07-02-2008, 07:37 AM
From DC.
<b>Time to come clean on the nuclear deal </b>
By Pran Chopra
It is time for the government to take the country in confidence regarding the "nuclear deal" with America. All that we have had so far are more or less uninformed bits and pieces of guesswork, with the blanks filled in only by what "sources" of various persuasions want the readers to believe. The "secrecy" about the deal has only become a cloak for a propaganda war between the supporters and opponents of the deal.
The absurdity of the situation is evident in the oft-repeated argument that India must finalise the deal before the presidency of George W. Bush ends in the inglorious termination which awaits it. Those who argue thus forget three undeniable facts.
First and foremost, the deal is not, and was never meant to be, an agreement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, or one between the Republican Party of America and the Congress Party of India (both of which are now lame ducks). The "deal", whenever made, can only be made under an agreement between two countries. Unless it is made that way, and is seen to have been made that way, it can never be a reliable basis for good relations between the two countries on a matter so important as nuclear policy. Therefore, it should not be treated as a pawn in the party politics of either country.
Second, the deal has been more thoroughly debated in India than any other foreign policy issue for many years. Yet some major facts about it have remained hidden behind a dense debate between variously motivated "interests".
Third, assuming that some of these interests do wish to be impartial, are well informed and are not only the public face of some caucuses in Washington or New Delhi, many of them also have a knife in their hands or held at their backs in the form of the Hyde Act, the most treacherous component of what is now known as the deal.
The making of the deal began with a well publicised meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. After the meeting, the two leaders issued a joint statement which spelt out the broad principles upon which a further meeting would take place. The meeting itself as well as the joint statement were well received by Indian Parliament and by the country at large.
A second meeting followed at which the principles announced earlier were further elaborated as an understanding or an agreement. That too was approved by Parliament and by the Indian public. The agreement itself, as approved by the US Congress under Americaâs own legislative procedures, soon became widely known as the 123 Agreement.
Up to that point the American contribution towards the making of the deal was mainly made by the Republican Party, which till then had control of the Congress as well as the White House. But in the American Congressional elections which followed soon afterwards, the Republicans lost out to the Democrats. While the Republicans still held the White House, they, and in particular their leader President Bush, were reduced to a shadow of their earlier selves.
The Democratsâ opposition to anything like the "deal" which President Bush had negotiated with India has a history behind it. But while they could not directly oppose the deal so long as the author of the American contribution, President Bush, held the presidency, they succeeded in using their newly-won majority in Congress to plant a landmine in the form of the Hyde Act under the presidential table.
They also succeeded in attaching certain "switches" to the Hyde Act, which the opponents of the deal can press at any time, either to cripple the deal or to put severe restrictions on Indiaâs deeply cherished independence of action on matters unconnected with nuclear issues. For example on Indiaâs options in conducting business with Iran, including large-scale import of oil from that country.
This backdoor interference in Indiaâs external relations is made possible by the "switch" which lays down that for the deal to remain in force the US President must, from time-to-time, satisfy Congress that India continues to abstain from actions and policies which would conflict with American interests.
In fact, according to some versions of the Congressional debate, the Act also requires that Indian actions in this field must support American policies and objectives. And if India fails to oblige, then America could not only stop all assistance but, whatever the damage such retaliation might cause to Indiaâs nuclear economy, it could withdraw all nuclear assets it might have provided to India earlier.
Now, it may be in Indiaâs interest to support the deal. But people must be given sufficient reasons to support the deal as it stands. The reasons must be given with the same degree of frankness and lucidity which had won our Parliamentâs approval in the earlier stages of the debate on the subject.
The Bush-Singh agreements were clearly placed before Parliament, and its clear approval was obtained before proceeding further. But in the present case, a bland formula, and at that an incomplete one, is being paraded: "India needs development that needs energy. The deal is for energy, therefore, the deal must be supported."
But there is obfuscation on how much energy the deal will yield, over what period, beginning when, at what immediate and overall cost, and (most importantly) on what political and operational terms.
Nor is there sufficient candour in comparing the benefits of the deal with those which other forms and sources of energy might bring. This is an omission worse than the one committed by the absence of sufficient debate on the consequences of the possibility of an American ban on a future nuclear test by India.
There is obviously a lot on which Dr Singh might have something to say if and when he chooses to say it, but most important would be his reasons for letting the latest stage of the deal hang in the air so mysteriously and for so long.
