08-03-2008, 01:44 AM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin--><b>Sellout at Vienna? </b>
Pioneer.com
Shobori Ganguli | New Delhi
India in all-duty-no-rights bind
With India only two steps short of a servile accession to the global non-proliferation regime, it is now clear that its sovereign right to enhance its nuclear weapons programme stands seriously challenged. Â
It is also clear that India's dealings with the Nuclear Suppliers Group will be technically conducted in the capacity of a non-nuclear weapons State, inviting sanctions if it proliferates.
While it was evident from the start - 18 July, 2005, to be precise - that the Indo-US nuclear deal would de facto bring India under the NPT regime, it is only now that the documents the Manmohan Singh Government has signed along the way prove how alarmingly close India is to submitting its national security to a nuclear bazaar governed by the insulated P-5 club.
In a nutshell, even if the bilateral nuclear deal with the US comes apart in case India conducts further tests, it will be impossible for it to deal with other members of the NSG, bound as they are by the international nuclear watchdog, the IAEA.
This was precisely the submission fiercely resisted by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998, immediately after Pokhran. While Vajpayee had indicated India's commitment to complete global disarmament - India had declared a self-imposed moratorium on future tests - he had refused to sign the draconian CTBT that would have placed India under the NPT regime as a non-nuclear weapons state and posed a threat to national security.
<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>Terming the NPT a "discriminatory and flawed treaty," Vajpayee had said: "In any event we cannot join the NPT regime as a non-nuclear weapon power when the fact is that we are a nuclear weapon power."</span>
This came amid noises from the US that India's security requirements are best served without nuclear capability. Then US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott even went to the extent of saying, "We do not, and will not, concede even by implication that India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear weapons states under the NPT." Vajpayee's response: "We are a nuclear power State. It is not a gift from anyone."
<b>Now that India stands on the verge of signing an Additional Protocol with the IAEA to access the nuclear bazaar on conditions that clearly show India's accession to the NPT regime as a non-nuclear power state, the Vajpayee Government's strategic victory in 2000 appears wasted.</b>
The UPA Government took the first step towards this in August 2007 when India and the US sealed the bilateral nuclear deal. While the Agreement underlines the US "commitment to reliable fuel supply to India," it is silent on the fact that the deal is governed by a domestic American legislation, the Hyde Act, specifically formalised for the Indo-US deal.
Although the UPA Government is at pains to explain that the Act is a domestic law not binding on India, the Act clearly says the US would deem India a fit partner only if it "has a foreign policy congruent to that of the US and is working with the US in key foreign policy initiatives related to non-proliferation."
While the former clause impinges on India's foreign policy sovereignty to deal with countries like Iran, the latter is a veiled threat in case India tests nuclear weapons. In effect, despite assurances of "uninterrupted fuel supply", the US reserves the right to withdraw from the deal unilaterally leaving India high and dry.
<b>The second step came on July 9, 2008 when India finalised the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, a step which placed India under a more binding international regime than the bilateral deal with the US</b>.
While Manmohan Singh repeatedly promised the country an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA the formalised text resembled all such accords with non-nuclear weapons states.
<b>Pinning India to a strict non-proliferation regime with stringent action in case of default, the text is specific about IAEA safeguards in perpetuity but holds little assurance for India on fuel supply in perpetuity.</b>
India is, indeed, allowed to take some undefined "corrective measures" in the event of disruption in fuel supplies. But the text does not provide for such license. The document dwells at length on the safeguards regime complete with IAEA inspections and reports but does not elaborate on India's rights incase of fuel disruption.
<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>What it certainly does is to make it impossible for India to walk away from its non-proliferation commitments. </span>
That India has now opened itself to stringent IAEA safeguards, unsure fuel supplies and possible sanctions in the event of non-compliance with non-proliferation norms is evident in the Additional Protocol that India will have to sign with the IAEA.
<span style='color:red'><b>This signature would bind India to inspections in both "declared and undeclared" nuclear facilities at the IAEA's will if it determines that India is violating international non-proliferation norms in any way. </b></span>
These would be far more stringent than the token inspections conducted by the IAEA in nuclear weapons states, in effect, making a mockery of the much-touted "separation plan." Unlike the five declared nuclear weapons powers, India will not have the luxury of testing further nuclear weapons in case of a changed security environment.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
Pioneer.com
Shobori Ganguli | New Delhi
India in all-duty-no-rights bind
With India only two steps short of a servile accession to the global non-proliferation regime, it is now clear that its sovereign right to enhance its nuclear weapons programme stands seriously challenged. Â
It is also clear that India's dealings with the Nuclear Suppliers Group will be technically conducted in the capacity of a non-nuclear weapons State, inviting sanctions if it proliferates.
