06-21-2004, 10:08 PM
http://www.fisiusa.org/fisi_pages/news_nukes.htm
This webpage provides a number of news links.
The following URL makes it scary pointing to the West Bengal and Bangladesh connection in the acquisition of material for the dirty nuke:
http://www.fisiusa.org/fisi_News_items/Nuk...uke_news113.htm
The epicenter is Paki, with links to an octopus network connecting with Saudi, Libya, Iran, Malaysia, N. Korea and of course, the recognized nuke contractor, China.
It may be too deep for tears after a nuclear 9-11 occurs for Uncle Sam to cope with appointing a Nuclear 9-11 Commission.
How on earth can the policy makers and Brookings Institutions pundits assume the ability of US to control events in Paki, even assuming that it is a US-colony run by the military brass? Is US indeed such a super-cop that Uncle Sam can dance with the devil as a tactical ploy and get away with it?
Nuclear 9-11 is a game in town and US is playing literally with fire.
The West Bengal transit is an ominous report and should be investigated further by investigative indicjournalists. Or, is it a matter for the super-spy contractors of Uncle Sam to unravel?
Kalyanaraman
Title: Proliferator Pak hiding behind individuals: UN
Author: ANI
Publication: Times of India
Date: Jan 26, 2004
URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll...show/445362.cms
PARIS : Individuals accused by President Pervez Musharraf of involvement in nuclear weapons proliferation serve as a front for states involved in leaking secrets, Therese Delpech, a UN disarmament commissioner has said.
"In reality, these private networks allow states to hide," The News quoted Therese Delpech as saying on Sunday.
Delpech is the French member of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).
"Naturally, it's not the Pakistani state that is going to directly sell this information," she said, adding: "Private proliferation is often a front for public proliferation."
http://www.fisiusa.org/fisi_News_items/Nuk...uke_news129.htm
Dirty Bomb?
New Evidence Raises Fears of Bin Laden Nuke
By Rebecca Cooper
Dec. 4 â A senior intelligence official tells ABCNEWS that Osama bin Laden has more advanced capabilities to detonate a radiological bomb than previously believed.
"Disturbing new information gathered by U.S. intelligence sources inside Afghanistan in recent weeks" indicates that bin Laden and his al Qaeda operatives have been working to develop so-called "dirty bombs" â nuclear weapons capable of spreading radiation across populated areas.
Dirty bombs are not traditional nuclear weapons, but a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material.
The intelligence official said there is "no proof that bin Laden has possession of a working nuclear weapon at this point," but adds that the new information gathered from inside Afghanistan "does indicate that al Qaeda is advancing in its knowledge of how to build a radioactive bomb."
The new intelligence on bin Laden's bomb-making capabilities is reported in today's Washington Post, and a senior administration official told ABCNEWS this new intelligence "contributed" to a decision by the Bush Administration to issue it's third warning to the public on Monday about the possibility of more terrorist attacks.
"It was one factor of many new concerns we have based on information we have picked up in recent days," the official told ABCNEWS.
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/Daily...bomb011204.html
Sleeping with the Nuclear Snake
Sunday, March 07 2004 @ 12:24 PM Eastern Standard Time
K Kapisthalam
In the furor following the surreal nuclear drama in Islamabad culminating with Pakistan?s dictator Gen. Pervez Musharraf?s ?pardon? of Dr. A.Q. Khan, the world media missed another, more farcical event. It was US President George W. Bush and his administration spinning the Khan episode as a ?major success? in cracking down on global nuclear proliferation activities. As the famous boxing promoter Don King likes to say ? ?Only in America!?
The idea that A.Q. Khan was solely responsible for proliferating nuclear technology and material to Libya, Iran and North Korea is nonsense and accepted as such by most neutral experts and retired diplomats. Former Pakistan army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg openly called for nuclear ties with Iran in the early 1990s when the nuclear transfers supposedly began. Libya has had long standing ties with the Pakistani nuclear program starting with the funding of the then nascent Pakistani nuclear program by Col. Gaddafi when Z.A.Bhutto was the Pakistani leader in the 1970s. Surely the wily Libyan leader was not doing this out of the solidarity with a fellow Islamic nation. The Pakistan-North Korea nuclear relationship was a simple nukes for missiles barter deal by which Pakistan was able to acquire North Korean NoDong ballistic missile by paying for it with nuclear technology, at a time when Pakistan was facing a financial crisis. The fact that Pakistan Air Force planes were involved in transferring this technology clearly shows state involvement in nuclear proliferation.
