07-07-2004, 09:07 PM
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Book Reviews
Indo-Pak story by an insider
By M.V. Kamath
India-Pakistan in War & Peace by J.N. Dixit, Books Today, Delhi, 501 pp; Rs 595
J.N. Dixit, a one-time ambassador to Pakistan and Afghanistan and later Foreign Secretary to India and now National Security Adviser to Government of India, has done a great favour to his country and especially to its Foreign Office. He has, from all accounts, written the definitive history of Indo-Pak relations right upto the present day, saving our ambassadors and foreign policy spokesmen a lot of trouble. All that they have to do is to present a copy of his latest work, India-Pakistan in War & Peace to all those wishing to see South Asia at peace, including UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, US President George Bush, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, not to speak of US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfield. All that they have to do is to read Dixit´s detailed work and they would know exactly what the facts are and how India views duplicitous Pakistan.
For what Dixit has done is to tell the full story of the birth and growth of Pakistan with a sense of detachment and feel for facts that is truly remarkable. Dixit is a man singularly without any illusions. As one who has served as India´s ambassador to Pakistan and subsequently as Foreign Secretary with access to all possible information, Dixit is unique. True, this book was written before Almaty and before the emergency visits paid to Delhi and Islamabad by British and American leaders, but for all that Dixit´s careful study of Indo-Pak relations, his considerable insights into Pakistan´s official mind, cannot the least be faulted.
The book is divided into 12 chapters, starting with the hijacking of the IS-814 to Kandahar, an inquiry into the implications of Kargil, the nature of Pak antagonism towards India, on to a ruthless analysis of Pakistan´s internal affairs, the break-up of the State, the advent of Zia-ul-Huq and the Agra summit. The study of ´Coup to Coup (1972-1999)´ is in a class in itself. Dixit covers a lot of ground inevitably that in the past had been covered by other equally knowledgeable, writers. But what gives Dixit´s coverage additional teeth is that he writes as an insider. His understanding of Pakistan leaves nothing to the imagination. Consider the 12-point lessons Dixit says India must learn from Kargil. The first three are specially pointed. Writes Dixit:
 Â
Pakistan is not likely to agree to any practical solution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue on the basis of ground realities and reasonableness in the near future.
 Â
Bilateral dialogue at the official and even at the highest political level with Pakistan should not be undertaken with any sense of excessive expectation.
 Â
Pakistan´s unalterable objective is to capture Jammu and Kashmir.
That is putting it straight. In the chapter on ´Kashmir: The Interactable Bone of Contention´, Dixit again puts things in their proper perspective. He defines Pakistan´s objectives thus: (a) It considers the acquisition of Jammu and Kashmir the unifinished part of Partition; (b) its claim to Kashmir is firmly rooted in the two-nation theory; © it desires to invalidate the provisions of the Indian Independence Act and the Instruments of Accession signed by the former Maharaja; (d) it also questions the decision taken by Sheikh Abdullah to make Jammu and Kashmir a part of India; and (e) it is of the view that continuing cross-border terrorism and violent intervention including sending mercenaries and non-Kashmir cadres to create a conflict situation in Jammu and Kashmir will achieve the above objectives.
And what are India´s objectives? Priority-wise, Dixit describes them as follows:
(a) The cessation of all violence and acts of terror; (b) to ensure that those portions of Jammu and Kashmir that are part of India do not get separated from the territories of the republic of India; © to ensure that any compromise arrived at on the basis of discussions with various opposition groups representing the people of Jammu and Kashmir does not dilute the strategic position of India in the state; (d) to ensure that it does not result in any ceding of territory to Pakistan; and finally (e) that the compromises reached should be such that they contribute to neutralising the centrifugal forces in other parts of India.
It is Dixit´s thesis that India has to fight its own battles against terrorism knowing fully well that while there is general sympathy in American official circles to India´s problems, their primary concern is to safeguard their own interests. It also seems to be Dixit´s firm conviction that "while Musharraf´s capability and inclination to support violent terrorist organisations may be eroded because of international pressure, he will not be able to completely distance himself from such organisations as far as India is concerned because his survival in power depends on not antagonising them beyond a point".
