07-14-2004, 08:30 AM
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
July 12, 2004
Memorandum
TO: Members
FROM: James A. Leach
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
SUBJECT: Hearing on "<b>Islam in Asia</b>"
1:30 p.m., Wednesday, July 14, 2004
Room 2172 Rayburn
-------------------------
On Wednesday, July 14 at 1:30 p.m. in room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building, the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific will hold an open hearing on "Islam in Asia." The witnesses will be: Meredith Weiss, Assistant Professor and Director of the Graduate Program Department of International Studies DePaul University; Douglas E. Ramage, Representative, Indonesia and Malaysia, The Asia Foundation; Ambassador Husain Haqqani, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Consulting Professor, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.
Overview of Islam in Asia
Islam and Asia are rarely connected in the American mind. For most Americans, Islam is a faith of the Middle East, intricately part of that human crucible's glories and tragedies. Yet the vast majority of the world's approximately 1.2 million Muslims live in Asia, which is home to the four largest Islamic countries in the world (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India). By contrast, even though many people in the world consider Islam to be mainly an Arab religion, less than 20% of the Muslims in the world live in Arab-speaking countries. Islam in Asia is diverse, as varied as Christianity in the West. Consequently, generalizations are perilous.
Islam in Southeast Asia is relatively more moderate in character than in much of the Middle East. This moderate side of Islam is to be seen through such organizations as Muhammadiya and Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia. This moderation stems in part from the way Islam evolved in Southeast Asia. Islam came to Southeast Asia with traders rather than through military conquest as it did in much of South Asia and the Arab Middle East. Islam also was overlaid on animist, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions in Indonesia, which are said to give it a more syncretic aspect. Islam spread throughout much of Southeast Asia by the end of the seventeenth century.
Islam in Asia is more "culturally and politically diverse" than in the Middle East and has been undergoing a revival in Asia. Several factors may contribute to this Islamic resurgence in Asia. Internally, the forces of globalization and the impact of Western culture have played a role, especially the effect of rapid industrialization and resulting urbanization. External factors include the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, Islamic revolution in Iran, the export of Saudi-backed Wahabi Islamic fundamentalism, and the Afghan war against the Soviets. The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, as well as counter-terror operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan are also sources of frustration for some South Asian Muslims.
Differing Schools of Islamic Tradition
The majority of Muslims are Sunni Muslims, while 10-15% are Shiite. This difference stems from disagreement over the succession to the prophet Mohammad. In South and Southeast Asia, Shiites are a significant portion of the population in only Afghanistan and Pakistan. Wahhabism has played an important role in the resurgence of Islam in Asia. It stems from a 18th Century movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab which preached a literal interpretation of the Quran and an orthodox practice of Islam. Historically there has been a close relationship between Wahhabism and the Saudi dynasty. Sufism is another more "mystical" variant of Islam, though its presence in Asia is small except for parts of South Asia.
Connections with Extremist and Terrorist Groups
The Islamic revival is changing the face of political Islam in Asia. This revival has a complex relationship to the level of extremism in the region. While Islam in Southeast Asia has been moderate in character, it is undergoing a process of revivalist change in some segments of society. The resurgence is in part inspired by links to the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some Asians returning from Islamic religious schools in the Middle East and Pakistan have returned with a new, radical and extremist form of Islam that is more likely to be anti-American or anti-Western in character. There are also up to 1,000 violent extremists among those who returned from fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Some of those radicals have gone on to spread extremist ideology, particularly by linking with local Muslim extremist groups who tend to have more nationally or regionally defined goals and who are largely opposed to local moderate Muslims. From one perspective "the most effective policies towards Muslim Asia will be those that contain extremism while working with, rather than against, the Muslim majority's aspirations for social and economic improvement."
There are a number of Islamist groups in Southeast Asia that have linkages, either direct or indirect, to terrorist organizations. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Abu Sayaff are examples of groups in the Philippines where Islamist ideology, secessionism, criminality, and linkages to international terrorist networks are evident. The terrorist Jemaah Islamiya (JI) organization, which seeks to establish an Islamic Khalifate across much of Southeast Asia and establish Sharia law, has ties to Al Qaeda. In Thailand, the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the New PULO have been fighting to gain separatism for the Muslim majority southern provinces.
The few Muslims of North East Asia are found in China for the most part. China is home to approximately 20 million Muslims. The largest group is the Uighurs of Xinjiang Province in western China. The Uighur minority has experienced unrest of an Islamic character in recent years. Many Uighurs seek autonomy within China. Demographic trends arising from Han-Chinese in-migration are projected to make the Uighurs a minority in their home province.