Reports quoting unnamed senior Bush administration officials in the media state that the US policy is now focused on uprooting the nuclear underground network that A.Q.Khan and his Pakistani associates had leveraged successfully to build the Pakistani nuclear program. For that reason, US officials argue, it would be worthwhile to ignore the A.Q.Khan pardon and not embarrass Gen.Musharraf by talking about Pakistan army and even his own links to the nuclear proliferation and focus on extracting promises from the embattled General to shut down the network for good. This theory looks good on paper but ignores certain facts, such as Gen.Musharraf?s track record in keeping his word. Be it action on the madrassas, cracking down on the Taliban or shutting down Pakistani terrorist groups, Gen.Musharraf?s record is abysmal. He usually makes grandiose promises in speeches to mainly Western audiences only to renege on them later. So why would Gen.Musharraf's promises on nuclear trade be any different?
Another point that the US seems to be ignoring is the critical role the nuclear underground has in Pakistan's nuclear program. Because of its weak indigenous scientific capacity, Pakistan has long relied on Western sources for sophisticated nuclear components. Even as the A.Q.Khan saga was unfolding, US Federal prosecutors were looking at the case of a South Africa based middleman who was caught in a sting operation sending nuclear bomb triggers to Pakistan. A UPI report mentioned that the South African's Pakistani contact was a person with ties to Pakistani intelligence. Clearly, for Gen.Musharraf to cooperate in dismantling the nuclear network would require him to give up details of his own army and intelligence service's hitherto secret ties to the nuclear underworld. In addition, were this network be dismantled, Pakistan would lose is nuclear component supply chain, bringing its nuclear weapons program to a grinding halt.
In this context, it is very likely that Gen.Musharraf's nuclear cooperation would be like his efforts in the terror and madrassa front - give misleading clues and eliminate low level expendable assets so that the Pakistani army interests are left unharmed, while doing just enough for America not to dump him totally. How does that help US National Security? The fact is that US policymakers have totally failed to grasp one point. American national security and Pakistani army interests are completely divergent. No amount of co-opting would make the Pakistani army destroy the nuclear proliferation or terrorist networks and logically so. Having a world devoid of pan-Islamic terrorists and a nuclear netherworld is simply not in the interests of the Pakistani establishment.
So what are the reasons behind this apparently injudicious US policy towards Pakistan? Outlook magazine?s excellent Washington reporter Seema Sirohi wrote in a recent column about a recent event she attended in Washington. The topic was ?Pakistan and Proliferation? and the person giving the talk was Robert Einhorn, the former US State Department non-proliferation Czar under the Clinton administration. Even though the topic was Pakistan, Ms.Sirohi reported, Einhorn wasted no time before he mentioned India as part of the ?regional problem? and said introducing nuclear weapons to South Asia was India?s ?original sin?. The best way forward with Pakistan, Einhorn said, was to ?forget the past and look to the future.?
In a nutshell, Mr. Einhorn illustrated the malaise afflicting US policymakers when it comes to Pakistan. It is called bureaucratic memory. In the 1970s and 80s, the US non-proliferation bureaucracy came to view Pakistan?s nuclear program as ?India?s problem.? After all, if India did not pursue nukes, why would the Pakistanis need them? Never mind that Pakistan?s nuclear program started after their defeat in 1971 by India and was a response to India?s conventional military superiority. The problem now is that this idea of associating India with Pakistan?s nuclear program and downplaying the clear and continuing Westward nuclear proliferation pattern coming out of Pakistan is so ingrained in the US diplomatic bureaucracy that it has become impossible to change.
