10-22-2003, 05:15 AM
Everybody please read this.
Take you time and it is a difficult subject
[url="http://www.geocities.com/vnr1995/self.doc"]http://www.geocities.com/vnr1995/self.doc[/url]
â...WE SHALL NOT CEASE FROM EXPLORATION...â
AN INVITATION DISGUISED AS A POSITION PAPER COMPOSED AT THE BEHEST
OF ARENA FOR THE THEME âDECOLONIZING SOCIAL SCIENCESâ
ByBalu1985
Electronic Version: 1.1
We know the West as the West looks at itself. We study the East the way West studies the East. We look at the world the way West looks at it. We do not even know whether the world would look different, if we looked at it our way. Today, we are not in a position even to make sense of the above statement. When Asian anthropologists or sociologists or culturologists do their anthropology, sociology or culturology â the West is really talking to itself.
Western culture, with background assumptions peculiar to it, âproblematizedâ some phenomenon which has taken the status of a fact to us: we prattle on endlessly about the problem of âthe Indian caste systemâ, the amorphous nature of âHinduismâ, the problem of âunderdevelopmentâ, the âquestion of human rights in Asiaâ â¦etc. Idem for our perspectives on the West.
Surely, but surely, there is a problem here? If our culture differs from that of the West and if, perforce, our background theories and assumptions are other than those of the West, we could not possibly either formulate questions or assign weights to them, both about us and the West, in exactly the same way the West does. Yet, we do â invariably and as a matter of fact. How can we make sense out of questions routinely copied from western social research, and then go on to answer them by means of empirical studies? But we do â we act as though these questions do make sense to us.
Be it as that may, this situation prevents us from either defending or attacking the Western social sciences: we cannot say that they are âtrueâ because we do not know any other. We cannot say they are âfalseâ because there are not any theories to compare them with. And that is why you will not find criticisms of Western social sciences in this paper.
Consequently, our task at this stage cannot be one of assessing Western social sciences. Therefore, we cannot âdecolonizeâ them either. But, what we can do is to try and say how the world appears to us. What are the things we take to exist in this world? What are the experiences important to us? If we try to do this by constantly contrasting our answers to the ones formulated by Western social sciences, then perhaps a stage will come when we could begin to talk about assessing Western social sciences. In this process, we shall have begun to construct an alternative (where possible) to Western social sciences.
But this is not what we have in mind when we speak of âdecolonizingâ social sciences. So, what do we have in mind? Let us look at the issue this way. Without the least bit of exaggeration it could be held that the study of societies and cultures is a project initiated by the Western world. Over the centuries, Western intellectuals have studied both themselves and other cultures and, in the process of doing so, they have developed a set of theories and methodologies to understand the human world. What we call âsocial sciencesâ are the result of the gigantic labour performed by brilliant and not-so-brilliant men and women from all over the world over a long period of time.
Let us formulate a hypothetical question in order to express our intuition: would the results have been the same or even approximately similar if, say, the Asians had undertaken such a task instead of the Europeans? Suppose that, in the imaginary world we are talking about, it was the effort of the Asian intellectuals reflecting about the European culture and that of their own, as they saw both, which eventuated in social sciences. Would it have looked like contemporary social sciences?
â¦and an Answer
I put to you that the most natural answer to the question is this: âWe do not knowâ. It is worthwhile reflecting on this answer.
When we confess to being unable to answer the question, it does not arise from an impossibility to answer questions about hypothetical situations: all our scientific laws describe hypothetical situations and we can say what would happen in such situations. (E.g., âwhat would happen if I drop a stone from the top of a building? It would fall downwardsâ¦etc.â) Our claim to ignorance has to do with the specific kind of hypothetical situation which the question picks out, and with the feeling that there is no way to check the veracity of the answers one may give. That is, because we have no model of such an attempt, we have no way of deciding how to go about answering such a question. Worse still, because we have no models where the answers can come out either true or false, we feel that all answers to this question are meaningless and, therefore, that the question itself is meaningless. The question has not violated any syntactic or semantic rule; it has not committed any category mistake and yet we do not know how to make sense of this question.
Consequently, our task at this stage cannot be one of assessing Western social sciences. Therefore, we cannot âdecolonizeâ them either. But, what we can do is to try and say how the world appears to us. What are the things we take to exist in this world? What are the experiences important to us? If we try to do this by constantly contrasting our answers to the ones formulated by Western social sciences, then perhaps a stage will come when we could begin to talk about assessing Western social sciences. In this process, we shall have begun to construct an alternative (where possible) to Western social sciences.
