07-23-2004, 11:56 AM
http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/...17,00.html
Al Qaeda on the loose in Pakistan: US 9/11 panel
Washington | June 24, 2004 8:55:21 PM IST
The National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks on the United States, the so-called 9-11 Commission, stated in a preliminary report that Saudi Arabia and especially Pakistan provided critical support to Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization in the days and months before those shocking hijackings which killed nearly 3,000 people in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania.
Questions continue to be raised about whether America's key allies in its war against terrorism are doing enough, considering their history of supporting Islamic militants.
ANI spoke with U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives' International Relations Committee.
Excerpts of the interview: Tom Tancredo "Well, the commission's findings are certainly not earth-shaking. Who did not know this? I'm surprised it has gotten this kind of attention because of course, the whole world knew, that al Qaeda had operated freely in Pakistan for a long time and continued to do so, even after 9-11."
"I do believe that it is good to continually draw attention to it so as to maintain some degree of pressure on the present government in Pakistan. But it's certainly not a fact of which we were not aware."
"No...their efforts are those of a country that is very, very, very frightened about the balance that they are trying to maintain, so as to mollify a very vocal minority in their country and on the other hand mollify the pressure from the West. It's a tough position to try and hold.
But it seems to me to be to their benefit, just as the Saudis have learned, that it is actually to their benefit to try their best to eradicate these radical groups from their country. The pakistanis have yet to do anything significant for instance, about the madrassas. These schools still operate, they operate without really any kind of restriction or governmental oversight. And, these are the breeding grounds for terrorists. And so, no, it really is apparent to me that they have not done enough and I recognize why, but they will find they probably should have moved quicker."
"I think frankly there's little America can do. I know that they can portray their need as financial and that if we give them a lot of money, some how or another this will take care of their problems. But, when you look around the world and we look in vain and see where that has helped, that that has actually created a different kind of environment in the country. And, so, no Pakistan has really go to do it themselves,. And they can, its just that, do they have the will to do so?"
The U.S. Congress convened the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks on the United States to investigate in an independent manner how al Qaeda succeeded in hijacking four U.S. airliners, crashing the planes and killing nearly 3,000 people on one tragic late summer day on September 11th, 2001.
In the staff's recent preliminary background report on the "Overview of the Enemy," the role of Pakistan in providing shelter and resources to Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization came up repeatedly. However, as Osama bin Laden had lived in the region during Afghanistan's war with the Soviet Union during the 1980s and moved his family there after Sudan kicked him out in 1996, it comes as no surprise to Tom Tancredo that al Qaeda found a home along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
The Soviets were driven from Afghanistan by a rag-tag assortment of fighters, some of whom were motivated by the desire to establish a pure, traditional Islamic state. These fighters formed the foundation of the Taliban, the religious group under Mullah Omar which came to run Afghanistan. The Taliban were also supported by Pakistan.
In its report, the commission staff pointed out that Pakistan did not break with the Taliban until after the terrorist attacks of September 11th. In fact, the report finds that the Taliban's ability to provide bin Laden ahaven in the face of international pressure and U.N. sanctions was significantly facilititated by Pakistani support. Pakistan even benefited from the Taliban-al Qaeda relationship, as the same terrorist training camps attended by the hijackers who attacked the United States may have also provided resources to militants looking to contribute to Pakistans' ongoing struggle with India over Kashmir.
In fact, in the weeks immediately following the attack, it was the Taliban's ambassador in Islamabad who served as a key go between as the U.S. threatened military action. It wasn't until President Bush insisted to President Musharraf that Pakistan's support was withdrawn weeks later.
Tancredo feels these are important facts to keep in mind.
Pakistan's role in the global war against terrorism is a line of questioning that comes up time and again at Congressional hearings. Earlier this week, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca admitted to a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee that there is a battle for the soul of Pakistan going on right now. That battle is between the conservative Muslims who imagine a world similar to that of when Mohammed founded the religion in the 7th century and those who feel that Islam can co-exist with the modern world.
Tancredo is a member of the committee.
