04-29-2009, 11:03 PM
Nightwatch for 4/28/09 comments:
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Comment: <b>Pakistan is in the news and the prophets of doom are legion. The state is not failing, but it is suffering from some decisions that have backfired.</b> Chief of Army Staff General Kayani was among those who supported the cession of national authority to the militants and imams in Swat, as a tradeoff for peace and disarmament. When the militants ignored the terms of the deal, and in response to outside pressure, the government has been roused to take some action, primarily to enforce the original deal, thus far.
General Kayaniâs warning to the militants on 25 April about extending their âwritâ was only about militant expansion into adjacent districts, not about the cession of authority to Swat. There are no big operations for Swat District at this time evident in press reporting.
<b>The start of the Army and Frontier Corps operations supported by air strikes does not signify much of an offensive.</b> For one thing, the preparation time appears to be far too brief to prepare the battlefield with competent intelligence. <b>The purpose, literally, is to force the militants back on the government approved reservation in Swat District.</b>
<b>The government in Islamabad is not in danger of falling to a militant uprising, not for a few years at least. Using terror and the preachings of fundamentalist imams, the militants have been successful in forcing the government to negotiate over local jurisdiction. This process is likely to continue. </b>
The effect of the security operations will be to channel the Islamists to put more pressure on a weak National Assembly to pass more bills authorizing the enforcement of Sharia, and not take the law into their own hands. <b>The result will be the same:Â the spread of strict Quranic observances enforced by Islamist enforcers, instead of the national or local police. The difference is the spread will be under color of law.</b> That is the <b>primary implication of Kayaniâs warning because he has only promised to act so as to back law enforcement, not undo the acts of the parliament.</b>
In instability analysis, the government writ is always weakest in the peripheral areas, in the border marches and among the politically disenfranchised. The Swat District regulations are proof of both wings of this precept.
Second, a weak government always tries to buy time by ceding authority that it has a constitutional right to enforce, provided it has forces it can rely on. This is always an expedient to gain time to marshal resources that will enable the government to rescind the cession later. Pakistan is also proof of this precept.
<b>The emergence of instability directed towards Islamabad in the Pashtun border agencies is not new, but it is a bit more intense. The big difference is in the government and military response to that unrest, which has been unprecedented even for past weak civilian governments. It raises serious but not fatal questions.</b>
The normal response to a de facto autonomy declaration by a district would be to use the Army, not just the paramilitary police forces, to preserve the integrity of the state by force, not to make de facto secession de jure. The government does not seem to have that option.
<b>The Army under Kayani apparently declined to participate two months back because of the likelihood of high losses and its cultural disinclination to shoot Pakistani citizens, according to press reporting.</b> Kayani appears to be a good soldier. <b>About the only justification for Army timidity in the face of a local insurrection is the likelihood that the Army itself would fracture during such operations.</b>
The Army position left the elected leaders with no choice but to try to buy time by creating a temporary power sharing arrangement that would stabilize local law and order conditions in Swat until the government could assess its options and the loyalty of its security forces. That is where we are today.
<b>Todayâs operations are mostly a show of force, a demonstration.</b> Pakistan has no joint doctrine; the air attacks are isolated pin pricks that annoy more than suppress the insurgents; there has not been enough time for adequate battlefield preparation. Kayani has not had enough time to rebuild the Army.
Inspector General of the Frontier Corps Major General Khan should get a heroâs medal for taking on the task of upholding the honor and rights of the federal government using his rag tag paramilitary forces.
<b>In sum, the government is a mess, but it is not collapsing or in danger of an Islamist overthrow.</b> <b>Pakistan</b> is not a failed state but it <b>is experiencing another test of its fundamental nature.</b> The problem with international press coverage is that it conflates the darkest and bleakest future for Pakistan with the present. The worst case has not yet arrived, by a long shot.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->
<!--QuoteBegin-->QUOTE<!--QuoteEBegin-->Comment: <b>Pakistan is in the news and the prophets of doom are legion. The state is not failing, but it is suffering from some decisions that have backfired.</b> Chief of Army Staff General Kayani was among those who supported the cession of national authority to the militants and imams in Swat, as a tradeoff for peace and disarmament. When the militants ignored the terms of the deal, and in response to outside pressure, the government has been roused to take some action, primarily to enforce the original deal, thus far.
General Kayaniâs warning to the militants on 25 April about extending their âwritâ was only about militant expansion into adjacent districts, not about the cession of authority to Swat. There are no big operations for Swat District at this time evident in press reporting.
<b>The start of the Army and Frontier Corps operations supported by air strikes does not signify much of an offensive.</b> For one thing, the preparation time appears to be far too brief to prepare the battlefield with competent intelligence. <b>The purpose, literally, is to force the militants back on the government approved reservation in Swat District.</b>
<b>The government in Islamabad is not in danger of falling to a militant uprising, not for a few years at least. Using terror and the preachings of fundamentalist imams, the militants have been successful in forcing the government to negotiate over local jurisdiction. This process is likely to continue. </b>
The effect of the security operations will be to channel the Islamists to put more pressure on a weak National Assembly to pass more bills authorizing the enforcement of Sharia, and not take the law into their own hands. <b>The result will be the same:Â the spread of strict Quranic observances enforced by Islamist enforcers, instead of the national or local police. The difference is the spread will be under color of law.</b> That is the <b>primary implication of Kayaniâs warning because he has only promised to act so as to back law enforcement, not undo the acts of the parliament.</b>
In instability analysis, the government writ is always weakest in the peripheral areas, in the border marches and among the politically disenfranchised. The Swat District regulations are proof of both wings of this precept.
Second, a weak government always tries to buy time by ceding authority that it has a constitutional right to enforce, provided it has forces it can rely on. This is always an expedient to gain time to marshal resources that will enable the government to rescind the cession later. Pakistan is also proof of this precept.
<b>The emergence of instability directed towards Islamabad in the Pashtun border agencies is not new, but it is a bit more intense. The big difference is in the government and military response to that unrest, which has been unprecedented even for past weak civilian governments. It raises serious but not fatal questions.</b>
The normal response to a de facto autonomy declaration by a district would be to use the Army, not just the paramilitary police forces, to preserve the integrity of the state by force, not to make de facto secession de jure. The government does not seem to have that option.
<b>The Army under Kayani apparently declined to participate two months back because of the likelihood of high losses and its cultural disinclination to shoot Pakistani citizens, according to press reporting.</b> Kayani appears to be a good soldier. <b>About the only justification for Army timidity in the face of a local insurrection is the likelihood that the Army itself would fracture during such operations.</b>
The Army position left the elected leaders with no choice but to try to buy time by creating a temporary power sharing arrangement that would stabilize local law and order conditions in Swat until the government could assess its options and the loyalty of its security forces. That is where we are today.
<b>Todayâs operations are mostly a show of force, a demonstration.</b> Pakistan has no joint doctrine; the air attacks are isolated pin pricks that annoy more than suppress the insurgents; there has not been enough time for adequate battlefield preparation. Kayani has not had enough time to rebuild the Army.
Inspector General of the Frontier Corps Major General Khan should get a heroâs medal for taking on the task of upholding the honor and rights of the federal government using his rag tag paramilitary forces.
<b>In sum, the government is a mess, but it is not collapsing or in danger of an Islamist overthrow.</b> <b>Pakistan</b> is not a failed state but it <b>is experiencing another test of its fundamental nature.</b> The problem with international press coverage is that it conflates the darkest and bleakest future for Pakistan with the present. The worst case has not yet arrived, by a long shot.<!--QuoteEnd--><!--QuoteEEnd-->