Nuclear Thread - 4

[acharya]

<b>Indo-US nuclear deal bad for global nuclear restraint’</b>

* Stimson Centre co-founder predicts upgrading of New Delhi’s nuclear forces will require more nuclear testing
* Says India a responsible state, has shown great restraint by testing nuclear weapons less than 10 times

By Khalid Hasan

WASHINGTON: The Bush administration has obliged India by relaxing commercial constraints without asking for meaningful steps to strengthen global non-proliferation norms, especially India’s signature on the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), according to Stimson Centre co-founder Michael Krepon.
He writes in a commentary that President Bush’s decision to bring India into the mainstream of nuclear commerce while facilitating its ability to serve as a counterweight to China was a bold, game-changing move. The upgrading of New Delhi’s nuclear forces will almost certainly require more nuclear testing, he predicts. By endorsing the United States-India deal, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) can therefore become complicit in undermining non-proliferation norms they were designed to uphold. Congress, which was unable to oppose the political appeal of the nuclear deal, at least sought to erect firewalls to make it harder for a future government of India to resume testing. Congress, for its part, made clear that the benefits it was about to bestow would be cut off if India resumed testing. It also endorsed an amendment proposed by Barack Obama expressing US policy against India’s accumulation of a fuel bank to guard against disruption of supply, since the most likely reason for disruption would be a resumption of testing. Instead, fuel would be provided on an as-needed basis, consistent with safe nuclear power operations.
According to Krepon, the Bush administration and the government of India have colluded to weaken these constraints. The “123 agreement” implementing the US-India deal as well as the draft agreement now before the IAEA’s Board of Governors include language reflecting New Delhi’s demand for a nuclear fuel bank. By incorporating this language, the IAEA can become an enabler to the resumption of nuclear testing, first by India, and then by Pakistan. The consequences of the US-India deal for the NSG could be even more adverse. The NSG is the only global cartel ever established to prevent profit-taking - when proliferation would result. Prior US administrations have worked hard to establish this norm, which is reinforced by a consensus rule for the NSG’s decision making. This structure could be hollowed out by the US-India deal. Russian, French and the US firms stand to make significant profits providing India with the fuel bank that the Congress has identified as a key problem with the proposed deal. By placing profits ahead of proliferation, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council - the most essential guardians of the NPT - will become accomplices to its weakening.

Restraint:

Krepon writes, “India is a responsible state possessing nuclear weapons. It has shown great restraint by testing these devices less than ten times. Just one of these tests was claimed to be a thermonuclear device – a high-yield weapon that would be carried on long-range missiles, like those India is developing to deter China. No state has ever perfected a thermonuclear device on the basis of a single test, and the data from India’s lone test suggest that it may not have been a complete success. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has been very forthright in stating that the nuclear deal would in no way constrain New Delhi’s right to resume testing. India is not a party to the NPT and it is one of the only 14 states that have not signed the CTBT. If India decides to test again, so be it. But the bulwarks of the global non-proliferation system should not become complicit in this decision. If so, the negative consequences of another game-changing decision by the Bush administration will be greatly compounded. The damage arising from this deal can be limited by making it harder for a future Indian government to resume nuclear testing.”