08-15-2008, 04:30 AM
India set to lose nuclear freedom
Shobori Ganguli
<i>US exemption draft with NSG places country permanently under NPT regime</i>
With a week to go before the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) starts deliberating on India's future in the global nuclear market, the draft US exemption proposal submitted to NSG chair Germany last week irrevocably places India under the global non-proliferation regime, robbing it of its nuclear independence.
Barring a cosmetic relaxation in a provision of the NSG Guidelines -- that it will not be brought under the IAEA's "comprehensive safeguards" -- India has been unsparingly placed under the non-proliferation norms of the NSG.
Seeking to "limit the further spread of nuclear weapons", the draft underlines the NSG's resolve, "to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the non-proliferation commitments and actions of those outside the traditional nuclear non-proliferation regime".
Lauding India for the steps it has taken "voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime", the draft says India's "non-proliferation commitments" include "continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and declaring its readiness with others towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty." In effect, India's sovereign and unilaterally imposed self-ban on further tests is being turned into a multilateral agreement.
On the face of it, India seems to have got concession on a key provision in the NSG guidelines, which calls for full-scope or "comprehensive safeguards" on all its nuclear facilities. The case being made out is that in India's case the civilian-military separation plan acknowledges the "special status" it has been seeking at the NSG.
However, barring concessions on paragraphs 4(a), 4 (b) and 4 © of Part 1 and 4(b) of Part 2 of the NSG guidelines, the draft says India will be allowed nuclear imports "for peaceful purposes for use in civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions" of Part 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines. These provisions, which essentially cover non-nuclear weapons states continue to bind India to its commitment to non-proliferation, including a moratorium on testing.
"What was 'unilateral' is to become a requirement for civil nuclear cooperation with other states. The implication treating India as a non-nuclear weapons state and implicitly of 'multilateralising' its unilateral test moratorium is that India will face a supply cut-off if it ever dared to test, leaving its imported power reactors high and dry," says strategic affairs expert Brahma Chellaney. He asserts that Part 2 of the guidelines "incorporates a presumption of denial of reprocessing and enrichment equipment and technology even under safeguards".
Seen alongside the 123 agreement and the Hyde Act, the draft effectively places India under the CTBT, turning a bilateral provision with the US into a requirement at a multilateral level. The Hyde Act unambiguously states that the US can scrap the deal in the event of India's non-compliance with non-proliferation norms. The draft at the NSG takes this bilateral non-proliferation requirement to a multilateral realm.
Part 3 of the draft says regular channels of communication will be established "on matters connected with the implementation of the (NSG) Guidelines, taking into account relevant international commitments and bilateral agreements with India." While compliance with the NSG's non-proliferation guidelines is an "international commitment" imposed on India, the "bilateral agreements" point to the 123 agreement India has signed with the US. Again, the draft holds India up to its commitment to "sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol (with the IAEA) with respect to India's civil nuclear facilities." While placing India under IAEA safeguards is only a corollary to any such multilateral agreement, it must be borne in mind that the Additional Protocol can be highly invasive because the IAEA reserves the right to conduct inspections on any nuclear facility "safeguarded or unsafeguarded" if it suspects a country of violating the non-proliferation code.
The US has also bought itself an insurance cover in the Hyde Act if at a future date the NSG were to redefine its guidelines. "No item subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG may be transferred to India if such transfer would be inconsistent with the guidelines in effect on the date of the transfer," the Hyde Act specifies.
"The implications for India entering into cooperation on the basis of unilateral adherence to the NSG guidelines is that this cartel could change its guidelines in the future to impose new conditions on India and India would have no recourse after having invested billions of dollars in imported reactors," feels Chellaney.
As for amendments to the NSG Guidelines, the draft takes away from India more than what it gives. Underlining India's non-member status at the NSG it says, "The NSG Chair is requested to review proposed amendments to the Guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments as a non-member may wish to make." The operational part of this clause, however, is that while India's comments may be welcome, "participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India." The keyword is "implementation," consultations not necessarily arming India with decision-making.
