<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->An unorthodox look at the nuclear deal
18 Jul 2008, 1551 hrs IST, Bhasker Roy
From the very beginning, the Indo-US nuclear deal has been embroiled in controversies, charges and counter-charges, debates over the issues of national security and provocations directly or indirectly from interested power centers abroad.
The India-US joint statement on the deal and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's statement to Parliament in 2005 was certainly not clear enough for the people to comprehend clearly how much was being given away and what was being received in return. Questions were raised not only among the retired community of nuclear scientists in India, but also among those serving.
Trying to get around the opacity surrounding the deal from July 2005, many questions arose.
While the government in India kept things under a wrap, the Americans began leaking elements of the agreement to their hardline non-proliferation lobby which was determined to ensure by some means that India was forced to roll back its nuclear weapons and missile programmes.
Although India enjoys an internationally impeccable record on proliferation, leaks to the US media from the Bush administration insinuated that Indian scientists have been helping Iran in its weapons programme. There were one or two Indian nuclear scientists who had earlier been with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who, after retirement, had taken up consultancy assignments with Iran's nuclear establishment. There was nothing secret about their activities. They were experts on âsafetyâ of nuclear plants, not enrichment facilities. The nuclear industry is a very wide spectrum of specialised sectors and one does not overlap with the other.
The efforts of the non-proliferation lobby failed. This lobby, which played a major role in the Democratic administration of President Clinton condemning the 1998 nuclear tests, had their supporters in the Republican Bush administration, too. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) headed by Dr. David Albright, a former UN Inspector in Iraq, played no small role in trying to depict India as a proliferator and accusing it of illegally acquiring nuclear weapons technology from abroad.
The position adopted by the US non-proliferation lobby under the Clinton administration following the Pokhran-II nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998 need to be seen against their position on Pakistan-China and Pakistan-North Korea nuclear and missile technology proliferations.
For years, the American administration at the highest level refused to make a determination of the China-Pakistan proliferation channel, including Chinese supply of M-11 nuclear capable missiles in 1990-92. The US intelligence, the CIA, had the smoking gun evidence on the M-11 missiles transferred to Pakistan and kept at the Sargoda airbase, but President George Bush Sr. ignored the evidence.
Skipping to a more recent frame, there was very little criticism and protests from the Washington anti-proliferation group led by people like Einhorn, when Libya decided to come clean on its nuclear programme and handed over all connected documents and items to the USA. This was the unraveling of the infamous nuclear proliferation network headed by Pakistani scientist A Q Khan. Khan had been very close to Chinese and North Korean nuclear and missile establishments. The surrendered Libyan documents included manuals in Chinese script. The blame was put squarely on one individual, Dr.Khan. And Dr. Khan, a hero of Pakistan, remains without any international access to question him.
<b>
No questions really asked by the US lobby</b>
Following India's May, 1998 nuclear tests the Clinton administration and China joined hands to try and force India to roll back its nuclear programme. During his visit to China that year President Clinton handed over the ombudsmanship of South Asia to China. This was published by China's official news agency, Xinhua. But the American media accompanying Clinton knew nothing about it.
Following the Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan followed with tests at the end of May. The demand from China was that India destroy its nuclear capabilities first and Pakistan would follow only after that, since India tested first. The Chinese and the American lobby concealed the fact that Pakistan had the bomb five years before India fabricated its own. The first Pakistani bomb was tested in China's Lop Nor nuclear testing site.
<b>
All this is known. Then why the anti-India charade?</b>
Indian scientists and analysts have not forgotten US actions following the 1998 nuclear tests. Indian scientists and engineers working in the USA under bilateral agreements were bundled out of the country over night. Indian scientists were also blacklisted from visiting the US even for international conferences.
In the initial stages of the nuclear deal negotiations the signals from the USA were anything but assuring. Statements from US officials competent to comment on the deal declared that the deal was aimed to defang India's nuclear weapons programmes. This, combined with whatever came out on the civil-military separation plan, suggested that the Indian programme was quietly being strangulated to death through this deal.
It is not news that every US administration has had its fair share of anti-elements who stood on shaky high moral grounds to condemn India, and looked away from blatant proliferation by Pakistan and China.
