09-09-2008, 04:56 AM
op-Ed from Deccan Chronicle, 9 sept., 2008
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->N-deal: Vienna done, now off to Washington
By Pran Chopra
Just a few days ago the American government lifted the veil on yet another corner of the complex behind-the-scenes nuclear negotiations between India and the United States.<b> What is being negotiated has been euphemistically labelled, for the benefit of the public, "civil nuclear cooperation". But as everyone knows, the subject can ramify into many aspects of Indiaâs entire nuclear programme, both civil and military, present and future.</b>
<b>Like the many earlier "disclosures" that have been made, generally by driblets, under intentional or voluntary or accidental "indiscretions", the latest has also been subjected to a thorough debate in and by the media, and the debate will go on until either country chooses, or both choose, to strike public postures which declare that the debate has ended in total agreement.</b>
Has it not so ended yet? It would be churlish, and probably wrong, to suggest that it has not. Therefore, oneâs first reaction must be, and is, to join wholeheartedly in the chorus of rejoicing over the drama played out, some of it in full public glare and some behind the scenes, over the "Sweet Deal in Vienna" to quote the banner headline in The Asian Age last Sunday. But the questions that raise their heads should also get such attention as they merit.
For example, <b>the doubt expressed last Sunday itself by a person so well disposed towards India as the former US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill.</b> Despite the jubilation in Delhi in the past few days, in which probably he joins as well, he has reminded us that "the fate of the nuclear deal will be decided by the Democratic leadership which has to decide whether to suspend the 30-day waiting period" and, more crucially, "whether amendments can be brought âfrom the floorâ in both Houses of the (US) Congress".
<b>His words of caution are important for various reasons.</b> First, the Democrats are a lot less enthusiastic about the deal than the Republicans. Second, they have a stronger majority in Congress and the country. Third, it would be premature to assume that the deal has been "done", that it has become iron clad against all adverse amendments. <b>More than just curiosity will make people wonder what wrought this total change, virtually overnight, in the Indian scene around the emerging nuclear agreement.</b> Till about the morning of last Friday, one could doubt whether it would be possible for the two countries to reach an agreement which would be welcomed by the people of either country. By Saturday afternoon, the probable text of such an agreement was already in circulation. By Saturday evening, the hot subject under the searchlight was the how and why, not the whether, of the change, and <b>what role had been played by President Bush and, additionally, by France and Russia, and why these two countries had come to differ from their close neighbours on the Continent.</b>
It would be wrong to assume that since the deal has been pushed through by the US Executive, namely the President, it is protected against Congressional probing because of the difference between the respective jurisdictions of the President and Congress under the US constitutional system and practices. The contrary is more possible now because, while the deal has been pushed through the Executive and the Congress by a Republican dispensation, both institutions may soon be flying the Democratic flag. In this connection re-read Mr Blackwillâs quote above and the US stipulation quoted below. It was published a few days ago and is closely connected to the nuclear deal.
It requires that at "each plenary" session, presumably of the NSG countries, participating governments shall notify each other of "approved transfers to India⦠Participating governments are also invited to exchange information, including about their own bilateral agreements with India⦠(and to) consult through regular channels, including the consultative group and plenary, on matters connected with the implementation of this statement, taking into account relevant international commitments or bilateral agreements with India".
All this, taken with the directive to NSG to intensify dialogue with India, will leave few things connected with Indiaâs nuclear programme outside the purview of international observers. Also note that this stipulation has been spelt out while the Republicans are still in office in Washington. How much and in which direction the Democratic Party will pull the stipulation if, as is likely, it captures the White House?
<b>Of more immediate interest is what led to the transformation of the negotiating stance of the five main concerned powers in the last few days â the US and UK on one side, France and Russia on the other, and China too (except that it cancelled out its former stance with the last one it took in the concluding hours of last week)?</b>
The reason most cited for the success scored in Vienna was that external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee reasserted Indiaâs commitment to non-proliferation and to Indiaâs voluntary moratorium on testing. His intellectual powers are indeed great, and so is his persuasive style. Together they make him Indiaâs best negotiator. But he came most into the picture, and most effectively, in the concluding hours of the Vienna session. And all of what he said had already been said many times over, by him as well as by others in Vienna. Surely, the style of repeating something that has been often said before cannot be more persuasive than the substance of what is being repeated.
Therefore, Mr Mukherjeeâs style and persona cannot explain the magic of effectiveness which he is thought to have created in Vienna. More convincing is the persuasion of the power which President Bush is said to have used upon many smaller countries, as confirmed by some, including the unnamed representative of an unnamed country quoted as having said that he and others had been "leaned on at the highest level". But that only raises the question that since only the weight of a major power would have been effective, how was that power persuaded to use its weight on behalf of India so effectively?
