04-04-2008, 07:05 AM
<b>Indiaâs energy needs and nuclear maths </b>
By Arun Kumar Singh
The numbers game first. India today produces close to 137,000 MWe (megawatts electricity), as against an estimated requirement of about 400,000 MWe. By 2050, the projected requirement is 1,250,000 MWe. At present, coal and oil (70 per cent oil is imported) contribute 54 per cent and 32 per cent respectively to the national power grid. Nuclear power chips in with a measly 4,000 MWe, or 3.5 per cent, well below the 10.5 per cent of hydel, wind and solar power. Unless we make new âfindsâ, our coal reserves will last till about 2090, oil reserves till 2030, gas reserves till 2040 and Uranium 238 (U-238) till 2025.
However, Indiaâs thorium 232 (Th 232) reserves are capable of producing 400,000 MWe for the next 400 years.This, of course, is possible only if the second and third stages of our indigenous fast breeder plan is allowed to grow and not be killed by the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) which, along with the CTBT, will definitely be a priority for the next man in the White House. India has only about 90,000 tons of poor-quality U-238 ore and unfortunately no funds were made available for additional mining efforts in the last 16 years.
Uranium 238, when used in the reactors, produces Plutonium 239 (PU 239) as a byproduct. Plutonium is vital to our nuclear weapons programme, as well as our second-stage fast breeder reactors (FBR). In the first variant of the FBR, the plutonium is used with U-238 to produce energy and more plutonium. One such pilot FBR plant is operational in Kalpakkam since 1985 and five plants of 500 MWe should be ready by 2020.
The second variant of the stage 2 FBR uses a mix of plutonium and thorium to produce energy with uranium 233 (U-233) as a byproduct. One such pilot plant is operational at Kalpakkam since 1996, while a 300 MWe plant should be ready by 2020. The third stage of Indiaâs indigenous plan uses a mix of thorium and U-233 in an FBR to produce energy and more U233. One such 300 MWe stage 3 FBR should be ready by 2020.
The only problem with the indigenous FBR stage 2 and 3 programmes is that sufficient stocks of Plutonium 239 and Uranium 233 will be built up only by about 2030 to 2040. We will need this time to construct 10 to 20 indigenous FBRs, of increasing sophistication and reliability. With oil prices crossing $105 a barrel, and our oil imports expected to quadruple by 2025, the government is pressing ahead to sign the Indo-US nuclear deal to tide over Indiaâs power requirements till about 2050 and beyond.
We do need additional power but we also need to realise that at $4 billion per 1000 MWe imported light water reactor with imported and safeguarded Uranium 235, India will need $400 billion to build and operate 100 such plants that will produce 100,000 MWe by about 2050. This, when our requirement is 1,250,000 Mwe, of which nuclear power is expected to contribute 400,000 Mwe, at a cost of $1,600 billion at 2008 prices.
The proposed Indo-US nuclear deal will add some badly needed power to the national grid, but it will not greatly reduce our power cuts, even assuming that we have the money to import these LWRs at exorbitant prices, which will then be passed on to consumers. More important is the strategic cost India will have to pay â as per the deal India will have to produce Plutonium 239 from its seven non-safeguarded research reactors both for its weapons and stage 2 FBRs. Further, the United States expects India to support its plan for CTBT and the FMCT to cap Indiaâs fissile material.
This will adversely impact Indiaâs nascent strategic deterrent, while almost putting a stop to the indigenous FBR programme. The directorate of atomic energyâs 2008-2009 budget shows a reduction of Rs 1,333 crores over last yearâs allocation. This has sparked speculation about the future of the thorium-based civilian nuclear power plans, as well as our commitment to building a strategic deterrent.
There are pros and cons to the Indo-US nuclear deal. There is no doubt that the deal will have technology spinoffs and end Indiaâs nuclear isolation. The Americans, having realised that India became a de facto nuclear weapons state in 1998, have adopted a pragmatic approach: they have negotiated hard, but eventually agreed to all Indian demands (including reprocessing), except for nuclear testing. This way, they hope to contain Indiaâs strategic programme, while engaging India in a strategic partnership.
Indiaâs dilemma, if it can be called that, is simple: it has two nuclear-armed neighbours who also have territorial claims, and its five nuclear tests in 1998 are clearly insufficient. Three of these tests were irrelevant âsub-kilotonâ types, one was a 20kt âHiroshima-typeâ test, while the 40kt âthermo-nuclearâ device was not big enough, given Chinaâs 1,000kt and 150kt bombs.
More tests will be required if a credible database is to be built for future âcomputer simulation testingâ. Interestingly, China has conducted 45 tests while Pakistan has done six, of already-proven weapons. The US has tested over 1,000 bombs, while Russia, Britain and France have a combined total of 800 tests.
All this permits confidence in future âcomputer simulation testsâ. India has a difficult decision to take, keeping in mind its differing energy and strategic requirements, and needs to take this decision with great care, keeping its national interests in mind. A good beginning can be made by simply increasing this yearâs DAE budget allocation, to send a clear signal that independent of the Indo-US nuclear deal, our indigenous programme will go ahead at full speed. We must remember that at some stage in the near or distant future, India may have to carry out at least half a dozen tests before it has sufficient faith in âcomputer simulated testingâ, even if the Indo-US nuclear deal is eventually signed.