An Indian apprehension was what would be the fate of India's three-stage programme using thorium. This process would require enriched uranium to start with to produce plutonium, and electrical power. India has one of the largest deposits of thorium in the world. And the Indian Thorium technology is also the most advanced in the world. The IAEA and the concerned countries are well aware of this achievement. Once India's thorium programme is under way, and there is no reason why it should not by 2014, the cut off year for separation, India could shake off external pressures. There is enough natural uranium available in the country and more deposits may be discovered, to get the thorium route through. What is required is increase in the budget to get things going, instead of cutting the AEC budget.
<b>
The legalities and IAEA draft</b>
The Hyde Act enacted by the US Congress to guide the US policy towards India covering the deal contains strong elements of not only intrusive US coverage of India's nuclear programme, but also forces India to toe Washington's foreign policy. For example, how can the US President determine how much natural uranium India mines every year unless India signs a subservient agreement with the USA to provide such information? Or, will the US intelligence efforts in India be primed to such levels to collect all information on the Indian nuclear programme? There are other such articles in the technical areas that have the potential to demolish India's indigenous minimum nuclear deterrent programme.
On the political side, the Hyde act tries to bind India to US foreign policy, especially on Iran. This aims to reduce India to a US puppet, and subjugates India's foreign policy to the subservience of Washington. It was not so long ago that the US exerted substantial pressure on the NDA government led by Prime Minister Vajpayee to send troops to Iraq. New Delhi did not comply, but only after some heated debates inside the government.
A look at the 123 Agreement with the USA on the nuclear deal, and read with the draft safeguard agreement with the IAEA released on July 8 after initialing, suggests certain important parameters have changed for the better.
It may dismay many that neither the 123 Agreement nor the IAEA draft agreement and additional protocol says explicitly that India is a âde jureâ nuclear state. But both the â123â Agreement and the IAEA draft give enough indications that India is a de facto nuclear power. Both texts stick closely to the premise the issue is civilian nuclear cooperation on energy only. Both make it clear they are not concerned what India does with its indigenously acquired nuclear technology and material, and stretches it to the extent the two agreements are not concerned beyond the purview of the 123 Agreement. Neither text discusses India's weapons programme. The IAEA text acknowledges India as a state with advanced nuclear technology.
The IAEA text also notes India's rights to build strategic fuel reserves for its civilian nuclear reactors for their lifetime. If there is breakdown in supplies, the IAEA will assist to the best of its ability. Finally, if nothing works, it is up to India to take steps, according to its sovereign rights.
This has wide interpretations. In such agreements, when a situation is reached action is taken. Safeguards in perpetuity are not god's own words. All agreements have two sides i.e. reciprocal actions. Safeguard in perpetuity is directly linked to supply of fuel in perpetuity.
Another aspect of the IAEA draft is that while all foreign acquired components and material under the agreement will automatically go under safeguards, for indigenously built facilities, it is up to India to decide. Also, it would be for India to decide which of its indigenously built nuclear power plants would be listed in the IAEA for safeguards. It is to be noted the IAEA draft agreement appendices for the purpose of listing, are blank. There are more negotiations with IAEA which the USA will take up for special protocol.
Returning to the Hyde Act which is US national law, it is supposed to supercede all other agreements and joint statements. But according to the Geneva Convention on Agreements, agreements between two sovereign nations stand by themselves. But it is also known that the US has increasingly demonstrated its scant respect for international laws and agreements. The Hyde Act is a problem India has to live with. But it necessarily is not the sword of Damocles. And India is no pushover as it proved its resilience and strength following the US sanctions post Pokhran-II. It is interest that guides policies.<b>
Both the 123 Agreement and the IAEA draft refer to national laws of each country as operative elements in the deal. This is a critical aspect and needs to be acted upon by India. The Indian government much enact its own laws through Parliament to protect its indigenous nuclear assets, without loss of time. The Act must be retroactive to ensure that no external laws have any influence on national assets or national policies. The Atomic Energy Act needs to be revisited to attend to new developments.</b>
<b>
The politics</b>
Unfortunately, the nuclear deal has shown up the dirty underbelly of Indian politics. Almost every political party big, small or tiny wants bounties in a manner which has nothing to do with the merits of the deal itself. To support the beleaguered Congress on the confidence vote on July 22 in Parliament on this specific issue one party is demanding a separate state, another wants to settle scores on corporate loyalty; and a third on the protection of its state's fishermen. A grand old man eyes the Prime Ministerial chair. The interest of the country almost does not figure anywhere. Such is the sorry state of affairs.
