06-01-2009, 01:56 AM
Saturday, May 30, 2009
<b>Without ideology, BJP is nothing </b>
Kanchan Gupta / Analysis
The responses to my last post have been extremely useful; they have helped
clear doubts in my mind. Scintillating debate, even when it gets sharp, is
always welcome.
The rise of the BJP between 1989 and 1998 was directly linked to assertive
Hindu expectations articulated by an assertive Hindu leadership. These can
be briefly summed up as:
. <b>Political:</b> Hindus had begun to tire of Congress's 'pseudo-secularism';
deep within them, Indians nurse a concept of nationhood whose defining
contours are Hindu. When I say Hindu, it is not religion specific but
culture and civilisation specific. The Ram Janmabhoomi agitation found a
resonance across the country because it became a symbol of both bruised
Hindu pride and an opportunity to correct a historical wrong. We could
debate the merits of such perceived hurt and grievance, but that is not
really relevant; what is relevant is that people saw it that way.
<b>. Social: </b>VP Singh's divisive Mandal politics had left middle India aghast
and angry. Since anti-Congress feelings were still high, people turned to
the BJP for succour. 'Hindutva' was seen as a unifying force.
<b>. Economic:</b> With the world moving towards market economy, middle India was seeking liberation from the statist economic control-and-command structure
that had stifled enterprise and restricted growth as well as wealth
generation for more than four decades. On this front, too, the BJP offered
an alternative economic policy and programme, based on deregulation and
reform.
These coalesced into a burst of support for the BJP, taking it to power in
1998. What also helped was the spectre of political instability and
Congress's inability to get its act together during the intervening years
between the 1996 and 1998 general elections.
This tectonic shift in voter preference towards the BJP would not have been
possible without the party's tactical adoption of 'Hindutva' as a component
of its ideology (or, as the BJP calls it, 'political philosophy') along with
'Integral Humanism', which the party says "gives us a broader and modern
perspective and tries to unshackle our minds from parochial concerns and
past baggage".
Deendayal Upadhyaya's enunciation on this aspect was explicit:
âWe have to discard the status quo mentality and usher in a new era.
Indeed our efforts at reconstruction need not be clouded by prejudice or
disregard for all that is inherited from our past. On the other hand, there
is no need to cling to past institutions and traditions which have outlived
their utility."
For the BJP, "A nation state based on Integral Humanism is a secular,
non-theocratic state. Also, it repudiates statism and stands up for
decentralisation to uphold the twin pillars of individual freedom and
national interest."
To this was added 'Hindutva' in the late-1980s, strengthening the Hindu
ethos of the party, making it more credible as a representative of Hindu
aspirations, and setting it apart from the 'secular' centrist and
left-of-centre political parties, especially the Congress.
Criticism of 'Hindutva' as a 'communal' idea was blunted by the Supreme
Court's Constitution Bench judgement which, essentially, <b>said that
'Hindutva' was/is India's 'way of life' and rooted in its civilisational and
cultural history.</b>
The Constitution Bench said,
<b> "No precise meaning can be ascribed to the terms 'Hindu', 'Hindutva' and
'Hinduism'; and no meaning in the abstract can confine it to the narrow
limits of religion alone, excluding the content of Indian culture and
heritage. It is difficult to appreciate how in the face of these decisions,
the term 'Hindutva' or 'Hinduism' per se, in the abstract, can be assumed to
mean and be equated with narrow fundamentalist Hindu religious bigotry..." </b>
The BJP's own articulation of 'Hindutva' is both pithy and sharp:
<b> "Hindutva or Cultural Nationalism presents the BJP's concept of Indian
nationhood. It must be noted that Hindutva is a nationalist, and not a
religious or theocratic, concept."
</b>
Yet, as has been evident during this summer's general election, events and
incidents have controverted this 'concept of Indian nationhood', and driven
voters away from the BJP, especially in urban India and among the middle
classes.
'Hindutva', as enunciated by the BJP, now carries less credibility as a
unifying force. On the contrary, it is seen as Hindu bigotry, fanaticism,
extremism and 'anti-modernism', and anti-social reform. The instinctive
liberal impulse of upwardly mobile Hindus in towns and cities rejects this
<b>perception</b> of 'Hindtuva'. We could argue that the perception is flawed and
not grounded in reality, but as we all know, perception matters more than
reality, especially in politics.
The following have undoubtedly contributed towards the creation of this
perception:
. The anti-Christian violence in Orissa and Karnataka; <i>{I guess, murdering the swami was ok and subversion of a nation by changing demographics is also ok for liberal hindus - HINOs? but it is the hindus' reaction we have to squelch and feel apologetic for?}</i>
. The unrestrained utterances of Hindu organisations like the Bajrang Dal
and the VHP, among many others.
. The moral policing of dubious outfits like Sri Ram Sene which promote
lumpen power.
. The harsh talk of neophytes like Varun Gandhi.
. The inability of the BJP to respond in a cogent and coherent manner when
under attack from the 'secular' camp.
. The failure to strategise how to achieve political objectives and adopt
tactics accordingly.