Connections between Islamic extremism and terrorist organization in South Asia appear to be more extensive than they are in Southeast Asia. This stems in large part from the presence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is also a function of long term conflict in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. The extremist Taliban regime gave sanctuary to Al Qaeda until it was crushed. Since that time remnant Al Qaeda forces have linked up with other Sunni extremist groups in South Asia including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. Pakistan has also experienced Sunni-Shiite conflict. Meanwhile, an extensive array of madrassas, including some that teach a militant anti-Western and anti-Hindu perspective, operate in Pakistan. A coalition of Islamist political parties control approximately 20% of the seats in Pakistan's legislature. It has also been reported that Al Qaeda fighters escaped to Bangladesh after the fall of Afghanistan to American and Afghan Northern Alliance forces and that Bangladesh veterans of the conflict in Afghanistan have played a role in establishing radical madrassas in Bangladesh. While India has experienced significant inter-communal strife between Hindus and Muslims, it is largely domestically focused with the exception of Pakistani based groups operating in Kashmir.
The scope of the Islamic revival in Asia, and the extent to which increased religious fervor will translate into extremist positions or political power that will express itself in violent ways towards the West, is debated. Some see this phenomenon manifesting itself more in terms of increased piety among individuals within society without necessarily expressing itself politically. In this regard, they believe that because fear feeds extremism the war against terror should include a better appreciation of Islam in the West. A key distinction for some in this debate is the distinction between cultural or religious identity and political identity. An Islamic revival that finds its _expression through cultural or religious means is not necessarily a threat, even as some in the Islamic world would manipulate it to their anti-American or anti-Western ends.
An examination of recent developments with political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia illustrate this point. Radical Islamist parties have not demonstrated broad appeal among Indonesian or Malaysian voters in recent elections even as some segments of these societies have experienced a resurgence of Islamic belief. The Islamist Parti Islam se Malaysia experienced significant electoral set backs in the 2004 elections to the relatively more secular Barisan National Coalition of Prime Minister Badawi, who is himself regarded as a respected Islamic scholar. In Indonesia, Islamist parties made small gains based not on their Islamist agenda but on their anti-corruption and good governance policies. Secular and nationalist parties clearly are preferred by voters in Indonesia and Malaysia even as Islam remains a core value of the people. There are also fundamentalists in Southeast Asia that would introduce strict Islamic law but would not advocate the use of violence to do so. There is also a distinction to be made between those who would focus primarily on local or national objectives, such as secession for a Muslim province, rather than focus on the international agenda advocated by Al Qaeda.
Alienation and humiliation appear to be keys for understanding the Islamic resurgence in Asia and for understanding why individuals are drawn to terrorist groups. Frustration from diminished expectations driven by economic malaise, the lack of effective political participation, and a sense of humiliation may be at the core of why many Asian Muslims have become radicalized. It is thought by some that U.S. policies can help best by assisting moderate elements in Asia to "respond to mainstream Muslims' hopes for economic improvement and political participation ... education, balanced development, participatory governance, and civil peace" that will give hope to alienated individuals who might otherwise drift towards radicalism. Some observers feel that diminishing the ranks of alienated Asian Muslims will in turn restrict room for maneuver by extremists and terrorists by limiting active or passive support from the societies within which they operate.
U.S. Policy Initiatives
The United States Department of State document Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, published in April 2003, identifies U.S. policy initiatives for addressing the war against terror. It emphasizes a policy of defeating terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, communications; material support; and finances. The Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, Ambassador Cofer Black, emphasized the need to develop "sustained international political will and effective capacity building" to more effectively fight terrorism. Within this context Ambassador Black identifies Malaysia's opening of the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-terrorism in August 2003 as a key example of counter-terrorism capacity building in Asia.
Observers have commented that the U.S needs to do more in the area of public diplomacy in addition to its initiatives in the area of education. Much of the current anti-U.S. sentiment in Asia is a reaction to U.S. policies towards Iraq and the Israel-Palestinian dispute as well as increasing identification among Asian Muslims with their coreligionists at the core of the Islamic world. This was demonstrated by the rapid decline in approval ratings of the U.S. in Indonesia, from over 70% in 2000 to only 15% in 2003. The declining popularity of the U.S. among Asian Muslim populations has made it difficult for some regional leaders to be associated with American policies. As noted above, major U.S. initiatives are under way in Indonesia and Pakistan to help improve the quality of the education those countries provide for their citizens.
If you have any questions about this hearing, please contact James McCormick or Andi Effendi at 6-7825.