There is another much more serious aspect: the external dimensions and its compatibility with some political sections inside the country. The national conscience must ask the question: if the deal is so bad for India, why is there so much opposition from abroad especially from the centers that have been traditionally inimical to India's growth and development, and aspirations to become a world power commensurate with its natural endowments?
One of the most emphatic opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal came from China. Beijing has argued variously both officially and through its propaganda institutions, that Pakistan should be given the same access to nuclear technology as India through a similar 123 Agreement, and that giving access to India will disturb the power balance in South Asia and lead to an arms race.
China is acutely aware that the 123 Agreement will not only add to India's energy security but also help retrieve it from the nuclear apartheid hole. China has also complained the US was helping India to join the nuclear weapons club through the back door. It is also aware that once the deal goes through, doors to technology that were closed to India following Pokhran-I in 1974 and Pokhran-II in 1998, would open up gradually. There is not only US technology but technology from other advanced countries of the world which could assist India's development in the civilian areas.
It may not be out of place to mention that while Chinese propaganda periodically depicts the US as an imperialist country, in its bilateral relationship with the US it officially discards any ideological or political label. After all, it signed a 123 Agreement with USA last year as a nuclear weapons state.
The Left Front in India has steadfastly opposed the deal on the grounds that India was entering into a deal with the âUS imperialistsâ and bartering away its independent foreign policy. The CPM has hardly ever seriously come out with the demerits of the nuclear deal, except quoting from some retired scientists.
It is to be noted with serious concern that the Left Front, especially the CPM central leadership, has been loath at criticising China's anti-India policies and diplomacy, including the Chinese official attack on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Arunachal Pradesh. Not a word has come out from the Left Front on China's repeated violations of the 1993 and 1996 Confidence Building Measures (CBM) agreements between India and China on the borders.
What is the Left Front up to, especially a few leaders of the CPM at the central level? Their position on the nuclear deal is bereft of any national sovereignty reasons. The bottom line of their position, wittingly or unwittingly, is the same as Chinese opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal!
<b>
Prognosis</b>
There is still a long way to go for the Indo-US nuclear deal to be culminated. The IAEA Board vote has to be overcome. Since a majority vote clears the IAEA agreement, India is reasonably safe to go through. But the NSG clearance is another issue. It is a consensus decision. Even one dissenting member of this 45-member group can kill the entire process. China is unlikely to be a lone member to oppose the deal, especially since Russia, France, UK and especially the US are in favour. If it can club together a European opposition group, that would be a different matter.
But the whole issue can be attacked politically through quiet diplomatic interactions. If the government loses the Parliament vote on July 22, NSG members could be influenced by interested parties that since the majority in India is opposed to the deal there is no need to endorse it in the NSG.
The ball is now in the court of the Indian political parties. They must respond to differentiate between their narrow political interests and that of national interest. India is on the steps of becoming a big power. The nuclear deal is much larger than âimperialismâ or even civilian nuclear energy. It is an imprimatur for a proud and resurgent India.
The ingredients of the nuclear deal have traveled a long way since July 17, 2005. Many adjustments have taken place. In this avatar of the deal, the BJP can take credit since it started the negotiations. The CPM, on the other hand, can choose to walk on the same road as their position during the independence movement and the 1962 India-China border war.
Having said the foregoing, a serious note of caution is not unwarranted. The Americans are not saints. With its strong urge to control the world, getting into an âally trapâ would be a windfall for them, and a disaster for India. An eye must always be kept on the negative aspects of the Hyde Act, and work accordingly in the interest of the nation, independent of all pressures.
Guard against China, which is disturbed at India getting the deal under the current conditions. Be alert to Chinese penetration of the Indian intelligentsia and politics. They already appear to have penetrated to an extent.
Ensure greater bilateral coordination with the G-8 members, but do not discard non-alignment and nurture the developing relations with the others. Simultaneously, concentrate urgently on âdevelopmentâ and âsecurityâ concurrently. This should be the core of India's foreign policy.
