<b> Missing the wood for the trees</b>
N. Ravi
On balance, it becomes clear that the advantages overwhelmingly outweigh any threat or flaw and the nuclear deal is as good a deal as any government can negotiate.
The vote in the Lok Sabha on July 22 is historic for the reason that it is the closest Parliament has come to the ratification of a treaty, and for the first time a government has staked its survival on a single issue but with wide ramifications for energy security, access to technology and foreign policy. Because the Constitution does not require ratification on the reasoning that a government entering into a treaty can in any case survive only if it enjoys the confidence of Parliament, governments typically have come before Parliament with statements and explanations on international agreements they have signed. On occasion there have been debates on the agreements but not a vote. In the circumstances, the only way a parliamentary majority which opposes an agreement can voice its disapproval is by voting out the government itself â a drastic step that would be resorted to only when emotions run high and the opposition is strong.
The question that is often raised in the current context is this: whether the nuclear deal is so important for the government to stake its very survival on it, considering its fairly impressive record in other areas including the policy framework that has made possible continued high growth rates â now dimmed somewhat by inflation â its pro-poor policies, notably the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, the farm loan waiver and initiatives in health and education, and transparency in government through the Right to Information Act. Seen purely from the standpoint of the electoral prospects of the Congress party and the United Progressive Alliance it leads, the deal may not quite be seen as a winner, particularly in the context of its presumed impact on minority votes. If one were to consider the deal from the standpoint of national interest â defined narrowly here as greatly advantageous, with the benefits substantially, if not overwhelmingly, balancing out any drawbacks â the answer would seem to be very different. It would be vastly different too if the question were to be turned on its head: whether the deal is so flawed, dangerous and unacceptable as to vote the government out.
In the no holds barred battle for the numbers, there is the danger that the merits of the nuclear deal would be overshadowed by other issues that have cropped up including the means â overt or hidden, promised or delivered â used to gather support, peripheral issues such as the naming of an airport or regional demands. Over the past three years, there has been a vigorous debate with little convergence or agreement on its merits both in and outside Parliament. Given the fundamental differences and the Leftâs opposition to any type of nuclear deal with the United States, discussions in the UPA-Left coordination committee on the finer points of the agreement would seem to have been farcical and no more than an exercise on both sides to buy time, hoping for some dramatic, new development. From the standpoint of the government, that development came in the form of the 39-member Samajwadi Partyâs unexpected change of heart.
Now that it has come to this pass with the government deciding to go ahead with the deal and putting its majority to test, it is important that Parliament keep the focus on the deal, its advantages and flaws. The deal itself needs to be seen as what it is primarily: an agreement to shore up energy security and gain access to nuclear and high technology, with transformative effects on foreign policy.
There is first its impact on the countryâs energy needs, which becomes a critical consideration given the high oil prices touching $140 and more a barrel and the imperative of maintaining high growth rates into the future. The national nuclear programme has been functioning in isolation for the last three decades since Pokhran I and with heightened restrictions since Pokhran II of 1998. Hamstrung by the non-availability of uranium and denial of access to international technology, generation capacity even now remains at a little over 3,000 MW as against the target of 10,000 MW set for 2000, with the result that upstart wind power has overtaken it in terms of contribution to the total power needs. Uranium shortage has become so serious that even the low installed capacity is being operated at just 40 to 50 per cent. The target set for 2020 is 20,000 MW but it is hard to see how it can be achieved under the present technology denial regime. On the other hand, the nuclear deal will secure access to equipment and uranium from the United States as well as from countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom and make it possible to not just meet this target but even double it to 40,000 MW. While there would still be several imponderables, its potential impact on the countryâs long term development would be far reaching and tremendous. Whether only the economist in the Prime Minister sees this advantage and whether the gain would be too far out into the future for others to appreciate remains to be seen.
The second advantage is that it will gain India access to high technology â to larger capacity reactors, for instance, and to monitoring and safety technology. The nuclear establishment will be able to participate in international collaborative research on thermonuclear reactors and the new fourth generation reactors as well that could offer significant advantages in the future. The countryâs three stage nuclear programme that will ultimately use the plentiful resources of thorium for power generation will also benefit from access to foreign technology. The intangible advantages of visits, collaboration and exchanges among scientists would be of great value as well. In return, the civilian reactors would be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards but the strategic nuclear weapons programme would remain separate and outside the safeguards regime.
