allâ mechanism, which authorizes members to block any export suspected to be destined to a nuclear weapons programme even if the export material does not appear on one of the control lists. The fact, of course, is that determined states and individuals like A.Q.Khan have been able to penetrate the fortress without any let or hindrance.
The regime is voluntary and there is no requirement for prior clearance of exports with the group, but as in the instance of Russian supplies to India in 2001, the other members can exert pressure on individual countries, which violate the guidelines. Russia was able to supply in 2006 only with the implicit understanding of the U.S. Members are supposed to report their export denials to each other so that potential proliferators cannot approach several suppliers with the same request and get different responses. They are also expected to refrain from making exports identical or similar to those denied by other members. The guidelines do not remain static, as members tend to add new items to the prohibited list, especially of dual-use items. The annual Plenary Meetings of the NSG take important decisions by consensus.Â
An informal grouping, the Zangger Committee, with a similar mandate was already in existence ever since the NPT came into force. The Zangger Committee characterizes itself as a âfaithful interpreter of Article III paragraph 2 of the NPTâ. The Groupâs objective was to reach a common understanding on the definition of âequipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable materialâ and the conditions and procedures for such exports. Though The NSG adopted the Zangger Committeeâs âTrigger Listâ and depended on it to resolve some non-proliferation issues at a time when China had not yet joined the NSG, the Zangger Committee was not considered adequate to deal with the challenges of India and Iraq, first because the Zangger Committee dealt only with NPT signatories and its decisions were not legally binding on its members. Their common mission and their co-location in Vienna have made the Zangger Committee and the NSG non-proliferation twins born out of the NPT.
My dealings with the NSG in Vienna (2000-04) were in a different time and era, when India was extremely sensitive to any signal that would bring us close to the NPT regime. The Indian Governor of the IAEA was under instructions not to attend even NSG dinners in Vienna, to which we were invited occasionally. One reason for the distance we maintained with the NSG was that the most active members of the âSouth Asia Working Groupâ that was set up to design the punitive measures against India after the nuclear tests of 1998 were NSG members. Some of them like Ukraine were thoughtlessly adamant about âpunishingâ India for its tests. Brazil and South Africa were also hardliners as they had the halo of nuclear renunciation around their heads.
The NSG, for some reason, began an outreach programme to non-NSG members in 2001. This was around the time when fissures became visible in the NSG when Russia, citing the safety exception clause of the NSG guidelines, supplied fuel for Tarapur. The state department had reacted strongly to the Russian action. âRussian disregard of its NSG commitmentsâ, said the state department, âraises serious questions about Russiaâs support for the goal of preventing nuclear proliferation.â 32 of the 34 members had opposed the Russian decision. A feeble effort by Russia to accord associate status to India in the NSG became a non-starter. Against this backdrop, we were invited for a meeting with a representative team of the NSG, including the United States, in Vienna. But, instead of exploring possibilities of any relaxation for the Russian supplies, the NSG team lectured us on the merits of non-proliferation and comprehensive safeguards. We declined further invitations from the NSG for dialogue in the next couple of years, much to the annoyance of the NSG leadership. The Czech Ambassador in Vienna, who chaired the group for a year, took it personally when I repeatedly declined his invitation for a dialogue. We knew that we did not miss much as Israel and Pakistan, which went to such meetings, came back disappointed that the NSG had no intention to relax its guidelines. Under pressure from NSG members, who were otherwise friendly, we suggested that we would not be averse to talks in New Delhi. Accordingly, a team of ambassadors from Vienna and some officials from NSG capitals came to New Delhi for an interaction. It was evident from these meetings that, unless there was a change in the U.S. position, such meetings would be futile. The NSG members at that time were aware of an Indian proposal to open up additional nuclear establishments for IAEA inspection in return for relaxation of the NSG guidelines, but the members, like the Americans, were not enthusiastic.
The atmosphere in the NSG changed after the Indo-U.S. Joint Statement of 2005, though an American proposal to put the nuclear deal on the agenda of the NSG Plenary Meeting in May 2006 was not accepted as the deal had not become operational. On the Russian supply of fuel to India in 2006, the state department stated: âDeals to supply that fuel should move forward on the basis of a joint initiative, on the basis of steps that India will take, but it has not yet taken.â Japan and Australia were particularly firm on examining matters only after the Indo-U.S. deal became operational. In the NSG, the general trend was for countries, which have nuclear power plants and other equipment to sell to be more positive than those, which had no business to transact under any new arrangement.