(Bhasker Roy is a foreign policy expert)
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18 Jul 2008, 1551 hrs IST, Bhasker Roy
From the very beginning, the Indo-US nuclear deal has been embroiled in controversies, charges and counter-charges, debates over the issues of national security and provocations directly or indirectly from interested power centers abroad.
The India-US joint statement on the deal and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's statement to Parliament in 2005 was certainly not clear enough for the people to comprehend clearly how much was being given away and what was being received in return. Questions were raised not only among the retired community of nuclear scientists in India, but also among those serving.
Trying to get around the opacity surrounding the deal from July 2005, many questions arose.
While the government in India kept things under a wrap, the Americans began leaking elements of the agreement to their hardline non-proliferation lobby which was determined to ensure by some means that India was forced to roll back its nuclear weapons and missile programmes.
Although India enjoys an internationally impeccable record on proliferation, leaks to the US media from the Bush administration insinuated that Indian scientists have been helping Iran in its weapons programme. There were one or two Indian nuclear scientists who had earlier been with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) who, after retirement, had taken up consultancy assignments with Iran's nuclear establishment. There was nothing secret about their activities. They were experts on âsafetyâ of nuclear plants, not enrichment facilities. The nuclear industry is a very wide spectrum of specialised sectors and one does not overlap with the other.
The efforts of the non-proliferation lobby failed. This lobby, which played a major role in the Democratic administration of President Clinton condemning the 1998 nuclear tests, had their supporters in the Republican Bush administration, too. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) headed by Dr. David Albright, a former UN Inspector in Iraq, played no small role in trying to depict India as a proliferator and accusing it of illegally acquiring nuclear weapons technology from abroad.
The position adopted by the US non-proliferation lobby under the Clinton administration following the Pokhran-II nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998 need to be seen against their position on Pakistan-China and Pakistan-North Korea nuclear and missile technology proliferations.
For years, the American administration at the highest level refused to make a determination of the China-Pakistan proliferation channel, including Chinese supply of M-11 nuclear capable missiles in 1990-92. The US intelligence, the CIA, had the smoking gun evidence on the M-11 missiles transferred to Pakistan and kept at the Sargoda airbase, but President George Bush Sr. ignored the evidence.
Skipping to a more recent frame, there was very little criticism and protests from the Washington anti-proliferation group led by people like Einhorn, when Libya decided to come clean on its nuclear programme and handed over all connected documents and items to the USA. This was the unraveling of the infamous nuclear proliferation network headed by Pakistani scientist A Q Khan. Khan had been very close to Chinese and North Korean nuclear and missile establishments. The surrendered Libyan documents included manuals in Chinese script. The blame was put squarely on one individual, Dr.Khan. And Dr. Khan, a hero of Pakistan, remains without any international access to question him.
<b>
No questions really asked by the US lobby</b>
Following India's May, 1998 nuclear tests the Clinton administration and China joined hands to try and force India to roll back its nuclear programme. During his visit to China that year President Clinton handed over the ombudsmanship of South Asia to China. This was published by China's official news agency, Xinhua. But the American media accompanying Clinton knew nothing about it.
Following the Indian nuclear tests, Pakistan followed with tests at the end of May. The demand from China was that India destroy its nuclear capabilities first and Pakistan would follow only after that, since India tested first. The Chinese and the American lobby concealed the fact that Pakistan had the bomb five years before India fabricated its own. The first Pakistani bomb was tested in China's Lop Nor nuclear testing site.
<b>
All this is known. Then why the anti-India charade?</b>
Indian scientists and analysts have not forgotten US actions following the 1998 nuclear tests. Indian scientists and engineers working in the USA under bilateral agreements were bundled out of the country over night. Indian scientists were also blacklisted from visiting the US even for international conferences.
In the initial stages of the nuclear deal negotiations the signals from the USA were anything but assuring. Statements from US officials competent to comment on the deal declared that the deal was aimed to defang India's nuclear weapons programmes. This, combined with whatever came out on the civil-military separation plan, suggested that the Indian programme was quietly being strangulated to death through this deal.
It is not news that every US administration has had its fair share of anti-elements who stood on shaky high moral grounds to condemn India, and looked away from blatant proliferation by Pakistan and China.
