02-26-2008, 04:06 AM
I dont know if it really scuttles it. The Left says if the UPA signs they will pull the govt down. That doesnt prevent the UPA from signing for they will sign and the govt will be pulled. I think UPA is a jihadi that wants the deal even if they dont survive. THey have massive lifafas and commitments. I think the US senators have come like Yama Dhoots to remind the UAP to pay up or else.
Meanwhile Deccan Chronicle op-ed, 26 Feb 2008
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Disturbance in our times
By Pran Chopra </b>
Speaking as loftily as is customary with them, a few American senators visiting India have warned the host country that it must comply quickly with American preferences about the so-called "nuclear deal" because "otherwise," they argued, "India would for ever remain starved of nuclear energy." <b>They and their leader, Senator Joe Biden, need to be reminded that the original sin was committed by the American Congress, and that is where its undoing must begin.
But before that, India itself needs to be reminded of its own contribution to the ups and downs which have afflicted Indiaâs search for nuclear self-sufficiency. There is a worrying contrast between what is happening in and to India today in this regard, and how things were only a few years ago, whether within India or in its nuclear relations with other countries. </b>
For example, <b>even until as little as two or three years ago, there was a growing sense of self-assurance in the way India handled so unfamiliar a subject as nuclear cooperation with other countries. For all the novelty of the subject, which had figured little in Indiaâs relations with other countries, this country had conducted its nuclear negotiations with such an experienced country as America with a clear understanding of Indiaâs own priorities, whether the party sitting across the table was America or Russia. The result was that during these negotiations India did not let its guard down, and when circumstances forced it to make a choice it preferred to give up a short term gain than to lose a long term objective.</b>
But this has been the case much less consistently of late, and as a result, <b>India has hovered close to losing its long term aims in its negotiations with America or Russia or both. It has not been able to strike a useful bargain with either, nor has it been able to avoid misunderstandings with either.</b>
It may be debated whether Indiaâs relations with Russia or with America are now a clearer example of that loss of self-assurance. <b>But consider the view generally prevailing in India until a couple of years ago that despite pressure from China, Russia was more sympathetic than America towards Indiaâs nuclear ambitions.</b> This certainly appeared to be so during the year or two which President Vladimir Putin invested in reducing the gap between Indian ambitions and Russian resistance to them during the first few years of this decade.
Contrast this with what happened during the talks between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh which followed a little later. Both sets of negotiations appeared to be on the verge of a breakthrough at one time, but both reached the brink of a collapse soon afterwards. <b>Indiaâs nuclear relations with America might have improved of late, but they have not improved sufficiently to compensate India fully for the decline in the warmth of its relations with Russia. </b>
The same is true of the shifts in Indiaâs relations with China. They have steadily improved since the mid Nineties, but not sufficiently to enable either country to cross out any of its problems with the other and to mark it as "solved." <b>China demonstrated that recently in relation to Arunachal Pradesh. It proved that at very short notice and to the considerable unease of India, China can rekindle any of its still outstanding problems with India with regard to Arunachal Pradesh.</b>
Indiaâs domestic relations with its closest neighbour to the west, Pakistan, have been unfortunate in many respects. The blame for this may lie less upon one country than upon the other. But the fact remains that despite their many quarrels with each other, none of Pakistanâs domestic players has become warmer towards India than it was before, while some, like Nawaz Sharif, have become comparatively more distant, and none of them has got more drawn towards Hamid Karzai, the Afghan player who has been closer to India than any other in the past quarter century.
<b>In other words, the sum total of the Islamic attachments that India can count upon in the whole of the West Asian region has grown little, if at all, in spite of Indiaâs efforts to improve them. The relations among the Islamic countries of the region might have improved or deteriorated, but India has not gained much from either process.</b>
Indiaâs domestic affairs are also continuing to be a baggage which can, as now, suddenly begin to weigh a lot heavier at one time than it does at another, and if <b>the recent visit of the American senators has not served any purpose for the visitors, it has at least reminded India that the weight of Americaâs domestic politics on Indian affairs can increase very quickly, and that too quite independently of anything done or left undone by India.</b>
<b>During a more constructive phase of the nuclear relations between India and America, that is around 2005, it had been agreed between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that while India would, unilaterally, agree to abide by the substance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, America would recognise India as a country which had developed advanced nuclear technology by its own independent efforts and therefore, would not have to face any of the disabilities which America could impose upon a country under the NPT.</b>
But there has been a kind of deadlock between the two countries in this regard since the latest elections to the US Congress. Under the US Constitution, the President can sign a treaty with another country even if his party does not have a majority in Congress, and the majority party in Congress can impose certain restrictions upon the cosignatory even without the consent of the US President. Indo-US nuclear relations have been in this kind of a limbo since the last Congressional elections, and will remain there until at least the countryâs next presidential elections.
This is the context in which Senator Biden recently held out the unpleasant threat to New Delhi that if India did not quickly sign the only nuclear agreement which America is willing to offer at present under the Republican presidency of Bush, it would face one which might be offered by a Democratic presidency after the next presidential election, and India might find that to be even less acceptable.
