09-14-2004, 02:30 AM
New hand - Worsening Israeli relations with Pakistan is a boon for India.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->13 September 2004: One of the best-kept secrets of the Indian government is the scale and extent of defence and intelligence cooperation with Israel. It is huge and staggering. Tens of Israeli companies collaborate with the Indian military establishment, but there is not a breath of it. The Israelis have helped in miniaturising our atomic weapons, they were the only outsiders present at the Pokhran-II explosions, and during Kargil, they flew sorties to teach the IAF how to bomb Pakistani intruders in their ridge redoubts.
On Saturday, we published intelligence that Israel has gotten into a flaming row with Pakistan because its airforce has taken an astonishing seven-hundred photographs of Pakistanâs nuclear establishment (Intelligence, âIsrael caught snapping Pak N-centres,â 11 September 2004), as a prelude perhaps to bombing them out like the Iraqi reactor Osirak in 1981. It is recorded history that Israel subsequently asked India landing permission to take out Pakistanâs still-nascent Kahuta facility, but Indira Gandhi refused. The reasons are disputed, but it is likely Mrs Gandhi thought a bombing wouldnât deter Pakistanâs nuclear march, since the Chinese imprint on it was strong. It is hard to say whether she was right or wrong in her reasoning, but Pakistan did go nuclear less than five years later.
Over the years, though, Pakistan has not overcome fears that India would attack its nuclear facilities, despite a bilateral pact not to. In the immediate aftermath of the Pokhran-II explosions, Nawaz Sharief sent up a scare through Pakistan of an imminent Indian attack. At the start of the October-2001 Afghan War, Pakistan feared India would use the window of opportunity to attack it. The sneak photography row with Israel also started on a different foot, with Pakistan first suspecting the IAF of making those reconnaissance missions.
What the current, the recent and distant past tells is that there is one imponderable in India-Pakistan relations, which is Israel. Israel provokes fears vastly disproportionate to its size. Its daredevil airforce is dreaded, and nothing is said to be beyond Mossad. The one fear Pakistan has is of Israeli saboteurs blowing up its nuclear laboratories and inventoried weapons. When Ariel Sharon visited on the NDAâs invitation, the worst fears of Pakistan were provoked of still closer India-Israeli ties, and the tremors were felt in China.
Being a tactical guru, General Pervez Musharraf has been keen to start a relationship with Israel, as that would put his ties with the US on firmer footing. For Israel, it is a veritable coup if Islamic Pakistan becomes a friend, because that would deplete the Arabs in untold ways. But obviously, the jihadi groups and politicians wonât allow it, the jihadi sections of the army wonât accept it, and the population would reject this on grounds of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the need to maintain Muslim brotherhood.
On the other hand, the advantage for Musharraf is that better relations with Israel would certainly limit the flow of high-tech weapons to India, since Israel would not wish to imperil a hard-got relation with an Islamic country so swiftly. But Musharrafâs progress in that direction has been aborted because of domestic opposition, and Israel is more implacably opposed to Pakistan these past few months, because of Pakistan and A.Q.Khanâs proliferation to Iran. Israel is not certain how much of nuclear transfers to Iran have occurred, because Pakistani and Iranian nuclear scientists have been interacting frequently, but it fears that in case Pakistan is targeted for proliferation, it may be tempted to pass on technology to Iran in spite or for safe-keeping, and the controversial reconnaissance photographs could be to gauge the situation. No country photographs anotherâs nuclear facilities at great risk for nothing.
What should India do?
Right now, there is no call to act, but it cannot remain insensitive to the situation. The politically correct in government would doubtless argue to condemn Israelâs action, and come on the side of Pakistan, in some perverse display of South-Asian brotherhood, but that would be shooting yourself in the foot. Nehru hoped that by campaigning for Chinaâs membership to the UN, Chairman Mao would remain ever grateful to India, and instead he perfidiously provoked and prosecuted the 1962 war. Like China leverages Pakistan against India, so India must play the Israel card, since it simultaneously hurts Pakistan and China. As for Indiaâs Muslim electorate, they would go along with policies that strengthen India, and if they have fought the Pakistani army in four wars, there is no reason to doubt their nationalism in any other matter, including still closer India-Israeli ties.