An Indian apprehension was what would be the fate of India's three-stage programme using thorium. This process would require enriched uranium to start with to produce plutonium, and electrical power. India has one of the largest deposits of thorium in the world. And the Indian Thorium technology is also the most advanced in the world. The IAEA and the concerned countries are well aware of this achievement. Once India's thorium programme is under way, and there is no reason why it should not by 2014, the cut off year for separation, India could shake off external pressures. There is enough natural uranium available in the country and more deposits may be discovered, to get the thorium route through. What is required is increase in the budget to get things going, instead of cutting the AEC budget.
<b>
The legalities and IAEA draft</b>
The Hyde Act enacted by the US Congress to guide the US policy towards India covering the deal contains strong elements of not only intrusive US coverage of India's nuclear programme, but also forces India to toe Washington's foreign policy. For example, how can the US President determine how much natural uranium India mines every year unless India signs a subservient agreement with the USA to provide such information? Or, will the US intelligence efforts in India be primed to such levels to collect all information on the Indian nuclear programme? There are other such articles in the technical areas that have the potential to demolish India's indigenous minimum nuclear deterrent programme.
On the political side, the Hyde act tries to bind India to US foreign policy, especially on Iran. This aims to reduce India to a US puppet, and subjugates India's foreign policy to the subservience of Washington. It was not so long ago that the US exerted substantial pressure on the NDA government led by Prime Minister Vajpayee to send troops to Iraq. New Delhi did not comply, but only after some heated debates inside the government.
A look at the 123 Agreement with the USA on the nuclear deal, and read with the draft safeguard agreement with the IAEA released on July 8 after initialing, suggests certain important parameters have changed for the better.
It may dismay many that neither the 123 Agreement nor the IAEA draft agreement and additional protocol says explicitly that India is a âde jureâ nuclear state. But both the â123â Agreement and the IAEA draft give enough indications that India is a de facto nuclear power. Both texts stick closely to the premise the issue is civilian nuclear cooperation on energy only. Both make it clear they are not concerned what India does with its indigenously acquired nuclear technology and material, and stretches it to the extent the two agreements are not concerned beyond the purview of the 123 Agreement. Neither text discusses India's weapons programme. The IAEA text acknowledges India as a state with advanced nuclear technology.
The IAEA text also notes India's rights to build strategic fuel reserves for its civilian nuclear reactors for their lifetime. If there is breakdown in supplies, the IAEA will assist to the best of its ability. Finally, if nothing works, it is up to India to take steps, according to its sovereign rights.
This has wide interpretations. In such agreements, when a situation is reached action is taken. Safeguards in perpetuity are not god's own words. All agreements have two sides i.e. reciprocal actions. Safeguard in perpetuity is directly linked to supply of fuel in perpetuity.
Another aspect of the IAEA draft is that while all foreign acquired components and material under the agreement will automatically go under safeguards, for indigenously built facilities, it is up to India to decide. Also, it would be for India to decide which of its indigenously built nuclear power plants would be listed in the IAEA for safeguards. It is to be noted the IAEA draft agreement appendices for the purpose of listing, are blank. There are more negotiations with IAEA which the USA will take up for special protocol.
Returning to the Hyde Act which is US national law, it is supposed to supercede all other agreements and joint statements. But according to the Geneva Convention on Agreements, agreements between two sovereign nations stand by themselves. But it is also known that the US has increasingly demonstrated its scant respect for international laws and agreements. The Hyde Act is a problem India has to live with. But it necessarily is not the sword of Damocles. And India is no pushover as it proved its resilience and strength following the US sanctions post Pokhran-II. It is interest that guides policies.<b>
Both the 123 Agreement and the IAEA draft refer to national laws of each country as operative elements in the deal. This is a critical aspect and needs to be acted upon by India. The Indian government much enact its own laws through Parliament to protect its indigenous nuclear assets, without loss of time. The Act must be retroactive to ensure that no external laws have any influence on national assets or national policies. The Atomic Energy Act needs to be revisited to attend to new developments.</b>
<b>
The politics</b>
Unfortunately, the nuclear deal has shown up the dirty underbelly of Indian politics. Almost every political party big, small or tiny wants bounties in a manner which has nothing to do with the merits of the deal itself. To support the beleaguered Congress on the confidence vote on July 22 in Parliament on this specific issue one party is demanding a separate state, another wants to settle scores on corporate loyalty; and a third on the protection of its state's fishermen. A grand old man eyes the Prime Ministerial chair. The interest of the country almost does not figure anywhere. Such is the sorry state of affairs.
