08-09-2008, 10:43 PM
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Germany
<b>Renaissance of Global Power Struggle</b>
By Matthias Rueb
Translated By Christiane Thieme
May 26, 2008
In the United States, a geostrategic discussion has resulted in two major conclusions: The âPacific Ageâ has begun, and the story is still far from being over. The two thoughts point directly at China. Both the field of science and politics agree that the Pacific world is shaping the 21st century, and that the political and economic focus of American foreign relations has slowly shifted from well-known Atlantic partners in Europe to still unknown giants in Asia.The dynamics of the political, economic, and demographic development in Asia requires an ever-increasing American attention and also offers more to the U.S. than does the somehow dowdy development in a, in many respects stagnant, Europe. Less explicit, however, is the magnitude of these new relations with the Pacific world, with the democratic partner India, with the medium-sized newly industrializing countries in this region, and especially with the enormous empire China.New Edition of the âBig World GameâBy the end of the Cold War, hope grew that world history would turn into some sort of historical entropy, in which all states would have a democratic and free-market focus and in which a mutual exchange would guarantee the prosperity and security of their citizens. However, by now, this hope has evaporated. Instead, world politics seem to be marked increasingly by a vivid competition between existing and rising global powers â a kind of renaissance of the global power struggle of the late 19th and early 20th century. One additional aspect of this new edition of the âBig World Gameâ is that national autocracy is growing more and more popular, as long as economic growth and domestic stability can be guaranteed.Based on these recent world political developments, the crucial question asked by American foreign policy makers if China is a strategic partner or a potential rival cannot be answered easily. During President Hu Jintaoâs first visit in Washington in April of 2006, host George W. Bush summarized the situation as following:âChina is a very important strategic friend and in many respects competes with us.â As partners in trade, China and the U.S. are so deeply interconnected that they are dependent on each other. American consumers are the eager buyers of an increasing variety of goods from Chinese production. With its large trade surplus, China finances a large chunk of the American national debt.Open confrontations are unusualAmerican investments as well as exports to China further strengthen the two nationsâ interdependence. Chinaâs steady economic growth depends heavily on the exports to and exchange with America. And because a consistent economic growth is Chinaâs major priority, Peking is often hesitant to evoke an open confrontation with Washington on international terrain.For example, China prefers to abstain from voting in the UN Security Council. Politically speaking, the economic giant stays in its corner for now. In general, the U.S. and China mostly agree on foreign political actions such as the attempt to denuclearize North Korea with diplomatic means.The rivalry between the incumbent and the aspiring superpower is first and foremost manifest in the current Taiwan situation. For years, China has been upgrading its navy, purchasing cruisers and submarines, and making significant progress in weapon technology.
The White House and the Pentagon observe these activities with growing concern, especially because Peking is concealing the actual expenditures for its armed forces.Military play of musclesWhile Washington militarily guarantees the factual independence of Taiwan, Peking considers Taiwan merely a renegade province. By demonstrating its military might in this affair, China took a first step toward the creation of a maritime zone of influence that would symbolize Chinaâs claim of power as well as secure its seafaring routes. It is projected that this zone will quickly expand to not only include the South and East Chinese and the Yellow Sea, but also the majority of the North Pacific Ocean. The open rivalry between Peking and Washington is also evident in the fight for natural resources, in which China not only focuses on the Near East, but also keeps a close eye on Latin America and Africa. The struggle furthermore underscores the drastic contradiction between American and Chinese world views. The painful experience of September 11, 2001 has taught Washington that stability, security, and prosperity around the world are unachievable in the long run without democracy. After the abatement of the democratic rebellion of 1989 in Tiananmen, China drew the very contrary conclusion that stability, security, and prosperity always take priority over potentially peace disturbing democracy.Its capitalistic success on the domestic and international level reinforces Chinaâs position. On the global stage, China acts just as it does at home: stability first, democracy last. And it is this attitude that could be the potential source for an epic war with a superpower whose mission it is to spread democracy and human rights throughout the world.