Shobori Ganguli
<i>US exemption draft with NSG places country permanently under NPT regime</i>
With a week to go before the Nuclear Suppliers' Group (NSG) starts deliberating on India's future in the global nuclear market, the draft US exemption proposal submitted to NSG chair Germany last week irrevocably places India under the global non-proliferation regime, robbing it of its nuclear independence.
Barring a cosmetic relaxation in a provision of the NSG Guidelines -- that it will not be brought under the IAEA's "comprehensive safeguards" -- India has been unsparingly placed under the non-proliferation norms of the NSG.
Seeking to "limit the further spread of nuclear weapons", the draft underlines the NSG's resolve, "to pursue mechanisms to affect positively the non-proliferation commitments and actions of those outside the traditional nuclear non-proliferation regime".
Lauding India for the steps it has taken "voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime", the draft says India's "non-proliferation commitments" include "continuing its unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests and declaring its readiness with others towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty." In effect, India's sovereign and unilaterally imposed self-ban on further tests is being turned into a multilateral agreement.
On the face of it, India seems to have got concession on a key provision in the NSG guidelines, which calls for full-scope or "comprehensive safeguards" on all its nuclear facilities. The case being made out is that in India's case the civilian-military separation plan acknowledges the "special status" it has been seeking at the NSG.
However, barring concessions on paragraphs 4(a), 4 (b) and 4 © of Part 1 and 4(b) of Part 2 of the NSG guidelines, the draft says India will be allowed nuclear imports "for peaceful purposes for use in civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, provided that the transfer satisfies all other provisions" of Part 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines. These provisions, which essentially cover non-nuclear weapons states continue to bind India to its commitment to non-proliferation, including a moratorium on testing.
"What was 'unilateral' is to become a requirement for civil nuclear cooperation with other states. The implication treating India as a non-nuclear weapons state and implicitly of 'multilateralising' its unilateral test moratorium is that India will face a supply cut-off if it ever dared to test, leaving its imported power reactors high and dry," says strategic affairs expert Brahma Chellaney. He asserts that Part 2 of the guidelines "incorporates a presumption of denial of reprocessing and enrichment equipment and technology even under safeguards".
Seen alongside the 123 agreement and the Hyde Act, the draft effectively places India under the CTBT, turning a bilateral provision with the US into a requirement at a multilateral level. The Hyde Act unambiguously states that the US can scrap the deal in the event of India's non-compliance with non-proliferation norms. The draft at the NSG takes this bilateral non-proliferation requirement to a multilateral realm.
Part 3 of the draft says regular channels of communication will be established "on matters connected with the implementation of the (NSG) Guidelines, taking into account relevant international commitments and bilateral agreements with India." While compliance with the NSG's non-proliferation guidelines is an "international commitment" imposed on India, the "bilateral agreements" point to the 123 agreement India has signed with the US. Again, the draft holds India up to its commitment to "sign and adhere to an Additional Protocol (with the IAEA) with respect to India's civil nuclear facilities." While placing India under IAEA safeguards is only a corollary to any such multilateral agreement, it must be borne in mind that the Additional Protocol can be highly invasive because the IAEA reserves the right to conduct inspections on any nuclear facility "safeguarded or unsafeguarded" if it suspects a country of violating the non-proliferation code.
The US has also bought itself an insurance cover in the Hyde Act if at a future date the NSG were to redefine its guidelines. "No item subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG may be transferred to India if such transfer would be inconsistent with the guidelines in effect on the date of the transfer," the Hyde Act specifies.
"The implications for India entering into cooperation on the basis of unilateral adherence to the NSG guidelines is that this cartel could change its guidelines in the future to impose new conditions on India and India would have no recourse after having invested billions of dollars in imported reactors," feels Chellaney.
As for amendments to the NSG Guidelines, the draft takes away from India more than what it gives. Underlining India's non-member status at the NSG it says, "The NSG Chair is requested to review proposed amendments to the Guidelines with all non-member adherents on a non-discriminatory basis and solicit such comments on the amendments as a non-member may wish to make." The operational part of this clause, however, is that while India's comments may be welcome, "participation of India in the decisions regarding proposed amendments will facilitate their implementation by India." The keyword is "implementation," consultations not necessarily arming India with decision-making.