. The BJP's proclivity to fudge issues rather than confront them.
. The confusion that has replaced clarity within the party about 'Hindutva',
with diverse opinions diluting its essence and disfiguring the concept.
. The absence of any strucured consultative process between the BJP and the
various units of the 'Sangh Parivar'.
. The subversion of organisational interests to promote individual
interests.
It could well be asked that if Hindus want grievances related to their
faith, <b>for instance the threat to Hinduism and Hindu society posed by
missionaries of the Christian church, whom should they turn to if not the
BJP? And, should the BJP shy away from speaking up for Hindu society?</b>
This is no doubt a tricky question. <b>If the BJP is indifferent to Hindu angst
and anger, it will be seen by Hindus as being no different from the
'secular' political class. But if it actively involves itself in the
redressal process, it will rile liberal Hindu sensitivities. </b> <i>{I really would like to know who is and what makes up a "liberal hindu"}
</i>
Nor can the BJP just disown fraternal organisations like the VHP and the
Bajrang Dal. Those who prescribe this course forget that at the grassroots
level, there is tremendous interlinking between the supporters of the
various Sangh organisations. {Amen to that. There is lot of truth to this}
Which brings us to three related questions:
Does a possible solution lie in repudiating 'Hindutva' and retaining
'Integral Humanism' as the core ideological belief of the party, as is being
suggested by some? <i>{This is what 4M axis wants and also by Arun Jaitley}</i>
Or, should the BJP reframe the concept of 'Hindutva' and make it more
meaningful for our times without 'secularising' the party? <i>{This wil be fun to watch to even attempt it}</i>
Or, should the BJP revisit both 'Integral Humanism' [conceptualised in a
particular social, political and economic context that does not obtain any
more] and 'Hindutva' [similarly formulated in a particular social/political
situation that no longer exists], cull out the most redeeming features of
both, and draft a new charter to guide the party in the next decade?
I personally feel the time has come to opt for the third course of action.
[My Sunday column in the Pioneer.] If adopted, it will ensure greater
clarity, help purge the party of its gathered malcontents and give it a 'new
look' with which 'new India' can connect.
<b>The BJP would be reduced to nothing without an ideology of its own that is
uniquely different from what is espoused by others. But ideology must lie at
the core of a grand political strategy, </b>which is different from what the
Americans refer to as 'the vision thing' and of which some in the BJP (the
courtiers) are enamoured because it promotes individuals over organisation.
Can the BJP come up with a grand political strategy in the next five years,
more precisely, by 2014?
The answer to this question is linked to the issue of ideology. One without
the other is meaningless, if not impossible.
What do you think?
<b>Without ideology, BJP is nothing </b>
Kanchan Gupta / Analysis
The responses to my last post have been extremely useful; they have helped
clear doubts in my mind. Scintillating debate, even when it gets sharp, is
always welcome.
The rise of the BJP between 1989 and 1998 was directly linked to assertive
Hindu expectations articulated by an assertive Hindu leadership. These can
be briefly summed up as:
. <b>Political:</b> Hindus had begun to tire of Congress's 'pseudo-secularism';
deep within them, Indians nurse a concept of nationhood whose defining
contours are Hindu. When I say Hindu, it is not religion specific but
culture and civilisation specific. The Ram Janmabhoomi agitation found a
resonance across the country because it became a symbol of both bruised
Hindu pride and an opportunity to correct a historical wrong. We could
debate the merits of such perceived hurt and grievance, but that is not
really relevant; what is relevant is that people saw it that way.
<b>. Social: </b>VP Singh's divisive Mandal politics had left middle India aghast
and angry. Since anti-Congress feelings were still high, people turned to
the BJP for succour. 'Hindutva' was seen as a unifying force.
<b>. Economic:</b> With the world moving towards market economy, middle India was seeking liberation from the statist economic control-and-command structure
that had stifled enterprise and restricted growth as well as wealth
generation for more than four decades. On this front, too, the BJP offered
an alternative economic policy and programme, based on deregulation and
reform.
These coalesced into a burst of support for the BJP, taking it to power in
1998. What also helped was the spectre of political instability and
Congress's inability to get its act together during the intervening years
between the 1996 and 1998 general elections.
This tectonic shift in voter preference towards the BJP would not have been
possible without the party's tactical adoption of 'Hindutva' as a component
of its ideology (or, as the BJP calls it, 'political philosophy') along with
'Integral Humanism', which the party says "gives us a broader and modern
perspective and tries to unshackle our minds from parochial concerns and
past baggage".
Deendayal Upadhyaya's enunciation on this aspect was explicit:
âWe have to discard the status quo mentality and usher in a new era.
Indeed our efforts at reconstruction need not be clouded by prejudice or
disregard for all that is inherited from our past. On the other hand, there
is no need to cling to past institutions and traditions which have outlived
their utility."
For the BJP, "A nation state based on Integral Humanism is a secular,
non-theocratic state. Also, it repudiates statism and stands up for
decentralisation to uphold the twin pillars of individual freedom and
national interest."