The U.S. had maintained, right from 2005, that exports under the new arrangement could commence only after India had negotiated an India specific safeguards agreement and an appropriate Additional Protocol with the IAEA and it had obtained relaxation of the NSG guidelines. But these were seen as mere formalities, once the US Congress had approved a bilateral arrangement between India and the United States. Even China had not given any strong indication that it would stand in the way. With the U.S. as the âsherpaâ, it was presumed that it would be an easy climb to the NSG summit. But difficulties will present themselves as the trek begins. Members are likely to resist the liquidation of an empire that they have built over the last 34 years.
A fundamental premise of the NSG is that any country that receives supplies should accept full-scope safeguards. China initially joined the Zangger Committee and not the NSG because China was at that time in the process of supplying a reactor to Pakistan. Since the NPT does not require full scope safeguards as a condition of supply, Chinaâs membership of the Zangger Committee did not prevent them from supplying the reactor to Pakistan. By joining the NSG at that time, China would have forsaken its right to supply nuclear equipment to Pakistan. A U.S. representative to NSG revealed this when China applied for NSG membership subsequently. Since India will not accept full-scope safeguards under the deal, NSG will need to make a change in its fundamental position. The India specific safeguards, which the IAEA approves, will be subjected to an analysis to see whether it will have sufficient safeguards against diversion of nuclear material or dual use equipment. For this reason, Russia is supposed to have advised India to circulate its draft of the safeguards to the members of the NSG in advance.
The strategy of the United States in the context of the NSG will be to ask the NSG members to take note of the steps that India has taken as a âcontributing partnerâ in the non-proliferation regime. It will also ask the NSG members to transfer the trigger list items and related technologies only to the safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India as long as India continues to meet the other requirements of the NSG. The relaxation will be sought on the ground that India has accepted IAEA safeguards in perpetuity for its civilian nuclear facilities, it has a moratorium on testing in place, it will sign an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, it has stringent export controls and it will adhere strictly to the NSG guidelines on exports. Here, interested governments will argue that India had no intention to be a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime as the Indian position is that the nuclear deal is merely an energy agreement.
Another requirement of the NSG is that adequate verification measures should be in place to ensure that the supplies of the participating states are not diverted to weapons purposes. The bilateral agreement between India and the US envisages IAEA inspections of civilian establishments in India and a certain amount of trust is an element in the agreement. A multilateral group like the NSG might want other verification measures, which may prove anathema to India.
Chinaâs position will be the most crucial in the entire NSG exercise. At the first NSG meeting after the Indo-US Joint Statement, China had pressed the US for a similar deal for Pakistan. China has been lying low, but it has not made secret of its opposition to the deal. But China tends to be eminently reasonable in the international arena and, therefore, may point out that giving exceptional treatment to one country may jeopordize the non-proliferation regime. China may suggest, instead, that the NSG guidelines should be relaxed in a manner that allows export to certain countries in certain situations, which may cover the Indian exception. Though the U.S. position is that no other exception will be made, it may close its eyes to the advantage it may give to Pakistan and China to enhance their nuclear co-operation. The Chinese position may enjoy some support among the other NSG members. China will also look for some gains for itself in the light of the impression that the 123 Agreement with China is not as favourable to China as in the Indian case.
Although nuclear tests are not mentioned in the 123 Agreement, it is premised on an Indian moratorium on testing, which finds mention in the Indo-U.S Joint Statement of 2005. The debate in Parliament and elsewhere about the need for India to protect its sovereign right to test may well have created suspicion in the minds of the NSG members and they may well make a reference in the revised guidelines to the termination of the arrangements in the event of a nuclear test by India. The U.S. will naturally welcome such a provision, which, according to it, is already included in the 123 Agreement.
The extent of challenges within the NSG will depend on the degree of firmness with which the United States will defend the agreement and ensure that it is not changed to Indiaâs disadvantage. They should not attempt to secure through the NSG what they had conceded in the bilateral negotiations. But at the same time, the U.S. will not favour a situation, which will dismantle the NSG and leave it to the member states to deal with India and others in accordance with their own interests. Although an exception for India will end the rationale for the existence of the group, the US will favour continuation of the Group and will do everything possible to maintain the integrity of the NSG.