If the decision makers in the US stopped to think about it, they would realize that the non-proliferation bureaucracy has been proven wrong time and again when it came to Pakistan. They believed Gen. Zia-ul-Haq?s assurances about not building a nuclear weapon in the 1980s, which proved to be a tissue of lies. As Einhorn himself admitted, the Pakistanis assured him the 1990s to look into the Iran dealings which we now know continued until recently. Gen.Musharraf gave his ?400%? assurance of non-proliferation to Colin Powell after the North Korea revelations came out in 2002. We now know that Pakistan continued to send nuclear material to Libya until late last year. We have seen Wall Street stock analysts called to account for their mistakes during the Dot Com disaster. We have seen US intelligence now being called to explain its recent failures in Iraq. Yet, the State Department South Asia Desk seems to be able to continuously make poor decisions with impunity.
The cliché goes ? ?If you sleep with snakes, you will get bitten.? One hopes that the American people don?t get a nuclear bite as a consequence of their government?s inexorable desire to consort with the Pakistani snake. (The Kashmir Telegraph)
http://www.pakistan-facts.com/article.ph...7172416552
Outside View:Rewarding China's Proliferation
By Kaushik Kapisthalam
A UPI Ouside View
Atlanta, GA, Jun. 17 (UPI) -- In a move that went all but unnoticed by the rest of the world, the People's Republic of China was accepted into the Nuclear Suppliers Group at a meeting in Sweden at the end of May. The NSG is an informal cartel made up of 40 nations that work together to coordinate and control the trade of nuclear reactor technology and 'dual-use' materials. More specifically, the NSG forbids its members from trading with nations which do not adopt "full-scope" International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over their entire nuclear program.
The United States non-proliferation bureaucracy played an active role in supporting China's bid to join the NSG. In a hearing on May 18, Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf told the House International Relations committee that by the 1990s, China began "taking a more serious approach to nonproliferation issues" and that the U.S. began a long-term dialogue with the Asian giant which promised China more nuclear co-operation in return for stronger export control laws.
Wolf told congressmen that in the State Department's view, China's progress since then has been sufficient enough to warrant strong U.S. support for moves like China's joining of the NSG.
Unfortunately, this a short-sighted move that once again betrays an unwillingness to learn from history on the part of American non-proliferation bureaucracy. Just days before it formally joined the NSG, China finalized a deal with Pakistan to build a 300 Mega-watt nuclear reactor.
This is especially galling because China knew that it could not trade nuclear technology with Pakistan after it joined the group. What makes this more appalling is that China concluded this hasty deal even as Pakistan's role in the A.Q. Khan nuclear scandal, which is perhaps the worst nuclear proliferation scandal in history, was unraveling.
China itself was implicated in the same scandal with indisputable evidence of its transfer of a nuclear warhead design, with detailed manufacturing instructions, partly in Chinese, to Pakistan, in direct violation of its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty commitment.
The 25 kiloton Chinese implosion device design freely circulated within the A.Q. Khan network and there is no telling which other countries and more ominously, terrorist groups managed to acquire the warhead design.
Nuclear weapons expert David Albright has stated that this Chinese bomb design would be ideal for a terrorist nuke that could fit in a pickup truck. In the wake of this embarrassing and deadly revelation, one would think that China would be circumspect in its dealings with its proliferation partner, Pakistan. Instead, China's decision to conclude a reactor deal with Pakistan now betrays the nation's lack of respect for multilateral restraint regimes and shows a willingness to thumb its nose at the rest of the world.
The claim that China started taking non-proliferation seriously since the 1990s also does not bear scrutiny. In 1992, the U.S. slapped sanctions on Chinese firms for delivering M-11 ballistic missile components to Pakistan. After a written assurance from China to stick to Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines, the sanctions were lifted.
Nine months after the waiver, the Los Angeles Times quoted U.S. intelligence officials as stating that China had delivered about around 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan through the port of Karachi, making a mockery of its earlier pledge. In 1996, after obtaining clear evidence of the sale of 5,000 ring magnets, critical uranium enrichment components, to Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, American non-proliferation bureaucrats bailed out China yet again by refusing to make a "determination" whether China violated its NPT commitments. For the rest of the world however, the ring magnets sale was a clear breach of Article III (2) of the NPT.