Germany - Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - Original Article (German)
Renaissance of Global Power Struggle
In the United States, a geostrategic discussion has resulted in two major conclusions: The âPacific Ageâ has begun, and the story is still far from being over. The two thoughts point directly at China. Both the field of science and politics agree that the Pacific world is shaping the 21st century, and that the political and economic focus of American foreign relations has slowly shifted from well-known Atlantic partners in Europe to still unknown giants in Asia.
The dynamics of the political, economic, and demographic development in Asia requires an ever-increasing American attention and also offers more to the U.S. than does the somehow dowdy development in a, in many respects stagnant, Europe. Less explicit, however, is the magnitude of these new relations with the Pacific world, with the democratic partner India, with the medium-sized newly industrializing countries in this region, and especially with the enormous empire China.
New Edition of the âBig World Gameâ
By the end of the Cold War, hope grew that world history would turn into some sort of historical entropy, in which all states would have a democratic and free-market focus and in which a mutual exchange would guarantee the prosperity and security of their citizens. However, by now, this hope has evaporated. Instead, world politics seem to be marked increasingly by a vivid competition between existing and rising global powers â a kind of renaissance of the global power struggle of the late 19th and early 20th century. One additional aspect of this new edition of the âBig World Gameâ is that national autocracy is growing more and more popular, as long as economic growth and domestic stability can be guaranteed.
Based on these recent world political developments, the crucial question asked by American foreign policy makers if China is a strategic partner or a potential rival cannot be answered easily. During President Hu Jintaoâs first visit in Washington in April of 2006, host George W. Bush summarized the situation as following:âChina is a very important strategic friend and in many respects competes with us.â
As partners in trade, China and the U.S. are so deeply interconnected that they are dependent on each other. American consumers are the eager buyers of an increasing variety of goods from Chinese production. With its large trade surplus, China finances a large chunk of the American national debt.
Open confrontations are unusual
American investments as well as exports to China further strengthen the two nationsâ interdependence. Chinaâs steady economic growth depends heavily on the exports to and exchange with America. And because a consistent economic growth is Chinaâs major priority, Peking is often hesitant to evoke an open confrontation with Washington on international terrain.
For example, China prefers to abstain from voting in the UN Security Council. Politically speaking, the economic giant stays in its corner for now. In general, the U.S. and China mostly agree on foreign political actions such as the attempt to denuclearize North Korea with diplomatic means.
The rivalry between the incumbent and the aspiring superpower is first and foremost manifest in the current Taiwan situation. For years, China has been upgrading its navy, purchasing cruisers and submarines, and making significant progress in weapon technology. The White House and the Pentagon observe these activities with growing concern, especially because Peking is concealing the actual expenditures for its armed forces.
Military play of muscles
While Washington militarily guarantees the factual independence of Taiwan, Peking considers Taiwan merely a renegade province. By demonstrating its military might in this affair, China took a first step toward the creation of a maritime zone of influence that would symbolize Chinaâs claim of power as well as secure its seafaring routes. It is projected that this zone will quickly expand to not only include the South and East Chinese and the Yellow Sea, but also the majority of the North Pacific Ocean.
<b>
The open rivalry between Peking and Washington is also evident in the fight for natural resources, in which China not only focuses on the Near East, but also keeps a close eye on Latin America and Africa. </b>The struggle furthermore underscores the drastic contradiction between American and Chinese world views. The painful experience of September 11, 2001 has taught Washington that stability, security, and prosperity around the world are unachievable in the long run without democracy. After the abatement of the democratic rebellion of 1989 in Tiananmen, China drew the very contrary conclusion that stability, security, and prosperity always take priority over potentially peace disturbing democracy.
Its capitalistic success on the domestic and international level reinforces Chinaâs position. On the global stage, China acts just as it does at home: stability first, democracy last. And it is this attitude that could be the potential source for an epic war with a superpower whose mission it is to spread democracy and human rights throughout the world.