The motivation that will eventually persuade the NSG to go along with the US will be commercial, as can be seen by the accommodating attitude of France, Russia, Australia and Japan. But those who have nothing to gain by opening the Indian market will not be enthusiastic about any relaxation of the guidelines. Ireland is supposed to have asked a number of hard questions in the initial discussions. South Africa, Argentina, Japan and Germany are also expected to be hard negotiators. The negotiations in the NSG are likely to be long and arduous.
The NSG exercise is still some distance away because there are other hurdles to cross such as the IAEA Board, which has to approve the India specific safeguards system. India will have to work bilaterally with each of the 45 members, as implementation of the guidelines is an individual rather than a collective responsibility. The success we have accomplished in befriending Brazil and South Africa should help us in the NSG. In the past, they have been rather adamant about full-scope safeguards.
Just as the entry of Russia into NATO is fast becoming logical in the changed world, India joining the NSG will be a logical step. In fact, no other country has better credentials than India in terms of the objective of the NSG to prevent exports that will lead to proliferation. Even in the aftermath of our nuclear tests, authorities on export controls had certified that India had an impeccable record in export control. If the criteria for membership of the NSG alone were to be considered, without considering our NPT status, there was no reason to exclude India from the NSG. Indiaâs membership of the NSG should be the next logical step after the NSG has taken a decision to exempt India from accepting full-scope safeguards before member states export nuclear fuel and equipment to India.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->
Negotiating with NSG- Prospects and Challenges
By Ambassador (Rtd) T.P.Sreenivasan
Negotiating with the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to seek an exception from its guidelines for India is like negotiating with Winston Churchill for the liquidation of the British Empire. The NSG was established specifically to deny India nuclear fuel and technology after its peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974. Once India becomes a partner rather than a target, there may be no more need for such a group to be in existence. The United States, which now proposes to shepherd India in its negotiations with the NSG, was, ironically the country that proposed the formation of the Group to ensure that suppliers around the globe uniformly applied a comprehensive set of guidelines so that nuclear cooperation did not contribute to proliferation. It had its eyes especially on France, at that time a key non-NPT supplier.
The growth of the NSG from its original 7 members to 15 in 1978, when its guidelines and Trigger List were published, to 45 till today was the result of the emergence of new votaries of non-proliferation and the break-up of the Soviet Union. In 1992, the revelations about Iraqâs illicit nuclear weapons programme spurred the NSG to adopt controls on nuclear-related dual-use goods that could make a contribution to explosive technology in the hands of non- nuclear weapon states. Between the original guidelines that required application of comprehensive IAEA safeguards and physical protection against unauthorized use of transferred material and the additional requirements of a strict regime for use of dual-use technology, there is a veritable fortress of rules and lists to prevent proliferation. In 2004, the members even adopted a âcatch allâ mechanism, which authorizes members to block any export suspected to be destined to a nuclear weapons programme even if the export material does not appear on one of the control lists. The fact, of course, is that determined states and individuals like A.Q.Khan have been able to penetrate the fortress without any let or hindrance.
The regime is voluntary and there is no requirement for prior clearance of exports with the group, but as in the instance of Russian supplies to India in 2001, the other members can exert pressure on individual countries, which violate the guidelines. Russia was able to supply in 2006 only with the implicit understanding of the U.S. Members are supposed to report their export denials to each other so that potential proliferators cannot approach several suppliers with the same request and get different responses. They are also expected to refrain from making exports identical or similar to those denied by other members. The guidelines do not remain static, as members tend to add new items to the prohibited list, especially of dual-use items. The annual Plenary Meetings of the NSG take important decisions by consensus.Â
An informal grouping, the Zangger Committee, with a similar mandate was already in existence ever since the NPT came into force. The Zangger Committee characterizes itself as a âfaithful interpreter of Article III paragraph 2 of the NPTâ. The Groupâs objective was to reach a common understanding on the definition of âequipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable materialâ and the conditions and procedures for such exports. Though The NSG adopted the Zangger Committeeâs âTrigger Listâ and depended on it to resolve some non-proliferation issues at a time when China had not yet joined the NSG, the Zangger Committee was not considered adequate to deal with the challenges of India and Iraq, first because the Zangger Committee dealt only with NPT signatories and its decisions were not legally binding on its members. Their common mission and their co-location in Vienna have made the Zangger Committee and the NSG non-proliferation twins born out of the NPT.