Thankfully, that course is being strengthened now. Soon after the UPA government was sworn in, there was some gratuitous Israel-bashing, partly from the misguided notion that relations with it were propelled by the NDA, although it was the P.V.Narasimha Rao government that had re-established formal ties with the Jewish state. The Left was also pressing for a pro-Arab tilt, but the government was knocked back to its senses when Indian expatriates were killed with some selectivity by Al-Qaeda terrorists in Al-Khobar in Saudi Arabia. The second shock was the Indian hostage-taking in Iraq, a traditionally pro-India country, and huge ransoms had to be paid to free the hostages.
Besides these incidents, the driver of pro-Israel relations is the defence establishment, which finds no alternative to Israeli high-tech weapons, and defence cooperation between the two countries has become so far-reaching that it is impossible to reverse it, without knocking the bottom out of Indiaâs security. So, it is happy to note that, finally, the UPA government is formally firming relations with Israel, when Indian officials leave for that country in December to sign a separate anti-terror protocol.
The protocol will allow sale of special anti-terror weapon systems, notch up intelligence-sharing of terrorist movements in the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and formalise at least three meetings a year between Israeli and Indian intelligence and security agencies. The architect of this new pro-Israel policy is defence minister Pranab Mukherjee, but an early convert to it has been the foreign minister, Natwar Singh, who recognises the extreme limitations of a pro-Arab paradigm.
For example, Arab and Iranian diplomats in New Delhi say that they will have to support Pakistan in any India-Pakistan dispute. Israel, on the other hand, while not coming openly on the side of India, will back it with weapons and such special assistance as may be necessary, as it was doing the Kargil War. Now, with Pakistan proliferating to Iran, Israel may even be compelled to openly side with India. The tide is turning.
The only grey area in all this is if the Indian establishment recognises the paradigm shift, and wishes to take such advantage of it as it can, before not taking advantage becomes a disadvantage. This calls for greater cooperation between the foreign and defence ministries, the defence and foreign minister Pranab and Natwar, and for greater accent and stress on defence diplomacy than has been so far laid by the UPA. Naturally, the national security advisor, J.N.Dixit, plays a key role, but the political direction has to come from Pranab and Natwar, with the enthusiastic consent of prime minister Manmohan Singh. Like in life, countries are given limited chances, and they must make the most of it. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->13 September 2004: One of the best-kept secrets of the Indian government is the scale and extent of defence and intelligence cooperation with Israel. It is huge and staggering. Tens of Israeli companies collaborate with the Indian military establishment, but there is not a breath of it. The Israelis have helped in miniaturising our atomic weapons, they were the only outsiders present at the Pokhran-II explosions, and during Kargil, they flew sorties to teach the IAF how to bomb Pakistani intruders in their ridge redoubts.
On Saturday, we published intelligence that Israel has gotten into a flaming row with Pakistan because its airforce has taken an astonishing seven-hundred photographs of Pakistanâs nuclear establishment (Intelligence, âIsrael caught snapping Pak N-centres,â 11 September 2004), as a prelude perhaps to bombing them out like the Iraqi reactor Osirak in 1981. It is recorded history that Israel subsequently asked India landing permission to take out Pakistanâs still-nascent Kahuta facility, but Indira Gandhi refused. The reasons are disputed, but it is likely Mrs Gandhi thought a bombing wouldnât deter Pakistanâs nuclear march, since the Chinese imprint on it was strong. It is hard to say whether she was right or wrong in her reasoning, but Pakistan did go nuclear less than five years later.
Over the years, though, Pakistan has not overcome fears that India would attack its nuclear facilities, despite a bilateral pact not to. In the immediate aftermath of the Pokhran-II explosions, Nawaz Sharief sent up a scare through Pakistan of an imminent Indian attack. At the start of the October-2001 Afghan War, Pakistan feared India would use the window of opportunity to attack it. The sneak photography row with Israel also started on a different foot, with Pakistan first suspecting the IAF of making those reconnaissance missions.
What the current, the recent and distant past tells is that there is one imponderable in India-Pakistan relations, which is Israel. Israel provokes fears vastly disproportionate to its size. Its daredevil airforce is dreaded, and nothing is said to be beyond Mossad. The one fear Pakistan has is of Israeli saboteurs blowing up its nuclear laboratories and inventoried weapons. When Ariel Sharon visited on the NDAâs invitation, the worst fears of Pakistan were provoked of still closer India-Israeli ties, and the tremors were felt in China.
