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Book Review in Pioneer, 3 Sept 2008

<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Indian Armed Forces: In need of a Revolution

Indian Army: Vision 2020 comes as a timely reminder for decision makers and the military leadership to wake up and vitalise the Indian Armed Forces which essentially involves changes of mindset and doctrine as well as updating and replacement of weapons and equipment, says Anil Bhat

<b>Indian Army Vision 2020
Author:Gurmeet Kanwal
Publisher: HarperCollins with Observer Research Foundation
Price: Rs 495</b> 

The Indian Army over the past six decades has evolved from being an entity put together by the British from armies of various kingdoms in Indian history to a professional fighting force which has experienced conflict in all forms, terrains and temperatures. In fact it has set new records of fighting at altitudes and weather conditions never experienced by other armies in military history, but with one common factor - of "making do" with whatever it has had, which was never enough or new enough, compared to most of its adversaries. Stark examples are the first two wars after India's Independence; the first India-Pakistan war of 1947 and the Chinese Aggression of 1962, both of which were fought with an over half a century old rifle, with clothing far too inadequate for temperatures falling short of minus 50 degrees Celsius and redefined mountain warfare by battling at heights of up to at least 14,000 feet above sea level. Because the Western concept of mountains is limited to 8000 feet or so. Later, in the Siachen Glacier it learnt how to survive at up to 22,000 feet and in the Thar desert, how to move over fine sand with few roads and scant water as the mercury rises up to short of 50 degrees Celsius.

Thanks to a couple of hostile neighbours, the Indian Army has been in a state of some sort of conflict or the other, or long term deployment, at least for all the six decades so far. In addition to the external, it has also been actively involved with internal disturbances owing to the inability of state and central police organisations to tackle insurgencies and major flare-ups or also because some of the internal problems have external roots. Besides these, every year there are floods and other disasters, which the Armed Forces are always involved in reacting to, not only within the country but in neighbouring ones including, ironically, the hostile ones as well as distant countries. In the field of United Nations peacekeeping, India has been one of the most regular and substantial contributors. Since the early 1990s when the Indian Army was probably stretched to the maximum, the only commitments struck off are Sri Lanka, 'Khalistani' terrorism in Punjab and Nagaland, where a tenuous ceasefire has been on for over a decade. The peace process begun with Pakistan since early 2004, only reduced the daily border and Line of Control skirmishes, still often violated by Pakistan, but the terrorists trained or operating from there, are still very active not only in Jammu and Kashmir but spread throughout the country.

Despite the vast infrastructure under the Defence Ministry, including the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), public sector undertakings and Ordnance factories all over the country, all three Services have remained dependent, earlier on Soviet Russia for up to 70 per cent of their requirement of weapons and equipment, and now on other countries.

The further irony is that lack of strategic consciousness of the political leadership coupled with bureaucratic apathy, tight fisted and ever decreasing budgetary allocations, short command tenures of senior commanders along with a "play safe and no risk" attitude as well as the sheer inertia of decision makers have led to a degradation of fighting potential of an otherwise professional army with the best of soldiery.

Scientific progress, particularly in information technology on the one hand, fundamentalism and bigotry on the other as well as a global arms race gone "mad" (mutually assured destruction) with nuclear options as "deterrents", when "disarmament" remains but only a fashionable term in the academic and international relations circuit, new terminologies and forms of warfare have emerged with prefixes like cyber, psychological and asymmetric. Nuclear (also often clubbed with biological and chemical warfares), in addition to those already mentioned require for the armed forces of a country like India, facing two neighbours not only hostile as mentioned but nuclear armed too, to adopt new tactics, techniques and procedures.

Chapter 2 of the book, 'Threats, Challenges and Vulnerabilities,' spells out what all these three aspects amount to externally and internally for India. With all three prevailing in ample measure and the kind of responses, or sheer lack of appropriate ones, recent events in Kashmir Valley and Jammu should not come as a surprise, particularly following major changes in Pakistan since early 2008. Such kind of developments are all the more reason that the Indian Armed Forces should be properly and amply equipped as these are the kind of circumstances which increase the possibility of a war erupting. And God forbid, should that happen, no amount of blame-gaming or instituting of inquiry commissions is going to help.

The book comes as yet another timely reminder for decision makers and the military leadership to wake up and vitalise the process which essentially involves changes of mindset and doctrine as well as updating or replacement of weapons and equipment. While at least two decades of fighting increasing asymmetric counter insurgency/terrorism operations in Jammu and Kashmir and almost six decades in the North East have honed the Indian Army personnel - never found wanting in blood and guts and valour - their capabilitiy as seen in mechanised and mobile operations as in 1965 and 1971 has not been similarly tested again, except in limited forms during Exercise Brass Tacks and the unfought Operation Parakarm.

The political leadership and bureaucracy should be quite clear about the fact that a nation of India's size and diversity not only aspiring to be a regional power, but one which is rising as an economic one also, needs a very sound well-armed modern hi-tech war machine for sheer survival. If India is aiming for the big league, it better have the muscle to do so and with a mind to make good use of that muscle whenever and wherever necessary.

Gurmeet Kanwal has, over the next few chapters, enumerated and elaborated on the changes in various military operations, procedures and other aspects of warfare that have occurred in the past few decades and those which are expected to happen in the next decade or so at least. And having done so, he discusses options that India can and should go in for, provided of course that the necessary measures towards Revolution in Military Affairs have been implemented. The one major change from the mindset of the past six decades recommended for India is for it to adopt the offensive approach, rather than, almost always, defensive. (Examples of political will to exercise the offensive option - and succeeding - in 1971 against Pakistan; in the case of China, forceful retaliation at Nathu La, Sikkim, in 1967 and in Sumdorong Chu, Arunachal Pradesh in 1984 has stood India in good stead. It was only after such a retaliation that India could consider annexation of Sikkim, eventually done in 1975). Kanwal's analyses and recommendations merit serious attention and, better late than never, early implementation.

-- The reviewer is Editor, WordSword Features & Media

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