<i>Arun Kumar Singh, a former vice-admiral of the Indian Navy, retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command in Visakhapatnam in April 2007 </i>
By Arun Kumar Singh
The numbers game first. India today produces close to 137,000 MWe (megawatts electricity), as against an estimated requirement of about 400,000 MWe. By 2050, the projected requirement is 1,250,000 MWe. At present, coal and oil (70 per cent oil is imported) contribute 54 per cent and 32 per cent respectively to the national power grid. Nuclear power chips in with a measly 4,000 MWe, or 3.5 per cent, well below the 10.5 per cent of hydel, wind and solar power. Unless we make new âfindsâ, our coal reserves will last till about 2090, oil reserves till 2030, gas reserves till 2040 and Uranium 238 (U-238) till 2025.
However, Indiaâs thorium 232 (Th 232) reserves are capable of producing 400,000 MWe for the next 400 years.This, of course, is possible only if the second and third stages of our indigenous fast breeder plan is allowed to grow and not be killed by the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) which, along with the CTBT, will definitely be a priority for the next man in the White House. India has only about 90,000 tons of poor-quality U-238 ore and unfortunately no funds were made available for additional mining efforts in the last 16 years.
Uranium 238, when used in the reactors, produces Plutonium 239 (PU 239) as a byproduct. Plutonium is vital to our nuclear weapons programme, as well as our second-stage fast breeder reactors (FBR). In the first variant of the FBR, the plutonium is used with U-238 to produce energy and more plutonium. One such pilot FBR plant is operational in Kalpakkam since 1985 and five plants of 500 MWe should be ready by 2020.
The second variant of the stage 2 FBR uses a mix of plutonium and thorium to produce energy with uranium 233 (U-233) as a byproduct. One such pilot plant is operational at Kalpakkam since 1996, while a 300 MWe plant should be ready by 2020. The third stage of Indiaâs indigenous plan uses a mix of thorium and U-233 in an FBR to produce energy and more U233. One such 300 MWe stage 3 FBR should be ready by 2020.
The only problem with the indigenous FBR stage 2 and 3 programmes is that sufficient stocks of Plutonium 239 and Uranium 233 will be built up only by about 2030 to 2040. We will need this time to construct 10 to 20 indigenous FBRs, of increasing sophistication and reliability. With oil prices crossing $105 a barrel, and our oil imports expected to quadruple by 2025, the government is pressing ahead to sign the Indo-US nuclear deal to tide over Indiaâs power requirements till about 2050 and beyond.
We do need additional power but we also need to realise that at $4 billion per 1000 MWe imported light water reactor with imported and safeguarded Uranium 235, India will need $400 billion to build and operate 100 such plants that will produce 100,000 MWe by about 2050. This, when our requirement is 1,250,000 Mwe, of which nuclear power is expected to contribute 400,000 Mwe, at a cost of $1,600 billion at 2008 prices.
The proposed Indo-US nuclear deal will add some badly needed power to the national grid, but it will not greatly reduce our power cuts, even assuming that we have the money to import these LWRs at exorbitant prices, which will then be passed on to consumers. More important is the strategic cost India will have to pay â as per the deal India will have to produce Plutonium 239 from its seven non-safeguarded research reactors both for its weapons and stage 2 FBRs. Further, the United States expects India to support its plan for CTBT and the FMCT to cap Indiaâs fissile material.
This will adversely impact Indiaâs nascent strategic deterrent, while almost putting a stop to the indigenous FBR programme. The directorate of atomic energyâs 2008-2009 budget shows a reduction of Rs 1,333 crores over last yearâs allocation. This has sparked speculation about the future of the thorium-based civilian nuclear power plans, as well as our commitment to building a strategic deterrent.
There are pros and cons to the Indo-US nuclear deal. There is no doubt that the deal will have technology spinoffs and end Indiaâs nuclear isolation. The Americans, having realised that India became a de facto nuclear weapons state in 1998, have adopted a pragmatic approach: they have negotiated hard, but eventually agreed to all Indian demands (including reprocessing), except for nuclear testing. This way, they hope to contain Indiaâs strategic programme, while engaging India in a strategic partnership.
Indiaâs dilemma, if it can be called that, is simple: it has two nuclear-armed neighbours who also have territorial claims, and its five nuclear tests in 1998 are clearly insufficient. Three of these tests were irrelevant âsub-kilotonâ types, one was a 20kt âHiroshima-typeâ test, while the 40kt âthermo-nuclearâ device was not big enough, given Chinaâs 1,000kt and 150kt bombs.
More tests will be required if a credible database is to be built for future âcomputer simulation testingâ. Interestingly, China has conducted 45 tests while Pakistan has done six, of already-proven weapons. The US has tested over 1,000 bombs, while Russia, Britain and France have a combined total of 800 tests.
All this permits confidence in future âcomputer simulation testsâ. India has a difficult decision to take, keeping in mind its differing energy and strategic requirements, and needs to take this decision with great care, keeping its national interests in mind. A good beginning can be made by simply increasing this yearâs DAE budget allocation, to send a clear signal that independent of the Indo-US nuclear deal, our indigenous programme will go ahead at full speed. We must remember that at some stage in the near or distant future, India may have to carry out at least half a dozen tests before it has sufficient faith in âcomputer simulated testingâ, even if the Indo-US nuclear deal is eventually signed.
<i>Arun Kumar Singh, a former vice-admiral of the Indian Navy, retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command in Visakhapatnam in April 2007 </i>