And there is no sign of improvement in China's behavior yet. The 2004 Annual report to the Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission notes that "Continuing intelligence reports indicate that Chinese cooperation with Pakistan and Iran remains an integral element of China's foreign policy."
This view fits in well with the actual Chinese actions, which are aimed to create nuclear and ballistic missile armed regional troublemakers like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran to both keep the U.S. occupied as well as to stymie China's local rivals like Japan and India, while China builds itself economically. The report also debunks the notion that the proliferation happens without the knowledge of top Chinese officials by pointing out many of the proliferating Chinese companies, which are state owned, have direct ties to top-level government and military officials.
Former Secretary of State James A. Baker noted in his memoirs that top Chinese officials partook in the profits from nuclear and missile proliferation by government owned Chinese companies.
Another red herring is the issue of "export controls." State Department officials have prided themselves in their ability to help China supposedly shore up its export controls by working with the Asian behemoth to come with lists of what can and cannot be sold to other nations. But given that government owned companies with ties to top Chinese officials are the ones proliferating, reducing China's problems to one of bureaucratic regulations is like working with the mob to write laws to regulate itself.
Within a totalitarian regime like China, government laws are meaningless and can be broken if top officials want to do so. Given this, framing the Chinese proliferation issue as one of export controls, instead of intent, flies in the face of facts.
By seeing an American willingness to repeatedly believe their bad-faith promises and eagerness to bail them out when they renege, Chinese leaders only get to draw one lesson -- that they can reap the benefits of belonging to multilateral nuclear regimes while being able to selectively break its commitments with impunity.
In the May 18 Congressional hearing, Assistant Secretary Wolf told lawmakers that the U.S. has not even seen the contract that China recently signed with Pakistan. What is the State Department likely to do should China try to pass more nuclear weapons aid to Pakistan under the cover of the reactor deal?
Unfortunately, China's entry into the NSG is likely to turn into a Trojan horse that could only serve to further undermine global non-proliferation efforts.
-0-
(Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance commentator on U.S. policy on South Asia and its effects on the war on terror and non-proliferation.)
-0-
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/upi-breakin...12653-2661r.htm
This webpage provides a number of news links.
The following URL makes it scary pointing to the West Bengal and Bangladesh connection in the acquisition of material for the dirty nuke:
http://www.fisiusa.org/fisi_News_items/Nuk...uke_news113.htm
The epicenter is Paki, with links to an octopus network connecting with Saudi, Libya, Iran, Malaysia, N. Korea and of course, the recognized nuke contractor, China.
It may be too deep for tears after a nuclear 9-11 occurs for Uncle Sam to cope with appointing a Nuclear 9-11 Commission.
How on earth can the policy makers and Brookings Institutions pundits assume the ability of US to control events in Paki, even assuming that it is a US-colony run by the military brass? Is US indeed such a super-cop that Uncle Sam can dance with the devil as a tactical ploy and get away with it?
Nuclear 9-11 is a game in town and US is playing literally with fire.
The West Bengal transit is an ominous report and should be investigated further by investigative indicjournalists. Or, is it a matter for the super-spy contractors of Uncle Sam to unravel?
Kalyanaraman
Title: Proliferator Pak hiding behind individuals: UN
Author: ANI
Publication: Times of India
Date: Jan 26, 2004
URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cms.dll...show/445362.cms
PARIS : Individuals accused by President Pervez Musharraf of involvement in nuclear weapons proliferation serve as a front for states involved in leaking secrets, Therese Delpech, a UN disarmament commissioner has said.
"In reality, these private networks allow states to hide," The News quoted Therese Delpech as saying on Sunday.
Delpech is the French member of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).
"Naturally, it's not the Pakistani state that is going to directly sell this information," she said, adding: "Private proliferation is often a front for public proliferation."
http://www.fisiusa.org/fisi_News_items/Nuk...uke_news129.htm
Dirty Bomb?
New Evidence Raises Fears of Bin Laden Nuke
By Rebecca Cooper
Dec. 4 â A senior intelligence official tells ABCNEWS that Osama bin Laden has more advanced capabilities to detonate a radiological bomb than previously believed.
