08-26-2008, 04:39 AM
<b>A harsh world for Russiaâs neighbours</b>
Published: August 22 2008 19:25 | Last updated: August 22 2008 19:25
The Georgian crisis has shown President Dmitry Medvedevâs Russia for what it is â an aggressive authoritarian power. The slim hope that he might soften the tough line set by his ex-KGB predecessor, Vladimir Putin, is gone. Prime minister Putin is the master and President Medvedev does his bidding.
The main foreign policy aim is to restore Russiaâs lost superpower status: by recovering its dominance in the ex-Soviet Union, exploiting its role as an energy supplier and boosting its say in world affairs.
The Georgian adventure has been a great success. Moscow has punished pro-west Tbilisi for trying to join Nato and humiliatingly exposed the limits of the westâs support for allies in the post-Soviet region. It has developed a tool â support for embattled ethnic minorities â which can be used elsewhere. The next target could be pro-west Ukraineâs Crimea, with its ethnic Russian majority and a Russian outpost in the leased naval port of Sevastopol. Even Belarus, the most pro-Moscow ex-Soviet state, is worried. So are Natoâs east European members like Poland, which has quickly signed a US missile defence deal.
The post-1989 opening of the ex-Communist world to western values and interests has suffered a big defeat. But all is not lost. First, the gains made in reducing Russian dominance are huge, with a swathe of new European Union and Nato members. Next, while oil-rich Russia is wealthy, it has deep-seated problems, not least a declining population. Finally, despite Georgia, the world is not yet in a new cold war. There is scope for co-operating with Russia, as well as containing its aggressive intentions.
The long list of issues for collaboration ranges from energy to nuclear non-proliferation. But the desire to work with Moscow must be matched by a clear response to Russian aggression. Natoâs mutual defence pledges should be backed by actions, such as building new forward bases in frontline countries, notably the Baltic states, and doing more to promote energy security.
But the alliance must take greater care over any further eastward expansion. Until now, the west has forced Russia to accept enlargement, betting (correctly) that Moscow was too weak to respond. Russia has shown that is no longer the case. The west should accept future new members, including Georgia and Ukraine, only if they are really ready to join and if Nato can really defend them. It cannot absorb states with violent internal conflicts (Georgia) or with deep splits over Nato (Ukraine).
This must not give Russia a veto over neighboursâ sovereign rights. Nor must it divide the region into spheres of influence. But countries that want to ally with the west will have to work harder to resist Russian pressure. And they can expect less western support than before. That is the painful reality, post Georgia.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008
Published: August 22 2008 19:25 | Last updated: August 22 2008 19:25
The Georgian crisis has shown President Dmitry Medvedevâs Russia for what it is â an aggressive authoritarian power. The slim hope that he might soften the tough line set by his ex-KGB predecessor, Vladimir Putin, is gone. Prime minister Putin is the master and President Medvedev does his bidding.
The main foreign policy aim is to restore Russiaâs lost superpower status: by recovering its dominance in the ex-Soviet Union, exploiting its role as an energy supplier and boosting its say in world affairs.
The Georgian adventure has been a great success. Moscow has punished pro-west Tbilisi for trying to join Nato and humiliatingly exposed the limits of the westâs support for allies in the post-Soviet region. It has developed a tool â support for embattled ethnic minorities â which can be used elsewhere. The next target could be pro-west Ukraineâs Crimea, with its ethnic Russian majority and a Russian outpost in the leased naval port of Sevastopol. Even Belarus, the most pro-Moscow ex-Soviet state, is worried. So are Natoâs east European members like Poland, which has quickly signed a US missile defence deal.
The post-1989 opening of the ex-Communist world to western values and interests has suffered a big defeat. But all is not lost. First, the gains made in reducing Russian dominance are huge, with a swathe of new European Union and Nato members. Next, while oil-rich Russia is wealthy, it has deep-seated problems, not least a declining population. Finally, despite Georgia, the world is not yet in a new cold war. There is scope for co-operating with Russia, as well as containing its aggressive intentions.
The long list of issues for collaboration ranges from energy to nuclear non-proliferation. But the desire to work with Moscow must be matched by a clear response to Russian aggression. Natoâs mutual defence pledges should be backed by actions, such as building new forward bases in frontline countries, notably the Baltic states, and doing more to promote energy security.
But the alliance must take greater care over any further eastward expansion. Until now, the west has forced Russia to accept enlargement, betting (correctly) that Moscow was too weak to respond. Russia has shown that is no longer the case. The west should accept future new members, including Georgia and Ukraine, only if they are really ready to join and if Nato can really defend them. It cannot absorb states with violent internal conflicts (Georgia) or with deep splits over Nato (Ukraine).
This must not give Russia a veto over neighboursâ sovereign rights. Nor must it divide the region into spheres of influence. But countries that want to ally with the west will have to work harder to resist Russian pressure. And they can expect less western support than before. That is the painful reality, post Georgia.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2008