09-12-2004, 11:21 PM
Pre-empting nuclear 9/11 or nuclear Beslan; priority number one in strategic security initiatives
9/11 and now, Beslan. It is no time to pause. Any number of commissions may be appointed to provide recommendations for public policy. Unless there is clarity in perceiving the disaster that a nuclear 9/11 will be for the entire world, there will not be a credible policy to counteract terror.
The following observations of Prof. Amy Zegart are scary and should alert every citizen of the world: "One recent study showed the odds of detecting a nuclear bomb inside a heavy machinery container were close to zero. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, such a lopsided transportation strategy makes sense only if you intend to fight the last war."
When will the US awaken to the dangers of the Islamic nuke in Pakistan? Wisdom lies in pre-empting a nuclear 9/11 or a nuclear Beslan. This should be priority number one for a sane world order.
Kalyanaraman
washingtonpost.comPreventing a Nuclear 9/11
By Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier
Sunday, September 12, 2004; Page B07
This month's hostage tragedy in Russia is a stark reminder of the potent terrorist threat that country still faces -- a threat that could result in a nuclear Sept. 11 if terrorists manage to gain access to Russia's nuclear stockpiles.
Unfortunately, the recent claim by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov that inadequately secured nuclear stockpiles in Russia are only a "myth" is far from the truth. There has been a decade of improvements in Russia, but the work remains dangerously incomplete and the threat to nuclear facilities is terrifyingly high. While many of the best-known thefts of nuclear material occurred a decade ago, it was only last year that the chief of Russia's nuclear agency testified that nuclear security was underfunded by hundreds of millions of dollars. At nearly every site U.S. experts visit, they reach quick agreement with Russian experts on the need for substantial security upgrades. Russia's decision to send additional troops to guard nuclear facilities in the wake of the most recent terrorist attacks belies the notion that these facilities were adequately secured before. Moreover, that heightened troop presence is not likely to last and will do little to reduce the danger of theft by insiders.
Meanwhile, terrorists are zeroing in on these nuclear stockpiles. Top Russian officials have confirmed at least two cases in 2001 of terrorists carrying out reconnaissance at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites. The 41 heavily armed, suicidal terrorists who seized hundreds of hostages at a Moscow theater in 2002 reportedly considered seizing the Kurchatov Institute instead -- a site with enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for dozens of nuclear weapons. In 2003 proceedings in a Russian criminal case revealed that a Russian businessman had been offering $750,000 for stolen weapon-grade plutonium for sale to a foreign client. Al Qaeda has been actively seeking nuclear material for a bomb and has strong connections to Chechen terrorist groups.
Comprehensive U.S.-funded security upgrades have been completed for only 22 percent of Russia's potential nuclear bomb material; upgrades for tens of thousands of bombs' worth of material are still incomplete. Disputes over access to sensitive sites, liability, and other bureaucratic and political obstacles have been allowed to stymie progress for years.
This is a global problem. More than 130 research reactors in dozens of countries still operate with HEU fuel, and many have no more security than a night watchman and a chain-link fence. Pakistan's heavily guarded nuclear stockpiles face huge threats, from both insiders and outsiders, including large remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban in the country.
The good news is that this is a solvable problem. Plutonium and HEU -- the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons -- are too difficult for terrorists to make. If the world's stockpiles can be locked down and kept out of terrorist hands, nuclear terrorism can be prevented.
Many of the needed programs are in place. In addition to continuing efforts to secure Russia's stockpiles, the administration has been exploring similar cooperation with Pakistan and others -- and Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham has just launched a Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) designed to remove potential bomb material entirely from the world's most vulnerable sites rapidly.
Three steps are urgently needed if the world is to win the race to lock down these stockpiles before the terrorists get to them.
First, it will be crucial to implement GTRI as quickly, flexibly and comprehensively as possible -- with a target of removing potential bomb material from the world's highest-risk facilities within four years. Congress should give Abraham both the explicit and flexible authority and the additional funds he needs.
Second, the United States and Russia must drastically accelerate their efforts to secure Russia's stockpiles. The next U.S-Russian summit should focus on agreements to sweep aside bureaucratic and political obstacles and set an agreed deadline for getting the job done. President Bush needs to make clear to Russian President Vladimir Putin that locking down these stockpiles quickly and permanently is central to U.S.-Russian relations and to Russia's own security.
Third, the United States must expand the security upgrade effort to the rest of the world, forming a fast-paced global partnership to quickly lock down all the vulnerable nuclear caches that cannot simply be removed or eliminated.
Making all this happen will require a sea change in the level of sustained White House leadership, no matter who is president. A full-time senior official is needed -- one who has the president's ear -- to lead the myriad efforts in many agencies meant to block the terrorist pathway to the bomb. This official must also keep the issue on the front burner at the White House day in and day out. Only then will we have done all we should to reduce the risk of a nuclear Sept. 11.