"Disturbing new information gathered by U.S. intelligence sources inside Afghanistan in recent weeks" indicates that bin Laden and his al Qaeda operatives have been working to develop so-called "dirty bombs" â nuclear weapons capable of spreading radiation across populated areas.
Dirty bombs are not traditional nuclear weapons, but a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material.
The intelligence official said there is "no proof that bin Laden has possession of a working nuclear weapon at this point," but adds that the new information gathered from inside Afghanistan "does indicate that al Qaeda is advancing in its knowledge of how to build a radioactive bomb."
The new intelligence on bin Laden's bomb-making capabilities is reported in today's Washington Post, and a senior administration official told ABCNEWS this new intelligence "contributed" to a decision by the Bush Administration to issue it's third warning to the public on Monday about the possibility of more terrorist attacks.
"It was one factor of many new concerns we have based on information we have picked up in recent days," the official told ABCNEWS.
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/Daily...bomb011204.html
Sleeping with the Nuclear Snake
Sunday, March 07 2004 @ 12:24 PM Eastern Standard Time
K Kapisthalam
In the furor following the surreal nuclear drama in Islamabad culminating with Pakistan?s dictator Gen. Pervez Musharraf?s ?pardon? of Dr. A.Q. Khan, the world media missed another, more farcical event. It was US President George W. Bush and his administration spinning the Khan episode as a ?major success? in cracking down on global nuclear proliferation activities. As the famous boxing promoter Don King likes to say ? ?Only in America!?
The idea that A.Q. Khan was solely responsible for proliferating nuclear technology and material to Libya, Iran and North Korea is nonsense and accepted as such by most neutral experts and retired diplomats. Former Pakistan army chief Gen. Mirza Aslam Beg openly called for nuclear ties with Iran in the early 1990s when the nuclear transfers supposedly began. Libya has had long standing ties with the Pakistani nuclear program starting with the funding of the then nascent Pakistani nuclear program by Col. Gaddafi when Z.A.Bhutto was the Pakistani leader in the 1970s. Surely the wily Libyan leader was not doing this out of the solidarity with a fellow Islamic nation. The Pakistan-North Korea nuclear relationship was a simple nukes for missiles barter deal by which Pakistan was able to acquire North Korean NoDong ballistic missile by paying for it with nuclear technology, at a time when Pakistan was facing a financial crisis. The fact that Pakistan Air Force planes were involved in transferring this technology clearly shows state involvement in nuclear proliferation.
Reports quoting unnamed senior Bush administration officials in the media state that the US policy is now focused on uprooting the nuclear underground network that A.Q.Khan and his Pakistani associates had leveraged successfully to build the Pakistani nuclear program. For that reason, US officials argue, it would be worthwhile to ignore the A.Q.Khan pardon and not embarrass Gen.Musharraf by talking about Pakistan army and even his own links to the nuclear proliferation and focus on extracting promises from the embattled General to shut down the network for good. This theory looks good on paper but ignores certain facts, such as Gen.Musharraf?s track record in keeping his word. Be it action on the madrassas, cracking down on the Taliban or shutting down Pakistani terrorist groups, Gen.Musharraf?s record is abysmal. He usually makes grandiose promises in speeches to mainly Western audiences only to renege on them later. So why would Gen.Musharraf's promises on nuclear trade be any different?
Another point that the US seems to be ignoring is the critical role the nuclear underground has in Pakistan's nuclear program. Because of its weak indigenous scientific capacity, Pakistan has long relied on Western sources for sophisticated nuclear components. Even as the A.Q.Khan saga was unfolding, US Federal prosecutors were looking at the case of a South Africa based middleman who was caught in a sting operation sending nuclear bomb triggers to Pakistan. A UPI report mentioned that the South African's Pakistani contact was a person with ties to Pakistani intelligence. Clearly, for Gen.Musharraf to cooperate in dismantling the nuclear network would require him to give up details of his own army and intelligence service's hitherto secret ties to the nuclear underworld. In addition, were this network be dismantled, Pakistan would lose is nuclear component supply chain, bringing its nuclear weapons program to a grinding halt.
