09-08-2008, 11:31 PM
The Indian Express reports
Quote
US says next aim is to make India 'full partner' in NSG
Agencies
Posted online: Monday, September 08, 2008 at 1614 hrs IST
New Delhi, September 8:
After working "tirelessly" for securing a waiver for India from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group for trade in the atomic energy, the US on Monday said its next aim is to make New Delhi a "full partner" in the nuclear cartel.
"President Bush, Secretary of State and the entire administration had worked tirelessly to ensure that India reached the stage where it has today in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)," Assistant Secretary (Market Access and Compliance) in the US Department of Commerce David Bohigian said in New Delhi.
Bohigian said Bush and the Congress administration would continue to work to "make India a full partner in this group (NSG) which we think is crucial... from a strategic, political, economic and energy standpoint".
He said the US administration would be working through the Congress and the Hyde Act to ensure 100 billion dollar market for American companies.
"The next step for the US (administration) will be working through the Congress and the Hyde Act and make sure that business opportunities will enable the US firms to stay in what is estimated to be 100 billion dollar market," the official said at a CII seminar.
He said atomic energy would play an important role for economic development of India. "When you look at the energy map of 2020 and beyond, certainly nuclear has a key role to play in India's growth which we welcome," Bohigian said.
According to industry body Assocham, about 40 companies, including Videocon, have already started talks with foreign firms to set up nuclear power plants envisaging a total investment of about Rs 2,00,000 crore in India.
"We have asked the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for amendments in the legislations to facilitate the entry of private sector in generation of nuclear power," Videocon group head Venugopal Dhoot said.
Unquote
Another interesting report from the same paper . Here the author appears to be quite ignorent of the complete sell out and disaster on the part of India. Please read on:-
Quote
Isnât just about n-trade, itâs about a rising India
C Raja Mohan
Posted online: Sunday, September 07, 2008 at 0119 hrs IST
Singapore, Septmeber 6
In lifting the three-and-a-half-decade-old nuclear blockade against India, the international community has come to terms with a rising India and its geopolitical consequences for the global order in the 21st century. That it was a wrenching decision for the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group and demanded unprecedented lobbying from the highest political levels in Washington and New Delhi, underlined the extraordinary scope of the issues at play.
Over the last three years, as India endlessly argued with itself the entry-price into the elite nuclear club that was outlined in the July 2005 agreement with the United States, its chattering classes refused to appreciate the kind of strategic readjustment that was being asked of the rest of the world â recognise Indiaâs nuclear exceptionalism, discard the notion of nuclear parity between New Delhi and Islamabad, and accept Indiaâs strategic equivalence with China.
All governments in New Delhi in recent decades have pursued these seemingly impossible national objectives. It is the Manmohan Singh government, however, that finally provided the long-awaited geopolitical breakthrough for India in partnership with US President George W. Bush.
That it took a lot of arm-twisting to silence the churlish white knights of the West and stop China from throwing a monkey wrench into the works highlighted the difficulties in getting the NSG to accept a change of nuclear rules painstakingly crafted over the last four decades, for India, and India alone.
The NSG was also asked to do this at a time when non-proliferation has emerged as one of the principal international security concerns and rules on high-technology transfers are being tightened against other countries.
Since its first atomic test, Pokharan I, in May 1974, India has been trapped in a no-manâs land or a ânuclear trishankuâ under international law. India was neither a weapon-state nor a non-nuclear weapon state. India could either keep its nuclear weapons or develop a substantive atomic power programme. It could not have both. The NSG waiver now allows India to have its weapons programme and expand its civilian atomic power generation in cooperation with the rest of the world.
That there was little applause in the room in Vienna when the consensus was finally forced on the NSG is a reminder that the group, set up in 1975 to counter the systemic challenge posed by Pokharan I, had to reverse itself today to accept the reality of Indiaâs nuclear weapons programme and agree to renew high technology civilian cooperation with India.
The international debate over the Indo-US nuclear deal was only in part about non-proliferation. More fundamentally it was about Indiaâs rise. Without a recognition of Indiaâs emergence as a great power, there was no prospect that the international system would have modified the nuclear regime in New Delhiâs favour.
Only a decade ago, in the wake of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, the United Nations Security Council, in a unanimous resolution No 1172 in June 1998, demanded that the two nations sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and end their nuclear and missile programmes. The history of international relations tells us that great powers agree to change the existing security norms only when they have to accommodate a rising power. The NSG decision to turn the solid international consensus in 1998 against New Delhiâs strategic programmes on its head is a bow to Indiaâs rise.
The Bush Administration was the first to recognise Indiaâs new strategic importance and the need to change the nuclear rules. It was not easy, however, selling the proposition to the powerful American non-proliferation lobby, the purists in the West and China.
Although it was small nations that raised all the noise, China had most to lose if the world began to differentiate between New Delhi and Islamabad in the nuclear domain. After all, without Chinese assistance, Pakistan could never have built a credible nuclear and missile programme. So Beijing had every reason to frown upon the international acknowledgement of Indiaâs nuclear parity with China. Not surprisingly, it showed its hand at the very last minute in the NSG. While China always saw the Indo-US nuclear deal in terms of its consequences for the Asian balance of power, it had to fall in line.
Itâs not entirely a coincidence that it was Manmohan Singh who, in the early 1990s, ended Indiaâs international economic isolation and itâs Manmohan Singh who has now reconfigured Indiaâs geopolictical standing. Thanks to the economic reforms which rebuilt Indiaâs economic sinews, India has now successfully repositioned itself in the global order.
(Contributing Editor C. Raja Mohan is a professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and the author of the book, Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order, that traces Indiaâs recent atomic diplomacy and its efforts to build a strategic partnership with the US.)