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, are co-authors of "Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action." Bunn worked on programs to secure nuclear materials in the Clinton administration, and Wier helped to develop budgets for some of these programs in the Clinton and current Bush administrations.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...-2004Sep10.html
THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORHow safe are we?
Bush says he's made an attack less likely, but homeland security funds go to all the wrong places and intelligence is still a mess
BY AMY B. ZEGART
Amy Zegart is an assistant professor of public policy at the University of California, Los Angeles. She is the author of "Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC."
September 12, 2004
When John Kerry starts dusting off his salute and George W. Bush starts listening to the 9/11 Commission, you know that this election is about national security. The president has made the campaign primarily a referendum on how safe from terrorism the country has become under his leadership. But can we really tell?
Thankfully, al-Qaida has not struck inside the United States since Sept. 11, 2001. But this does not prove that the president's policies are working. The Bush administration could be doing something right. Or we could be days away from al-Qaida's next strike.
Henry Kissinger once asked Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai what he thought of the French Revolution. The Chinese leader said it was too soon to tell. Terrorism is no different. In a war that will last for decades, judging success mid-stream cannot be done by examining outcomes; only a rear-view mirror in a distant future will reveal how many plots al-Qaida hatched, how many were stopped and what American actions made a difference.
If we ask how far we have come since 9/11 in terms of safety planning the evidence is not encouraging.
Homeland security funds are flowing, but not to the right places. Since 9/11, Congress has distributed $13 billion to state governments with a formula only Washington could concoct: 40 percent was split evenly, regardless of a state's population, targets or vulnerability to terrorist attack. The result: Safe places got safer. Rural states with fewer potential targets and low populations, such as Alaska and Wyoming, received more than $55 per resident. Target-rich and densely populated states like New York and California received $25 and $14 per person respectively. Osama bin Laden, beware: Wyoming is well fortified.
It gets worse. Over the past three years, the federal government has spent 20 times more on aviation security than on protecting America's seaports, even though more than 90 percent of U.S. foreign trade moves by ship, but less than 5 percent of all shipping containers entering the country are inspected. One recent study showed the odds of detecting a nuclear bomb inside a heavy machinery container were close to zero. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, such a lopsided transportation strategy makes sense only if you intend to fight the last war.
Then there is our intelligence system, a dysfunctional family of agencies that have proven uniquely adept at resisting reform, getting the wrong information into the right hands and the right information into the wrong hands. The past three years have witnessed the two greatest intelligence failures since Pearl Harbor. Yet Bush has held no one accountable for these results, and has avoided leading the charge for reform.
The president grudgingly embraced one of the 9/11 Commission's key recommendations - creating a national intelligence director with "full budgetary authority" - only under strong pressure and finally, last Wednesday, after opposing the idea for weeks. There is urgency and boldness for you.
Not only has Bush shown tepid support for the 9/11 Commission's ideas, he seems to have none of his own. For instance: How can we fix the cultural pathologies that cripple our intelligence system? Bush has said nothing about this and the Commission identified the problem but left it to the national intelligence director to solve.
Building new organizational arrangements with more people and more power will not make us safer if intelligence officials still view the world through the same old lenses and hoard information in the same old stovepipes.
The FBI, for example, faces a daunting cultural challenge: transforming a crime-fighting culture that prizes slow and careful evidence gathering after-the-fact into an intelligence culture that takes fast action to prevent future tragedies. Training programs are crucial to this effort. Today, however, counter-terrorism training constitutes only two weeks out of the 17-week required course for all new agents. That's less time than agents get for vacation.
Then there is the unspoken 11th Commandment operating inside the CIA, FBI and the other 13 intelligence agencies: Thou Shalt Not Share. Here, too, the core problem is cultural - the reluctance to pass information across agency lines is deeply engrained, based more on habit and values than policy or organization charts. And here, too, training is key.
Creating a "one-team" approach to intelligence requires developing trust and building informal networks between officials in different agencies. This is best done by requiring cross-agency training programs early in officials' careers. By current policies, however, most intelligence professionals can spend 20 years or more without a single community-wide training experience. Dots will always be hard to connect when intelligence agencies do not trust or understand each other.
While Bush has placed the biggest burden on his own record in the campaign, it's important to note that Kerry has offered only a lackluster alternative that can be summed up as, "I'm for whatever the 9/11 Commission says." This is like a diner who orders the entire menu because there's nothing he really wants except to avoid making a choice. The commission's recommendations are good, but far from perfect.
No one knows when or where al-Qaida will strike next. But this much we do know: All Americans will lose in November if we don't start demanding better homeland security policies and stronger leadership from the White House and a more thoughtful plan from Kerry too.
http://www.newsday.com/news/opinion/ny-vpz...oints-headlines
9/11 and now, Beslan. It is no time to pause. Any number of commissions may be appointed to provide recommendations for public policy. Unless there is clarity in perceiving the disaster that a nuclear 9/11 will be for the entire world, there will not be a credible policy to counteract terror.