Being a tactical guru, General Pervez Musharraf has been keen to start a relationship with Israel, as that would put his ties with the US on firmer footing. For Israel, it is a veritable coup if Islamic Pakistan becomes a friend, because that would deplete the Arabs in untold ways. But obviously, the jihadi groups and politicians wonât allow it, the jihadi sections of the army wonât accept it, and the population would reject this on grounds of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the need to maintain Muslim brotherhood.
On the other hand, the advantage for Musharraf is that better relations with Israel would certainly limit the flow of high-tech weapons to India, since Israel would not wish to imperil a hard-got relation with an Islamic country so swiftly. But Musharrafâs progress in that direction has been aborted because of domestic opposition, and Israel is more implacably opposed to Pakistan these past few months, because of Pakistan and A.Q.Khanâs proliferation to Iran. Israel is not certain how much of nuclear transfers to Iran have occurred, because Pakistani and Iranian nuclear scientists have been interacting frequently, but it fears that in case Pakistan is targeted for proliferation, it may be tempted to pass on technology to Iran in spite or for safe-keeping, and the controversial reconnaissance photographs could be to gauge the situation. No country photographs anotherâs nuclear facilities at great risk for nothing.
What should India do?
Right now, there is no call to act, but it cannot remain insensitive to the situation. The politically correct in government would doubtless argue to condemn Israelâs action, and come on the side of Pakistan, in some perverse display of South-Asian brotherhood, but that would be shooting yourself in the foot. Nehru hoped that by campaigning for Chinaâs membership to the UN, Chairman Mao would remain ever grateful to India, and instead he perfidiously provoked and prosecuted the 1962 war. Like China leverages Pakistan against India, so India must play the Israel card, since it simultaneously hurts Pakistan and China. As for Indiaâs Muslim electorate, they would go along with policies that strengthen India, and if they have fought the Pakistani army in four wars, there is no reason to doubt their nationalism in any other matter, including still closer India-Israeli ties.
Thankfully, that course is being strengthened now. Soon after the UPA government was sworn in, there was some gratuitous Israel-bashing, partly from the misguided notion that relations with it were propelled by the NDA, although it was the P.V.Narasimha Rao government that had re-established formal ties with the Jewish state. The Left was also pressing for a pro-Arab tilt, but the government was knocked back to its senses when Indian expatriates were killed with some selectivity by Al-Qaeda terrorists in Al-Khobar in Saudi Arabia. The second shock was the Indian hostage-taking in Iraq, a traditionally pro-India country, and huge ransoms had to be paid to free the hostages.
Besides these incidents, the driver of pro-Israel relations is the defence establishment, which finds no alternative to Israeli high-tech weapons, and defence cooperation between the two countries has become so far-reaching that it is impossible to reverse it, without knocking the bottom out of Indiaâs security. So, it is happy to note that, finally, the UPA government is formally firming relations with Israel, when Indian officials leave for that country in December to sign a separate anti-terror protocol.
The protocol will allow sale of special anti-terror weapon systems, notch up intelligence-sharing of terrorist movements in the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and formalise at least three meetings a year between Israeli and Indian intelligence and security agencies. The architect of this new pro-Israel policy is defence minister Pranab Mukherjee, but an early convert to it has been the foreign minister, Natwar Singh, who recognises the extreme limitations of a pro-Arab paradigm.
For example, Arab and Iranian diplomats in New Delhi say that they will have to support Pakistan in any India-Pakistan dispute. Israel, on the other hand, while not coming openly on the side of India, will back it with weapons and such special assistance as may be necessary, as it was doing the Kargil War. Now, with Pakistan proliferating to Iran, Israel may even be compelled to openly side with India. The tide is turning.
The only grey area in all this is if the Indian establishment recognises the paradigm shift, and wishes to take such advantage of it as it can, before not taking advantage becomes a disadvantage. This calls for greater cooperation between the foreign and defence ministries, the defence and foreign minister Pranab and Natwar, and for greater accent and stress on defence diplomacy than has been so far laid by the UPA. Naturally, the national security advisor, J.N.Dixit, plays a key role, but the political direction has to come from Pranab and Natwar, with the enthusiastic consent of prime minister Manmohan Singh. Like in life, countries are given limited chances, and they must make the most of it. <!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->