In this context, it is very likely that Gen.Musharraf's nuclear cooperation would be like his efforts in the terror and madrassa front - give misleading clues and eliminate low level expendable assets so that the Pakistani army interests are left unharmed, while doing just enough for America not to dump him totally. How does that help US National Security? The fact is that US policymakers have totally failed to grasp one point. American national security and Pakistani army interests are completely divergent. No amount of co-opting would make the Pakistani army destroy the nuclear proliferation or terrorist networks and logically so. Having a world devoid of pan-Islamic terrorists and a nuclear netherworld is simply not in the interests of the Pakistani establishment.
So what are the reasons behind this apparently injudicious US policy towards Pakistan? Outlook magazine?s excellent Washington reporter Seema Sirohi wrote in a recent column about a recent event she attended in Washington. The topic was ?Pakistan and Proliferation? and the person giving the talk was Robert Einhorn, the former US State Department non-proliferation Czar under the Clinton administration. Even though the topic was Pakistan, Ms.Sirohi reported, Einhorn wasted no time before he mentioned India as part of the ?regional problem? and said introducing nuclear weapons to South Asia was India?s ?original sin?. The best way forward with Pakistan, Einhorn said, was to ?forget the past and look to the future.?
In a nutshell, Mr. Einhorn illustrated the malaise afflicting US policymakers when it comes to Pakistan. It is called bureaucratic memory. In the 1970s and 80s, the US non-proliferation bureaucracy came to view Pakistan?s nuclear program as ?India?s problem.? After all, if India did not pursue nukes, why would the Pakistanis need them? Never mind that Pakistan?s nuclear program started after their defeat in 1971 by India and was a response to India?s conventional military superiority. The problem now is that this idea of associating India with Pakistan?s nuclear program and downplaying the clear and continuing Westward nuclear proliferation pattern coming out of Pakistan is so ingrained in the US diplomatic bureaucracy that it has become impossible to change.
If the decision makers in the US stopped to think about it, they would realize that the non-proliferation bureaucracy has been proven wrong time and again when it came to Pakistan. They believed Gen. Zia-ul-Haq?s assurances about not building a nuclear weapon in the 1980s, which proved to be a tissue of lies. As Einhorn himself admitted, the Pakistanis assured him the 1990s to look into the Iran dealings which we now know continued until recently. Gen.Musharraf gave his ?400%? assurance of non-proliferation to Colin Powell after the North Korea revelations came out in 2002. We now know that Pakistan continued to send nuclear material to Libya until late last year. We have seen Wall Street stock analysts called to account for their mistakes during the Dot Com disaster. We have seen US intelligence now being called to explain its recent failures in Iraq. Yet, the State Department South Asia Desk seems to be able to continuously make poor decisions with impunity.
The cliché goes ? ?If you sleep with snakes, you will get bitten.? One hopes that the American people don?t get a nuclear bite as a consequence of their government?s inexorable desire to consort with the Pakistani snake. (The Kashmir Telegraph)
http://www.pakistan-facts.com/article.ph...7172416552
Outside View:Rewarding China's Proliferation
By Kaushik Kapisthalam
A UPI Ouside View
Atlanta, GA, Jun. 17 (UPI) -- In a move that went all but unnoticed by the rest of the world, the People's Republic of China was accepted into the Nuclear Suppliers Group at a meeting in Sweden at the end of May. The NSG is an informal cartel made up of 40 nations that work together to coordinate and control the trade of nuclear reactor technology and 'dual-use' materials. More specifically, the NSG forbids its members from trading with nations which do not adopt "full-scope" International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over their entire nuclear program.
The United States non-proliferation bureaucracy played an active role in supporting China's bid to join the NSG. In a hearing on May 18, Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf told the House International Relations committee that by the 1990s, China began "taking a more serious approach to nonproliferation issues" and that the U.S. began a long-term dialogue with the Asian giant which promised China more nuclear co-operation in return for stronger export control laws.
Wolf told congressmen that in the State Department's view, China's progress since then has been sufficient enough to warrant strong U.S. support for moves like China's joining of the NSG.
Unfortunately, this a short-sighted move that once again betrays an unwillingness to learn from history on the part of American non-proliferation bureaucracy. Just days before it formally joined the NSG, China finalized a deal with Pakistan to build a 300 Mega-watt nuclear reactor.