My dealings with the NSG in Vienna (2000-04) were in a different time and era, when India was extremely sensitive to any signal that would bring us close to the NPT regime. The Indian Governor of the IAEA was under instructions not to attend even NSG dinners in Vienna, to which we were invited occasionally. One reason for the distance we maintained with the NSG was that the most active members of the âSouth Asia Working Groupâ that was set up to design the punitive measures against India after the nuclear tests of 1998 were NSG members. Some of them like Ukraine were thoughtlessly adamant about âpunishingâ India for its tests. Brazil and South Africa were also hardliners as they had the halo of nuclear renunciation around their heads.
The NSG, for some reason, began an outreach programme to non-NSG members in 2001. This was around the time when fissures became visible in the NSG when Russia, citing the safety exception clause of the NSG guidelines, supplied fuel for Tarapur. The state department had reacted strongly to the Russian action. âRussian disregard of its NSG commitmentsâ, said the state department, âraises serious questions about Russiaâs support for the goal of preventing nuclear proliferation.â 32 of the 34 members had opposed the Russian decision. A feeble effort by Russia to accord associate status to India in the NSG became a non-starter. Against this backdrop, we were invited for a meeting with a representative team of the NSG, including the United States, in Vienna. But, instead of exploring possibilities of any relaxation for the Russian supplies, the NSG team lectured us on the merits of non-proliferation and comprehensive safeguards. We declined further invitations from the NSG for dialogue in the next couple of years, much to the annoyance of the NSG leadership. The Czech Ambassador in Vienna, who chaired the group for a year, took it personally when I repeatedly declined his invitation for a dialogue. We knew that we did not miss much as Israel and Pakistan, which went to such meetings, came back disappointed that the NSG had no intention to relax its guidelines. Under pressure from NSG members, who were otherwise friendly, we suggested that we would not be averse to talks in New Delhi. Accordingly, a team of ambassadors from Vienna and some officials from NSG capitals came to New Delhi for an interaction. It was evident from these meetings that, unless there was a change in the U.S. position, such meetings would be futile. The NSG members at that time were aware of an Indian proposal to open up additional nuclear establishments for IAEA inspection in return for relaxation of the NSG guidelines, but the members, like the Americans, were not enthusiastic.
The atmosphere in the NSG changed after the Indo-U.S. Joint Statement of 2005, though an American proposal to put the nuclear deal on the agenda of the NSG Plenary Meeting in May 2006 was not accepted as the deal had not become operational. On the Russian supply of fuel to India in 2006, the state department stated: âDeals to supply that fuel should move forward on the basis of a joint initiative, on the basis of steps that India will take, but it has not yet taken.â Japan and Australia were particularly firm on examining matters only after the Indo-U.S. deal became operational. In the NSG, the general trend was for countries, which have nuclear power plants and other equipment to sell to be more positive than those, which had no business to transact under any new arrangement.
The U.S. had maintained, right from 2005, that exports under the new arrangement could commence only after India had negotiated an India specific safeguards agreement and an appropriate Additional Protocol with the IAEA and it had obtained relaxation of the NSG guidelines. But these were seen as mere formalities, once the US Congress had approved a bilateral arrangement between India and the United States. Even China had not given any strong indication that it would stand in the way. With the U.S. as the âsherpaâ, it was presumed that it would be an easy climb to the NSG summit. But difficulties will present themselves as the trek begins. Members are likely to resist the liquidation of an empire that they have built over the last 34 years.
A fundamental premise of the NSG is that any country that receives supplies should accept full-scope safeguards. China initially joined the Zangger Committee and not the NSG because China was at that time in the process of supplying a reactor to Pakistan. Since the NPT does not require full scope safeguards as a condition of supply, Chinaâs membership of the Zangger Committee did not prevent them from supplying the reactor to Pakistan. By joining the NSG at that time, China would have forsaken its right to supply nuclear equipment to Pakistan. A U.S. representative to NSG revealed this when China applied for NSG membership subsequently. Since India will not accept full-scope safeguards under the deal, NSG will need to make a change in its fundamental position. The India specific safeguards, which the IAEA approves, will be subjected to an analysis to see whether it will have sufficient safeguards against diversion of nuclear material or dual use equipment. For this reason, Russia is supposed to have advised India to circulate its draft of the safeguards to the members of the NSG in advance.