While it was evident from the start - 18 July, 2005, to be precise - that the Indo-US nuclear deal would de facto bring India under the NPT regime, it is only now that the documents the Manmohan Singh Government has signed along the way prove how alarmingly close India is to submitting its national security to a nuclear bazaar governed by the insulated P-5 club.
In a nutshell, even if the bilateral nuclear deal with the US comes apart in case India conducts further tests, it will be impossible for it to deal with other members of the NSG, bound as they are by the international nuclear watchdog, the IAEA.
This was precisely the submission fiercely resisted by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 1998, immediately after Pokhran. While Vajpayee had indicated India's commitment to complete global disarmament - India had declared a self-imposed moratorium on future tests - he had refused to sign the draconian CTBT that would have placed India under the NPT regime as a non-nuclear weapons state and posed a threat to national security.
<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>Terming the NPT a "discriminatory and flawed treaty," Vajpayee had said: "In any event we cannot join the NPT regime as a non-nuclear weapon power when the fact is that we are a nuclear weapon power."</span>
This came amid noises from the US that India's security requirements are best served without nuclear capability. Then US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott even went to the extent of saying, "We do not, and will not, concede even by implication that India and Pakistan have established themselves as nuclear weapons states under the NPT." Vajpayee's response: "We are a nuclear power State. It is not a gift from anyone."
<b>Now that India stands on the verge of signing an Additional Protocol with the IAEA to access the nuclear bazaar on conditions that clearly show India's accession to the NPT regime as a non-nuclear power state, the Vajpayee Government's strategic victory in 2000 appears wasted.</b>
The UPA Government took the first step towards this in August 2007 when India and the US sealed the bilateral nuclear deal. While the Agreement underlines the US "commitment to reliable fuel supply to India," it is silent on the fact that the deal is governed by a domestic American legislation, the Hyde Act, specifically formalised for the Indo-US deal.
Although the UPA Government is at pains to explain that the Act is a domestic law not binding on India, the Act clearly says the US would deem India a fit partner only if it "has a foreign policy congruent to that of the US and is working with the US in key foreign policy initiatives related to non-proliferation."
While the former clause impinges on India's foreign policy sovereignty to deal with countries like Iran, the latter is a veiled threat in case India tests nuclear weapons. In effect, despite assurances of "uninterrupted fuel supply", the US reserves the right to withdraw from the deal unilaterally leaving India high and dry.
<b>The second step came on July 9, 2008 when India finalised the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, a step which placed India under a more binding international regime than the bilateral deal with the US</b>.
While Manmohan Singh repeatedly promised the country an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA the formalised text resembled all such accords with non-nuclear weapons states.
<b>Pinning India to a strict non-proliferation regime with stringent action in case of default, the text is specific about IAEA safeguards in perpetuity but holds little assurance for India on fuel supply in perpetuity.</b>
India is, indeed, allowed to take some undefined "corrective measures" in the event of disruption in fuel supplies. But the text does not provide for such license. The document dwells at length on the safeguards regime complete with IAEA inspections and reports but does not elaborate on India's rights incase of fuel disruption.
<span style='font-size:14pt;line-height:100%'>What it certainly does is to make it impossible for India to walk away from its non-proliferation commitments. </span>
That India has now opened itself to stringent IAEA safeguards, unsure fuel supplies and possible sanctions in the event of non-compliance with non-proliferation norms is evident in the Additional Protocol that India will have to sign with the IAEA.
<span style='color:red'><b>This signature would bind India to inspections in both "declared and undeclared" nuclear facilities at the IAEA's will if it determines that India is violating international non-proliferation norms in any way. </b></span>
These would be far more stringent than the token inspections conducted by the IAEA in nuclear weapons states, in effect, making a mockery of the much-touted "separation plan." Unlike the five declared nuclear weapons powers, India will not have the luxury of testing further nuclear weapons in case of a changed security environment.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->