Unquote
Quote
US says next aim is to make India 'full partner' in NSG
Agencies
Posted online: Monday, September 08, 2008 at 1614 hrs IST
New Delhi, September 8:
After working "tirelessly" for securing a waiver for India from the Nuclear Suppliers' Group for trade in the atomic energy, the US on Monday said its next aim is to make New Delhi a "full partner" in the nuclear cartel.
"President Bush, Secretary of State and the entire administration had worked tirelessly to ensure that India reached the stage where it has today in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)," Assistant Secretary (Market Access and Compliance) in the US Department of Commerce David Bohigian said in New Delhi.
Bohigian said Bush and the Congress administration would continue to work to "make India a full partner in this group (NSG) which we think is crucial... from a strategic, political, economic and energy standpoint".
He said the US administration would be working through the Congress and the Hyde Act to ensure 100 billion dollar market for American companies.
"The next step for the US (administration) will be working through the Congress and the Hyde Act and make sure that business opportunities will enable the US firms to stay in what is estimated to be 100 billion dollar market," the official said at a CII seminar.
He said atomic energy would play an important role for economic development of India. "When you look at the energy map of 2020 and beyond, certainly nuclear has a key role to play in India's growth which we welcome," Bohigian said.
According to industry body Assocham, about 40 companies, including Videocon, have already started talks with foreign firms to set up nuclear power plants envisaging a total investment of about Rs 2,00,000 crore in India.
"We have asked the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for amendments in the legislations to facilitate the entry of private sector in generation of nuclear power," Videocon group head Venugopal Dhoot said.
Unquote
Another interesting report from the same paper . Here the author appears to be quite ignorent of the complete sell out and disaster on the part of India. Please read on:-
Quote
Isnât just about n-trade, itâs about a rising India
C Raja Mohan
Posted online: Sunday, September 07, 2008 at 0119 hrs IST
Singapore, Septmeber 6
In lifting the three-and-a-half-decade-old nuclear blockade against India, the international community has come to terms with a rising India and its geopolitical consequences for the global order in the 21st century. That it was a wrenching decision for the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group and demanded unprecedented lobbying from the highest political levels in Washington and New Delhi, underlined the extraordinary scope of the issues at play.
Over the last three years, as India endlessly argued with itself the entry-price into the elite nuclear club that was outlined in the July 2005 agreement with the United States, its chattering classes refused to appreciate the kind of strategic readjustment that was being asked of the rest of the world â recognise Indiaâs nuclear exceptionalism, discard the notion of nuclear parity between New Delhi and Islamabad, and accept Indiaâs strategic equivalence with China.
All governments in New Delhi in recent decades have pursued these seemingly impossible national objectives. It is the Manmohan Singh government, however, that finally provided the long-awaited geopolitical breakthrough for India in partnership with US President George W. Bush.
That it took a lot of arm-twisting to silence the churlish white knights of the West and stop China from throwing a monkey wrench into the works highlighted the difficulties in getting the NSG to accept a change of nuclear rules painstakingly crafted over the last four decades, for India, and India alone.
The NSG was also asked to do this at a time when non-proliferation has emerged as one of the principal international security concerns and rules on high-technology transfers are being tightened against other countries.
Since its first atomic test, Pokharan I, in May 1974, India has been trapped in a no-manâs land or a ânuclear trishankuâ under international law. India was neither a weapon-state nor a non-nuclear weapon state. India could either keep its nuclear weapons or develop a substantive atomic power programme. It could not have both. The NSG waiver now allows India to have its weapons programme and expand its civilian atomic power generation in cooperation with the rest of the world.
That there was little applause in the room in Vienna when the consensus was finally forced on the NSG is a reminder that the group, set up in 1975 to counter the systemic challenge posed by Pokharan I, had to reverse itself today to accept the reality of Indiaâs nuclear weapons programme and agree to renew high technology civilian cooperation with India.
The international debate over the Indo-US nuclear deal was only in part about non-proliferation. More fundamentally it was about Indiaâs rise. Without a recognition of Indiaâs emergence as a great power, there was no prospect that the international system would have modified the nuclear regime in New Delhiâs favour.
Only a decade ago, in the wake of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998, the United Nations Security Council, in a unanimous resolution No 1172 in June 1998, demanded that the two nations sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and end their nuclear and missile programmes. The history of international relations tells us that great powers agree to change the existing security norms only when they have to accommodate a rising power. The NSG decision to turn the solid international consensus in 1998 against New Delhiâs strategic programmes on its head is a bow to Indiaâs rise.
The Bush Administration was the first to recognise Indiaâs new strategic importance and the need to change the nuclear rules. It was not easy, however, selling the proposition to the powerful American non-proliferation lobby, the purists in the West and China.
Although it was small nations that raised all the noise, China had most to lose if the world began to differentiate between New Delhi and Islamabad in the nuclear domain. After all, without Chinese assistance, Pakistan could never have built a credible nuclear and missile programme. So Beijing had every reason to frown upon the international acknowledgement of Indiaâs nuclear parity with China. Not surprisingly, it showed its hand at the very last minute in the NSG. While China always saw the Indo-US nuclear deal in terms of its consequences for the Asian balance of power, it had to fall in line.
Itâs not entirely a coincidence that it was Manmohan Singh who, in the early 1990s, ended Indiaâs international economic isolation and itâs Manmohan Singh who has now reconfigured Indiaâs geopolictical standing. Thanks to the economic reforms which rebuilt Indiaâs economic sinews, India has now successfully repositioned itself in the global order.
(Contributing Editor C. Raja Mohan is a professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and the author of the book, Impossible Allies: Nuclear India, United States and the Global Order, that traces Indiaâs recent atomic diplomacy and its efforts to build a strategic partnership with the US.)
Unquote