That leads us straight to the power of the "market" that is India, and its need for nuclear power plants and the need of the makers of such powers plants to find a market for their products. But that equation too has its limits. There are only a few countries which have proven competence for making such plants, and fewer still have the clout which, alas, is possessed by manufacturers who may be more influential in some other respects but do not have an established reputation for quality of production in this particular field. <b>So the answers to the questions "who" and "how" may yet take some time to emerge.</b>
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<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->N-deal: Vienna done, now off to Washington
By Pran Chopra
Just a few days ago the American government lifted the veil on yet another corner of the complex behind-the-scenes nuclear negotiations between India and the United States.<b> What is being negotiated has been euphemistically labelled, for the benefit of the public, "civil nuclear cooperation". But as everyone knows, the subject can ramify into many aspects of Indiaâs entire nuclear programme, both civil and military, present and future.</b>
<b>Like the many earlier "disclosures" that have been made, generally by driblets, under intentional or voluntary or accidental "indiscretions", the latest has also been subjected to a thorough debate in and by the media, and the debate will go on until either country chooses, or both choose, to strike public postures which declare that the debate has ended in total agreement.</b>
Has it not so ended yet? It would be churlish, and probably wrong, to suggest that it has not. Therefore, oneâs first reaction must be, and is, to join wholeheartedly in the chorus of rejoicing over the drama played out, some of it in full public glare and some behind the scenes, over the "Sweet Deal in Vienna" to quote the banner headline in The Asian Age last Sunday. But the questions that raise their heads should also get such attention as they merit.
For example, <b>the doubt expressed last Sunday itself by a person so well disposed towards India as the former US ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill.</b> Despite the jubilation in Delhi in the past few days, in which probably he joins as well, he has reminded us that "the fate of the nuclear deal will be decided by the Democratic leadership which has to decide whether to suspend the 30-day waiting period" and, more crucially, "whether amendments can be brought âfrom the floorâ in both Houses of the (US) Congress".
<b>His words of caution are important for various reasons.</b> First, the Democrats are a lot less enthusiastic about the deal than the Republicans. Second, they have a stronger majority in Congress and the country. Third, it would be premature to assume that the deal has been "done", that it has become iron clad against all adverse amendments. <b>More than just curiosity will make people wonder what wrought this total change, virtually overnight, in the Indian scene around the emerging nuclear agreement.</b> Till about the morning of last Friday, one could doubt whether it would be possible for the two countries to reach an agreement which would be welcomed by the people of either country. By Saturday afternoon, the probable text of such an agreement was already in circulation. By Saturday evening, the hot subject under the searchlight was the how and why, not the whether, of the change, and <b>what role had been played by President Bush and, additionally, by France and Russia, and why these two countries had come to differ from their close neighbours on the Continent.</b>
It would be wrong to assume that since the deal has been pushed through by the US Executive, namely the President, it is protected against Congressional probing because of the difference between the respective jurisdictions of the President and Congress under the US constitutional system and practices. The contrary is more possible now because, while the deal has been pushed through the Executive and the Congress by a Republican dispensation, both institutions may soon be flying the Democratic flag. In this connection re-read Mr Blackwillâs quote above and the US stipulation quoted below. It was published a few days ago and is closely connected to the nuclear deal.
It requires that at "each plenary" session, presumably of the NSG countries, participating governments shall notify each other of "approved transfers to India⦠Participating governments are also invited to exchange information, including about their own bilateral agreements with India⦠(and to) consult through regular channels, including the consultative group and plenary, on matters connected with the implementation of this statement, taking into account relevant international commitments or bilateral agreements with India".
All this, taken with the directive to NSG to intensify dialogue with India, will leave few things connected with Indiaâs nuclear programme outside the purview of international observers. Also note that this stipulation has been spelt out while the Republicans are still in office in Washington. How much and in which direction the Democratic Party will pull the stipulation if, as is likely, it captures the White House?
<b>Of more immediate interest is what led to the transformation of the negotiating stance of the five main concerned powers in the last few days â the US and UK on one side, France and Russia on the other, and China too (except that it cancelled out its former stance with the last one it took in the concluding hours of last week)?</b>
The reason most cited for the success scored in Vienna was that external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee reasserted Indiaâs commitment to non-proliferation and to Indiaâs voluntary moratorium on testing. His intellectual powers are indeed great, and so is his persuasive style. Together they make him Indiaâs best negotiator. But he came most into the picture, and most effectively, in the concluding hours of the Vienna session. And all of what he said had already been said many times over, by him as well as by others in Vienna. Surely, the style of repeating something that has been often said before cannot be more persuasive than the substance of what is being repeated.
Therefore, Mr Mukherjeeâs style and persona cannot explain the magic of effectiveness which he is thought to have created in Vienna. More convincing is the persuasion of the power which President Bush is said to have used upon many smaller countries, as confirmed by some, including the unnamed representative of an unnamed country quoted as having said that he and others had been "leaned on at the highest level". But that only raises the question that since only the weight of a major power would have been effective, how was that power persuaded to use its weight on behalf of India so effectively?
That leads us straight to the power of the "market" that is India, and its need for nuclear power plants and the need of the makers of such powers plants to find a market for their products. But that equation too has its limits. There are only a few countries which have proven competence for making such plants, and fewer still have the clout which, alas, is possessed by manufacturers who may be more influential in some other respects but do not have an established reputation for quality of production in this particular field. <b>So the answers to the questions "who" and "how" may yet take some time to emerge.</b>
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->