In the face of these advantages, some of the objections raised by critics seem quite peripheral and even trivial. There is, for instance, the criticism that technological cooperation will remain less than full unless the U.S. were to amend its laws to permit export of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water technology. Or that arrangements for reprocessing the spent fuel imported from the U.S. have still to be negotiated when reprocessing becomes necessary, though within a time span of one year. The more substantive objections, however, are basically two.
The first is the Leftâs view that the deal will take India into a closer strategic partnership with the U.S. which would mark a departure from the independent foreign policy line agreed to in the national common minimum programme. It is well thought out and articulated objective of the Prime Minister that closer relations with the U.S. are essential in a globalised world where it controls the levers of economic and technological power. Nobody can really object to better relations as such but the question is whether closer relations would lead to the blind following of the U.S. line. Here, even if one were to dismiss the governmentâs declaration that it will not swerve from an independent foreign policy as rhetoric, two other factors seem to hold some assurance. One is the historical background and practical realities of policy making where given the pressures at work âthe views of the Muslim minority, for instance, when dealing with Israel â it will be very difficult for any government to effect a drastic change of course. The second is that, as articulated by Dr. Manmohan Singh, following the U.S. other nations too will feel the need to come to terms with a new and rising India, or as he put it, the deal will open new doors in other capitals. Thus a deal with the U.S. is an essential first step towards diversifying cooperation and entering into similar deals with other nuclear suppliers such as Russia, France and the U.K.
The second objection from the BJP at the other end of the political spectrum is that the deal will compromise Indiaâs strategic autonomy and it will become virtually impossible to carry out another nuclear explosion. As of now, the government is committed in the deal to continuing with the policy of voluntary restraint on further nuclear explosions that was propounded by the NDA regime after Pokhran II. It will be naïve to imagine, however, that any explosion quite apart from being ill advised and untenable can be totally cost free or that nuclear cooperation would still continue as usual. The deal, however, seeks to minimise the cost of such explosions in the unlikely event of a government resorting to it through such arrangements as building up a strategic fuel reserve to overcome sudden supply stoppages, a multi-stage dialogue process to try to sort out issues before resort to drastic steps such as a cut off of supplies and some leeway for international developments such as explosions by another country in the neighbourhood. On balance, it becomes clear that the advantages overwhelmingly outweigh any threat or flaw and it is as good a deal as any government can negotiate. Were the country to miss this chance, it will be an uphill task for any future government to resurrect the deal with a new administration in Washington.
N. Ravi
On balance, it becomes clear that the advantages overwhelmingly outweigh any threat or flaw and the nuclear deal is as good a deal as any government can negotiate.
The vote in the Lok Sabha on July 22 is historic for the reason that it is the closest Parliament has come to the ratification of a treaty, and for the first time a government has staked its survival on a single issue but with wide ramifications for energy security, access to technology and foreign policy. Because the Constitution does not require ratification on the reasoning that a government entering into a treaty can in any case survive only if it enjoys the confidence of Parliament, governments typically have come before Parliament with statements and explanations on international agreements they have signed. On occasion there have been debates on the agreements but not a vote. In the circumstances, the only way a parliamentary majority which opposes an agreement can voice its disapproval is by voting out the government itself â a drastic step that would be resorted to only when emotions run high and the opposition is strong.
The question that is often raised in the current context is this: whether the nuclear deal is so important for the government to stake its very survival on it, considering its fairly impressive record in other areas including the policy framework that has made possible continued high growth rates â now dimmed somewhat by inflation â its pro-poor policies, notably the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, the farm loan waiver and initiatives in health and education, and transparency in government through the Right to Information Act. Seen purely from the standpoint of the electoral prospects of the Congress party and the United Progressive Alliance it leads, the deal may not quite be seen as a winner, particularly in the context of its presumed impact on minority votes. If one were to consider the deal from the standpoint of national interest â defined narrowly here as greatly advantageous, with the benefits substantially, if not overwhelmingly, balancing out any drawbacks â the answer would seem to be very different. It would be vastly different too if the question were to be turned on its head: whether the deal is so flawed, dangerous and unacceptable as to vote the government out.
In the no holds barred battle for the numbers, there is the danger that the merits of the nuclear deal would be overshadowed by other issues that have cropped up including the means â overt or hidden, promised or delivered â used to gather support, peripheral issues such as the naming of an airport or regional demands. Over the past three years, there has been a vigorous debate with little convergence or agreement on its merits both in and outside Parliament. Given the fundamental differences and the Leftâs opposition to any type of nuclear deal with the United States, discussions in the UPA-Left coordination committee on the finer points of the agreement would seem to have been farcical and no more than an exercise on both sides to buy time, hoping for some dramatic, new development. From the standpoint of the government, that development came in the form of the 39-member Samajwadi Partyâs unexpected change of heart.