President Musharraf has told the Bush administration that he and his government do not support terrorism and that he is committed to bringing modern democracy to Pakistan. However, Musharraf also feels he needs help. The Bush administration has offered a 3 billion dollar aid package, which includes funds for development, health and education. Some members of the U.S. Congress believe that strings should be attached to that aid. But Tancredo is not convinced money will bring about an end to terrorism.
The final report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks on the United States is expected by the end of July.(ANI)
http://www.webindia123.com/news/showdetail...41505&cat=World
Support Pakistan if it stays the course: commission
By Khalid Hasan
Washington: While Pakistan comes in for a good deal of criticism for its pre- 9/11 role, the commission on terrorist attacks on the United States urges the government to make a long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan, as long as the Pakistani leadership remains willing to stay the course in the fight against terrorism.
The commission also calls on the US to make the hard choices that would be necessary provided Gen Pervez Musharraf continues to adhere to his declared policy of âenlightened moderation.â In the words of the report, âSustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistanâs government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistanâs leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own.â
In the section of the report devoted to Pakistan, the commission talks of the countryâs endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and often ineffective government, all of which help create opportunities for jihadi recruitment. Poor education is a particular concern. The report notes that millions of families, especially those with little money, send their children to religious schools, or madrassas. Many of these schools are the only opportunity available for an education, but some have been used as incubators for violent extremism. According to Karachiâs police commander, there are 859 madrassas teaching more than 200,000 youngsters in his city alone.
The following are excerpts from the voluminous report that is bound to shape US policy in many fundamental ways in the years to come.
It is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism. Within Pakistanâs borders are 150 million Muslims, scores of Al Al Qaeda terrorists, many Taliban fighters, and â perhaps â Osama Bin Laden. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and has come frighteningly close to war with nuclear-armed India over the disputed territory of Kashmir. A political battle among anti-American Islamic fundamentalists, the Pakistani military, and more moderate mainstream political forces has already spilled over into violence, and there have been repeated recent attempts to kill Pakistanâs president, Pervez Musharraf.
In recent years, the United States has had three basic problems in its relationship with Pakistan:
On terrorism, the report says Pakistan helped nurture the Taliban. The Pakistani army and intelligence services, especially below the top ranks, have long been ambivalent about confronting Islamist extremists. Many in the government have sympathized with or provided support to the extremists. Musharraf agreed that Bin Laden was bad. But before 9/11, preserving good relations with the Taliban took precedence.
On proliferation, Musharraf has repeatedly said that Pakistan does not barter with its nuclear technology. But proliferation concerns have been long-standing and very serious. Most recently, the Pakistani government has claimed not to have known that one of its nuclear weapons developers, a national figure, was leading the most dangerous nuclear smuggling ring ever disclosed.
Finally, Pakistan has made little progress toward the return of democratic rule at the national level, although that turbulent process does continue to function at the provincial level and the Pakistani press remains relatively free.
Immediately after 9/11, confronted by the United States with a stark choice, Pakistan made a strategic decision. Its government stood aside and allowed the U.S.-led coalition to destroy the Taliban regime. In other ways, Pakistan actively assisted: its authorities arrested more than 500 Al Al Qaeda operatives and Taliban members, and Pakistani forces played a leading part in tracking down KSM, Abu Zubaydah and other key Al Al Qaeda figures.
In the following two years, the Pakistani government tried to walk a tightrope, helping against Al Qaeda while seeking to avoid a larger confrontation with Taliban remnants and other Islamic extremists. When Al Qaeda and its Pakistani allies repeatedly tried to assassinate Musharraf, almost succeeding, the battle came home.
The countryâs vast unpoliced regions make Pakistan attractive to extremists seeking refuge and recruits and also provide a base for operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Almost all the 9/11 attackers traveled the north-south nexus of KandaharâQuettaâKarachi. The Balochistan region of Pakistan (KSMâs ethnic home) and the sprawling city of Karachi remain centres of Islamist extremism where US and Pakistani security and intelligence presence has been weak. The US consulate in Karachi is a makeshift fortress, reflecting the gravity of the surrounding threat.
