07-11-2008, 01:28 AM
<b>Safeguards text has nothing India-specific</b>
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->While supporters of the deal have looked for "concessions" in the draft, the fine print reveals that the Agreement will pin India to a strict non-proliferation regime with stringent action in case of default. Additionally, while the text is specific about IAEA safeguards in perpetuity, it holds little assurance for India on fuel supply in perpetuity.
Unlike the impression created in July 2005 -- that the IAEA would accord special status to India with India-specific safeguards -- the Agreement in its current form strongly resembles all such accords with non-nuclear weapons states, not acknowledging India as a nuclear power.
As for the "corrective measures" India can take in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies, those against the deal in the US and those for it in India have interpreted this phrase as granting India de facto right to block some of its civilian nuclear facilities from IAEA oversight in order to employ the same for fissile weapons material manufacture. The IAEA text does not provide such licence
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Contesting this belief, Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy Research says, "corrective measures" is merely a "cosmetic reference" in the preamble of the Agreement, which in fact denies India the right to take any such measures. Pointing to the 123 agreement with the US which instead of granting
India the right to take corrective measures in the event of fuel supply disruption, merely said New Delhi should seek such a right with the IAEA, Chellaney says "no such right has been secured in definable terms" in the agreement.
The preamble says<b>, "India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." Asserting it is a question of "may" and not "shall",</b> Chellaney says India has no "legal entitlement."
<b>Indeed, while the text dwells at length on the make-up of the safeguards regime complete with IAEA inspections and reports, it does not elaborate on India's rights in case of fuel disruption</b>. What is apparent instead is that under the safeguards agreement India will find it difficult, if not impossible, to walk away from its non-proliferation commitments
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<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>At a whopping cost of 1.2 million euro annually for each facility -- India will open up 14 facilities -- India has committed a high price, albeit to be shared by the IAEA. </span>
In effect, Chellaney feels "India has agreed to be subject to rigorous safeguards, not the token inspections the IAEA carries out in nuclear weapon states."
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Moron Singh really sold India.
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->While supporters of the deal have looked for "concessions" in the draft, the fine print reveals that the Agreement will pin India to a strict non-proliferation regime with stringent action in case of default. Additionally, while the text is specific about IAEA safeguards in perpetuity, it holds little assurance for India on fuel supply in perpetuity.
Unlike the impression created in July 2005 -- that the IAEA would accord special status to India with India-specific safeguards -- the Agreement in its current form strongly resembles all such accords with non-nuclear weapons states, not acknowledging India as a nuclear power.
As for the "corrective measures" India can take in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies, those against the deal in the US and those for it in India have interpreted this phrase as granting India de facto right to block some of its civilian nuclear facilities from IAEA oversight in order to employ the same for fissile weapons material manufacture. The IAEA text does not provide such licence
...........
Contesting this belief, Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Centre for Policy Research says, "corrective measures" is merely a "cosmetic reference" in the preamble of the Agreement, which in fact denies India the right to take any such measures. Pointing to the 123 agreement with the US which instead of granting
India the right to take corrective measures in the event of fuel supply disruption, merely said New Delhi should seek such a right with the IAEA, Chellaney says "no such right has been secured in definable terms" in the agreement.
The preamble says<b>, "India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." Asserting it is a question of "may" and not "shall",</b> Chellaney says India has no "legal entitlement."
<b>Indeed, while the text dwells at length on the make-up of the safeguards regime complete with IAEA inspections and reports, it does not elaborate on India's rights in case of fuel disruption</b>. What is apparent instead is that under the safeguards agreement India will find it difficult, if not impossible, to walk away from its non-proliferation commitments
.........
<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>At a whopping cost of 1.2 million euro annually for each facility -- India will open up 14 facilities -- India has committed a high price, albeit to be shared by the IAEA. </span>
In effect, Chellaney feels "India has agreed to be subject to rigorous safeguards, not the token inspections the IAEA carries out in nuclear weapon states."
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Moron Singh really sold India.