<b>Time to come clean on the nuclear deal </b>
By Pran Chopra
It is time for the government to take the country in confidence regarding the "nuclear deal" with America. All that we have had so far are more or less uninformed bits and pieces of guesswork, with the blanks filled in only by what "sources" of various persuasions want the readers to believe. The "secrecy" about the deal has only become a cloak for a propaganda war between the supporters and opponents of the deal.
The absurdity of the situation is evident in the oft-repeated argument that India must finalise the deal before the presidency of George W. Bush ends in the inglorious termination which awaits it. Those who argue thus forget three undeniable facts.
First and foremost, the deal is not, and was never meant to be, an agreement between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, or one between the Republican Party of America and the Congress Party of India (both of which are now lame ducks). The "deal", whenever made, can only be made under an agreement between two countries. Unless it is made that way, and is seen to have been made that way, it can never be a reliable basis for good relations between the two countries on a matter so important as nuclear policy. Therefore, it should not be treated as a pawn in the party politics of either country.
Second, the deal has been more thoroughly debated in India than any other foreign policy issue for many years. Yet some major facts about it have remained hidden behind a dense debate between variously motivated "interests".
Third, assuming that some of these interests do wish to be impartial, are well informed and are not only the public face of some caucuses in Washington or New Delhi, many of them also have a knife in their hands or held at their backs in the form of the Hyde Act, the most treacherous component of what is now known as the deal.
The making of the deal began with a well publicised meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. After the meeting, the two leaders issued a joint statement which spelt out the broad principles upon which a further meeting would take place. The meeting itself as well as the joint statement were well received by Indian Parliament and by the country at large.
A second meeting followed at which the principles announced earlier were further elaborated as an understanding or an agreement. That too was approved by Parliament and by the Indian public. The agreement itself, as approved by the US Congress under Americaâs own legislative procedures, soon became widely known as the 123 Agreement.
Up to that point the American contribution towards the making of the deal was mainly made by the Republican Party, which till then had control of the Congress as well as the White House. But in the American Congressional elections which followed soon afterwards, the Republicans lost out to the Democrats. While the Republicans still held the White House, they, and in particular their leader President Bush, were reduced to a shadow of their earlier selves.
The Democratsâ opposition to anything like the "deal" which President Bush had negotiated with India has a history behind it. But while they could not directly oppose the deal so long as the author of the American contribution, President Bush, held the presidency, they succeeded in using their newly-won majority in Congress to plant a landmine in the form of the Hyde Act under the presidential table.
They also succeeded in attaching certain "switches" to the Hyde Act, which the opponents of the deal can press at any time, either to cripple the deal or to put severe restrictions on Indiaâs deeply cherished independence of action on matters unconnected with nuclear issues. For example on Indiaâs options in conducting business with Iran, including large-scale import of oil from that country.
This backdoor interference in Indiaâs external relations is made possible by the "switch" which lays down that for the deal to remain in force the US President must, from time-to-time, satisfy Congress that India continues to abstain from actions and policies which would conflict with American interests.
In fact, according to some versions of the Congressional debate, the Act also requires that Indian actions in this field must support American policies and objectives. And if India fails to oblige, then America could not only stop all assistance but, whatever the damage such retaliation might cause to Indiaâs nuclear economy, it could withdraw all nuclear assets it might have provided to India earlier.
Now, it may be in Indiaâs interest to support the deal. But people must be given sufficient reasons to support the deal as it stands. The reasons must be given with the same degree of frankness and lucidity which had won our Parliamentâs approval in the earlier stages of the debate on the subject.
The Bush-Singh agreements were clearly placed before Parliament, and its clear approval was obtained before proceeding further. But in the present case, a bland formula, and at that an incomplete one, is being paraded: "India needs development that needs energy. The deal is for energy, therefore, the deal must be supported."
But there is obfuscation on how much energy the deal will yield, over what period, beginning when, at what immediate and overall cost, and (most importantly) on what political and operational terms.
Nor is there sufficient candour in comparing the benefits of the deal with those which other forms and sources of energy might bring. This is an omission worse than the one committed by the absence of sufficient debate on the consequences of the possibility of an American ban on a future nuclear test by India.
There is obviously a lot on which Dr Singh might have something to say if and when he chooses to say it, but most important would be his reasons for letting the latest stage of the deal hang in the air so mysteriously and for so long.