The strategy of the United States in the context of the NSG will be to ask the NSG members to take note of the steps that India has taken as a âcontributing partnerâ in the non-proliferation regime. It will also ask the NSG members to transfer the trigger list items and related technologies only to the safeguarded civil nuclear facilities in India as long as India continues to meet the other requirements of the NSG. The relaxation will be sought on the ground that India has accepted IAEA safeguards in perpetuity for its civilian nuclear facilities, it has a moratorium on testing in place, it will sign an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, it has stringent export controls and it will adhere strictly to the NSG guidelines on exports. Here, interested governments will argue that India had no intention to be a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime as the Indian position is that the nuclear deal is merely an energy agreement.
Another requirement of the NSG is that adequate verification measures should be in place to ensure that the supplies of the participating states are not diverted to weapons purposes. The bilateral agreement between India and the US envisages IAEA inspections of civilian establishments in India and a certain amount of trust is an element in the agreement. A multilateral group like the NSG might want other verification measures, which may prove anathema to India.
Chinaâs position will be the most crucial in the entire NSG exercise. At the first NSG meeting after the Indo-US Joint Statement, China had pressed the US for a similar deal for Pakistan. China has been lying low, but it has not made secret of its opposition to the deal. But China tends to be eminently reasonable in the international arena and, therefore, may point out that giving exceptional treatment to one country may jeopordize the non-proliferation regime. China may suggest, instead, that the NSG guidelines should be relaxed in a manner that allows export to certain countries in certain situations, which may cover the Indian exception. Though the U.S. position is that no other exception will be made, it may close its eyes to the advantage it may give to Pakistan and China to enhance their nuclear co-operation. The Chinese position may enjoy some support among the other NSG members. China will also look for some gains for itself in the light of the impression that the 123 Agreement with China is not as favourable to China as in the Indian case.
Although nuclear tests are not mentioned in the 123 Agreement, it is premised on an Indian moratorium on testing, which finds mention in the Indo-U.S Joint Statement of 2005. The debate in Parliament and elsewhere about the need for India to protect its sovereign right to test may well have created suspicion in the minds of the NSG members and they may well make a reference in the revised guidelines to the termination of the arrangements in the event of a nuclear test by India. The U.S. will naturally welcome such a provision, which, according to it, is already included in the 123 Agreement.
The extent of challenges within the NSG will depend on the degree of firmness with which the United States will defend the agreement and ensure that it is not changed to Indiaâs disadvantage. They should not attempt to secure through the NSG what they had conceded in the bilateral negotiations. But at the same time, the U.S. will not favour a situation, which will dismantle the NSG and leave it to the member states to deal with India and others in accordance with their own interests. Although an exception for India will end the rationale for the existence of the group, the US will favour continuation of the Group and will do everything possible to maintain the integrity of the NSG.
The motivation that will eventually persuade the NSG to go along with the US will be commercial, as can be seen by the accommodating attitude of France, Russia, Australia and Japan. But those who have nothing to gain by opening the Indian market will not be enthusiastic about any relaxation of the guidelines. Ireland is supposed to have asked a number of hard questions in the initial discussions. South Africa, Argentina, Japan and Germany are also expected to be hard negotiators. The negotiations in the NSG are likely to be long and arduous.
The NSG exercise is still some distance away because there are other hurdles to cross such as the IAEA Board, which has to approve the India specific safeguards system. India will have to work bilaterally with each of the 45 members, as implementation of the guidelines is an individual rather than a collective responsibility. The success we have accomplished in befriending Brazil and South Africa should help us in the NSG. In the past, they have been rather adamant about full-scope safeguards.
Just as the entry of Russia into NATO is fast becoming logical in the changed world, India joining the NSG will be a logical step. In fact, no other country has better credentials than India in terms of the objective of the NSG to prevent exports that will lead to proliferation. Even in the aftermath of our nuclear tests, authorities on export controls had certified that India had an impeccable record in export control. If the criteria for membership of the NSG alone were to be considered, without considering our NPT status, there was no reason to exclude India from the NSG. Indiaâs membership of the NSG should be the next logical step after the NSG has taken a decision to exempt India from accepting full-scope safeguards before member states export nuclear fuel and equipment to India.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->