Now that it has come to this pass with the government deciding to go ahead with the deal and putting its majority to test, it is important that Parliament keep the focus on the deal, its advantages and flaws. The deal itself needs to be seen as what it is primarily: an agreement to shore up energy security and gain access to nuclear and high technology, with transformative effects on foreign policy.
There is first its impact on the countryâs energy needs, which becomes a critical consideration given the high oil prices touching $140 and more a barrel and the imperative of maintaining high growth rates into the future. The national nuclear programme has been functioning in isolation for the last three decades since Pokhran I and with heightened restrictions since Pokhran II of 1998. Hamstrung by the non-availability of uranium and denial of access to international technology, generation capacity even now remains at a little over 3,000 MW as against the target of 10,000 MW set for 2000, with the result that upstart wind power has overtaken it in terms of contribution to the total power needs. Uranium shortage has become so serious that even the low installed capacity is being operated at just 40 to 50 per cent. The target set for 2020 is 20,000 MW but it is hard to see how it can be achieved under the present technology denial regime. On the other hand, the nuclear deal will secure access to equipment and uranium from the United States as well as from countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom and make it possible to not just meet this target but even double it to 40,000 MW. While there would still be several imponderables, its potential impact on the countryâs long term development would be far reaching and tremendous. Whether only the economist in the Prime Minister sees this advantage and whether the gain would be too far out into the future for others to appreciate remains to be seen.
The second advantage is that it will gain India access to high technology â to larger capacity reactors, for instance, and to monitoring and safety technology. The nuclear establishment will be able to participate in international collaborative research on thermonuclear reactors and the new fourth generation reactors as well that could offer significant advantages in the future. The countryâs three stage nuclear programme that will ultimately use the plentiful resources of thorium for power generation will also benefit from access to foreign technology. The intangible advantages of visits, collaboration and exchanges among scientists would be of great value as well. In return, the civilian reactors would be placed under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards but the strategic nuclear weapons programme would remain separate and outside the safeguards regime.
In the face of these advantages, some of the objections raised by critics seem quite peripheral and even trivial. There is, for instance, the criticism that technological cooperation will remain less than full unless the U.S. were to amend its laws to permit export of enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water technology. Or that arrangements for reprocessing the spent fuel imported from the U.S. have still to be negotiated when reprocessing becomes necessary, though within a time span of one year. The more substantive objections, however, are basically two.
The first is the Leftâs view that the deal will take India into a closer strategic partnership with the U.S. which would mark a departure from the independent foreign policy line agreed to in the national common minimum programme. It is well thought out and articulated objective of the Prime Minister that closer relations with the U.S. are essential in a globalised world where it controls the levers of economic and technological power. Nobody can really object to better relations as such but the question is whether closer relations would lead to the blind following of the U.S. line. Here, even if one were to dismiss the governmentâs declaration that it will not swerve from an independent foreign policy as rhetoric, two other factors seem to hold some assurance. One is the historical background and practical realities of policy making where given the pressures at work âthe views of the Muslim minority, for instance, when dealing with Israel â it will be very difficult for any government to effect a drastic change of course. The second is that, as articulated by Dr. Manmohan Singh, following the U.S. other nations too will feel the need to come to terms with a new and rising India, or as he put it, the deal will open new doors in other capitals. Thus a deal with the U.S. is an essential first step towards diversifying cooperation and entering into similar deals with other nuclear suppliers such as Russia, France and the U.K.
The second objection from the BJP at the other end of the political spectrum is that the deal will compromise Indiaâs strategic autonomy and it will become virtually impossible to carry out another nuclear explosion. As of now, the government is committed in the deal to continuing with the policy of voluntary restraint on further nuclear explosions that was propounded by the NDA regime after Pokhran II. It will be naïve to imagine, however, that any explosion quite apart from being ill advised and untenable can be totally cost free or that nuclear cooperation would still continue as usual. The deal, however, seeks to minimise the cost of such explosions in the unlikely event of a government resorting to it through such arrangements as building up a strategic fuel reserve to overcome sudden supply stoppages, a multi-stage dialogue process to try to sort out issues before resort to drastic steps such as a cut off of supplies and some leeway for international developments such as explosions by another country in the neighbourhood. On balance, it becomes clear that the advantages overwhelmingly outweigh any threat or flaw and it is as good a deal as any government can negotiate. Were the country to miss this chance, it will be an uphill task for any future government to resurrect the deal with a new administration in Washington.