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<b>Renaissance of Global Power Struggle</b>
By Matthias Rueb
Translated By Christiane Thieme
May 26, 2008
In the United States, a geostrategic discussion has resulted in two major conclusions: The âPacific Ageâ has begun, and the story is still far from being over. The two thoughts point directly at China. Both the field of science and politics agree that the Pacific world is shaping the 21st century, and that the political and economic focus of American foreign relations has slowly shifted from well-known Atlantic partners in Europe to still unknown giants in Asia.The dynamics of the political, economic, and demographic development in Asia requires an ever-increasing American attention and also offers more to the U.S. than does the somehow dowdy development in a, in many respects stagnant, Europe. Less explicit, however, is the magnitude of these new relations with the Pacific world, with the democratic partner India, with the medium-sized newly industrializing countries in this region, and especially with the enormous empire China.New Edition of the âBig World GameâBy the end of the Cold War, hope grew that world history would turn into some sort of historical entropy, in which all states would have a democratic and free-market focus and in which a mutual exchange would guarantee the prosperity and security of their citizens. However, by now, this hope has evaporated. Instead, world politics seem to be marked increasingly by a vivid competition between existing and rising global powers â a kind of renaissance of the global power struggle of the late 19th and early 20th century. One additional aspect of this new edition of the âBig World Gameâ is that national autocracy is growing more and more popular, as long as economic growth and domestic stability can be guaranteed.Based on these recent world political developments, the crucial question asked by American foreign policy makers if China is a strategic partner or a potential rival cannot be answered easily. During President Hu Jintaoâs first visit in Washington in April of 2006, host George W. Bush summarized the situation as following:âChina is a very important strategic friend and in many respects competes with us.â As partners in trade, China and the U.S. are so deeply interconnected that they are dependent on each other. American consumers are the eager buyers of an increasing variety of goods from Chinese production. With its large trade surplus, China finances a large chunk of the American national debt.Open confrontations are unusualAmerican investments as well as exports to China further strengthen the two nationsâ interdependence. Chinaâs steady economic growth depends heavily on the exports to and exchange with America. And because a consistent economic growth is Chinaâs major priority, Peking is often hesitant to evoke an open confrontation with Washington on international terrain.For example, China prefers to abstain from voting in the UN Security Council. Politically speaking, the economic giant stays in its corner for now. In general, the U.S. and China mostly agree on foreign political actions such as the attempt to denuclearize North Korea with diplomatic means.The rivalry between the incumbent and the aspiring superpower is first and foremost manifest in the current Taiwan situation. For years, China has been upgrading its navy, purchasing cruisers and submarines, and making significant progress in weapon technology.
The White House and the Pentagon observe these activities with growing concern, especially because Peking is concealing the actual expenditures for its armed forces.Military play of musclesWhile Washington militarily guarantees the factual independence of Taiwan, Peking considers Taiwan merely a renegade province. By demonstrating its military might in this affair, China took a first step toward the creation of a maritime zone of influence that would symbolize Chinaâs claim of power as well as secure its seafaring routes. It is projected that this zone will quickly expand to not only include the South and East Chinese and the Yellow Sea, but also the majority of the North Pacific Ocean. The open rivalry between Peking and Washington is also evident in the fight for natural resources, in which China not only focuses on the Near East, but also keeps a close eye on Latin America and Africa. The struggle furthermore underscores the drastic contradiction between American and Chinese world views. The painful experience of September 11, 2001 has taught Washington that stability, security, and prosperity around the world are unachievable in the long run without democracy. After the abatement of the democratic rebellion of 1989 in Tiananmen, China drew the very contrary conclusion that stability, security, and prosperity always take priority over potentially peace disturbing democracy.Its capitalistic success on the domestic and international level reinforces Chinaâs position. On the global stage, China acts just as it does at home: stability first, democracy last. And it is this attitude that could be the potential source for an epic war with a superpower whose mission it is to spread democracy and human rights throughout the world.