The following observations of Prof. Amy Zegart are scary and should alert every citizen of the world: "One recent study showed the odds of detecting a nuclear bomb inside a heavy machinery container were close to zero. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, such a lopsided transportation strategy makes sense only if you intend to fight the last war."
When will the US awaken to the dangers of the Islamic nuke in Pakistan? Wisdom lies in pre-empting a nuclear 9/11 or a nuclear Beslan. This should be priority number one for a sane world order.
Kalyanaraman
washingtonpost.comPreventing a Nuclear 9/11
By Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier
Sunday, September 12, 2004; Page B07
This month's hostage tragedy in Russia is a stark reminder of the potent terrorist threat that country still faces -- a threat that could result in a nuclear Sept. 11 if terrorists manage to gain access to Russia's nuclear stockpiles.
Unfortunately, the recent claim by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov that inadequately secured nuclear stockpiles in Russia are only a "myth" is far from the truth. There has been a decade of improvements in Russia, but the work remains dangerously incomplete and the threat to nuclear facilities is terrifyingly high. While many of the best-known thefts of nuclear material occurred a decade ago, it was only last year that the chief of Russia's nuclear agency testified that nuclear security was underfunded by hundreds of millions of dollars. At nearly every site U.S. experts visit, they reach quick agreement with Russian experts on the need for substantial security upgrades. Russia's decision to send additional troops to guard nuclear facilities in the wake of the most recent terrorist attacks belies the notion that these facilities were adequately secured before. Moreover, that heightened troop presence is not likely to last and will do little to reduce the danger of theft by insiders.
Meanwhile, terrorists are zeroing in on these nuclear stockpiles. Top Russian officials have confirmed at least two cases in 2001 of terrorists carrying out reconnaissance at Russian nuclear warhead storage sites. The 41 heavily armed, suicidal terrorists who seized hundreds of hostages at a Moscow theater in 2002 reportedly considered seizing the Kurchatov Institute instead -- a site with enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for dozens of nuclear weapons. In 2003 proceedings in a Russian criminal case revealed that a Russian businessman had been offering $750,000 for stolen weapon-grade plutonium for sale to a foreign client. Al Qaeda has been actively seeking nuclear material for a bomb and has strong connections to Chechen terrorist groups.
Comprehensive U.S.-funded security upgrades have been completed for only 22 percent of Russia's potential nuclear bomb material; upgrades for tens of thousands of bombs' worth of material are still incomplete. Disputes over access to sensitive sites, liability, and other bureaucratic and political obstacles have been allowed to stymie progress for years.
This is a global problem. More than 130 research reactors in dozens of countries still operate with HEU fuel, and many have no more security than a night watchman and a chain-link fence. Pakistan's heavily guarded nuclear stockpiles face huge threats, from both insiders and outsiders, including large remnants of al Qaeda and the Taliban in the country.
The good news is that this is a solvable problem. Plutonium and HEU -- the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons -- are too difficult for terrorists to make. If the world's stockpiles can be locked down and kept out of terrorist hands, nuclear terrorism can be prevented.
Many of the needed programs are in place. In addition to continuing efforts to secure Russia's stockpiles, the administration has been exploring similar cooperation with Pakistan and others -- and Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham has just launched a Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) designed to remove potential bomb material entirely from the world's most vulnerable sites rapidly.
Three steps are urgently needed if the world is to win the race to lock down these stockpiles before the terrorists get to them.
First, it will be crucial to implement GTRI as quickly, flexibly and comprehensively as possible -- with a target of removing potential bomb material from the world's highest-risk facilities within four years. Congress should give Abraham both the explicit and flexible authority and the additional funds he needs.
Second, the United States and Russia must drastically accelerate their efforts to secure Russia's stockpiles. The next U.S-Russian summit should focus on agreements to sweep aside bureaucratic and political obstacles and set an agreed deadline for getting the job done. President Bush needs to make clear to Russian President Vladimir Putin that locking down these stockpiles quickly and permanently is central to U.S.-Russian relations and to Russia's own security.
Third, the United States must expand the security upgrade effort to the rest of the world, forming a fast-paced global partnership to quickly lock down all the vulnerable nuclear caches that cannot simply be removed or eliminated.
Making all this happen will require a sea change in the level of sustained White House leadership, no matter who is president. A full-time senior official is needed -- one who has the president's ear -- to lead the myriad efforts in many agencies meant to block the terrorist pathway to the bomb. This official must also keep the issue on the front burner at the White House day in and day out. Only then will we have done all we should to reduce the risk of a nuclear Sept. 11.
