02-10-2009, 04:52 PM
Mumbai attacks: anatomy of a failed strategy
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Periodic tough-sounding statements from our leaders about all options being open, etc., are for effect to cover up lack of real action. The disconnect between verbal muscle-flexing and limp action reduces our credibility further. As time passes, options not used become more difficult to use. Initiative lost cannot be easily regained, especially when other powerful actors become involved. By doing nothing we have little leverage left. Had we taken some bilateral political measures, besides threatening to blacklist companies selling advanced weaponry to Pakistan and demanding that economic assistance by international financial institutions be made conditional on Pakistan meeting concrete benchmarks in eliminating terrorist activity within its territory, etc., we would have increased our leverage with third countries. Tactically, some of these steps should have been taken before the Obama administration took over in order to retain some bargaining options. Now it is too late.
By avoiding bilateral action we have imposed no direct cost on Pakistan, besides weakening pressure on others to act meaningfully to staunch terrorism against us. With America promising substantial military and economic aid, Pakistani rulers can conclude that, as before, a judicious mix of action and inaction on terrorism directed at U.S. interests and deniable support to terrorism against India can be a paying policy. In sum, with some tactical refining, it threatens to be business as usual for all the players.
<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Periodic tough-sounding statements from our leaders about all options being open, etc., are for effect to cover up lack of real action. The disconnect between verbal muscle-flexing and limp action reduces our credibility further. As time passes, options not used become more difficult to use. Initiative lost cannot be easily regained, especially when other powerful actors become involved. By doing nothing we have little leverage left. Had we taken some bilateral political measures, besides threatening to blacklist companies selling advanced weaponry to Pakistan and demanding that economic assistance by international financial institutions be made conditional on Pakistan meeting concrete benchmarks in eliminating terrorist activity within its territory, etc., we would have increased our leverage with third countries. Tactically, some of these steps should have been taken before the Obama administration took over in order to retain some bargaining options. Now it is too late.
By avoiding bilateral action we have imposed no direct cost on Pakistan, besides weakening pressure on others to act meaningfully to staunch terrorism against us. With America promising substantial military and economic aid, Pakistani rulers can conclude that, as before, a judicious mix of action and inaction on terrorism directed at U.S. interests and deniable support to terrorism against India can be a paying policy. In sum, with some tactical refining, it threatens to be business as usual for all the players.
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