During the winter of 2003â2004, Musharraf made another strategic decision. He ordered the Pakistani army into the frontier provinces of northwest Pakistan along the Afghan border, where Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahri have reportedly taken refuge. The army is confronting groups of Al Qaeda fighters and their local allies in very difficult terrain. On the other side of the frontier, US forces in Afghanistan have found it challenging to organize effective joint operations, given Pakistanâs limited capabilities and reluctance to permit US military operations on its soil. Yet in 2004, it is clear that the Pakistani government is trying harder than ever before in the battle against Islamist terrorists.
Acknowledging these problems and Musharraf âs own part in the story, we believe that Musharraf âs government represents the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In an extraordinary public essay asking how Muslims can âdrag our-selves out of the pit we find ourselves in, to raise ourselves up,â Musharraf has called for a strategy of âenlightened moderation.â The Muslim world, he said, should shun militancy and extremism; the West â and the United States in particular â should seek to resolve disputes with justice and help improve the Muslim world.
Having come close to war in 2002 and 2003, Pakistan and India have recently made significant progress in peacefully discussing their long-standing differences. The United States has been and should remain a key supporter of that process.
The constant refrain of Pakistanis is that the United States long treated them as allies of convenience. As the United States makes fresh commitments now, it should make promises it is prepared to keep, for years to come.
Discussing the days after 9/11 and how the attacks on Afghanistan were launched, the Commission report said (in part):
The principals also focused on Pakistan and what it could do to turn the Taliban against Al Qaeda. They concluded that if Pakistan decided not to help the United States, it too would be at risk. The same day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, and the visiting head of Pakistanâs Military Intelligence service, Mahmud Ahmed. Armitage said that the United States wanted Pakistan to take seven steps: to stop Al Qaeda operatives at its border and end all logistical support for Bin Laden; to give the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations; to provide territorial access to US and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against Al Qaeda; to provide the United States with intelligence information; to continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts; to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan; and, if the evidence implicated Bin Laden and Al Qaeda and the Taliban continued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban government. Pakistan made its decision swiftly. That afternoon, Secretary of State Powell announced at the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistani President Musharraf had agreed to every US request for support in the war on terrorism. The next day, the US embassy in Islamabad confirmed that Musharraf and his top military commanders had agreed to all seven demands. âPakistan will need full US support as it proceeds with us,â the embassy noted. âMusharraf said the government of Pakistan was making substantial concessions in allowing use of its territory and that he would pay a domestic price. His standing in Pakistan was certain to suffer. To counterbalance that he needed to show that Pakistan was benefiting from his decisions.â
At the September 13 NSC meeting, when Secretary Powell described Pakistanâs reply, President Bush led a discussion of an appropriate ultimatum to the Taliban. He also ordered Secretary Rumsfeld to develop a military plan against the Taliban. The president wanted the United States to strike the Taliban, step back, wait to see if they got the message, and hit them hard if they did not. He made clear that the military should focus on targets that would influence the Talibanâs behavior. President Bush also tasked the State Department, which on the following day delivered to the White House a paper titled âGame Plan for a Political-Military Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.â The paper took it as a given that Bin Laden would continue to act against the United States even while under Taliban control. It therefore detailed specific US demands for the Taliban: surrender Bin Laden and his chief lieutenants, including Ayman al Zawahri; tell the United States what the Taliban knew about Al Qaeda and its operations; close all terrorist camps; free all imprisoned foreigners; and comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.
The State Department proposed delivering an ultimatum to the Taliban: produce Bin Laden and his deputies and shut down al Al Qaeda camps within 24 to 48 hours, or the United States will use all necessary means to destroy the terrorist infrastructure. The State Department did not expect the Taliban to comply. Therefore, State and Defense would plan to build an international coalition to go into Afghanistan. Both departments would consult with NATO and other allies and request intelligence, basing, and other support from countries, according to their capabilities and resources.
Finally, the plan detailed a public US stance: America would use all its resources to eliminate terrorism as a threat, punish those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, hold states and other actors responsible for providing sanctuary to terrorists, work with a coalition to eliminate terrorist groups and networks, and avoid malice toward any people, religion, or culture.