Matthew Bunn and Anthony Wier, of the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, are co-authors of "Securing the Bomb: An Agenda for Action." Bunn worked on programs to secure nuclear materials in the Clinton administration, and Wier helped to develop budgets for some of these programs in the Clinton and current Bush administrations.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/artic...-2004Sep10.html
THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORHow safe are we?
Bush says he's made an attack less likely, but homeland security funds go to all the wrong places and intelligence is still a mess
BY AMY B. ZEGART
Amy Zegart is an assistant professor of public policy at the University of California, Los Angeles. She is the author of "Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC."
September 12, 2004
When John Kerry starts dusting off his salute and George W. Bush starts listening to the 9/11 Commission, you know that this election is about national security. The president has made the campaign primarily a referendum on how safe from terrorism the country has become under his leadership. But can we really tell?
Thankfully, al-Qaida has not struck inside the United States since Sept. 11, 2001. But this does not prove that the president's policies are working. The Bush administration could be doing something right. Or we could be days away from al-Qaida's next strike.
Henry Kissinger once asked Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai what he thought of the French Revolution. The Chinese leader said it was too soon to tell. Terrorism is no different. In a war that will last for decades, judging success mid-stream cannot be done by examining outcomes; only a rear-view mirror in a distant future will reveal how many plots al-Qaida hatched, how many were stopped and what American actions made a difference.
If we ask how far we have come since 9/11 in terms of safety planning the evidence is not encouraging.
Homeland security funds are flowing, but not to the right places. Since 9/11, Congress has distributed $13 billion to state governments with a formula only Washington could concoct: 40 percent was split evenly, regardless of a state's population, targets or vulnerability to terrorist attack. The result: Safe places got safer. Rural states with fewer potential targets and low populations, such as Alaska and Wyoming, received more than $55 per resident. Target-rich and densely populated states like New York and California received $25 and $14 per person respectively. Osama bin Laden, beware: Wyoming is well fortified.
It gets worse. Over the past three years, the federal government has spent 20 times more on aviation security than on protecting America's seaports, even though more than 90 percent of U.S. foreign trade moves by ship, but less than 5 percent of all shipping containers entering the country are inspected. One recent study showed the odds of detecting a nuclear bomb inside a heavy machinery container were close to zero. As the 9/11 Commission concluded, such a lopsided transportation strategy makes sense only if you intend to fight the last war.
Then there is our intelligence system, a dysfunctional family of agencies that have proven uniquely adept at resisting reform, getting the wrong information into the right hands and the right information into the wrong hands. The past three years have witnessed the two greatest intelligence failures since Pearl Harbor. Yet Bush has held no one accountable for these results, and has avoided leading the charge for reform.
The president grudgingly embraced one of the 9/11 Commission's key recommendations - creating a national intelligence director with "full budgetary authority" - only under strong pressure and finally, last Wednesday, after opposing the idea for weeks. There is urgency and boldness for you.
Not only has Bush shown tepid support for the 9/11 Commission's ideas, he seems to have none of his own. For instance: How can we fix the cultural pathologies that cripple our intelligence system? Bush has said nothing about this and the Commission identified the problem but left it to the national intelligence director to solve.
Building new organizational arrangements with more people and more power will not make us safer if intelligence officials still view the world through the same old lenses and hoard information in the same old stovepipes.
The FBI, for example, faces a daunting cultural challenge: transforming a crime-fighting culture that prizes slow and careful evidence gathering after-the-fact into an intelligence culture that takes fast action to prevent future tragedies. Training programs are crucial to this effort. Today, however, counter-terrorism training constitutes only two weeks out of the 17-week required course for all new agents. That's less time than agents get for vacation.
Then there is the unspoken 11th Commandment operating inside the CIA, FBI and the other 13 intelligence agencies: Thou Shalt Not Share. Here, too, the core problem is cultural - the reluctance to pass information across agency lines is deeply engrained, based more on habit and values than policy or organization charts. And here, too, training is key.
Creating a "one-team" approach to intelligence requires developing trust and building informal networks between officials in different agencies. This is best done by requiring cross-agency training programs early in officials' careers. By current policies, however, most intelligence professionals can spend 20 years or more without a single community-wide training experience. Dots will always be hard to connect when intelligence agencies do not trust or understand each other.
While Bush has placed the biggest burden on his own record in the campaign, it's important to note that Kerry has offered only a lackluster alternative that can be summed up as, "I'm for whatever the 9/11 Commission says." This is like a diner who orders the entire menu because there's nothing he really wants except to avoid making a choice. The commission's recommendations are good, but far from perfect.
No one knows when or where al-Qaida will strike next. But this much we do know: All Americans will lose in November if we don't start demanding better homeland security policies and stronger leadership from the White House and a more thoughtful plan from Kerry too.
http://www.newsday.com/news/opinion/ny-vpz...oints-headlines