This is especially galling because China knew that it could not trade nuclear technology with Pakistan after it joined the group. What makes this more appalling is that China concluded this hasty deal even as Pakistan's role in the A.Q. Khan nuclear scandal, which is perhaps the worst nuclear proliferation scandal in history, was unraveling.
China itself was implicated in the same scandal with indisputable evidence of its transfer of a nuclear warhead design, with detailed manufacturing instructions, partly in Chinese, to Pakistan, in direct violation of its Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty commitment.
The 25 kiloton Chinese implosion device design freely circulated within the A.Q. Khan network and there is no telling which other countries and more ominously, terrorist groups managed to acquire the warhead design.
Nuclear weapons expert David Albright has stated that this Chinese bomb design would be ideal for a terrorist nuke that could fit in a pickup truck. In the wake of this embarrassing and deadly revelation, one would think that China would be circumspect in its dealings with its proliferation partner, Pakistan. Instead, China's decision to conclude a reactor deal with Pakistan now betrays the nation's lack of respect for multilateral restraint regimes and shows a willingness to thumb its nose at the rest of the world.
The claim that China started taking non-proliferation seriously since the 1990s also does not bear scrutiny. In 1992, the U.S. slapped sanctions on Chinese firms for delivering M-11 ballistic missile components to Pakistan. After a written assurance from China to stick to Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines, the sanctions were lifted.
Nine months after the waiver, the Los Angeles Times quoted U.S. intelligence officials as stating that China had delivered about around 24 M-11 missiles to Pakistan through the port of Karachi, making a mockery of its earlier pledge. In 1996, after obtaining clear evidence of the sale of 5,000 ring magnets, critical uranium enrichment components, to Pakistan's Khan Research Laboratories by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, American non-proliferation bureaucrats bailed out China yet again by refusing to make a "determination" whether China violated its NPT commitments. For the rest of the world however, the ring magnets sale was a clear breach of Article III (2) of the NPT.
And there is no sign of improvement in China's behavior yet. The 2004 Annual report to the Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission notes that "Continuing intelligence reports indicate that Chinese cooperation with Pakistan and Iran remains an integral element of China's foreign policy."
This view fits in well with the actual Chinese actions, which are aimed to create nuclear and ballistic missile armed regional troublemakers like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran to both keep the U.S. occupied as well as to stymie China's local rivals like Japan and India, while China builds itself economically. The report also debunks the notion that the proliferation happens without the knowledge of top Chinese officials by pointing out many of the proliferating Chinese companies, which are state owned, have direct ties to top-level government and military officials.
Former Secretary of State James A. Baker noted in his memoirs that top Chinese officials partook in the profits from nuclear and missile proliferation by government owned Chinese companies.
Another red herring is the issue of "export controls." State Department officials have prided themselves in their ability to help China supposedly shore up its export controls by working with the Asian behemoth to come with lists of what can and cannot be sold to other nations. But given that government owned companies with ties to top Chinese officials are the ones proliferating, reducing China's problems to one of bureaucratic regulations is like working with the mob to write laws to regulate itself.
Within a totalitarian regime like China, government laws are meaningless and can be broken if top officials want to do so. Given this, framing the Chinese proliferation issue as one of export controls, instead of intent, flies in the face of facts.
By seeing an American willingness to repeatedly believe their bad-faith promises and eagerness to bail them out when they renege, Chinese leaders only get to draw one lesson -- that they can reap the benefits of belonging to multilateral nuclear regimes while being able to selectively break its commitments with impunity.
In the May 18 Congressional hearing, Assistant Secretary Wolf told lawmakers that the U.S. has not even seen the contract that China recently signed with Pakistan. What is the State Department likely to do should China try to pass more nuclear weapons aid to Pakistan under the cover of the reactor deal?
Unfortunately, China's entry into the NSG is likely to turn into a Trojan horse that could only serve to further undermine global non-proliferation efforts.
-0-
(Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance commentator on U.S. policy on South Asia and its effects on the war on terror and non-proliferation.)
-0-
(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/upi-breakin...12653-2661r.htm