Tiernen Miller
Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific
Committee on International Relations
(202)226-5921
July 12, 2004
Memorandum
TO: Members
FROM: James A. Leach
Chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
SUBJECT: Hearing on "<b>Islam in Asia</b>"
1:30 p.m., Wednesday, July 14, 2004
Room 2172 Rayburn
-------------------------
On Wednesday, July 14 at 1:30 p.m. in room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building, the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific will hold an open hearing on "Islam in Asia." The witnesses will be: Meredith Weiss, Assistant Professor and Director of the Graduate Program Department of International Studies DePaul University; Douglas E. Ramage, Representative, Indonesia and Malaysia, The Asia Foundation; Ambassador Husain Haqqani, Visiting Scholar Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Consulting Professor, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.
Overview of Islam in Asia
Islam and Asia are rarely connected in the American mind. For most Americans, Islam is a faith of the Middle East, intricately part of that human crucible's glories and tragedies. Yet the vast majority of the world's approximately 1.2 million Muslims live in Asia, which is home to the four largest Islamic countries in the world (Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India). By contrast, even though many people in the world consider Islam to be mainly an Arab religion, less than 20% of the Muslims in the world live in Arab-speaking countries. Islam in Asia is diverse, as varied as Christianity in the West. Consequently, generalizations are perilous.
Islam in Southeast Asia is relatively more moderate in character than in much of the Middle East. This moderate side of Islam is to be seen through such organizations as Muhammadiya and Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia. This moderation stems in part from the way Islam evolved in Southeast Asia. Islam came to Southeast Asia with traders rather than through military conquest as it did in much of South Asia and the Arab Middle East. Islam also was overlaid on animist, Hindu, and Buddhist traditions in Indonesia, which are said to give it a more syncretic aspect. Islam spread throughout much of Southeast Asia by the end of the seventeenth century.
Islam in Asia is more "culturally and politically diverse" than in the Middle East and has been undergoing a revival in Asia. Several factors may contribute to this Islamic resurgence in Asia. Internally, the forces of globalization and the impact of Western culture have played a role, especially the effect of rapid industrialization and resulting urbanization. External factors include the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, Islamic revolution in Iran, the export of Saudi-backed Wahabi Islamic fundamentalism, and the Afghan war against the Soviets. The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, as well as counter-terror operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan are also sources of frustration for some South Asian Muslims.
Differing Schools of Islamic Tradition
The majority of Muslims are Sunni Muslims, while 10-15% are Shiite. This difference stems from disagreement over the succession to the prophet Mohammad. In South and Southeast Asia, Shiites are a significant portion of the population in only Afghanistan and Pakistan. Wahhabism has played an important role in the resurgence of Islam in Asia. It stems from a 18th Century movement founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab which preached a literal interpretation of the Quran and an orthodox practice of Islam. Historically there has been a close relationship between Wahhabism and the Saudi dynasty. Sufism is another more "mystical" variant of Islam, though its presence in Asia is small except for parts of South Asia.
Connections with Extremist and Terrorist Groups
The Islamic revival is changing the face of political Islam in Asia. This revival has a complex relationship to the level of extremism in the region. While Islam in Southeast Asia has been moderate in character, it is undergoing a process of revivalist change in some segments of society. The resurgence is in part inspired by links to the Middle East, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Some Asians returning from Islamic religious schools in the Middle East and Pakistan have returned with a new, radical and extremist form of Islam that is more likely to be anti-American or anti-Western in character. There are also up to 1,000 violent extremists among those who returned from fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Some of those radicals have gone on to spread extremist ideology, particularly by linking with local Muslim extremist groups who tend to have more nationally or regionally defined goals and who are largely opposed to local moderate Muslims. From one perspective "the most effective policies towards Muslim Asia will be those that contain extremism while working with, rather than against, the Muslim majority's aspirations for social and economic improvement."
There are a number of Islamist groups in Southeast Asia that have linkages, either direct or indirect, to terrorist organizations. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and Abu Sayaff are examples of groups in the Philippines where Islamist ideology, secessionism, criminality, and linkages to international terrorist networks are evident. The terrorist Jemaah Islamiya (JI) organization, which seeks to establish an Islamic Khalifate across much of Southeast Asia and establish Sharia law, has ties to Al Qaeda. In Thailand, the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the New PULO have been fighting to gain separatism for the Muslim majority southern provinces.
The few Muslims of North East Asia are found in China for the most part. China is home to approximately 20 million Muslims. The largest group is the Uighurs of Xinjiang Province in western China. The Uighur minority has experienced unrest of an Islamic character in recent years. Many Uighurs seek autonomy within China. Demographic trends arising from Han-Chinese in-migration are projected to make the Uighurs a minority in their home province.