What does it mean though to say or suggest that we try and describe the world as it looks to us? How can this be both rewarding and serious? It is the aim of this paper to answer these questions. For the moment, all we ought to remember from the foregoing is the following: even though we have been looking at the world, the social world that is, for centuries, we do not know how it appears to us!
The Structure
This paper has six sections. In the first, I introduce the notion of world models which I will use during the course of the next five. The second section explicates the model of âselfâ as it obtains in the Western and Asian cultures. The third section looks at one dimension of the relation between human selves and ethical phenomenon. The fourth discusses one aspect of the moral domain viz. the moral nature of human rights. It asks the question whether the differing notions of the ethical, as they obtain between these two cultures, throw doubt on the idea of universal rights. The fifth section carries us into the debates about Nations and ethnicity as they are isomorphic with the differing models of self. The sixth looks into the way human selves learn in these two cultures and at the relation between the nature of selves and learning. It also formulates some hypotheses as a consequence. The paper concludes by reflecting about what has been achieved and proposes some guidelines for assessing it.
The entire paper is organized around one theme viz. the model of âselfâ. The first section, consequently, does not exhaust the theme. It is taken up and elaborated in different ways in the different sections: hopefully, what is said in one will get clarified by what will be said subsequently. Because not only do later sections clarify the earlier ones but also presuppose them, the paper hangs together as a whole: each section illumines the other, each leans upon the other. Therefore, I would suggest that you read through to the end, even when you feel that some thoughts expressed in any one section are not perspicuous enough. If I have succeeded in what I want to, by the end of this paper you should get a glimpse of the pattern I am trying to point out.
In this sense, I would like to believe that this paper is not only governed by a thematic continuity but also by the methodology used. Cultural practices, I believe, should not get âexplainedâ in the first instance as something that arose out of a rational or irrational belief or decision.( M. Harrisâ âexplanationâ of the âorigin of sacred cowâ in India and Frazerâs âexplanationâ of the âmagical practicesâ of peoples represent such attempts.) Because a culture is âa way of life of a peopleâ, to render a culture perspicuous is to show how one practice leans upon the other, how the other illumines the first and how they, in their interconnections, hang together and constitute a âform of lifeâ. Such a âmethodologyâ is the most appropriate one for this domain because it is best able to point out the âpatternsâ in cultural practices.
Take you time and it is a difficult subject
[url="http://www.geocities.com/vnr1995/self.doc"]http://www.geocities.com/vnr1995/self.doc[/url]
â...WE SHALL NOT CEASE FROM EXPLORATION...â
AN INVITATION DISGUISED AS A POSITION PAPER COMPOSED AT THE BEHEST
OF ARENA FOR THE THEME âDECOLONIZING SOCIAL SCIENCESâ
ByBalu1985
Electronic Version: 1.1
We know the West as the West looks at itself. We study the East the way West studies the East. We look at the world the way West looks at it. We do not even know whether the world would look different, if we looked at it our way. Today, we are not in a position even to make sense of the above statement. When Asian anthropologists or sociologists or culturologists do their anthropology, sociology or culturology â the West is really talking to itself.
Western culture, with background assumptions peculiar to it, âproblematizedâ some phenomenon which has taken the status of a fact to us: we prattle on endlessly about the problem of âthe Indian caste systemâ, the amorphous nature of âHinduismâ, the problem of âunderdevelopmentâ, the âquestion of human rights in Asiaâ â¦etc. Idem for our perspectives on the West.
Surely, but surely, there is a problem here? If our culture differs from that of the West and if, perforce, our background theories and assumptions are other than those of the West, we could not possibly either formulate questions or assign weights to them, both about us and the West, in exactly the same way the West does. Yet, we do â invariably and as a matter of fact. How can we make sense out of questions routinely copied from western social research, and then go on to answer them by means of empirical studies? But we do â we act as though these questions do make sense to us.
Be it as that may, this situation prevents us from either defending or attacking the Western social sciences: we cannot say that they are âtrueâ because we do not know any other. We cannot say they are âfalseâ because there are not any theories to compare them with. And that is why you will not find criticisms of Western social sciences in this paper.
Consequently, our task at this stage cannot be one of assessing Western social sciences. Therefore, we cannot âdecolonizeâ them either. But, what we can do is to try and say how the world appears to us. What are the things we take to exist in this world? What are the experiences important to us? If we try to do this by constantly contrasting our answers to the ones formulated by Western social sciences, then perhaps a stage will come when we could begin to talk about assessing Western social sciences. In this process, we shall have begun to construct an alternative (where possible) to Western social sciences.