Following the Agra summit, Dixit´s analysis is even more forthright. With eyes wide-open, he writes: "An inescapable conclusion to be drawn is that there is not even a tentative meeting ground on the substance of political issues at discussion between India and Pakistan." That is telling it as it is. So where do we go from here, especially after Almaty? In his concluding chapter, Dixit holds that "the hope for rationality in Indo-Pak relations has to be tempered with abundant political caution." That surely is true, but where does it take us? Dixit provides us no answer. For all one knows, there is none.
The importance of this book is that it casts a look at Indo-Pak relations in their totality and with inside knowledge. That is where Dixit scores over practically everyone else. But are his conclusions necessarily sound? Would they hold good today? One wishes Dixit could give an addendum bringing us to post-Almaty conditions and what they presage. If, as he puts it, it is Pakistan government´s policy "not to allow norms and easy people-to-people contacts between Indians and Pakistanis", then the future looks bleak. That is obviously not Dixit´s fault. The author is a realist, if ever there is one.
His chapter, thus, on ´Retrospect and Prospects´ needs careful study. Dixit sees no prospects of a friendly neighbour coming closer to India even if Jammu and Kashmir were to join Pakistan. As he sees it-and he quotes Pakistanis as well-"As long as India remains the largest polity in South Asia, tensions are inevitable and will continue." It is a depressing thought. And rather frightening as well. But Dixit´s idea is not to apply the calming unguent to our souls but to wake up his fellow countrymen, to <b>the reality of Pakistan and Islam that first manifested itself when Aurangzeb defeated his older brother Dara Shikoh at the battle of Samugar in the summer of 1658. The seeds of Pakistan were sown then and today we see the fruition of that poisonous tree. </b>
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Can some history expert explain statments in the end (highlighted in bold) in one of the history threads?
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Book Reviews
Indo-Pak story by an insider
By M.V. Kamath
India-Pakistan in War & Peace by J.N. Dixit, Books Today, Delhi, 501 pp; Rs 595
J.N. Dixit, a one-time ambassador to Pakistan and Afghanistan and later Foreign Secretary to India and now National Security Adviser to Government of India, has done a great favour to his country and especially to its Foreign Office. He has, from all accounts, written the definitive history of Indo-Pak relations right upto the present day, saving our ambassadors and foreign policy spokesmen a lot of trouble. All that they have to do is to present a copy of his latest work, India-Pakistan in War & Peace to all those wishing to see South Asia at peace, including UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, US President George Bush, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, not to speak of US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfield. All that they have to do is to read Dixit´s detailed work and they would know exactly what the facts are and how India views duplicitous Pakistan.
For what Dixit has done is to tell the full story of the birth and growth of Pakistan with a sense of detachment and feel for facts that is truly remarkable. Dixit is a man singularly without any illusions. As one who has served as India´s ambassador to Pakistan and subsequently as Foreign Secretary with access to all possible information, Dixit is unique. True, this book was written before Almaty and before the emergency visits paid to Delhi and Islamabad by British and American leaders, but for all that Dixit´s careful study of Indo-Pak relations, his considerable insights into Pakistan´s official mind, cannot the least be faulted.
The book is divided into 12 chapters, starting with the hijacking of the IS-814 to Kandahar, an inquiry into the implications of Kargil, the nature of Pak antagonism towards India, on to a ruthless analysis of Pakistan´s internal affairs, the break-up of the State, the advent of Zia-ul-Huq and the Agra summit. The study of ´Coup to Coup (1972-1999)´ is in a class in itself. Dixit covers a lot of ground inevitably that in the past had been covered by other equally knowledgeable, writers. But what gives Dixit´s coverage additional teeth is that he writes as an insider. His understanding of Pakistan leaves nothing to the imagination. Consider the 12-point lessons Dixit says India must learn from Kargil. The first three are specially pointed. Writes Dixit:
 Â
Pakistan is not likely to agree to any practical solution of the Jammu and Kashmir issue on the basis of ground realities and reasonableness in the near future.