While this inter-party rivalry within America has added one complication to the nuclear controversy between the two countries, another has been added by a different<b> inter-party rivalry within India, between the government led by Dr Manmohan Singh and its principal supporter outside the government that is the coalition between the parties of the Left. Both have added to the political instability which is currently affecting the stature of the government at a critical time, only days away from the next budget first and then the elections which might follow soon after. America must weigh its words in that context.</b>
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Meanwhile Deccan Chronicle op-ed, 26 Feb 2008
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Disturbance in our times
By Pran Chopra </b>
Speaking as loftily as is customary with them, a few American senators visiting India have warned the host country that it must comply quickly with American preferences about the so-called "nuclear deal" because "otherwise," they argued, "India would for ever remain starved of nuclear energy." <b>They and their leader, Senator Joe Biden, need to be reminded that the original sin was committed by the American Congress, and that is where its undoing must begin.
But before that, India itself needs to be reminded of its own contribution to the ups and downs which have afflicted Indiaâs search for nuclear self-sufficiency. There is a worrying contrast between what is happening in and to India today in this regard, and how things were only a few years ago, whether within India or in its nuclear relations with other countries. </b>
For example, <b>even until as little as two or three years ago, there was a growing sense of self-assurance in the way India handled so unfamiliar a subject as nuclear cooperation with other countries. For all the novelty of the subject, which had figured little in Indiaâs relations with other countries, this country had conducted its nuclear negotiations with such an experienced country as America with a clear understanding of Indiaâs own priorities, whether the party sitting across the table was America or Russia. The result was that during these negotiations India did not let its guard down, and when circumstances forced it to make a choice it preferred to give up a short term gain than to lose a long term objective.</b>
But this has been the case much less consistently of late, and as a result, <b>India has hovered close to losing its long term aims in its negotiations with America or Russia or both. It has not been able to strike a useful bargain with either, nor has it been able to avoid misunderstandings with either.</b>
It may be debated whether Indiaâs relations with Russia or with America are now a clearer example of that loss of self-assurance. <b>But consider the view generally prevailing in India until a couple of years ago that despite pressure from China, Russia was more sympathetic than America towards Indiaâs nuclear ambitions.</b> This certainly appeared to be so during the year or two which President Vladimir Putin invested in reducing the gap between Indian ambitions and Russian resistance to them during the first few years of this decade.
Contrast this with what happened during the talks between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh which followed a little later. Both sets of negotiations appeared to be on the verge of a breakthrough at one time, but both reached the brink of a collapse soon afterwards. <b>Indiaâs nuclear relations with America might have improved of late, but they have not improved sufficiently to compensate India fully for the decline in the warmth of its relations with Russia. </b>
The same is true of the shifts in Indiaâs relations with China. They have steadily improved since the mid Nineties, but not sufficiently to enable either country to cross out any of its problems with the other and to mark it as "solved." <b>China demonstrated that recently in relation to Arunachal Pradesh. It proved that at very short notice and to the considerable unease of India, China can rekindle any of its still outstanding problems with India with regard to Arunachal Pradesh.</b>
Indiaâs domestic relations with its closest neighbour to the west, Pakistan, have been unfortunate in many respects. The blame for this may lie less upon one country than upon the other. But the fact remains that despite their many quarrels with each other, none of Pakistanâs domestic players has become warmer towards India than it was before, while some, like Nawaz Sharif, have become comparatively more distant, and none of them has got more drawn towards Hamid Karzai, the Afghan player who has been closer to India than any other in the past quarter century.
<b>In other words, the sum total of the Islamic attachments that India can count upon in the whole of the West Asian region has grown little, if at all, in spite of Indiaâs efforts to improve them. The relations among the Islamic countries of the region might have improved or deteriorated, but India has not gained much from either process.</b>
Indiaâs domestic affairs are also continuing to be a baggage which can, as now, suddenly begin to weigh a lot heavier at one time than it does at another, and if <b>the recent visit of the American senators has not served any purpose for the visitors, it has at least reminded India that the weight of Americaâs domestic politics on Indian affairs can increase very quickly, and that too quite independently of anything done or left undone by India.</b>
<b>During a more constructive phase of the nuclear relations between India and America, that is around 2005, it had been agreed between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that while India would, unilaterally, agree to abide by the substance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, America would recognise India as a country which had developed advanced nuclear technology by its own independent efforts and therefore, would not have to face any of the disabilities which America could impose upon a country under the NPT.</b>
But there has been a kind of deadlock between the two countries in this regard since the latest elections to the US Congress. Under the US Constitution, the President can sign a treaty with another country even if his party does not have a majority in Congress, and the majority party in Congress can impose certain restrictions upon the cosignatory even without the consent of the US President. Indo-US nuclear relations have been in this kind of a limbo since the last Congressional elections, and will remain there until at least the countryâs next presidential elections.
This is the context in which Senator Biden recently held out the unpleasant threat to New Delhi that if India did not quickly sign the only nuclear agreement which America is willing to offer at present under the Republican presidency of Bush, it would face one which might be offered by a Democratic presidency after the next presidential election, and India might find that to be even less acceptable.
While this inter-party rivalry within America has added one complication to the nuclear controversy between the two countries, another has been added by a different<b> inter-party rivalry within India, between the government led by Dr Manmohan Singh and its principal supporter outside the government that is the coalition between the parties of the Left. Both have added to the political instability which is currently affecting the stature of the government at a critical time, only days away from the next budget first and then the elections which might follow soon after. America must weigh its words in that context.</b>
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->