But this is not what we have in mind when we speak of âdecolonizingâ social sciences. So, what do we have in mind? Let us look at the issue this way. Without the least bit of exaggeration it could be held that the study of societies and cultures is a project initiated by the Western world. Over the centuries, Western intellectuals have studied both themselves and other cultures and, in the process of doing so, they have developed a set of theories and methodologies to understand the human world. What we call âsocial sciencesâ are the result of the gigantic labour performed by brilliant and not-so-brilliant men and women from all over the world over a long period of time.
Let us formulate a hypothetical question in order to express our intuition: would the results have been the same or even approximately similar if, say, the Asians had undertaken such a task instead of the Europeans? Suppose that, in the imaginary world we are talking about, it was the effort of the Asian intellectuals reflecting about the European culture and that of their own, as they saw both, which eventuated in social sciences. Would it have looked like contemporary social sciences?
â¦and an Answer
I put to you that the most natural answer to the question is this: âWe do not knowâ. It is worthwhile reflecting on this answer.
When we confess to being unable to answer the question, it does not arise from an impossibility to answer questions about hypothetical situations: all our scientific laws describe hypothetical situations and we can say what would happen in such situations. (E.g., âwhat would happen if I drop a stone from the top of a building? It would fall downwardsâ¦etc.â) Our claim to ignorance has to do with the specific kind of hypothetical situation which the question picks out, and with the feeling that there is no way to check the veracity of the answers one may give. That is, because we have no model of such an attempt, we have no way of deciding how to go about answering such a question. Worse still, because we have no models where the answers can come out either true or false, we feel that all answers to this question are meaningless and, therefore, that the question itself is meaningless. The question has not violated any syntactic or semantic rule; it has not committed any category mistake and yet we do not know how to make sense of this question.
Consequently, our task at this stage cannot be one of assessing Western social sciences. Therefore, we cannot âdecolonizeâ them either. But, what we can do is to try and say how the world appears to us. What are the things we take to exist in this world? What are the experiences important to us? If we try to do this by constantly contrasting our answers to the ones formulated by Western social sciences, then perhaps a stage will come when we could begin to talk about assessing Western social sciences. In this process, we shall have begun to construct an alternative (where possible) to Western social sciences.
What does it mean though to say or suggest that we try and describe the world as it looks to us? How can this be both rewarding and serious? It is the aim of this paper to answer these questions. For the moment, all we ought to remember from the foregoing is the following: even though we have been looking at the world, the social world that is, for centuries, we do not know how it appears to us!
The Structure
This paper has six sections. In the first, I introduce the notion of world models which I will use during the course of the next five. The second section explicates the model of âselfâ as it obtains in the Western and Asian cultures. The third section looks at one dimension of the relation between human selves and ethical phenomenon. The fourth discusses one aspect of the moral domain viz. the moral nature of human rights. It asks the question whether the differing notions of the ethical, as they obtain between these two cultures, throw doubt on the idea of universal rights. The fifth section carries us into the debates about Nations and ethnicity as they are isomorphic with the differing models of self. The sixth looks into the way human selves learn in these two cultures and at the relation between the nature of selves and learning. It also formulates some hypotheses as a consequence. The paper concludes by reflecting about what has been achieved and proposes some guidelines for assessing it.
The entire paper is organized around one theme viz. the model of âselfâ. The first section, consequently, does not exhaust the theme. It is taken up and elaborated in different ways in the different sections: hopefully, what is said in one will get clarified by what will be said subsequently. Because not only do later sections clarify the earlier ones but also presuppose them, the paper hangs together as a whole: each section illumines the other, each leans upon the other. Therefore, I would suggest that you read through to the end, even when you feel that some thoughts expressed in any one section are not perspicuous enough. If I have succeeded in what I want to, by the end of this paper you should get a glimpse of the pattern I am trying to point out.
In this sense, I would like to believe that this paper is not only governed by a thematic continuity but also by the methodology used. Cultural practices, I believe, should not get âexplainedâ in the first instance as something that arose out of a rational or irrational belief or decision.( M. Harrisâ âexplanationâ of the âorigin of sacred cowâ in India and Frazerâs âexplanationâ of the âmagical practicesâ of peoples represent such attempts.) Because a culture is âa way of life of a peopleâ, to render a culture perspicuous is to show how one practice leans upon the other, how the other illumines the first and how they, in their interconnections, hang together and constitute a âform of lifeâ. Such a âmethodologyâ is the most appropriate one for this domain because it is best able to point out the âpatternsâ in cultural practices.