Germany - Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung - Original Article (German)
Renaissance of Global Power Struggle
In the United States, a geostrategic discussion has resulted in two major conclusions: The âPacific Ageâ has begun, and the story is still far from being over. The two thoughts point directly at China. Both the field of science and politics agree that the Pacific world is shaping the 21st century, and that the political and economic focus of American foreign relations has slowly shifted from well-known Atlantic partners in Europe to still unknown giants in Asia.
The dynamics of the political, economic, and demographic development in Asia requires an ever-increasing American attention and also offers more to the U.S. than does the somehow dowdy development in a, in many respects stagnant, Europe. Less explicit, however, is the magnitude of these new relations with the Pacific world, with the democratic partner India, with the medium-sized newly industrializing countries in this region, and especially with the enormous empire China.
New Edition of the âBig World Gameâ
By the end of the Cold War, hope grew that world history would turn into some sort of historical entropy, in which all states would have a democratic and free-market focus and in which a mutual exchange would guarantee the prosperity and security of their citizens. However, by now, this hope has evaporated. Instead, world politics seem to be marked increasingly by a vivid competition between existing and rising global powers â a kind of renaissance of the global power struggle of the late 19th and early 20th century. One additional aspect of this new edition of the âBig World Gameâ is that national autocracy is growing more and more popular, as long as economic growth and domestic stability can be guaranteed.
Based on these recent world political developments, the crucial question asked by American foreign policy makers if China is a strategic partner or a potential rival cannot be answered easily. During President Hu Jintaoâs first visit in Washington in April of 2006, host George W. Bush summarized the situation as following:âChina is a very important strategic friend and in many respects competes with us.â
As partners in trade, China and the U.S. are so deeply interconnected that they are dependent on each other. American consumers are the eager buyers of an increasing variety of goods from Chinese production. With its large trade surplus, China finances a large chunk of the American national debt.
Open confrontations are unusual
American investments as well as exports to China further strengthen the two nationsâ interdependence. Chinaâs steady economic growth depends heavily on the exports to and exchange with America. And because a consistent economic growth is Chinaâs major priority, Peking is often hesitant to evoke an open confrontation with Washington on international terrain.
For example, China prefers to abstain from voting in the UN Security Council. Politically speaking, the economic giant stays in its corner for now. In general, the U.S. and China mostly agree on foreign political actions such as the attempt to denuclearize North Korea with diplomatic means.
The rivalry between the incumbent and the aspiring superpower is first and foremost manifest in the current Taiwan situation. For years, China has been upgrading its navy, purchasing cruisers and submarines, and making significant progress in weapon technology. The White House and the Pentagon observe these activities with growing concern, especially because Peking is concealing the actual expenditures for its armed forces.
Military play of muscles
While Washington militarily guarantees the factual independence of Taiwan, Peking considers Taiwan merely a renegade province. By demonstrating its military might in this affair, China took a first step toward the creation of a maritime zone of influence that would symbolize Chinaâs claim of power as well as secure its seafaring routes. It is projected that this zone will quickly expand to not only include the South and East Chinese and the Yellow Sea, but also the majority of the North Pacific Ocean.
<b>
The open rivalry between Peking and Washington is also evident in the fight for natural resources, in which China not only focuses on the Near East, but also keeps a close eye on Latin America and Africa. </b>The struggle furthermore underscores the drastic contradiction between American and Chinese world views. The painful experience of September 11, 2001 has taught Washington that stability, security, and prosperity around the world are unachievable in the long run without democracy. After the abatement of the democratic rebellion of 1989 in Tiananmen, China drew the very contrary conclusion that stability, security, and prosperity always take priority over potentially peace disturbing democracy.
Its capitalistic success on the domestic and international level reinforces Chinaâs position. On the global stage, China acts just as it does at home: stability first, democracy last. And it is this attitude that could be the potential source for an epic war with a superpower whose mission it is to spread democracy and human rights throughout the world.
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