 Â
Bilateral dialogue at the official and even at the highest political level with Pakistan should not be undertaken with any sense of excessive expectation.
 Â
Pakistan´s unalterable objective is to capture Jammu and Kashmir.
That is putting it straight. In the chapter on ´Kashmir: The Interactable Bone of Contention´, Dixit again puts things in their proper perspective. He defines Pakistan´s objectives thus: (a) It considers the acquisition of Jammu and Kashmir the unifinished part of Partition; (b) its claim to Kashmir is firmly rooted in the two-nation theory; © it desires to invalidate the provisions of the Indian Independence Act and the Instruments of Accession signed by the former Maharaja; (d) it also questions the decision taken by Sheikh Abdullah to make Jammu and Kashmir a part of India; and (e) it is of the view that continuing cross-border terrorism and violent intervention including sending mercenaries and non-Kashmir cadres to create a conflict situation in Jammu and Kashmir will achieve the above objectives.
And what are India´s objectives? Priority-wise, Dixit describes them as follows:
(a) The cessation of all violence and acts of terror; (b) to ensure that those portions of Jammu and Kashmir that are part of India do not get separated from the territories of the republic of India; © to ensure that any compromise arrived at on the basis of discussions with various opposition groups representing the people of Jammu and Kashmir does not dilute the strategic position of India in the state; (d) to ensure that it does not result in any ceding of territory to Pakistan; and finally (e) that the compromises reached should be such that they contribute to neutralising the centrifugal forces in other parts of India.
It is Dixit´s thesis that India has to fight its own battles against terrorism knowing fully well that while there is general sympathy in American official circles to India´s problems, their primary concern is to safeguard their own interests. It also seems to be Dixit´s firm conviction that "while Musharraf´s capability and inclination to support violent terrorist organisations may be eroded because of international pressure, he will not be able to completely distance himself from such organisations as far as India is concerned because his survival in power depends on not antagonising them beyond a point".
Following the Agra summit, Dixit´s analysis is even more forthright. With eyes wide-open, he writes: "An inescapable conclusion to be drawn is that there is not even a tentative meeting ground on the substance of political issues at discussion between India and Pakistan." That is telling it as it is. So where do we go from here, especially after Almaty? In his concluding chapter, Dixit holds that "the hope for rationality in Indo-Pak relations has to be tempered with abundant political caution." That surely is true, but where does it take us? Dixit provides us no answer. For all one knows, there is none.
The importance of this book is that it casts a look at Indo-Pak relations in their totality and with inside knowledge. That is where Dixit scores over practically everyone else. But are his conclusions necessarily sound? Would they hold good today? One wishes Dixit could give an addendum bringing us to post-Almaty conditions and what they presage. If, as he puts it, it is Pakistan government´s policy "not to allow norms and easy people-to-people contacts between Indians and Pakistanis", then the future looks bleak. That is obviously not Dixit´s fault. The author is a realist, if ever there is one.
His chapter, thus, on ´Retrospect and Prospects´ needs careful study. Dixit sees no prospects of a friendly neighbour coming closer to India even if Jammu and Kashmir were to join Pakistan. As he sees it-and he quotes Pakistanis as well-"As long as India remains the largest polity in South Asia, tensions are inevitable and will continue." It is a depressing thought. And rather frightening as well. But Dixit´s idea is not to apply the calming unguent to our souls but to wake up his fellow countrymen, to <b>the reality of Pakistan and Islam that first manifested itself when Aurangzeb defeated his older brother Dara Shikoh at the battle of Samugar in the summer of 1658. The seeds of Pakistan were sown then and today we see the fruition of that poisonous tree. </b>
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Can some history expert explain statments in the end (highlighted in bold) in one of the history threads?