11-02-2007, 03:46 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Something amiss in the 1971 story </b>
Pioneer.com
Second Opinion: HP Hande
Former Army Chief Gen JJ Singh's suggestion that the records of 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars be made public is pertinent. Recently some articles appeared in the media exposing the guarded secrets in the sinking of INS Kuthar and the way Indian Navy hijacked the credit for shelling oil depots at Karachi and scooped up gallantry awards that were rightfully due to IAF Hunter Pilots.
In the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the Pakistan Air Force was virtually grounded by the IAF within 48 hours. Pakistan's air defence became ineffective and their 'fighters' scared despite possessing lethal and high-tech aircraft. Their bombers would sneak in during the night, dump the bombs in the wilderness of the Thar desert and report back claiming to have bombed IAF bases and installations. A plum opportunity to completely destroy Pakistan's military machine and war potential was irrevocably lost by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
I was one of the five officers of the 'Bomber Operations Cell' at Air Headquarters during the 1971 conflict. On the penultimate day of the war, we received orders to send only one Canberra bomber with six 1000-pound bombs to be dropped over Skardu and Gilgit, which had become Divisional Headquarters of Pakistan Army in PoK. We were shocked on receiving this foolish instruction. This was no way to fight a war when we had at least 40 Canberra bombers, loaded with eight 1000-pound bombs each, poised to demolish Pakistan Army concentration at Skardu and Gilgit. That would have taught their Army a lesson.
<b>In a war there are no runners up. Either you love properly or hate properly. No doubt, some would try to defend the then leadership saying that the US's Seventh Fleet was breathing down our neck. If that was the reason to pull our punches, the then leadership was indeed paranoid. Granting that the Government lacked the will power, it could have called off the air operations altogether, instead of ordering a one-bomber raid.</b>
<b>As a retired Air Force flier having given the prime of my youth to the nation, I wrote to one of the former Chiefs of Air Staff requesting him to let the nation know who bungled on Skardu and Gilgit. He said something to the effect that it was not worth delving into the matter at this belated stage as long as we learnt the lessons. It must now come out in the open. The country has the right to know</b>
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Pioneer.com
Second Opinion: HP Hande
Former Army Chief Gen JJ Singh's suggestion that the records of 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars be made public is pertinent. Recently some articles appeared in the media exposing the guarded secrets in the sinking of INS Kuthar and the way Indian Navy hijacked the credit for shelling oil depots at Karachi and scooped up gallantry awards that were rightfully due to IAF Hunter Pilots.
In the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the Pakistan Air Force was virtually grounded by the IAF within 48 hours. Pakistan's air defence became ineffective and their 'fighters' scared despite possessing lethal and high-tech aircraft. Their bombers would sneak in during the night, dump the bombs in the wilderness of the Thar desert and report back claiming to have bombed IAF bases and installations. A plum opportunity to completely destroy Pakistan's military machine and war potential was irrevocably lost by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
I was one of the five officers of the 'Bomber Operations Cell' at Air Headquarters during the 1971 conflict. On the penultimate day of the war, we received orders to send only one Canberra bomber with six 1000-pound bombs to be dropped over Skardu and Gilgit, which had become Divisional Headquarters of Pakistan Army in PoK. We were shocked on receiving this foolish instruction. This was no way to fight a war when we had at least 40 Canberra bombers, loaded with eight 1000-pound bombs each, poised to demolish Pakistan Army concentration at Skardu and Gilgit. That would have taught their Army a lesson.
<b>In a war there are no runners up. Either you love properly or hate properly. No doubt, some would try to defend the then leadership saying that the US's Seventh Fleet was breathing down our neck. If that was the reason to pull our punches, the then leadership was indeed paranoid. Granting that the Government lacked the will power, it could have called off the air operations altogether, instead of ordering a one-bomber raid.</b>
<b>As a retired Air Force flier having given the prime of my youth to the nation, I wrote to one of the former Chiefs of Air Staff requesting him to let the nation know who bungled on Skardu and Gilgit. He said something to the effect that it was not worth delving into the matter at this belated stage as long as we learnt the lessons. It must now come out in the open. The country has the right to know</b>
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