President Bush recalled that he quickly realized that the administration would have to invade Afghanistan with ground troops.
But the early briefings to the president and Secretary Rumsfeld on military options were disappointing. Tommy Franks, the commanding general of Central Command (CENTCOM), said that the president was dissatisfied. The US military, Franks said, did not have an off-the-shelf plan to eliminate the Al Qaeda threat in Afghanistan. The existing Infinite Resolve options did not, in his view, amount to such a plan. All these diplomatic and military plans were reviewed over the weekend of September 15â16, as President Bush convened his war council at Camp David 45 Present were Vice President Cheney, Rice, Hadley, Powell, Armitage, Rumsfeld, Ashcroft, Mueller, Tenet, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Cofer Black, chief of the DCIâs Counterterrorist Center. Tenet described a plan for collecting intelligence and mounting covert operations. He proposed inserting CIA teams into Afghanistan to work with Afghan warlords who would join the fight against Al Qaeda. These CIA teams would act jointly with the militaryâs Special Operations units. President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been a turning point in his thinking.
Also by September 18, Powell had contacted 58 of his foreign counterparts and received offers of general aid, search-and-rescue equipment and personnel, and medical assistance teams. On the same day, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage was called by Mahmud Ahmed regarding a two-day visit to Afghanistan during which the Pakistani intelligence chief had met with Mullah Omar and conveyed the U.S. demands. Omarâs response was ânot negative on all these points.â
But the administration knew that the Taliban was unlikely to turn over Bin Ladin. The pre-9/11 draft presidential directive on al Al Qaeda evolved into a new directive, National Security Presidential Directive 9, now titled âDefeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States.â The directive would now extend to a global war on terrorism, not just on Al Al Qaeda. It also incorporated the Presidentâs determination not to distinguish between terrorists and those who harbor them. It included a determination to use military force if necessary.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?p...3-7-2004_pg7_20
Al Qaeda on the loose in Pakistan: US 9/11 panel
Washington | June 24, 2004 8:55:21 PM IST
The National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks on the United States, the so-called 9-11 Commission, stated in a preliminary report that Saudi Arabia and especially Pakistan provided critical support to Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization in the days and months before those shocking hijackings which killed nearly 3,000 people in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania.
Questions continue to be raised about whether America's key allies in its war against terrorism are doing enough, considering their history of supporting Islamic militants.
ANI spoke with U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo, a member of the U.S. House of Representatives' International Relations Committee.
Excerpts of the interview: Tom Tancredo "Well, the commission's findings are certainly not earth-shaking. Who did not know this? I'm surprised it has gotten this kind of attention because of course, the whole world knew, that al Qaeda had operated freely in Pakistan for a long time and continued to do so, even after 9-11."
"I do believe that it is good to continually draw attention to it so as to maintain some degree of pressure on the present government in Pakistan. But it's certainly not a fact of which we were not aware."
"No...their efforts are those of a country that is very, very, very frightened about the balance that they are trying to maintain, so as to mollify a very vocal minority in their country and on the other hand mollify the pressure from the West. It's a tough position to try and hold.
But it seems to me to be to their benefit, just as the Saudis have learned, that it is actually to their benefit to try their best to eradicate these radical groups from their country. The pakistanis have yet to do anything significant for instance, about the madrassas. These schools still operate, they operate without really any kind of restriction or governmental oversight. And, these are the breeding grounds for terrorists. And so, no, it really is apparent to me that they have not done enough and I recognize why, but they will find they probably should have moved quicker."
"I think frankly there's little America can do. I know that they can portray their need as financial and that if we give them a lot of money, some how or another this will take care of their problems. But, when you look around the world and we look in vain and see where that has helped, that that has actually created a different kind of environment in the country. And, so, no Pakistan has really go to do it themselves,. And they can, its just that, do they have the will to do so?"
The U.S. Congress convened the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks on the United States to investigate in an independent manner how al Qaeda succeeded in hijacking four U.S. airliners, crashing the planes and killing nearly 3,000 people on one tragic late summer day on September 11th, 2001.