Connections between Islamic extremism and terrorist organization in South Asia appear to be more extensive than they are in Southeast Asia. This stems in large part from the presence of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is also a function of long term conflict in Afghanistan and in Kashmir. The extremist Taliban regime gave sanctuary to Al Qaeda until it was crushed. Since that time remnant Al Qaeda forces have linked up with other Sunni extremist groups in South Asia including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. Pakistan has also experienced Sunni-Shiite conflict. Meanwhile, an extensive array of madrassas, including some that teach a militant anti-Western and anti-Hindu perspective, operate in Pakistan. A coalition of Islamist political parties control approximately 20% of the seats in Pakistan's legislature. It has also been reported that Al Qaeda fighters escaped to Bangladesh after the fall of Afghanistan to American and Afghan Northern Alliance forces and that Bangladesh veterans of the conflict in Afghanistan have played a role in establishing radical madrassas in Bangladesh. While India has experienced significant inter-communal strife between Hindus and Muslims, it is largely domestically focused with the exception of Pakistani based groups operating in Kashmir.
The scope of the Islamic revival in Asia, and the extent to which increased religious fervor will translate into extremist positions or political power that will express itself in violent ways towards the West, is debated. Some see this phenomenon manifesting itself more in terms of increased piety among individuals within society without necessarily expressing itself politically. In this regard, they believe that because fear feeds extremism the war against terror should include a better appreciation of Islam in the West. A key distinction for some in this debate is the distinction between cultural or religious identity and political identity. An Islamic revival that finds its _expression through cultural or religious means is not necessarily a threat, even as some in the Islamic world would manipulate it to their anti-American or anti-Western ends.
An examination of recent developments with political Islam in Malaysia and Indonesia illustrate this point. Radical Islamist parties have not demonstrated broad appeal among Indonesian or Malaysian voters in recent elections even as some segments of these societies have experienced a resurgence of Islamic belief. The Islamist Parti Islam se Malaysia experienced significant electoral set backs in the 2004 elections to the relatively more secular Barisan National Coalition of Prime Minister Badawi, who is himself regarded as a respected Islamic scholar. In Indonesia, Islamist parties made small gains based not on their Islamist agenda but on their anti-corruption and good governance policies. Secular and nationalist parties clearly are preferred by voters in Indonesia and Malaysia even as Islam remains a core value of the people. There are also fundamentalists in Southeast Asia that would introduce strict Islamic law but would not advocate the use of violence to do so. There is also a distinction to be made between those who would focus primarily on local or national objectives, such as secession for a Muslim province, rather than focus on the international agenda advocated by Al Qaeda.
Alienation and humiliation appear to be keys for understanding the Islamic resurgence in Asia and for understanding why individuals are drawn to terrorist groups. Frustration from diminished expectations driven by economic malaise, the lack of effective political participation, and a sense of humiliation may be at the core of why many Asian Muslims have become radicalized. It is thought by some that U.S. policies can help best by assisting moderate elements in Asia to "respond to mainstream Muslims' hopes for economic improvement and political participation ... education, balanced development, participatory governance, and civil peace" that will give hope to alienated individuals who might otherwise drift towards radicalism. Some observers feel that diminishing the ranks of alienated Asian Muslims will in turn restrict room for maneuver by extremists and terrorists by limiting active or passive support from the societies within which they operate.
U.S. Policy Initiatives
The United States Department of State document Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, published in April 2003, identifies U.S. policy initiatives for addressing the war against terror. It emphasizes a policy of defeating terrorist organizations of global reach by attacking their sanctuaries; leadership; command, control, communications; material support; and finances. The Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, Ambassador Cofer Black, emphasized the need to develop "sustained international political will and effective capacity building" to more effectively fight terrorism. Within this context Ambassador Black identifies Malaysia's opening of the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter-terrorism in August 2003 as a key example of counter-terrorism capacity building in Asia.
Observers have commented that the U.S needs to do more in the area of public diplomacy in addition to its initiatives in the area of education. Much of the current anti-U.S. sentiment in Asia is a reaction to U.S. policies towards Iraq and the Israel-Palestinian dispute as well as increasing identification among Asian Muslims with their coreligionists at the core of the Islamic world. This was demonstrated by the rapid decline in approval ratings of the U.S. in Indonesia, from over 70% in 2000 to only 15% in 2003. The declining popularity of the U.S. among Asian Muslim populations has made it difficult for some regional leaders to be associated with American policies. As noted above, major U.S. initiatives are under way in Indonesia and Pakistan to help improve the quality of the education those countries provide for their citizens.
If you have any questions about this hearing, please contact James McCormick or Andi Effendi at 6-7825.
Tiernen Miller
Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific
Committee on International Relations
(202)226-5921