10-01-2004, 03:50 AM
Book Review:
The Telegraph, 10/01/2004.....
THE RAJ IN A NUTSHELL
Denis Judd attempts an overview of 400 years of British imperialism in India in 200 pages â following the long duree approach that is quite rare in Indian historiography.
Judd disagrees with that section of imperial historiographers who claim that the Empire was an economic and strategic burden on Britain. He challenges the interpretation that India dragged Britain down and prevented London from concentrating on the crucial European arena.
Judd asserts that for economic, political, military and psychological reasons, India was valuable to the British Empire. About 60 per cent of the Empireâs inhabitants were Indians. Indiaâs military manpower in the form of the Sepoy Army guarded British imperial interests all over the world.
Contradicting the theory that India was not an important market for British industrial goods, Judd writes that from the late 16th century, Britain was interested in establishing commercial contacts with the subcontinent because of its fabulous riches. In the Victorian era, 19 per cent of British exports went to India and hundreds of millions of pounds were invested in the subcontinent.
About the motives of imperialism, Judd is non-committal. The British traders wanted money but they had no clear programme for establishing an imperium in India. The role of the metropolitan capitalists is not emphasized. However, Judd does not corroborate the other extreme view that the empire was acquired in a fit of absentmindedness. <b>He feels that the ambitions of the likes of Governor-General Wellesley and the power vacuum following the disintegration of the Mughal empire were behind the steady expansion of the Empire in India.</b>
Judd is clear about one point. <b>The British never wanted to devolve power to the Indians. Following John Gallagherâs argument, Judd writes that the so-called concessions, such as the Morley-Minto reforms and the Government of India Act 1935, were attempts to split the national movement by driving a wedge between provincial interests and the central leadership. Another technique was to increase the Hindu-Muslim divide. Judd does not accept the colonizerâs role as that of a night-watchman. He also feels that the pan-Indian Congress had the capability to shake the raj. World War II weakened Britain at the global level. The only option for London was to quit. </b>The decision to divide India, writes Judd, was only at Jinnahâs insistence.
Judd writes that the imperial encounter registered a mixed response from both sides. Negative traits like corruption were imbibed by the British. However, a handful of raj officials had respect for Indiaâs pre-colonial culture. The Indians shared a love-hate relationship with their masters, respecting the latterâs imperial achievements on the one hand, and hated the sahibs for ruling India on the other.
Had Judd taken up a particular issue of the British Indian Empire (for instance, state formation or economy or strategy), then his book would have been more valuable. Nevertheless, The Lion and the Tiger remains a must-read for undergraduate students, and a refreshing primer for the experts.
KAUSHIK ROY
The Telegraph, 10/01/2004.....
THE RAJ IN A NUTSHELL
Denis Judd attempts an overview of 400 years of British imperialism in India in 200 pages â following the long duree approach that is quite rare in Indian historiography.
Judd disagrees with that section of imperial historiographers who claim that the Empire was an economic and strategic burden on Britain. He challenges the interpretation that India dragged Britain down and prevented London from concentrating on the crucial European arena.
Judd asserts that for economic, political, military and psychological reasons, India was valuable to the British Empire. About 60 per cent of the Empireâs inhabitants were Indians. Indiaâs military manpower in the form of the Sepoy Army guarded British imperial interests all over the world.
Contradicting the theory that India was not an important market for British industrial goods, Judd writes that from the late 16th century, Britain was interested in establishing commercial contacts with the subcontinent because of its fabulous riches. In the Victorian era, 19 per cent of British exports went to India and hundreds of millions of pounds were invested in the subcontinent.
About the motives of imperialism, Judd is non-committal. The British traders wanted money but they had no clear programme for establishing an imperium in India. The role of the metropolitan capitalists is not emphasized. However, Judd does not corroborate the other extreme view that the empire was acquired in a fit of absentmindedness. <b>He feels that the ambitions of the likes of Governor-General Wellesley and the power vacuum following the disintegration of the Mughal empire were behind the steady expansion of the Empire in India.</b>
Judd is clear about one point. <b>The British never wanted to devolve power to the Indians. Following John Gallagherâs argument, Judd writes that the so-called concessions, such as the Morley-Minto reforms and the Government of India Act 1935, were attempts to split the national movement by driving a wedge between provincial interests and the central leadership. Another technique was to increase the Hindu-Muslim divide. Judd does not accept the colonizerâs role as that of a night-watchman. He also feels that the pan-Indian Congress had the capability to shake the raj. World War II weakened Britain at the global level. The only option for London was to quit. </b>The decision to divide India, writes Judd, was only at Jinnahâs insistence.
Judd writes that the imperial encounter registered a mixed response from both sides. Negative traits like corruption were imbibed by the British. However, a handful of raj officials had respect for Indiaâs pre-colonial culture. The Indians shared a love-hate relationship with their masters, respecting the latterâs imperial achievements on the one hand, and hated the sahibs for ruling India on the other.
Had Judd taken up a particular issue of the British Indian Empire (for instance, state formation or economy or strategy), then his book would have been more valuable. Nevertheless, The Lion and the Tiger remains a must-read for undergraduate students, and a refreshing primer for the experts.
KAUSHIK ROY