In the staff's recent preliminary background report on the "Overview of the Enemy," the role of Pakistan in providing shelter and resources to Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization came up repeatedly. However, as Osama bin Laden had lived in the region during Afghanistan's war with the Soviet Union during the 1980s and moved his family there after Sudan kicked him out in 1996, it comes as no surprise to Tom Tancredo that al Qaeda found a home along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
The Soviets were driven from Afghanistan by a rag-tag assortment of fighters, some of whom were motivated by the desire to establish a pure, traditional Islamic state. These fighters formed the foundation of the Taliban, the religious group under Mullah Omar which came to run Afghanistan. The Taliban were also supported by Pakistan.
In its report, the commission staff pointed out that Pakistan did not break with the Taliban until after the terrorist attacks of September 11th. In fact, the report finds that the Taliban's ability to provide bin Laden ahaven in the face of international pressure and U.N. sanctions was significantly facilititated by Pakistani support. Pakistan even benefited from the Taliban-al Qaeda relationship, as the same terrorist training camps attended by the hijackers who attacked the United States may have also provided resources to militants looking to contribute to Pakistans' ongoing struggle with India over Kashmir.
In fact, in the weeks immediately following the attack, it was the Taliban's ambassador in Islamabad who served as a key go between as the U.S. threatened military action. It wasn't until President Bush insisted to President Musharraf that Pakistan's support was withdrawn weeks later.
Tancredo feels these are important facts to keep in mind.
Pakistan's role in the global war against terrorism is a line of questioning that comes up time and again at Congressional hearings. Earlier this week, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca admitted to a subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee that there is a battle for the soul of Pakistan going on right now. That battle is between the conservative Muslims who imagine a world similar to that of when Mohammed founded the religion in the 7th century and those who feel that Islam can co-exist with the modern world.
Tancredo is a member of the committee.
President Musharraf has told the Bush administration that he and his government do not support terrorism and that he is committed to bringing modern democracy to Pakistan. However, Musharraf also feels he needs help. The Bush administration has offered a 3 billion dollar aid package, which includes funds for development, health and education. Some members of the U.S. Congress believe that strings should be attached to that aid. But Tancredo is not convinced money will bring about an end to terrorism.
The final report of the National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks on the United States is expected by the end of July.(ANI)
http://www.webindia123.com/news/showdetail...41505&cat=World
Support Pakistan if it stays the course: commission
By Khalid Hasan
Washington: While Pakistan comes in for a good deal of criticism for its pre- 9/11 role, the commission on terrorist attacks on the United States urges the government to make a long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan, as long as the Pakistani leadership remains willing to stay the course in the fight against terrorism.
The commission also calls on the US to make the hard choices that would be necessary provided Gen Pervez Musharraf continues to adhere to his declared policy of âenlightened moderation.â In the words of the report, âSustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support Pakistanâs government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as Pakistanâs leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own.â
In the section of the report devoted to Pakistan, the commission talks of the countryâs endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and often ineffective government, all of which help create opportunities for jihadi recruitment. Poor education is a particular concern. The report notes that millions of families, especially those with little money, send their children to religious schools, or madrassas. Many of these schools are the only opportunity available for an education, but some have been used as incubators for violent extremism. According to Karachiâs police commander, there are 859 madrassas teaching more than 200,000 youngsters in his city alone.
The following are excerpts from the voluminous report that is bound to shape US policy in many fundamental ways in the years to come.
It is hard to overstate the importance of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism. Within Pakistanâs borders are 150 million Muslims, scores of Al Al Qaeda terrorists, many Taliban fighters, and â perhaps â Osama Bin Laden. Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons and has come frighteningly close to war with nuclear-armed India over the disputed territory of Kashmir. A political battle among anti-American Islamic fundamentalists, the Pakistani military, and more moderate mainstream political forces has already spilled over into violence, and there have been repeated recent attempts to kill Pakistanâs president, Pervez Musharraf.
In recent years, the United States has had three basic problems in its relationship with Pakistan:
On terrorism, the report says Pakistan helped nurture the Taliban. The Pakistani army and intelligence services, especially below the top ranks, have long been ambivalent about confronting Islamist extremists. Many in the government have sympathized with or provided support to the extremists. Musharraf agreed that Bin Laden was bad. But before 9/11, preserving good relations with the Taliban took precedence.