There is another much more serious aspect: the external dimensions and its compatibility with some political sections inside the country. The national conscience must ask the question: if the deal is so bad for India, why is there so much opposition from abroad especially from the centers that have been traditionally inimical to India's growth and development, and aspirations to become a world power commensurate with its natural endowments?
One of the most emphatic opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal came from China. Beijing has argued variously both officially and through its propaganda institutions, that Pakistan should be given the same access to nuclear technology as India through a similar 123 Agreement, and that giving access to India will disturb the power balance in South Asia and lead to an arms race.
China is acutely aware that the 123 Agreement will not only add to India's energy security but also help retrieve it from the nuclear apartheid hole. China has also complained the US was helping India to join the nuclear weapons club through the back door. It is also aware that once the deal goes through, doors to technology that were closed to India following Pokhran-I in 1974 and Pokhran-II in 1998, would open up gradually. There is not only US technology but technology from other advanced countries of the world which could assist India's development in the civilian areas.
It may not be out of place to mention that while Chinese propaganda periodically depicts the US as an imperialist country, in its bilateral relationship with the US it officially discards any ideological or political label. After all, it signed a 123 Agreement with USA last year as a nuclear weapons state.
The Left Front in India has steadfastly opposed the deal on the grounds that India was entering into a deal with the âUS imperialistsâ and bartering away its independent foreign policy. The CPM has hardly ever seriously come out with the demerits of the nuclear deal, except quoting from some retired scientists.
It is to be noted with serious concern that the Left Front, especially the CPM central leadership, has been loath at criticising China's anti-India policies and diplomacy, including the Chinese official attack on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Arunachal Pradesh. Not a word has come out from the Left Front on China's repeated violations of the 1993 and 1996 Confidence Building Measures (CBM) agreements between India and China on the borders.
What is the Left Front up to, especially a few leaders of the CPM at the central level? Their position on the nuclear deal is bereft of any national sovereignty reasons. The bottom line of their position, wittingly or unwittingly, is the same as Chinese opposition to the Indo-US nuclear deal!
<b>
Prognosis</b>
There is still a long way to go for the Indo-US nuclear deal to be culminated. The IAEA Board vote has to be overcome. Since a majority vote clears the IAEA agreement, India is reasonably safe to go through. But the NSG clearance is another issue. It is a consensus decision. Even one dissenting member of this 45-member group can kill the entire process. China is unlikely to be a lone member to oppose the deal, especially since Russia, France, UK and especially the US are in favour. If it can club together a European opposition group, that would be a different matter.
But the whole issue can be attacked politically through quiet diplomatic interactions. If the government loses the Parliament vote on July 22, NSG members could be influenced by interested parties that since the majority in India is opposed to the deal there is no need to endorse it in the NSG.
The ball is now in the court of the Indian political parties. They must respond to differentiate between their narrow political interests and that of national interest. India is on the steps of becoming a big power. The nuclear deal is much larger than âimperialismâ or even civilian nuclear energy. It is an imprimatur for a proud and resurgent India.
The ingredients of the nuclear deal have traveled a long way since July 17, 2005. Many adjustments have taken place. In this avatar of the deal, the BJP can take credit since it started the negotiations. The CPM, on the other hand, can choose to walk on the same road as their position during the independence movement and the 1962 India-China border war.
Having said the foregoing, a serious note of caution is not unwarranted. The Americans are not saints. With its strong urge to control the world, getting into an âally trapâ would be a windfall for them, and a disaster for India. An eye must always be kept on the negative aspects of the Hyde Act, and work accordingly in the interest of the nation, independent of all pressures.
Guard against China, which is disturbed at India getting the deal under the current conditions. Be alert to Chinese penetration of the Indian intelligentsia and politics. They already appear to have penetrated to an extent.
Ensure greater bilateral coordination with the G-8 members, but do not discard non-alignment and nurture the developing relations with the others. Simultaneously, concentrate urgently on âdevelopmentâ and âsecurityâ concurrently. This should be the core of India's foreign policy.
(Bhasker Roy is a foreign policy expert)
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