Book Review in Telegraph, Calcutta.. 6/18/2004..
BATTLE WITHOUT THE RIGHT STRATEGY
From hydaspes to kargil: a history of warfare in india from 326 BC to ad1999 By Kaushik Roy, Manohar, Rs 595
Military history in India has never been Clioâs favourite child. One kind of military history flourished in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the hands of great narrative historians like Jadunath Sarkar. They wrote about battles with great fanfare. Seldom, if ever, detailed analysis of tactics and strategy was brought into play. But even this kind of attention to military matters disappeared when issues of social and political history came to acquire a prominence in Indian historiography.
It is impossible to recall a single important book on Indian military history written in the last 30 years by a serious academic historian. It became infra dig to do research on military history. Graduate students in premier universities were guided by their professors to the obscure corners of nationalism and to arcane problems of agrarian relations as possible themes for their doctoral dissertation.
Kaushik Roy is the rare species that fought off blandishments and threats of academic marginalization to pursue research in military history, his childhood passion.
The book has a wide range. It begins with the battle of Hydaspes. Alexander the Greatâs triumph on the banks of the Jhelum in 326 BC is taken as Indiaâs first battle. The book ends with Kargil, though one might well wonder if Kargil was a battle or a skirmish.
Roy raises the most interesting question about the complete absence of military coups in India. His answer to this is problematic. He says, âthe roots of civilian supremacy may be traced back to classical antiquity. The marginalization of the army within the entire state structure of the state machinery was the chief characteristic of ancient Indian political philosophy.ââ
Further, he discovers the influence of âthe anti-militaristic Hindu tradition in almost all spheres of [Indiaâs] national life.ââ When such claims follow mumbo-jumbo like, âCredit is due to Nehruvian political vision for subordinating the military through a judicious military synthesis of British-designated bureaucratic systems and statecraft based on the Kautilya-Ashokan formatââ, one begins to wonder about the seriousness of this book and the common sense of the author. One of the first rules a historian learns is to avoid cross-epoch and cross-cultural generalizations. Mr Roy will serve his passion best if he stayed with the details of strategy and tactics. In military history, as in most other branches of the subject, the truth lies in the details. Where Mr Roy flies from the details, he also flies off the handle.
Draupadi Ghosh
BATTLE WITHOUT THE RIGHT STRATEGY
From hydaspes to kargil: a history of warfare in india from 326 BC to ad1999 By Kaushik Roy, Manohar, Rs 595
Military history in India has never been Clioâs favourite child. One kind of military history flourished in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in the hands of great narrative historians like Jadunath Sarkar. They wrote about battles with great fanfare. Seldom, if ever, detailed analysis of tactics and strategy was brought into play. But even this kind of attention to military matters disappeared when issues of social and political history came to acquire a prominence in Indian historiography.
It is impossible to recall a single important book on Indian military history written in the last 30 years by a serious academic historian. It became infra dig to do research on military history. Graduate students in premier universities were guided by their professors to the obscure corners of nationalism and to arcane problems of agrarian relations as possible themes for their doctoral dissertation.
Kaushik Roy is the rare species that fought off blandishments and threats of academic marginalization to pursue research in military history, his childhood passion.
The book has a wide range. It begins with the battle of Hydaspes. Alexander the Greatâs triumph on the banks of the Jhelum in 326 BC is taken as Indiaâs first battle. The book ends with Kargil, though one might well wonder if Kargil was a battle or a skirmish.
Roy raises the most interesting question about the complete absence of military coups in India. His answer to this is problematic. He says, âthe roots of civilian supremacy may be traced back to classical antiquity. The marginalization of the army within the entire state structure of the state machinery was the chief characteristic of ancient Indian political philosophy.ââ
Further, he discovers the influence of âthe anti-militaristic Hindu tradition in almost all spheres of [Indiaâs] national life.ââ When such claims follow mumbo-jumbo like, âCredit is due to Nehruvian political vision for subordinating the military through a judicious military synthesis of British-designated bureaucratic systems and statecraft based on the Kautilya-Ashokan formatââ, one begins to wonder about the seriousness of this book and the common sense of the author. One of the first rules a historian learns is to avoid cross-epoch and cross-cultural generalizations. Mr Roy will serve his passion best if he stayed with the details of strategy and tactics. In military history, as in most other branches of the subject, the truth lies in the details. Where Mr Roy flies from the details, he also flies off the handle.
Draupadi Ghosh