To this was added 'Hindutva' in the late-1980s, strengthening the Hindu
ethos of the party, making it more credible as a representative of Hindu
aspirations, and setting it apart from the 'secular' centrist and
left-of-centre political parties, especially the Congress.
Criticism of 'Hindutva' as a 'communal' idea was blunted by the Supreme
Court's Constitution Bench judgement which, essentially, <b>said that
'Hindutva' was/is India's 'way of life' and rooted in its civilisational and
cultural history.</b>
The Constitution Bench said,
<b> "No precise meaning can be ascribed to the terms 'Hindu', 'Hindutva' and
'Hinduism'; and no meaning in the abstract can confine it to the narrow
limits of religion alone, excluding the content of Indian culture and
heritage. It is difficult to appreciate how in the face of these decisions,
the term 'Hindutva' or 'Hinduism' per se, in the abstract, can be assumed to
mean and be equated with narrow fundamentalist Hindu religious bigotry..." </b>
The BJP's own articulation of 'Hindutva' is both pithy and sharp:
<b> "Hindutva or Cultural Nationalism presents the BJP's concept of Indian
nationhood. It must be noted that Hindutva is a nationalist, and not a
religious or theocratic, concept."
</b>
Yet, as has been evident during this summer's general election, events and
incidents have controverted this 'concept of Indian nationhood', and driven
voters away from the BJP, especially in urban India and among the middle
classes.
'Hindutva', as enunciated by the BJP, now carries less credibility as a
unifying force. On the contrary, it is seen as Hindu bigotry, fanaticism,
extremism and 'anti-modernism', and anti-social reform. The instinctive
liberal impulse of upwardly mobile Hindus in towns and cities rejects this
<b>perception</b> of 'Hindtuva'. We could argue that the perception is flawed and
not grounded in reality, but as we all know, perception matters more than
reality, especially in politics.
The following have undoubtedly contributed towards the creation of this
perception:
. The anti-Christian violence in Orissa and Karnataka; <i>{I guess, murdering the swami was ok and subversion of a nation by changing demographics is also ok for liberal hindus - HINOs? but it is the hindus' reaction we have to squelch and feel apologetic for?}</i>
. The unrestrained utterances of Hindu organisations like the Bajrang Dal
and the VHP, among many others.
. The moral policing of dubious outfits like Sri Ram Sene which promote
lumpen power.
. The harsh talk of neophytes like Varun Gandhi.
. The inability of the BJP to respond in a cogent and coherent manner when
under attack from the 'secular' camp.
. The failure to strategise how to achieve political objectives and adopt
tactics accordingly.
. The BJP's proclivity to fudge issues rather than confront them.
. The confusion that has replaced clarity within the party about 'Hindutva',
with diverse opinions diluting its essence and disfiguring the concept.
. The absence of any strucured consultative process between the BJP and the
various units of the 'Sangh Parivar'.
. The subversion of organisational interests to promote individual
interests.
It could well be asked that if Hindus want grievances related to their
faith, <b>for instance the threat to Hinduism and Hindu society posed by
missionaries of the Christian church, whom should they turn to if not the
BJP? And, should the BJP shy away from speaking up for Hindu society?</b>
This is no doubt a tricky question. <b>If the BJP is indifferent to Hindu angst
and anger, it will be seen by Hindus as being no different from the
'secular' political class. But if it actively involves itself in the
redressal process, it will rile liberal Hindu sensitivities. </b> <i>{I really would like to know who is and what makes up a "liberal hindu"}
</i>
Nor can the BJP just disown fraternal organisations like the VHP and the
Bajrang Dal. Those who prescribe this course forget that at the grassroots
level, there is tremendous interlinking between the supporters of the
various Sangh organisations. {Amen to that. There is lot of truth to this}
Which brings us to three related questions:
Does a possible solution lie in repudiating 'Hindutva' and retaining
'Integral Humanism' as the core ideological belief of the party, as is being
suggested by some? <i>{This is what 4M axis wants and also by Arun Jaitley}</i>
Or, should the BJP reframe the concept of 'Hindutva' and make it more
meaningful for our times without 'secularising' the party? <i>{This wil be fun to watch to even attempt it}</i>
Or, should the BJP revisit both 'Integral Humanism' [conceptualised in a
particular social, political and economic context that does not obtain any
more] and 'Hindutva' [similarly formulated in a particular social/political
situation that no longer exists], cull out the most redeeming features of
both, and draft a new charter to guide the party in the next decade?
I personally feel the time has come to opt for the third course of action.
[My Sunday column in the Pioneer.] If adopted, it will ensure greater
clarity, help purge the party of its gathered malcontents and give it a 'new
look' with which 'new India' can connect.
<b>The BJP would be reduced to nothing without an ideology of its own that is
uniquely different from what is espoused by others. But ideology must lie at
the core of a grand political strategy, </b>which is different from what the
Americans refer to as 'the vision thing' and of which some in the BJP (the
courtiers) are enamoured because it promotes individuals over organisation.
Can the BJP come up with a grand political strategy in the next five years,
more precisely, by 2014?
The answer to this question is linked to the issue of ideology. One without
the other is meaningless, if not impossible.
What do you think?