On proliferation, Musharraf has repeatedly said that Pakistan does not barter with its nuclear technology. But proliferation concerns have been long-standing and very serious. Most recently, the Pakistani government has claimed not to have known that one of its nuclear weapons developers, a national figure, was leading the most dangerous nuclear smuggling ring ever disclosed.
Finally, Pakistan has made little progress toward the return of democratic rule at the national level, although that turbulent process does continue to function at the provincial level and the Pakistani press remains relatively free.
Immediately after 9/11, confronted by the United States with a stark choice, Pakistan made a strategic decision. Its government stood aside and allowed the U.S.-led coalition to destroy the Taliban regime. In other ways, Pakistan actively assisted: its authorities arrested more than 500 Al Al Qaeda operatives and Taliban members, and Pakistani forces played a leading part in tracking down KSM, Abu Zubaydah and other key Al Al Qaeda figures.
In the following two years, the Pakistani government tried to walk a tightrope, helping against Al Qaeda while seeking to avoid a larger confrontation with Taliban remnants and other Islamic extremists. When Al Qaeda and its Pakistani allies repeatedly tried to assassinate Musharraf, almost succeeding, the battle came home.
The countryâs vast unpoliced regions make Pakistan attractive to extremists seeking refuge and recruits and also provide a base for operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Almost all the 9/11 attackers traveled the north-south nexus of KandaharâQuettaâKarachi. The Balochistan region of Pakistan (KSMâs ethnic home) and the sprawling city of Karachi remain centres of Islamist extremism where US and Pakistani security and intelligence presence has been weak. The US consulate in Karachi is a makeshift fortress, reflecting the gravity of the surrounding threat.
During the winter of 2003â2004, Musharraf made another strategic decision. He ordered the Pakistani army into the frontier provinces of northwest Pakistan along the Afghan border, where Bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahri have reportedly taken refuge. The army is confronting groups of Al Qaeda fighters and their local allies in very difficult terrain. On the other side of the frontier, US forces in Afghanistan have found it challenging to organize effective joint operations, given Pakistanâs limited capabilities and reluctance to permit US military operations on its soil. Yet in 2004, it is clear that the Pakistani government is trying harder than ever before in the battle against Islamist terrorists.
Acknowledging these problems and Musharraf âs own part in the story, we believe that Musharraf âs government represents the best hope for stability in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In an extraordinary public essay asking how Muslims can âdrag our-selves out of the pit we find ourselves in, to raise ourselves up,â Musharraf has called for a strategy of âenlightened moderation.â The Muslim world, he said, should shun militancy and extremism; the West â and the United States in particular â should seek to resolve disputes with justice and help improve the Muslim world.
Having come close to war in 2002 and 2003, Pakistan and India have recently made significant progress in peacefully discussing their long-standing differences. The United States has been and should remain a key supporter of that process.
The constant refrain of Pakistanis is that the United States long treated them as allies of convenience. As the United States makes fresh commitments now, it should make promises it is prepared to keep, for years to come.
Discussing the days after 9/11 and how the attacks on Afghanistan were launched, the Commission report said (in part):
The principals also focused on Pakistan and what it could do to turn the Taliban against Al Qaeda. They concluded that if Pakistan decided not to help the United States, it too would be at risk. The same day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage met with the Pakistani ambassador to the United States, Maleeha Lodhi, and the visiting head of Pakistanâs Military Intelligence service, Mahmud Ahmed. Armitage said that the United States wanted Pakistan to take seven steps: to stop Al Qaeda operatives at its border and end all logistical support for Bin Laden; to give the United States blanket overflight and landing rights for all necessary military and intelligence operations; to provide territorial access to US and allied military intelligence and other personnel to conduct operations against Al Qaeda; to provide the United States with intelligence information; to continue to publicly condemn the terrorist acts; to cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban and stop recruits from going to Afghanistan; and, if the evidence implicated Bin Laden and Al Qaeda and the Taliban continued to harbor them, to break relations with the Taliban government. Pakistan made its decision swiftly. That afternoon, Secretary of State Powell announced at the beginning of an NSC meeting that Pakistani President Musharraf had agreed to every US request for support in the war on terrorism. The next day, the US embassy in Islamabad confirmed that Musharraf and his top military commanders had agreed to all seven demands. âPakistan will need full US support as it proceeds with us,â the embassy noted. âMusharraf said the government of Pakistan was making substantial concessions in allowing use of its territory and that he would pay a domestic price. His standing in Pakistan was certain to suffer. To counterbalance that he needed to show that Pakistan was benefiting from his decisions.â
At the September 13 NSC meeting, when Secretary Powell described Pakistanâs reply, President Bush led a discussion of an appropriate ultimatum to the Taliban. He also ordered Secretary Rumsfeld to develop a military plan against the Taliban. The president wanted the United States to strike the Taliban, step back, wait to see if they got the message, and hit them hard if they did not. He made clear that the military should focus on targets that would influence the Talibanâs behavior. President Bush also tasked the State Department, which on the following day delivered to the White House a paper titled âGame Plan for a Political-Military Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan.â The paper took it as a given that Bin Laden would continue to act against the United States even while under Taliban control. It therefore detailed specific US demands for the Taliban: surrender Bin Laden and his chief lieutenants, including Ayman al Zawahri; tell the United States what the Taliban knew about Al Qaeda and its operations; close all terrorist camps; free all imprisoned foreigners; and comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.
The State Department proposed delivering an ultimatum to the Taliban: produce Bin Laden and his deputies and shut down al Al Qaeda camps within 24 to 48 hours, or the United States will use all necessary means to destroy the terrorist infrastructure. The State Department did not expect the Taliban to comply. Therefore, State and Defense would plan to build an international coalition to go into Afghanistan. Both departments would consult with NATO and other allies and request intelligence, basing, and other support from countries, according to their capabilities and resources.
Finally, the plan detailed a public US stance: America would use all its resources to eliminate terrorism as a threat, punish those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, hold states and other actors responsible for providing sanctuary to terrorists, work with a coalition to eliminate terrorist groups and networks, and avoid malice toward any people, religion, or culture.
President Bush recalled that he quickly realized that the administration would have to invade Afghanistan with ground troops.
But the early briefings to the president and Secretary Rumsfeld on military options were disappointing. Tommy Franks, the commanding general of Central Command (CENTCOM), said that the president was dissatisfied. The US military, Franks said, did not have an off-the-shelf plan to eliminate the Al Qaeda threat in Afghanistan. The existing Infinite Resolve options did not, in his view, amount to such a plan. All these diplomatic and military plans were reviewed over the weekend of September 15â16, as President Bush convened his war council at Camp David 45 Present were Vice President Cheney, Rice, Hadley, Powell, Armitage, Rumsfeld, Ashcroft, Mueller, Tenet, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Cofer Black, chief of the DCIâs Counterterrorist Center. Tenet described a plan for collecting intelligence and mounting covert operations. He proposed inserting CIA teams into Afghanistan to work with Afghan warlords who would join the fight against Al Qaeda. These CIA teams would act jointly with the militaryâs Special Operations units. President Bush later praised this proposal, saying it had been a turning point in his thinking.
Also by September 18, Powell had contacted 58 of his foreign counterparts and received offers of general aid, search-and-rescue equipment and personnel, and medical assistance teams. On the same day, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage was called by Mahmud Ahmed regarding a two-day visit to Afghanistan during which the Pakistani intelligence chief had met with Mullah Omar and conveyed the U.S. demands. Omarâs response was ânot negative on all these points.â
But the administration knew that the Taliban was unlikely to turn over Bin Ladin. The pre-9/11 draft presidential directive on al Al Qaeda evolved into a new directive, National Security Presidential Directive 9, now titled âDefeating the Terrorist Threat to the United States.â The directive would now extend to a global war on terrorism, not just on Al Al Qaeda. It also incorporated the Presidentâs determination not to distinguish between terrorists and those who harbor them. It included a determination to use military force if necessary.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?p...3-7-2004_pg7_20